across Northern Asia Minor from Angora been adhered to, the interior
would have been kept free, and it is likely that a favorite English plan
(afterward taken up also by the French Government) to run a railway from
the Gulf of Alexandretta via Aleppo and the Euphrates to Bagdad might
have been carried out. * * * The railway projects of Asia Minor and
Syria might have remained purely commercial undertakings of great
cultural value. The political aspect of railway plans in the Near East
might have been permanently kept in the background.
The stumbling block that prevented the execution of the original plan
was--strangely enough--Russia. Her opposition to the northern route
brought about the change. Russia had plans of her own in Asia Minor and
in the lands to the east beyond. In the last two decades of the
nineteenth century Russia, fearing the extension of English power in
the Far East, cast her eyes about for securing zones of influence that
might bring her into touch with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
She secured the co-operation of France in 1891, and it is both
interesting and instructive to note that the Franco-Russian alliance was
originally directed against England rather than against Germany. * * *
She exacted from Turkey the Black Sea Basin agreement, formally
sanctioned in 1900, which reserved to her the right to construct
railroads in Northern Asia Minor. * * * At all events, her opposition
was strong enough to secure a modification of the plan of the Bagdad
Railway in favor of the transverse route, which, as it turned out, gave
Germany a tremendous advantage over all rivals, though it also brought
on the opposition of England. Russia was not prepared to allow any
further advantage to be gained in the East by England. On the whole she
still preferred Germany.
[England's opposition to Germany's new railway scheme became acute when
it was publicly announced that the road was not to terminate at Bagdad,
or even at Basra, but to run on to a point "to be determined" on the
Persian Gulf. The Convention of 1902-3 made it evident that Germany had
stolen a march on England, and that the prestige of France, too, had
suffered. The favor shown to the German syndicate by the Turkish
Government was evident. The terms were indeed unprecedented. Says Dr.
Jastrow: "No wonder that there were great rejoicings in Germany when
they were announced and gnashing of teeth outside of Germany." With the
announcement of the 1902-3 concession and the formation of the Bagdad
Railway Company as a successor to the old Anatolian Company, the German
syndicate did offer English and French capitalists a share in the
enterprise, and insisted that the plan was "international." But the
"share" thus offered was merely assistance in financing what would
remain a German matter--inasmuch as Germany reserved the control in the
management's personnel. England and France therefore refused to
participate.]
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM
Von Jagow's Replies to the Prince's Revelations--Further German Comments
The revelations by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London at the
outbreak of the war, which were printed in the May number of CURRENT
HISTORY MAGAZINE, produced a profound impression throughout the world,
disclosing as they did the part played by the German Imperial Government
in starting the war. German officialdom at once attacked Lichnowsky,
compelling him to resign his rank and threatening him with trial for
treason. On April 27, 1918, the Prussian upper house decided to grant
the request of the First State Attorney of District Court No. 1 of
Berlin for authorization to undertake criminal proceedings against
Prince Lichnowsky. The State Attorney held that Prince Lichnowsky, in
communicating to third parties documents or their contents officially
intrusted to him by his superiors had infringed the secrecy incumbent on
him.
In referring to the prosecution of the Prince, Maximilian Harden, in a
May issue of the Zukunft, said:
"I will swear that there are dozens of men sitting there in these dark
war hours who have written and said similar things in sharper and more
bitter words." Herr Harden asked whether these would meet the same fate
if their papers were stolen and exposed in German shop windows. "Many a
trusted wife," he said, "must cry out in fear: 'But, you know, Ernst,
Adolf, and Klaus have spoken more desperately.'"
The chief theme of Lichnowsky's memorandum, the editor of Die Zukunft
asserts, was the danger to Germany of a too-close alliance with Vienna
and Budapest, of the flirtation with Poland, and his insistence upon the
necessity of friendly relations with a strong Russia. The German outcry
against Lichnowsky, however, gave foreign countries the impression that
the Prince had made fearfully damaging disclosures of Berlin's guilt.
The question of blame, he says, "reflected almost an identical
interpretation to that of our White Book, and a cool head would not have
made a world sensation out of it." Harden concludes by saying that an
ostracized Lichnowsky would become a power; but the Prussian Diet has no
sense of humor.
In the May CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE an abridged version of the first
reply of former Foreign Secretary von Jagow to Prince Lichnowsky was
printed, but the document is of such importance that a translation in
its entirety is herewith given.[4]
[Footnote 4: The full text of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum, with the
replies of Herr von Jagow, the Mühlon letter, comments of the German
press, and other matter, has been published in a separate forty-page
pamphlet by The Current History Magazine.]
Von Jagow's Two Replies to Lichnowsky
Practically coincident with the giving out for publication on March 19,
through the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bureau, of an account of a
discussion in the Main Committee of the Reichstag of the memorandum of
the former Ambassador at London, together with substantial excerpts from
the main chapters of his work, the German Government got in touch with
Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the war
began, and asked him to write an article calculated to counteract the
effect of the Lichnowsky revelations. Herr von Jagow hastened to accede
to this request, but he merely made matters worse for the German
Government by practically admitting the correctness of Prince
Lichnowsky's assertion that England did not want war and that Berlin was
aware of this.
Copies of German newspapers received here show that, while the journals
of all factions were practically of one mind in reproaching the German
Foreign Office for its lack of diplomatic ability, the Pan-German and
militarist organs laid special stress upon the implication in the von
Jagow article that Germany might have been willing to drop its alliance
with Austria if it could have been sure of contracting one with England,
and the Liberal and Socialist papers declared that it was no use
insisting any longer that Great Britain was guilty of the wholesale
bloodshed of the world war, and that now nothing really stood in the way
of moving for a peace by agreement.
These comments were so sharp on both sides that Herr von Jagow was soon
moved to write another article defending his reply to Prince Lichnowsky
and arguing that his statements regarding the Triple Alliance could by
no means be interpreted as meaning that he would have been willing to
abandon Austria-Hungary in favor of Great Britain. In this article,
which was first printed in the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, von Jagow
says he cannot understand how these statements can be taken to mean that
he was an opponent of the alliance with Austria and was considering a
choice between Austria and England. He proceeds to defend his own policy
by reference to the fact that Bismarck was not content with the Triple
Alliance on the one hand, and the famous "Reinsurance Treaty" with
Russia on the other hand, but in 1887 deliberately promoted agreements
between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and England, with the object of
"bringing England into a closer relationship to the Central European
league and making her share its burdens." Bismarck's policy relieved
Germany of some of her obligations, because "Austria-Hungary, supported
by Italy and England, held the balance against Russia."
Then, as The London Times points out, carefully avoiding the history of
the present Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's policy and abandonment of
the "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia, von Jagow defends his attempts to
make British policy serve Germany's purposes. It was "because of the
isolation of the Triple Alliance, which had come about in the course of
years," that von Jagow "pursued a rapprochement with England." He
did so, "not with any idea of putting England in the place of
Austria-Hungary, but in order, by disposing of the Anglo-German
antagonism, to move England to a different orientation of her policy."
Germany "could not count upon Italy," and wanted other assistance in
upholding Austria-Hungary in the Balkans against Russia. Herr von Jagow
proceeds:
"The combination of England would have relieved us of the necessity of
taking: our stand alone, when the case arose, for Austria-Hungary
against Russia. As was effected by the agreements of 1887, a part
of our obligations would have been laid upon other shoulders. It is in
this sense that I spoke of the possibility of the loosening and the
dissolution of old unions which no longer satisfy all the conditions.
"The alliance with Austria-Hungary was the cornerstone of Bismarckian
policy, and that it had to remain. The expansion of the alliance into
the Triple Alliance, by taking in Italy, was a means of supplementing
the Central European grouping of the powers; it was an 'auxiliary
structure,' by means of which Bismarck aimed at a further guarantee of
peace, especially as he intended thereby to check Italy's Irredentist
policy. Threads then ran to England via Italy. These threads gave way
later, and this caused a considerable change in the attitude of Italy.
Friendly to England
"A friendly attitude on the part of England toward the Triple
Alliance--what Professor Hermann Oncken calls the moral extension of the
Triple Alliance over the Channel--was the aim of our policy, and in this
we were sure of the complete accord of our allies. I never thought that
the agreements about Bagdad and the colonies would mean an immediate
alteration of England's course in European policy. These agreements were
to prepare the way for this change of course. I was under no illusions
about the difficulties which would still have to be overcome. But
difficulties, and even resistance on the part of public opinion in one's
own country, cannot prevent us from following a road that is seen to be
right. The league between Germany and Austria-Hungary, supported by
friendship with England, would have created a peace bloc of unassailable
strength. The increasing Irredentism of Italy, her friction with Austria
on the Adriatic, and the Russophile and also Irredentist tendencies of
Rumania, would have lost their importance. Then, in given circumstances,
the Triple Alliance treaty might have been modified. The union with
England would also have secured us against Russian aggression, and the
obligations imposed upon us by our alliance would thereby have been
diminished.
"The road to this goal was long. The calm development was crossed by the
Serajevo murders, and in the fateful hour of August, 1914, the English
Government--instead of keeping peace--preferred to join in the war
against us. The English Government has probably since then been assailed
by serious doubts as to whether its choice was right. In any case, it
assumed a considerable share of the guilt for the bloodshed in Europe."
Herr von Jagow then denies that his scheme was inevitably doomed to
failure, saying that the policy of England is more liable to adaptation
and alteration than the policy of any other country, and that "more
far-seeing statesmen than those who were intrusted with the fortunes of
the Island Empire in 1914--think only of the Pitts, Disraelis, and
Salisburys--held other views about the orientation of England toward
Germany and Russia."
"As matters stand today, attempts to arrive at clearness about the
respective parts played by our enemies at the outbreak of the war, and
about the greater or less degrees of guilt belonging to each of them,
can have only a historical value. England has made the cause of our
enemies her own, and so she also shall be made to feel how Germany
defends herself against her enemies."
Full Text of von Jagow's First Reply
[Copyrighted]
_Herr von Jagow's first reply to Prince Lichnowsky, which was printed in
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 23, 1918, follows:_
"So far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from taking up
the statements concerning the policy obtaining before my administration
of the Foreign Office.
"I should like to make the following remarks about the individual points
in the article:
"When I was named State Secretary in January, 1913, I regarded a
German-English rapprochement as desirable and also believed an agreement
attainable on the points where our interests touched or crossed each
other. At all events, I wanted to try to work in this sense. A principal
point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question--the so-called
Bagdad policy--as this had become for us a question of prestige. If
England wanted to force us out there it certainly appeared to me that a
conflict could hardly be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it was
possible to do so, to negotiate over the Bagdad Railroad. We found a
favorable disposition on the part of the English Government, and the
result was the agreement that was almost complete when the world war
broke out.
Colonial Questions
"At the same time the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies that had
been begun by Count Metternich, (as German Ambassador at London,)
continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky were
under way. I intended to carve the way later for further negotiations
regarding other--for example, East Asiatic--problems, when what was in
my opinion the most important problem, that of the Bagdad Railroad,
should be settled, and an atmosphere of more confidence thus created. I
also left the naval problem aside, as it would have been difficult to
reach an early agreement over that matter, after past experiences.
"I can pass over the development of the Albanian problem, as it occurred
before my term of office began. In general, however, I would like to
remark that such far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as
Prince Lichnowsky proposes does not seem possible to me. It would have
contradicted the essential part of the alliance if we had completely
ignored really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had demanded that
Austria stand by us at Algeciras, and at that time Italy's attitude had
caused serious resentment among us. Russia, although she had no interest
at all in Morocco, also stood by France. Finally, it was our task, as
the third member of the alliance, to support such measures as would
render possible a settlement of the divergent interests of our allies
and avoid a conflict between them.
"It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue a 'triple alliance
policy' in matters where the interests of the allied powers touched each
other. Then Italy would have been driven entirely into line with the
Entente in questions of the Orient, and Austria handed over to the mercy
of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would thus have really gone to
pieces. And we, too, would not have been able to look after our
interests in the Orient, if we did not have some support. And even
Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had to represent great economic
interests right there. But today economic interests are no longer to be
separated from political interests.
"That the people 'in Petrograd wanted to see the Sultan independent' is
an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be able to prove; it
would contradict every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore,
had not had at our command the influence at Constantinople founded by
Baron Marschall, it would hardly have been possible for us to defend our
economic interests in Turkey in the desired way.
Russia and Germany
"When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that we only 'drove Russia, our
natural friend and best neighbor, into the arms of France and England
through our Oriental and Balkan policy' he is in conflict with the
historical facts. Only because Prince Gortschakoff [Russian Premier] was
guiding Russian policy toward a rapprochement with a France lusting for
revenge was Prince Bismarck induced to enter into the alliance with
Austria-Hungary; through the alliance with Rumania he barred an advance
of Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky condemns the basic
principles of Bismarck's policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Russia
went to pieces--Björki proves it--or remained ineffective, like the
so-called Potsdam agreement. Also, Russia was not always our 'best
neighbor.' Under Queen Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for
possession of East Prussia to extend her Baltic coasts and to insure her
domination of the Baltic. The Petrograd 'window' has gradually widened,
so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach
after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a field over which to send troops
against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Russian policy to an
ever greater degree, had positive anti-German tendencies.
"And we did not force Russia to drop 'her policy of Asiatic expansion,'
but only tried to defend ourselves against her encroachments in European
policy and her encircling of our Austro-Hungarian ally.
Grey Conciliatory
"Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [British Foreign Secretary] did we
want war to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our unhappy
experience at Algeciras, we agreed to a conference. The credit of an
'attitude of mediation' at the conference should not be denied Sir
Edward Grey; but that he 'by no means placed himself on the side of the
Entente' is, however, surely saying rather too much. Certainly he often
advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in Vienna) and found 'formulas
of agreement,' but in dealing with the other side he represented the
Entente, because he, no less than ourselves, neither would, nor could,
abandon his associates. That we, on the other hand, 'without exception,
represented the standpoint dictated to us from Vienna' is absolutely
false. We, like England, played a mediatory rôle, and also in Vienna
counseled far more yielding and moderation than Prince Lichnowsky
appears to know about, or even to suggest. And then Vienna made several
far-reaching concessions, (Dibra, Djakowa.) If Prince Lichnowsky, who
always wanted to be wiser than the Foreign Office, and who apparently
allowed himself to be strongly influenced by the Entente statesmen, did
not know this, he surely ought not to make any false assertions now! If,
to be sure, the degree of yielding that was necessary was reached in
Vienna, we also naturally had to represent the Austrian standpoint at
the conference. Ambassador Szögyeni himself was not one of the
extremists; in Vienna they were by no means always satisfied with his
attitude. That the Ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost every
day, constantly sounded the refrain of casus foederis is entirely
unknown to me. It certainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for some
time past had not been counted as a friend of Austria in Vienna. Still
complaints about him came to my ears oftener from the side of Marquis
San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] than from the side of Count
Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister.]
"King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari constituted a mockery of the entire
conference and a snub to all the powers taking part in it.
"Russia was by no means obliged 'to give way to us all along the line';
on the contrary, she 'advanced the wishes of Serbia' in several ways,
Serbia even receiving some cities and strips of territory that could
have been regarded as purely Albanian or preponderatingly so. Prince
Lichnowsky says that 'the course of the conference was a fresh
humiliation for the self-consciousness of Russia' and that there was a
feeling of resentment in Russia on that account. It cannot be the task
of our policy to satisfy all the unjustified demands of the exaggerated
self-consciousness of a power by no means friendly to us, at the cost of
our ally. Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our ally
certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky seems to wish, had flatly
taken the same stand as Russia, the result would have been a humiliation
for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnowsky
seems only anxious that Russia be not humiliated; a humiliation of
Austria is apparently a matter of indifference to him.
The "Wily" Venizelos
"When Prince Lichnowsky says that our 'Austrophilie' was not adapted to
'promote Russia's interests in Asia,' I don't exactly understand what
this means. Following a disastrous diversion toward East Asia--in the
Japanese war we had favored Russia without even being thanked for
it!--Russia again took up her policy directed toward the European Orient
(the Balkans and Constantinople) with renewed impulse, (the Balkan
Alliance, Buchlau, Iswolsky, &c.) [Iswolsky retired as Russian Foreign
Minister after Germany forced the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy
in 1909.]
"Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 'Ribbon of the Order of the Red
Eagle,' evidently knew how to throw a little sand into the eyes of our
Ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, always was
pro-Entente. His present attitude reveals his feelings as clearly as can
be. Herr Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward Petrograd.
"That Count Berchtold displayed certain inclinations toward Bulgaria
also in its differences with Rumania is true; that we 'naturally went
with him' is, however, entirely false. With our support, King Carol had
the satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended second Balkan war.] If,
therefore, in the case of the Bucharest peace, in which we favored the
wishes and interests of Rumania, which was allied to us, our policy
deviated somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet
certainly did not believe--as Prince Lichnowsky asserts--that it 'could
count upon our support in case of its revision.' That Marquis San
Giuliano 'is said to have warned us already in the Summer of 1913 from
becoming involved in a world war,' because at that time in Austria 'the
thought of a campaign against Serbia' had found entrance, is entirely
unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr von Tschirschky--who
certainly was rather pessimistic by nature--is said to have declared in
the Spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. Therefore, I was just
as ignorant of the 'important happenings' that Prince Lichnowsky here
suspects as he was himself! Such events as the English visit to
Paris--Sir Edward Grey's first to the Continent--surely must have been
known to the Ambassador, and we informed him about the secret
Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he did not want to believe
it!
"In the matter of Liman von Sander, [German reorganizer of the Turkish
Army,] we made a far-reaching concession to Russia by renouncing the
General's power of command over Constantinople. I will admit that this
point of the agreement over the military mission was not opportune
politically.
"When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having succeeded in giving the treaty
a form corresponding to our wishes, this credit must not be denied him,
although it certainly required strong pressure on several occasions to
induce him to represent some of our desires with more emphasis.
"When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received the authorization
definitely to conclude the treaty, after he previously asserts that 'the
treaty was consequently dropped,' this contains a contradiction which we
may let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky's assertion, however, that
we delayed publication because the treaty would have been 'a public
success' for him that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of insinuation
that can only be explained through his self-centred conception of
things. The treaty would have lost its practical and moral effect--one
of its main objects was to create a good atmosphere between us and
England--if its publication had been greeted with violent attacks upon
'perfidious Albion' in our Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. And
there is no doubt that, in view of our internal position at that time,
this is what the simultaneous publication of the so-called Windsor
Treaty would have caused. And the howl about English perfidy that the
internal contradiction between the text of the Windsor Treaty and our
treaty would doubtless have called forth would hardly have been stilled
in the minds of our public through the assurance of English bona fides.
"With justified precaution, we intended to allow the publication to be
made only at the proper moment, when the danger of disapproving
criticism was no longer so acute, if possible simultaneously with the
announcement of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the point of being
concluded. The fact that two great agreements had been concluded between
us and England would doubtless have materially favored their reception
and made it easier to overlook the aesthetic defects of the Portuguese
agreement. It was consideration for the effect of the agreement--with
which we wanted to improve our relations with England, not to generate
more trouble--that caused our hesitation.
"It is correct that--although in a secondary degree--consideration was
also taken of the efforts just then being made to obtain economic
interests in the Portuguese colonies, which the publication of the
agreement would naturally have made more difficult to realize. These
conditions Prince Lichnowsky may not have been able to perceive fully
from London, but he should have trusted in our objective judgment and
acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his lack of understanding with
suspicions and the interjection of personal motives. He certainly would
have found our arguments understood by the English statesmen themselves.
"The Ambassador's speeches aroused considerable adverse sentiment in
this country. It was necessary for the creation of a better atmosphere,
in which alone the rapprochement being worked for could flourish, that
confidence in our English policy and in our London Ambassador be spread
also among our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so
susceptible to public opinion, did not take this motive sufficiently
into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles.
The charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable
to be bothered with. I would only like to point out that Prince
Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the 'most important
things,' in so far as they were of value to his mission. On the
contrary, I gave the Ambassador much more general information than used
to be the custom. My own experiences as Ambassador induced me to do so.
But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely more upon his own
impressions and judgment than upon the information and advice of the
Central Office. To be sure, I did not always have either the motive or
the authority to impart the sources of our news. Here there were quite
definite considerations, particularly anxiety regarding the compromising
of our sources. The Prince's memorandum furnishes the best justification
for the caution exercised in this regard.
Defense of Archduke
"It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England
would protect France under all circumstances were not believed.
"At Knopischt, on the occasion of the visit of his Majesty the Kaiser
to the Archduke heir apparent, no plan of an active policy against
Serbia was laid down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the
champion of a policy leading to war for which he has often been taken.
During the London conference he advised moderation and the avoidance of
war.
"Prince Lichnowsky's 'optimism' was hardly justified, as he has probably
convinced himself since through the revelations of the Sukhomlinoff
trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as
said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical.
Unfortunately, the suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor and the
Under Secretary of State was well grounded. How does this agree with the
assertion that we, relying upon the reports of Count Pourtalès that
'Russia would not move under any circumstances,' had not thought of the
possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count
Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never made such reports.
Blame for Russia
"That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against the constant
provocations stirred up by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which reached
their climax in the outrage of Serajevo, we had to recognize as
justified. In spite of all the former settlements and avoidances of
menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at
the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and naturally ours
also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd,
continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the
existence of the Danube Monarchy. It must either put up with the
Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a quos ego, even at the risk of
war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had the intention been to
exclude the ultima ratio of the war in general, the alliance should not
have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military
preparations, (for instance, the extension of the railroads and forts in
Poland,) for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and
which would have been completed in a few years, were directed
principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the
aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming more evident from
day to day, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We
only decided to declare war on Russia in the face of the Russian
mobilization and to prevent a Russian invasion.
"I have not the letters exchanged with the Prince at hand--it was a
matter of private letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the abandonment of
Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty
obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of
England. If we abandoned our only reliable ally later we would stand
entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is likely that I
also wrote that 'Russia was constantly becoming more anti-German' and
that we must 'just risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, in
order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from
exposing his views also in London, may also have written that there
would probably be some 'bluster'; that 'the more firmly we stood by
Austria the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said already that our
policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war; certainly at
that time I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I
was fully aware of the very serious danger.
"We could not agree to the English proposal of a conference of
Ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic
defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb and, with her Balkan interests,
stood rather opposed to Austria. The 'intimacy of the Russo-Italian
relations' is admitted by Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only
feasible way of escape was a localization of the conflict and an
understanding between Vienna and Petrograd. We worked toward that end
with all our energy. That we 'insisted upon' the war is an unheard-of
assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of his
Majesty the Kaiser to the Czar and to King George, published in the
White Books--Prince Lichnowsky only cares to tell about 'the really
humble telegram of the Czar'--as well as the instruction we sent to
Vienna. The worst caricature is formed by the sentence:
"'When Count Berchtold finally decided to come around we answered the
Russian mobilization, after Russia had vainly negotiated and waited a
whole week, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.'
[In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow omits the former's statement that
Count Berchtold "hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from
Berlin."]
"Wrong" Conclusions
"Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobilized Russian Army was
streaming over our borders? The reading of the Sukhomlinov trial has
probably given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of 'Oh si tacuisses!' On
July 5 I was absent from Berlin. The declaration that I was 'shortly
thereafter in Vienna' 'in order to talk everything over with Count
Berchtold' is false. I returned to Berlin on July 6 from my honeymoon
trip and did not leave there until Aug. 15, on the occasion of the
shifting of the Great Headquarters. As Secretary of State I was only
once in Vienna before the war, in the Spring of 1913.
"Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over the matter of the confusing
dispatch that he sent us on Aug. 1--at present I am not in possession of
the exact wording--as a 'misunderstanding' and even seems to want to
reproach us because 'in Berlin the news, without first waiting for the
conversation, was made the basis of a far-reaching action.' The
question of war with England was a matter of minutes, and immediately
after the arrival of the dispatch it was decided to make an
eleventh-hour attempt to avoid war with France and England. His Majesty
sent the well-known telegram to King George. The contents of the
Lichnowsky dispatch could not have been understood any other way than we
understood it.
"Objectively taken, the statement of Prince Lichnowsky presents such an
abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is hardly a wonder
that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. The reproach that we sent
an ultimatum on July 30 to Petrograd merely because of the mobilization
of Russia and on July 31 declared war upon the Russians, although the
Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as
negotiations were under way, thus willfully destroying the possibility
of a peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque effect. In concluding,
the statement seems almost to identify itself with the standpoint of our
enemies.
"When the Ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified
itself 'with Turks and Austro-Magyars' and 'subjected itself to the
viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest,' he may be suitably answered that he
saw things only through London spectacles and from the narrow point of
view of his desired rapprochement with England à tout prix. He also
appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much
more against us than against Austria.
"I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England,
because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape
from the unfavorable position in which we were placed by the unequal
division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia
and France insisted upon war. We were obligated through our treaty with
Austria, and our position as a great power was also threatened--hic
Rhodus, hic salta. But England, that was not allied in the same way with
Russia and that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding
the sparing of France and Belgium, seized the sword.
"In saying this, I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us
today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on
the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his
earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. But he had allowed
himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian
policy; he no longer found the way out, and he did not prevent the world
war--something that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with
the English people; Belgium had to serve as a battle cry.
"'Political marriages for life and death' are, as Prince Lichnowsky
says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation,
under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe
consists of coalitions that sometimes have led to the avoidance of
warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening and
dissolving of old alliances that no longer correspond to all conditions
is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the
object of the policy of a rapprochement with England. So long as this
policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not abandon the old
guarantees--even with their obligations.
"The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. In the Bosnian crisis
this had been luckily avoided, the same as at the London Conference. A
fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable for our position in
Europe and in the world. The prosperity of States, their political and
economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the
world.
"The personal attacks contained in the work, the unheard-of calumnies
and slanders of others, condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion
that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him,
Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed
hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.
"In closing, let us draw attention here to what Hermann Oncken has also
quoted in his work, 'The Old and New Central Europe,' the memorandum of
Prince Bismarck of the year 1879, in which the idea is developed that
the German Empire must never dare allow a situation in which it would
remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France,
side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been left in the
lurch by Germany."
German Comments on von Jagow's Views
In commenting upon Herr von Jagow's reply to Prince Lichnowsky, Georg
Bernhard, editor in chief of the Vossische Zeitung, took occasion to
re-emphasize his favorite theory of a rapprochement with Russia so as to
enable Germany to reduce Great Britain to the level of a second-class
power. In a long article, printed on March 31, Herr Bernhard asserted
that Prince Lichnowsky had been by no means alone in his policy of
seeking agreement with England as Herr von Jagow himself had admitted,
and that the German Foreign Office had seemed obsessed with the idea
that it was a question of a choice between Austria and England, when, in
reality, if the diplomats had wanted to pursue a good German policy and
at the same time be of service to Austria, they should have made it a
question of Russia or England and tried to establish good relations with
the former under all circumstances. After quoting von Jagow's remark
about the inadvisability of abandoning old alliances until new
constellations were attainable, Herr Bernhard said:
"We shall not go into the question here if, during this war, which
strains all the forces of the alliance to the utmost, a former German
Secretary of State should have written such sentences. It is
incomprehensible how they came from the pen of a sensible man--and Herr
von Jagow is such a one. And it is still more incomprehensible how they
were able to escape the attention of the Foreign Office. Fortunately,
they can no longer do any harm now, as through our deeds we have
demonstrated our loyalty to the Austrians and Hungarians better than it
can be done by any amount of talk."
In an earlier editorial Herr Bernhard referred as follows to von Jagow's
admission that he did not believe that England had laid all the mines
leading to the world war:
"In spite of all experiences, therefore, here is another--almost
official--attempt made to represent the war as merely the result of the
aggressive desires of France and Russia. As if France (through whose
population went a shudder of fear as it saw itself on the edge of the
abyss of war) would ever have dared to go to war without knowing that
England stood back of her! And were Edward's trips to Paris without any
effect upon our diplomats? Has it not also finally become sufficiently
well known through the reports of the Belgian Ambassador how France
repeatedly tried to escape from the alliance, but was always again
forced into the net by Nicolson, [former British Under Secretary for
Foreign Affairs,] through Edward? The Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann
Hollweg, himself admitted in the Reichstag the harmful rôle of King
Edward. Only he, as probably did Herr von Jagow also, thought that
Edward's death put an end to the policy of encircling. But this policy
of encircling--and here is where the mistake entailing serious
consequences is made by our diplomats--was not at all merely a personal
favorite idea of Edward VII., but the continuation of the traditional
English policy toward the strongest Continental power."
Thanks for Hindenburg
Herr Bernhard then asserted that England desired the publication of the
proposed Anglo-German treaty regarding the division of the Portuguese
colonies into spheres of economic interests so as to make Portugal's
eventual support of the Entente all the surer, and continued:
"And Lichnowsky wanted to fall into this trap set by England. It was
avoided by the Foreign Office more through instinct than sagacity. And
these diplomats have guided Germany's destiny before and during the war!
Let us give the warmest thanks to Hindenburg because his sword has now,
it is to be hoped, put an end once for all to the continued spinning of
plans by such and similar diplomats even during the war."
Theodor Wolff, editor in chief of the Berliner Tageblatt, probably the
leading organ of the German business elements and liberal politicians
who were opposed to the war from the beginning, and who still hope for a
negotiated peace that will facilitate an early resumption of trade
relations with Great Britain and the rest of the allies, expressed the
hope that the "battle of minds will finally create a clearer
atmosphere," and then remarked:
"Only quite incidentally would I like to allow myself to direct the
attention of Herr von Jagow to an erroneous expression that appears
twice in his reply. Herr von Jagow writes: 'We informed him [Lichnowsky]
of the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement,' and in another place: 'The
secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement might also have made him a little
more skeptical.' Only the day before, on Saturday, it was said in an
article of the Norddeutshe Allgemeine Zeitung, also directed against
Lichnowsky: 'Negotiations were pending with Russia over a naval
agreement that the Prince characteristically passes over in silence.' In
reality, although hasty historians also speak without further ceremony
of a treaty, it is manifest that no Anglo-Russian agreement existed;
there was merely a Russian proposal, and the most that can be said is
that 'negotiations were pending.' * * *
"His [von Jagow's] remark, 'It is not true that the Foreign Office did
not believe the reports that England would protect France under all
circumstances,' is in contradiction with the well-known report of the
then English Ambassador, Goschen, which describes into what surprise and
consternation Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow were thrown by the
news of the English declaration of war."
In beginning his comment upon von Jagow, Herr Wolff threw a little more
light upon the way in which Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum "for the
family archives" got into more or less general secret circulation in
Germany before it was printed by the Swedish Socialist paper Politiken
last March, and also described the character of Captain Beerfelde, the
member of the German General Staff who, according to some cabled
reports, is to be tried for his part in distributing copies of the
memorandum.
Herr Wolff said that Prince Lichnowsky had had five or six copies made,
of which he had sent one to Wolff, one to Albert Ballin, head of the
Hamburg-American line, and another to Arthur von Gwinner, head of the
Deutsche Bank. All of these persons carefully hid the "dangerous gift"
in the deepest recesses of their writing desks, but a fourth copy went
astray and got into hands for which it had not been intended, and from
these hands passed into those of still another individual. Then the
editor wrote:
How Manuscript Became Public
"I made the acquaintance some years before the war of the officer who
obtained the memorandum 'on loan,' and sent copies of it to State
officials and politicians. He belongs to an old noble family, was
treated with sympathy by General von Moltke, the Chief of the General
Staff, occupied himself enthusiastically with religious philosophy or
theosophy, and was a thoroughly manly but mystic person. * * * After
hard war experiences, he felt the longing to serve the dictates of peace
with complete devotion, and he surrendered himself to a pacifism which
is absolutely incompatible with the uniform.
"Late one evening he visited me in a state of great excitement, and told
me that he had manifolded a memorandum by Prince Lichnowsky which had
been lent to him, and that, without asking the author, he had sent it to
the 'leading men.' It was impossible to convince him by any logic or on
any grounds of reason that his action was wrong, senseless, and harmful.
He was a Marquis Posa, or, still more, a Horatius Cocles, who, out of
love for Rome or for mankind, sprang into the abyss."
The Berlin Vorwärts, the leading organ of the pro-Government Socialists,
began its editorial on the von Jagow reply by remarking that the article
of the former State Secretary for Foreign Affairs was hardly calculated
to convince the reader that Prince Lichnowsky's self-esteem was the only
thing that had had a "painful effect" upon the German people in July,
1914, and since that time. It then said that "Herr von Jagow agrees with
Lichnowsky upon the decisive point!" quoted what von Jagow had said
about his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement, and continued:
"These words show that, in 1913, the Wilhelmstrasse and the London
Embassy were in the complete harmony of common beliefs and intentions.
Herr von Jagow, exactly like Lichnowsky, exactly like Bethmann, and
exactly like Wilhelm II., believed in the possibility of creating 'an
atmosphere of confidence,' as Jagow says, between Germany and England,
through a series of agreements, of which those regarding the Bagdad
Railroad and Africa were to have been the first."
Vorwärts then proceeded to point out that the Albanian crisis had
strengthened this faith instead of weakening it, took up von Jagow's
reasons for Germany's refusal to have the proposed Anglo-German
agreement on the Portuguese African colonies published, and exclaimed:
"What a fear of Tirpitz! A disturbing of the new relations through his
intrigues and the howling of his jingo press was to be avoided through
an affectation of secrecy. But three weeks later the war with England
was here and the Pan-German sheets welcomed 'the longed-for day!' What
had happened in the meantime? Of course, 'perfidious Albion' (even Jagow
puts quotation marks on these words) had in the meantime thrown off the
mask and revealed her perfidy! Let's hear what--after Lichnowsky--Herr
von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in July, 1914, has to
say about it!"
Then Vorwärts quoted Jagow's description of how the war began, and went
on:
"All that remains of the accusations against the English Government is
that it did not prevent the world war, 'although it could have done so.'
Now Herr von Jagow also did not prevent the world war, but he must
certainly be acquitted of the charge that he could have prevented it. He
really could not, and so an emphatic statement of inability is the best
excuse for him and his fellow-disputants.
"Let us establish the facts. England did not desire the war; she merely
did not prevent it. The war was not popular in England; it also was not
popular in Russia and France. But it has become popular. The whole
world--right away across the Atlantic and the Pacific--is united in
hatred against us. We, however, have for almost four years been
inoculated with the view that 'England laid all the mines which caused
the war'--a view which the Secretary of State, in accordance with the
evidence of the Ambassador, has now declared to be false! It is,
however, by this false view that the whole war policy of the German
Empire has been directed--from the declaration of unrestricted submarine
warfare, which brought us war with America, down to those Chancellor
speeches which say that Belgium must not again become England's area of
military concentration.
"If all the parties concerned were convinced that the belief in
England's guilt is a fiction, why did they feed this belief, and why did
they pursue a policy which was based upon it? They ought rather to have
appointed to the Chancellorship Tirpitz, who, perhaps, believes what he
says. Instead of that, a policy of fear of Tirpitz has been pursued.
Sometimes a policy against Tirpitz has been attempted, but it has always
been reversed at decisive moments, out of fear of the nationalistic
terror.
"This fear was, perhaps, not entirely unfounded, for agitation is
unscrupulous. The older ones among us still remember very well 'an
Englishwoman' who was very unpopular in many circles, but this
Englishwoman was the mother of the German Kaiser. No doubt there was no
more convenient method for the Government to guard the dynasty than for
it to take part in, or at least to tolerate, the agitation against the
English. This was the only way of preventing the agitation from turning
ultimately against the wearer of the German imperial crown. But ought
such intimate considerations to have been permitted to play a part when
the fate of the nations was at stake?
"Let us put an end to this! At this moment we are in a battle which may
be decisive and which is going in favor of the empire. But even after
this battle we shall possess neither the possibility nor the moral right
to treat our opponent according to the principle of 'With thumbs in his
eyes and knee on his breast.' Even after the greatest military successes
there exists the necessity for political negotiation. It will be easier
for us to enter into this negotiation after the poisonous fog of the war
lies shall have lifted. Now that Herr von Jagow has cleared up the rôle
played by England at the beginning of the war, there is nothing in the
way of the fulfillment of the promise made by Bethmann to 'make good the
wrong committed against Belgium'!
"If it is perhaps true that everything Wilhelm II., Bethmann, von Jagow,
and Lichnowsky thought was true up to three weeks before the outbreak of
the war was false, then let the mistake be acknowledged and the
conservative Pan-Germans be put openly in the Government, so that they,
both within and without, may complete the work of a peace by force. But
if this is neither desirable nor possible, then there is nothing left to
do but to take a decided step ahead. For the German people cannot be
satisfied with the methods of governing exercised before and during the
war. * * * The German people can only endure after the war as a
peace-loving nation that governs itself."
Lichnowsky's Testimony as to Germany's Long Plotting for Domination
By H. Charles Woods, F. R. G. S.
To a Britisher who has followed the trend of events in the Near East,
and who has witnessed the gradual development of German intrigues in
that area, there has never been published a document so important and so
condemnatory of Germany as the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky.
On the one hand, the memorandum of the Kaiser's ex-Ambassador in London
proves from an authoritative enemy pen that, practically ever since the
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and particularly from the time of the
accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888, the Germans have
carefully prepared the way for the present war, and that during this
period they have consistently turned their attention toward the East and
toward the development of the Mitteleuropa scheme. And on the other side
it indicates, if indeed any indication were still required, that the
so-called rivalry existing between England and Germany prior to the war
arose not from any desire on the part of Great Britain to stand in the
way of the development of legitimate German interests in the Balkans and
in Asia Minor, but from the unwillingness of the Government of Berlin to
agree to any reasonable settlement of the many all-important questions
connected with these regions.
Although for years the Germans had been intriguing against the Triple
Entente, Prince Lichnowsky, a man possessed of personally friendly
feelings for England, was sent to London in order to camouflage the real
designs of the enemy and to secure representation by a diplomatist who
was intended to make good, and who, in fact, did make a high position
for himself in British official and social circles. The appointment
itself raises two interesting questions. In the first place, while this
is not stated in the memorandum, it is clear that, whereas Baron
Marschall von Bieberstein was definitely instructed to endeavor to make
friends with England and to detach her from France and Russia, or, if
this were impossible, to bring about war at a convenient time for
Germany, Prince Lichnowsky's task was somewhat different. Kept at least
more or less in the dark as to German objects, the Ambassador, who
arrived in London when the Morocco crisis of 1911 was considered at an
end, instead of being intrusted with the dual objects of his
predecessor, was clearly told to do, and did in fact do, his utmost to
establish friendly relations with England. The Berlin Government, on the
other hand, this time maintained in its own hands the larger question of
the making of war at what it believed, happily wrongly, to be a
convenient time for the Central Empires. In the second place, although
this, too, is not explained, various references made by Prince
Lichnowsky leave little doubt in the mind of the reader who knows the
situation existing at the German Embassy prior to the outbreak of war
that the Ambassador himself was aware that von Kühlmann--the Councilor
of Embassy--was, in fact, the representative of Pan-Germanism in
England, and that to this very able and expert intriguer was left the
work of trying to develop a situation which, in peace or in war, would
be favorable to the ruler and to the class whose views he voiced.
Phases of German Policy
To come down to the real subject of this article--the proof provided by
Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures of the long existence of the German
Mitteleuropa scheme and of the fact that Germany, and not Austria, made
this war, largely with the object of pushing through her designs in the
East--I propose to divide my remarks in such a way as to show that the
development of this scheme passed through three phases and in each case
to take what may be called a text from the document under discussion.
The first phase lasted from the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince
Lichnowsky says that Germany began the Triple Alliance policy, and more
definitely from the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in
1888 until the Balkan wars. While in using these expressions the
ex-Ambassador does not refer only to this period, he says: "The goal of
our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosporus," and "instead of
encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, we placed
ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors."
These words contain in essence and in tabulated form an explanation
(from the pen of a German whose personal and official positions enabled
him to know the truth) of the events which were in progress during this
period--events the full importance of which has often been refuted and
denied by those who refused to see that from the first the Kaiser was
obsessed by a desire for domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.
Indeed, from the moment of his accession the sentiments and views of the
German ruler became markedly apparent, for one year later his Majesty
paid the first of his carpet-bagging visits to Constantinople--a visit
more or less connected with the then recent grabbing of Haidar
Pasha-Ismid railway--now the first section of the Bagdad line--by the
Germans, and with the prolongation of that line to Angora as a German
concern, concessions secured by Mr. Kaula, acting on behalf of German
interests in 1888.
Preparing for Pan-German Project
Before and particularly after the appointment of Baron Marschall von
Bieberstein, who had then been a personal friend of the Kaiser for many
years, the enemy had been carefully preparing the way for the
realization of his Pan-German dreams in the Near and Middle East.
Although so far as the Balkan States were concerned, up to the outbreak
of the war the Kaiser endeavored to screen his intentions behind a
nominally Austrian program, for years he had really been making ready
his ground for the present occasion by military, political, and economic
penetration and by diplomatic intrigues destined to bring about a
favorable situation for Germany when the propitious moment for action
arrived. The power of von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the present
military system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils was gradually
increased until the Ottoman Army was finally placed completely under
Germanic control.
The Young Turkish revolution of 1908, which at first seemed destined
greatly to minimize German power at Constantinople, really resulted in
an opposite effect. Thus in spite of the effective support of England
for Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian crises of 1908 and 1909, a
gradual reaction subsequently set in. This was due in part to the
cleverness and regardlessness of von Bieberstein, and in part to the
circumstances arising out of the policy adopted by the Young Turks. For
instance, while the Germans ignored the necessity for reforms in the
Ottoman Empire so long as the Turks favored a Teutonic program, it was
impossible for the British Government or the British public to look with
favor upon a régime which worked to maintain the privileged position of
Moslems throughout the empire, which did nothing to punish those who
instigated the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909, and which
was intent upon disturbing the status quo in the Persian Gulf, and upon
changing the status of Egypt to the Turkish advantage.
The Turco-German Entente
Such indeed became the position that even the Turco-Italian war, which
might have been expected to shake the confidence of the Ottoman
Government in the bona fides of Italy's then ally, did not seriously
disturb the intimate relations which were gradually developing between
Berlin and Constantinople. Here again enemy intrigues were to the fore,
for in addition to Austria's objecting to the inauguration of any
Italian operations in the Balkans, the German Government, when the
position of its representative in Constantinople had become seriously
compromised as a result of the Italian annexation of Tripoli, which he
could not prevent, suddenly found it convenient to transfer von
Bieberstein to London and to replace him by another, perhaps less able,
but certainly none the less successful in retaining a grasp over
everything which took place in the Ottoman capital.
Before and particularly after the accession of the Kaiser to the throne,
the Germans gradually furthered their program by a system of railway
penetration in the East. In the late '60s Baron Hirsch secured a
concession for the construction of lines from Constantinople to what was
then the north-western frontier of Eastern Rumelia, and from Saloniki to
Mitrovitza, with a branch to Ristovatz on the then Serbian frontier. At
first these lines were under French influence, but they subsequently
became largely an Austrian undertaking, and considerably later the
Deutsche Bank secured a predominating proportion of the capital,
thus turning them practically into a German concern. In Asia Minor the
British, who were originally responsible for the construction of
railways, were gradually ousted, until, with the signature of the Bagdad
Railway agreement in 1903, the Germans dominated not only that line, but
also occupied a position in which, on the one hand, they had secured
control of many of its feeders, and, on the other, they had jeopardized
the future development and even the actual prosperity of those not
already in their possession.
Fruits of the Balkan Wars
This brings us up to the second phase in the development of
Pan-Germanism in the East--the period of the Balkan wars--toward two
aspects of which, as Prince Lichnowsky says, the Central Powers devoted
their attention. "Two possibilities for settling the question remained."
Either Germany left the Near Eastern problem to the peoples themselves
or she supported her allies "and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in
the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator." Once more, in the
words of the Prince himself, "The German Foreign Office very much
preferred the latter," and as a result supported Austria on the one hand
in her desire for the establishment of an independent Albania, and on
the other in her successful attempts to draw Bulgaria into the second
war and to prevent that country from providing the concessions which at
that time would have satisfied Rumania.
So far as the first of these questions--that connected with Albania--is
concerned, while the ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Austria was
actuated by the fact that she "would not allow Serbia to reach the
Adriatic," the actual creation of Albania was justified by the existence
of the Albanians as a nationality and by their desire for independent
government. Indeed, that the régime inaugurated by the great powers on
the east of the Adriatic, and particularly the Government of William of
Wied, proved an utter failure, was due not so much to what Prince
Lichnowsky describes as the "incapacity of existence" of Albania as to
the attitude of the Central Powers, and especially to that of Austria,
who, having brought the new State into being, at once worked for unrest
and for discord in the hope of being able to step in to put the house in
order when the propitious moment arrived.
Promoting Balkan Discord
The second direction in which the enemy devoted his energy was an even
larger, more German and more far-reaching one. "The first Balkan war led
to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which
has been identified with Turkey for many years," says the memorandum.
This at one time seemed destined to carry with it results entirely
disadvantageous to Germany. Thus, if the four States, Bulgaria, Greece,
Montenegro, and Serbia, who fought in the first war had continued on
good terms with one another, the whole balance of power in Europe would
almost certainly have been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Empire, which
prior to the outbreak of these hostilities was held by competent
authorities to be able to provide a vast army, then calculated to number
approximately 1,225,000 men, there would have sprung up a friendly group
of countries which in the near future could easily have placed in the
field a combined army approximately amounting to at least 1,000,000, all
told. As the interests of such a confederation, which would probably
have been joined by Rumania, would have been on the side of the Triple
Entente, the Central Powers at once realized that its formation or its
continued existence would mean for them not only the loss of the whole
of Turkey, but also the gain for their enemies of four or five allies,
most of whom had already proved their power in war.
German Power in Turkey
Between the Balkan wars and the outbreak of the European conflagration,
but as part of the former period, there occurred two events of
far-reaching significance. The first, which is mentioned by Prince
Lichnowsky, was the appointment of General Liman von Sanders practically
as Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army--an appointment which Mr.
Morgenthau rightly tells us constituted a diplomatic triumph for
Germany. When coupled with the fact that Enver Pasha--an out-and-out
pro-German--became Minister of War about the same time, the military
result of this appointment was an enormous improvement in the efficiency
of the Ottoman Army. Its political significance, on the other hand, was
due to the fact that it carried with it a far-reaching increase of
Pan-German influence at Constantinople.
The second event in progress during the interval of peace was connected
with the Aegean Islands question. Germany, having first utilized her
diplomatic influence in favor of Turkey, later on encouraged the
Government of that country in its continued protests against the
decision upon that question arrived at by the great powers. Not content,
however, with this, the Kaiser, who has now adopted the policy of
deportation in Belgium, in Poland, and in Serbia, definitely encouraged
the Turks in a like measure in regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor in
order to be rid of a hostile and Christian population when the time for
action arrived. That this encouragement was given was always apparent to
those who followed the course of events in 1914, but that it was
admitted by a German Admiral to Mr. Morgenthau constitutes a
condemnation the damning nature of which it is difficult to exaggerate.
THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS
[Illustration: [Dutch Cartoon]
Gott Mit Uns
_--Raemaekers in "Kultur in Cartoons."_]
[Illustration: [French Cartoon]
Signing the Russian Peace
_--From La Victoire, Paris._]
[Illustration: [Spanish Cartoon]
Peace in Russia
_--From Esquella, Barcelona._]
[Illustration: [Swiss Cartoon]
The Russian Revolution
_--From Nebelspalter, Zurich._
Bolshevist statesmanship.]
[Illustration: [English Cartoon]
A Threat from the Orient
_--From The Passing Show, London._
"Fancy meeting _you_!"]
[Illustration: [Italian Cartoon]
The Yellow Peril
_--From Il 420, Florence._
GERMANY: "After I have gathered all these eggs into one basket, this
fellow threatens to upset everything."]
[Illustration: [American Cartoon]
Camouflage
_--From The Indianapolis News._]
[Illustration: [Dutch Cartoon]
The Kaiser's "Alte Gott"
_--From De Notenkraker, Amsterdam._
"In thee I trust, confound me not."]
[Illustration: [French Cartoon]
_--From La Victoire, Paris._
"We have done all this: We will try to do better."--_General Foch._]
[Illustration: [American Cartoon]
Prussianism
_--From The Columbus Dispatch._
How can the world make peace with this thing?]
[Illustration: [American Cartoon]
Enough to Make a Dead Man Laugh
_--From The New York Herald._
WILHELM: "What have I not done to preserve the world from these
horrors?"]
[Illustration: [English Cartoon]
The End of Their Perfect Day
_--From The Passing Show, London._]
[Illustration: [American Cartoon]
_--G. M. Amato in Mid-Week Pictorial._]
[Illustration: [English Cartoon]
Postponed
"Papa, ven _are_ ve going to Calais?"
"Ach! Go and ask your grandpa!"
_--From Cassell's Saturday Journal, London._]
[Illustration: [American Cartoons]
Rough Going
_--San Francisco Chronicle._
Now You're Shoutin', Newton!
_--St. Louis Globe-Democrat._]
[Illustration: [American Cartoons]
Hohenzollern "Victory"
_--From The New York Times._
GERMANY: "How many will be left to enjoy the fruits of your 'victory'?"]
[Illustration: The Follies of 1918
_--Buffalo News._
WAR BULLETIN: "The Kaiser's six sons have suffered no casualties."]
[Illustration: So Far and No Further!
_--Central Press Association._]
[Illustration:[English Cartoon]
The Line Blocked
_--From News of the World, London._
THE ALL-HIGHEST: "Gott in Himmel! Hindenburg! What shall we do? I
promised to be in Paris on the 1st of April!"]
[Illustration: [Italian Cartoon]
German Peace Methods
_--From Il 420; Florence._
First disarm the people by false talk of no annexations, then, with a
dagger at their back, force them to sign peace on your own terms.]
[Illustration: [German-Swiss Cartoon]
On the Field of Honor
_--Nebelspalter, Zurich._
MARIANNE (France): "Wilson, my friend and protector, defend me!"]
[Illustration: [Italian Cartoon]
A French Counterattack
_--Il 420, Florence._
WAR BULLETIN: "The French violently attacked the weakest point on the
German front."]
[Illustration: [German Cartoon]
The Fate of Holland's Ships
_--Lustige Blätter, Berlin._
PROUD ALBION: "Here, give me that boat; I need it in my fight for the
'freedom of the seas'!"]
[Illustration: [Spanish Cartoon]
In Paris on Good Friday
_--Esquella, Barcelona._
JOAN OF ARC: "Father, forgive them; they know not what they do."]
[Illustration: [English Cartoon]
Germany's Lost Colonies
_--From The Passing Show, London._
PACIFIST: "Here! All that bag of yours must be handed over to a league
of nations for disposal."
JOHN BULL: "Oh, must it? And did your friend behind the hedge send you
to say that?"]
[Illustration: [American Cartoon]
Hitting Him Where He Lives
_--From The New York World._]
[Illustration: [Italian Cartoon]
The Battle of Picardy
--Il 420, Florence.
A second Verdun, with the same results for Germany.]
[Illustration: [American Cartoon]
On the Western Front
_--From The San Francisco Call-Post._
"Ach! How he iss gaining!"]
[Illustration: [English Cartoon]
A Test of Endurance
_--From The Passing Show, London._
How much longer?]
[Illustration: [Dutch Cartoon]
The New Waxworks Group for the German Museum
_--From De Amsterdammer, Amsterdam._]
[Transcriber's Note:
Italicized text denoted by underscores (_).
Apparent printer's errors corrected.
Spelling changes:
Page 383, "y" was changed to read "by." (a private letter written by
Emperor Charles to a relative...)
Page 383, "Guilford" was changed to read "Guildford." (At the time the
Guildford Castle was...)
Page 385, "langauge" was changed to read "language." ( including parts
of two fine bridges across the great river, a language largely Latin in
substance,)
Page 402, "altogther" was changed to read "altogether." (they spent the
night clearing out the enemy from the village, where he made a desperate
resistance, and brought back altogether something like 700 or 800
prisoners.)
Page 406, "fiften" was changed to read "fifteen." (made a general
counterattack and succeeded in advancing their line to a depth of about
fifteen hundred yards beyond the line of the three hills,...)
Page 427, "Austalians" was changed to read "Australians." (Germans gain
a foothold at several points midway between La Clytte and Voormezeele,
but are repulsed at other points along the line; Australians advance 500
yards near Sailly and 300 yards west of Morlancourt.)
Page 440, "skudskär" was changed to read "skudshär." (the head of the
Russian Bureau of Counterespionage in Finland spoke of the skudshär
as...)
Page 455, "miniumum" was changed to read "minimum." (The executive
organs of the Soviets of Workmen's Control have the right to fix the
minimum output of a given firm,..)
Page 468, "cinsiderably" was changed to read "considerably," (After
America's entry into the war material help for the Entente has not only
not increased, but has even decreased considerably.)
Page 468, "rogram" was changed to read "program." (Wilson's gigantic
armament program has brought about such...)
Page 470, "dur-" was changed to read "during." (In regard to the
sinkings in April, French official figures showed that the total losses
of allied and neutral ships, including those from accidents at sea
during the month, aggregated 381,631 tons.)]