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WORKS BY SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE
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[Illustration: _East View of_ Hell Gate, _in the Province of_ New York.
_W A Williams Del. 1725_
_1. Hoorns Hook._ _3. Hancock's Rock._ _5. Morrisena._ _7. Pinfold's
Place._ _9. The Pot._ _11. The Frying Pan._
_2. The Gridiron._ _4. The Mill Rock._ _6. Bahanna's Island._ _8.
Hallet's Point._ _10. The Hogs back._]
Decisive Events in American History
THE
CAMPAIGN OF TRENTON
1776-77
BY
SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE
BOSTON
LEE AND SHEPARD PUBLISHERS
10 MILK STREET
1895
COPYRIGHT, 1895, BY LEE AND SHEPARD
_All rights reserved_
THE CAMPAIGN OF TRENTON
PRESS OF
Rockwell and Churchill
BOSTON, U.S.A.
CONTENTS
PRELUDE 7
I--NEW YORK THE SEAT OF WAR 11
II--PLANS FOR DEFENCE 19
III--LONG ISLAND TAKEN 26
IV--NEW YORK EVACUATED 33
V--THE SITUATION REVIEWED 43
VI--THE RETREAT THROUGH THE JERSEYS 50
VII--LEE'S MARCH AND CAPTURE 59
VIII--THE OUTLOOK 68
IX--THE MARCH TO TRENTON 79
X--TRENTON 89
XI--THE FLANK MARCH TO PRINCETON 94
XII--AFTER PRINCETON 108
PRELUDE
Seldom, in the annals of war, has a single campaign witnessed such a
remarkable series of reverses as did that which began at Boston in
March, 1776, and ended at Morristown in January, 1777. Only by
successive defeats did our home-made generals and our rustic soldiery
learn their costly lesson that war is not a game of chance, or mere
masses of men an army.
Though costly, this sort of discipline, this education, gradually led to
a closer equality between the combatants, as year after year they faced
and fought each other. When the lesson was well learned our generals
began to win battles, and our soldiers to fight with a confidence
altogether new to them. In vain do we look for any other explanation of
the sudden stiffening up of the backbone of the Revolutionary army, or
of the equally sudden restoration of an apparently dead and buried cause
after even its most devoted followers had given up all as lost. As with
expiring breath that little band of hunted fugitives, miserable remnant
of an army of 30,000 men, turning suddenly upon its victorious pursuers,
dealt it blow after blow, the sun which seemed setting in darkness,
again rose with new splendor upon the fortunes of these infant States.
Certainly the military, political, and moral effects of this brilliant
finish to what had been a losing campaign, in which almost each
succeeding day ushered in some new misfortune, were prodigious. But
neither the importance nor the urgency of this masterly counter-stroke
to the American cause can be at all appreciated, or even properly
understood, unless what had gone before, what in fact had produced a
crisis so dark and threatening, is brought fully into light. Washington
himself says the act was prompted by a dire necessity. Coming from him,
these words are full of meaning. We realize that the fate of the
Revolution was staked upon this one last throw. If we would take the
full measure of these words of his, spoken in the fullest conviction of
their being final words, we must again go over the whole field, strewed
with dead hopes, littered with exploded reputations, cumbered with
cast-off traditions, over which the patriot army marched to its supreme
trial out into the broad pathway which led to final success.
The campaign of 1776 is, therefore, far too instructive to be studied
merely with reference to its crowning and concluding feature. In
considering it the mind is irresistibly impelled toward one central,
statuesque figure, rising high above the varying fortunes of the hour,
like the Statue of Liberty out of the crash and roar of the surrounding
storm.
Nowhere, we think, does Washington appear to such advantage as during
this truly eventful campaign. Though sometimes troubled in spirit, he is
always unshaken. Though his army was a miserable wreck, driven about at
the will of the enemy, Washington was ever the rallying-point for the
handful of officers and men who still surrounded him. If the cause was
doomed to shipwreck, we feel that he would be the last to leave the
wreck.
His letters, written at this trying period, are characterized by that
same even tone, as they disclose in more prosperous times. He does not
dare to be hopeful, yet he will not give up beaten. There is an
atmosphere of stern, though dignified determination about him, at this
trying hour, which, in a man of his admirable equipoise, is a thing for
an enemy to beware of. In a word, Washington driven into a corner was
doubly dangerous. And it is evident that his mind, roused to unwonted
activity by the gravity of the crisis, the knowledge that all eyes
turned to him, sought only for the opportune moment to show forth its
full powers, and by a conception of genius dominate the storm of
disaster around him.
Washington never claimed to be a man of destiny. He never had any
nicknames among his soldiers. Napoleon was the "Little Corporal,"
"Marlborough" "Corporal John," Wellington the "Iron Duke," Grant the
"Old Man," but there seems to have been something about the personality
of Washington that forbade any thought of familiarity, even on the part
of his trusty veterans. Yet their faith in him was such that, as
Wellington once said of his Peninsular army, they would have gone
anywhere with him, and he could have done anything with them.
THE CAMPAIGN OF TRENTON
NEW YORK THE SEAT OF WAR
[Sidenote: New views of the war.]
Upon finding that what had at first seemed only a local rebellion was
spreading like wildfire throughout the length and breadth of the
colonies, that bloodshed had united the people as one man, and that
these people were everywhere getting ready for a most determined
resistance, the British ministry awoke to the necessity of dealing with
the revolt, in this its newer and more dangerous aspect, as a fact to be
faced accordingly, and its military measures were, therefore, no longer
directed to New England exclusively, but to the suppression of the
rebellion as a whole. For this purpose New York was very judiciously
chosen as the true base of operations.[1]
In the colonies, the news of great preparations then making in England
to carry out this policy, inevitably led up to the same conclusions, but
as the siege of Boston had not yet drawn to a close, very little could
be done by way of making ready to meet this new and dangerous emergency.
We must now first look at the ways and means.
[Sidenote: The new Continental Army.]
A new army had been enlisted in the trenches before Boston to take the
place of that first one, whose term of service expired with the new
year, 1776. On paper it consisted of twenty-eight battalions, with an
aggregate of 20,372 officers and men. By the actual returns, made up
shortly before the army marched for New York, there were 13,145 men of
all arms then enrolled, of whom not more than 9,500 were reported as fit
for duty. These were all Continentals,[2] as the regular troops were
then called, to distinguish them from the militia.
[Sidenote: It marches to New York.]
Immediately upon the evacuation of Boston by the British (March 17,
1776), the army marched by divisions to New York, the last brigade, with
the commander-in-chief, leaving Cambridge on April 4.[3] This move
distinctly foreshadows the general opinion that the seat of war was
about to be transferred to New York and its environs.
There is no need to discuss the general proposition, so quickly accepted
by both belligerents, as regards the strategic value of New York for
combined operations by land and sea. Hence the Americans were naturally
unwilling to abandon it to the enemy. A successful defence was really
beyond their abilities, however, against such a powerful fleet as was
now coming to attack them, because this fleet could not be prevented
from forcing its way into the upper bay without strong fortifications at
the Narrows to stop it, and these the Americans did not have. Once in
possession of the navigable waters, the enemy could cut off
communication in every direction, as well as choose his own point of
attack. Afraid, however, of the moral effect of giving up the city
without a struggle, the Americans were led into the fatal error of
squandering their resources upon a defence which could end only in one
way, instead of holding the royal army besieged, as had been so
successfully done at Boston.
Having arrived at New York, Washington's force was increased by the two
or three thousand men who had been hastily summoned for its defence,[4]
and who were then busily employed in throwing up works at various
points, under the direction of the engineers.
[Sidenote: Make-up of the army.]
Now, it is usual to call such a large body of raw recruits, badly armed,
and without discipline, an army, in the same breath as a well armed and
thoroughly disciplined body. This one had done good service behind
entrenchments, and in some minor operations at Boston had shown itself
possessed of the best material, but the situation was now to be wholly
reversed, the besiegers were to become the besieged, their mistakes were
to be turned against them, the experiments of inexperience were to be
tested at the risk of total failure, and the _morale_ severely tried by
the grumbling and discontent arising for the most part from laxity of
discipline, but somewhat so, too, from the wretched administration of
the various civil departments of the army.[5] The officers did not know
how to instruct their men, and the men could not be made to take proper
care of themselves. In consequence of this state of things, inseparable
perhaps from the existing conditions, General Heath tells us that by the
first week of August the number of sick amounted to near 10,000 men, who
were to be met with lying "in almost every barn, stable, shed, and even
under the fences and bushes," about the camps. This primary element of
disintegration is always one of the worst possible to deal with in an
army of citizen soldiers, and the present case proved no exception.
Except a troop of Connecticut light-horse, who had been curtly and
imprudently dismissed because they showed sufficient _esprit de corps_
to demur against doing guard duty as infantry, and whose absence was
only too soon to be dearly atoned for, there was no cavalry, not even
for patrols, outposts, or vedettes. These being thus of necessity drawn
from the infantry, it was usual to see them come back into camp with the
enemy close at their heels, instead of giving the alarm in season to get
the troops under arms.
As for the infantry, it was truly a motley assemblage. A few of the
regiments, raised in the cities, were tolerably well armed and
equipped, and some few were in uniform. But in general they wore the
same homespun in which they had left their homes, even to the field
officers, who were only distinguished by their red cockades. In few
regiments were the arms all of one kind, not a few had only a sprinkling
of bayonets, while some companies, whom it had been found impracticable
to furnish with fire-arms at the home rendezvous, carried the
old-fashioned pikes of by-gone days. Among the good, bad, and
indifferent, Washington had had two thousand militia poured in upon him,
without any arms whatever. But these men could use pick and spade.
The single regiment of artillery this "rabble army," as Knox calls it,
could boast was unquestionably its most reliable arm. Under Knox's able
direction it was getting into fairly good shape, though the guns were of
very light metal. In the early conflicts around New York it was rather
too lavishly used, and suffered accordingly, but its efficiency was so
marked as to draw forth the admission from a British officer of rank
that the rebel artillery officers were at least equal to their own.
These plain facts speak for themselves. If radical defects of
organization lay behind them, it was not the fault of Washington or the
army, but is rather attributable to the want of any settled policy or
firm grasp of the situation on the part of the Congress.
Washington had no illusions either with regard to himself or his
soldiers. His letters of this date prove this. He was as well aware of
his own shortcomings as a general, as of those of his men as soldiers.
There could, perhaps, be no greater proof of the solidity of his
judgment than this capacity to estimate himself correctly, free from all
the prickings of personal vanity or popular praise. With reference to
the army he probably thought that if raw militia would fight so well
behind breastworks at Bunker Hill, they could be depended upon to do so
elsewhere, under the same conditions. His idea, therefore, was to fight
only in intrenched positions, and this was the general plan of campaign
for 1776.[6]
Footnotes:
[1] As will be seen farther on, New England had no strategic value in
this relation.
[2] Continentals. This term, for want of a better, arose from the
practice of speaking of the colonies, as a whole, as the Continent, to
distinguish them from this or that one, separately.
[3] The last brigade to march at this time is meant. As a matter of
fact one brigade was left at Boston, as a guard against accidents. Later
on it joined Washington.
[4] General Lee had been sent to New York as early as January. He took
military possession of the city, with militia furnished by Connecticut.
[5] In a private letter General Knox indignantly styles it "this rabble
army."
[6] "Being fully persuaded that it would be presumption to draw out our
young troops into open ground against their superiors, both in numbers
and discipline, I have never spared the spade and pickaxe."--_Letters._
II
PLANS FOR DEFENCE
[Sidenote: Troops sent to Canada.]
Washington's army had no sooner reached the Hudson than ten of the best
battalions[1] were hurried off to Albany, if possible, to retrieve the
disasters which had recently overwhelmed the army of Canada, where three
generals, two of whom, Montgomery and Thomas, were of the highest
promise, with upwards of 5,000 men, had been lost. The departure of
these seasoned troops made a gap not easily filled, and should not be
lost sight of in reckoning the effectiveness of what were left.
[Sidenote: Strength of the army.]
This large depletion was, however, more than made good, in numbers at
least, by the reinforcements now arriving from the middle colonies, who,
with troops forming the garrison of the city, presently raised the whole
force under Washington's orders[2] to a much larger number than were
ever assembled in one body again. A very large proportion, however,
were militiamen, called out for a few weeks only, who indeed served to
swell the ranks, without adding much real strength to the army.
[Sidenote: Plans for defence.]
It being fully decided upon that New York should be held, two entirely
distinct sets of measures were found indispensable. First the city was
commanded by Brooklyn Heights, rising at short cannon-shot across the
East River. These heights were now being strongly fortified on the
water-side against the enemy's fleet, and on the land-side against a
possible attack by his land forces.[3]
[Sidenote: New York in 1776.]
The second measure looked to defending the city from an attack in the
rear. At this time New York City occupied only a very small section of
the southern part of the island which it has since outgrown. A few farms
and country seats stretched up beyond Harlem, but the major part of the
island was to the city below as the country to the town, retaining all
its natural features of hill and dale unimpaired. At this time, too, the
only exit from the island was by way of King's Bridge,[4] twelve miles
above the city, where the great roads to Albany and New England turned
off, the one to the north, the other to the east, making this passage
fully as important in a military sense, as was the heavy drawbridge
thrown across the moat of some ancient castle.
[Sidenote: Fort Washington.]
Fort Washington[5] was, therefore, built on a commanding height two and
a half miles below King's Bridge, with outworks covering the approaches
to the bridge, either by the country roads coming in from the north or
from Harlem River at the east. These works were never finished, but even
if they had been they could not solve the problem of a successful
defence, because it lay always in the power of the strongest army to cut
off all communication with the country beyond--and that means the
passing in of reenforcements or supplies--by merely throwing itself
across the roads just referred to. This done, the army in New York must
either be shut up in the island, or come out and fight, provided the
enemy had not already put it out of their power to do so by promptly
seizing King's Bridge. And in that case there was no escape except by
water, under fire of the enemy's ships of war.
One watchful eye, therefore, had to be kept constantly to the front,
and another to the rear, between positions lying twelve to thirteen
miles apart, and separated by a wide and deep river.
It thus appears that the defence of New York was a much more formidable
task than had, at first, been supposed, and that an army of 40,000 men
was none too large for the purpose, especially as it was wholly
impracticable to reenforce King's Bridge from Brooklyn, or _vice versa_.
But from one or another cause the army had fallen below 25,000
effectives by midsummer, counting also the militia, who formed a
floating and most uncertain constituent of it. For the present,
therefore, King's Bridge was held as an outpost, or until the enemy's
plan of attack should be clearly developed; for whether Howe would first
assail the works at Brooklyn, Bunker Hill fashion, or land his troops
beyond King's Bridge, bringing them around by way of Long Island Sound,
were questions most anxiously debated in the American camp.
However, the belief in a successful defence was much encouraged by the
recent crushing defeat that the British fleet had met with in
attempting to pass the American batteries at Charleston. Thrice welcome
after the disasters of the unlucky Canada campaign, this success tended
greatly to stiffen the backbone of the army, in the face of the steady
and ominous accumulation of the British land and naval forces in the
lower bay. Then again, the Declaration of Independence, read to every
brigade in the army (July 9), was received with much enthusiasm. Now,
for the first time since hostilities began, officers and men knew
exactly what they were fighting for. There was at least an end to
suspense, a term to all talk of compromise, and that was much.
[Sidenote: The British army.]
Thus matters stood in the American camps, when the British army that had
been driven from Boston, heavily reenforced from Europe, and by calling
in detachments from South Carolina, Florida, and the West Indies, so
bringing the whole force in round numbers up to 30,000 men,[6] cast
anchor in the lower bay. Never before had such an armament been seen in
American waters. Backed by this imposing display of force, royal
commissioners had come to tender the olive branch, as it were, on the
point of the bayonet. They were told, in effect, that those who have
committed no crime want no pardon. Washington was next approached. As
the representative soldier of the new nation, he refused to be addressed
except by the title it had conferred upon him. The etiquette of the
contest must be asserted in his person. Failing to find any common
ground, upon which negotiations could proceed, resort was had to the
bayonet again.
Footnotes:
[1] These were Poor's, Patterson's, Greaton's, and Bond's Massachusetts
regiments on April 21, two New Jersey, two Pennsylvania, and two New
Hampshire battalions on the 26th. See _Burgoyne's Invasion_ of this
series for an account of the Canada campaign.
[2] The numbers are estimated by General Heath (_Memoirs_, p. 51) as
high as 40,000. He, however, deducts 10,000 for the sick, present. They
were published long after any reason for exaggeration existed.
[3] The Brooklyn lines ran from Wallabout Bay (Navy Yard) on the left,
to Gowanus Creek on the right, making a circuit of a mile and a half.
All are now in the heart of the city.
[4] King's Bridge was so named for William III., of England. It crosses
Spuyten Duyvil Creek. The bridge at Morrisania was not built until 1796.
[5] Fort Washington stood at the present 183d street. Besides defending
the approaches from King's Bridge, it also obstructed the passage of the
enemy's ships up the Hudson, at its narrowest point below the Highlands.
At the same time Fort Lee, first called Fort Constitution, was built on
the brow of the lofty Palisades, opposite, and a number of pontoons
filled with stones were sunk in the river between. The enemy's ships ran
the blockade, however, with impunity.
[6] The British regiments serving with Howe were the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Tenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth,
Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth,
Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Fortieth,
Forty-second, Forty-third, Forty-fourth, Forty-fifth, Forty-sixth,
Forty-ninth, Fifty-second, Fifty-fourth, Fifty-fifth, Fifty-seventh,
Sixty-third, Sixty-fourth, and Seventy-first, or thirty battalions with
an aggregate of 24,513 officers and men. To these should be added 8,000
Hessians hired for the war, bringing the army up to 32,500 soldiers.
Twenty-five per cent. would be a liberal deduction for the sick,
camp-guards, orderlies, etc. The navy was equally powerful in its way,
though it did little service here. Large as it was, this army was
virtually destroyed by continued attrition.
III
LONG ISLAND TAKEN
[Sidenote: British move to L. Island.]
Up to August 22, the British army made no move from its camps at Staten
Island. On their part, the Americans could only watch and wait. On this
day, however, active operations began with the landing of Howe's troops,
in great force, on the Long Island shore, opposite. This force
immediately spread itself out through the neighboring villages from
Gravesend, to Flatbush and Flatlands, driving the American skirmishers
before them into a range of wooded hills,[1] which formed their outer
line of defence. Howe had determined to attack in front, clearing the
way as he went.
[Sidenote: Plan of attack.]
As the enemy would have to force his way across these hills, before he
could reach the American intrenched lines around Brooklyn, all the roads
leading over them were strongly guarded, except out at the extreme
left, beyond Bedford village, where only a patrol was posted.[2] This
fatal oversight, of which Howe was well informed, suggested the British
plan of attack, which was quickly matured and successfully carried out.
It included a demonstration on the American left, to draw attention to
that point, while another corps was turning the right, at its unguarded
point.
A third column was held in readiness to move upon the American centre
from Flatbush, just as soon as the other attacks were well in progress.
When the flanking corps was in position, these demonstrations were to be
turned into real attacks, which, if successful, would throw the
Americans back upon the flanking column, which, in its turn, would cut
off their retreat to their intrenchments.
This clever combination, showing a perfect knowledge of the ground,
worked exactly as planned.
By making a night march, the turning column got quite around the
American flank and rear unperceived, and on the morning of the 27th was
in position, near Bedford, at an early hour, waiting for the
signal-guns to announce the beginning of the battle at the British left.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Long Island.]
Both columns then advanced to the attack. Being strongly posted, and
well commanded, the Americans made an obstinate resistance and did hold
the enemy in check for some hours at one end of the line, only to find
themselves cut off by the hurried retreat of all the troops posted at
the passes on their left; for as soon as the firing there showed that
the turning column had come up in their rear, these troops, with great
difficulty, fought their way back to the Brooklyn lines, leaving three
generals and upwards of 1,000 men in the enemy's hands.
The resistance met with by the enemy's turning corps may be guessed from
what an officer[3] who took part has to say of it. "We have had," he
goes on to relate, "what some call a battle, but if it deserves that
name it was the pleasantest I ever heard of, as we had not received more
than a dozen shots from the enemy, when they ran away with the utmost
precipitation."
[Sidenote: Washington re-enforces.]
Though not in personal command when the action began, Washington crossed
over to Brooklyn in time to see his broken and dispirited battalions
come streaming back into their works. Fearing the worst, he had called
down two of his best regiments (Shee's and Magaw's) from Harlem
Heights, and Glover's from the city, to reenforce the troops then
engaged on Long Island, but as has already been pointed out, reenforcing
in this manner was out of the question. By making a rapid march, the
Harlem troops reached the ferry in the afternoon, after firing had
ceased. They were, however, ferried across the next morning.
[Sidenote: 28th and 29th.]
These movements would indicate a resolution to hold the Brooklyn lines
at all hazards, and were so regarded, but during the two days subsequent
to the battle, while the enemy was closing in upon him, Washington
changed his mind, preparations were quietly made to withdraw the troops,
while still keeping up a bold front to the enemy, and on the night of
the 29th the army repassed the East River without accident or
molestation.
Having thus cleared Long Island, the British extended themselves along
the East River as far as Newtown, that river thus dividing the hostile
camps throughout its whole extent. And though New York now lay quite at
his mercy, Howe refrained from cannonading it, for the same reason as
Washington did from shelling Boston; namely, that of securing the city
intact a little later.
In spite of this brilliant opening of the campaign, and outside of the
noisy subalterns who were making their _debut_ in war, it was felt that
the British army, fresh, numerous, and splendidly equipped, had
acquitted itself most ingloriously in permitting the Americans to make
their retreat from the island as they had, when the event of an assault
must probably have been most disastrous to them.
[Sidenote: Losses so far.]
On the other side defeat had seriously affected the _morale_ of the
Americans. Fifteen hundred men had been lost on Long Island. A great
many more were now being lost through desertion. In Washington's own
words the unruly militia left him by companies, half regiments or whole
regiments, leaving the infection of their evil example to work its will
among the well-disposed.
[Sidenote: New York to be held.]
Although the defence of New York had thus broken down at its vital
point, a majority of generals favored still holding the city. To this
end Washington now divided his forces, leaving 4,000 in the city,
posting 6,500 at Harlem Heights, and 12,000 at Fort Washington and
King's Bridge. Though furnished by a general officer,[4] these figures
really include the sick, who were estimated at nearly 10,000, as well as
the large number detached on extra duty. Washington, himself, vaguely
estimated his effective force at under 20,000 at this time.
As thus arranged, Harlem Heights, in the centre, became the army
headquarters for the time being, Washington, by one of those little
accidents that sometimes arrest a passing thought, occupying the
house[5] of the same lady who had formerly refused the offer of his hand
in marriage, Miss Mary Phillipse, later to accept that of Colonel Roger
Morris, his old companion in arms during Braddock's fatal campaign.
Footnotes:
[1] This range of hills includes the present Prospect Park and Greenwood
Cemetery.
[2] This weak point was the approach from the east where the Jamaica
road crossed the hills into Bedford village. By striking this road
somewhat higher up, the enemy got to Bedford before the Americans,
guarding the hills beyond, had notice of their approach.
[3] Captain Harris, of the Fifth Foot.
[4] General Glover's estimate.
[5] The Morris House is still standing at 160th street, near 10th
avenue, N. Y., and is now occupied by Gen. Ferdinand P. Earle.
IV
NEW YORK EVACUATED
Howe seems to have thought that so long as Washington remained in New
York he might be bagged at leisure. In no other way can his dilatory
proceedings be accounted for. Sixteen days passed without any
demonstration on his part whatever. Meantime, however, the steady
extension of his lines toward Hell Gate had operated such a change of
opinion in the American camp that the decision to hold the city was now
reconsidered, and the evacuation fixed for September 15. It was seen
that the storm centre was now shifting over toward the American
communications, but just where it would break forth was still a matter
of conjecture.
Howe was fully informed of what was going on by his royalist friends in
the city, and like the cat watching the wounded mouse while it is
recovering its breath, he prepared to spring at the moment his
enfeebled adversary should show signs of returning animation.
[Sidenote: British seize New York.]
All being ready, on the very day fixed for the evacuation, Sir Henry
Clinton crossed the East River in boats from Newtown Bay to Kipp's Bay,
with 4,000 men, landed without opposition, owing to a disgraceful panic
which seized the Americans posted there for just such an emergency, and
thus thrust himself in between the Americans in the city and those at
Harlem Heights. Thus cut off, it was only at the greatest risk of
capture that the garrison below was saved, with the loss of much
artillery, tents, baggage, and stores, by marching out on one road while
the enemy were marching in on another,[1] as Clinton had immediately
pushed on up the island, at the heels of the retreating Americans.
A captain of British grenadiers describes what took place after the
landing, in the following animated style:
"After landing in York Island we drove the Americans into their
works beyond the eighth milestone from New York, and thus got
possession of the best half of the island. We took post opposite
to them, placed our pickets, borrowed a sheep, killed, cooked, and
ate some of it, and then went to sleep on a gate, which we took the
liberty of throwing off its hinges, covering our feet with an
American tent, for which we should have cut poles and pitched had
it not been so dark. Give me such living as we enjoy at present,
such a hut and such company, and I would not care three farthings
if we stayed all the winter, for though the mornings and evenings
are cold, yet the sun is so hot as to oblige me to put up a blanket
as a screen."
[Sidenote: Great fire, September 21.]
Each side now rested in possession of half the island, Washington of all
above Harlem Heights, Howe of all below. His conquest was, however, near
proving a barren one, at best, for within a week a third part of the
city was laid in ashes, some say by incendiaries, some by accident.
The situation was now so far reversed that Washington seemed to be
blockading Howe in the city.
[Sidenote: Captain Hale hanged.]
Though it had little bearing upon the result of the campaign, one other
event is deserving of brief mention here. Clinton's descent had been
cleverly managed, out of Washington's sight. What were the enemy
proposing to do next? It was imperative to know. To ascertain this Capt.
Nathan Hale volunteered to go over to Long Island. At his returning he
was arrested. The papers found upon him betrayed his purpose in going
within the enemy's lines, and he was forthwith hanged in a manner that
would have disgraced Tyburn itself.
Howe's next move was probably conceived with the twofold design, first
of cooping Washington up within the island, and second of capturing or
breaking up his entire army.
[Sidenote: Howe's delays.]
But again and again we are puzzled to account for Howe's delays. Hard
fighter that he unquestionably was, he seemed never in a hurry to begin.
There is even some ground for believing that in New York he had found
his Capua. Be that as it may, it is certainly true that nearly a whole
month passed by before the sluggard Sir William again drew sword.
[Sidenote: Lands at Throg's Neck.]
Leaving Lord Percy to defend the lines below Harlem with four brigades,
at eight o'clock P.M. of the 11th of October, General Clinton with the
reserves, light infantry and 1,500 Hessians, embarked on the East River,
passed through Hell Gate, and landed at Throg's Neck,[2] in Westchester,
early the next morning.
[Illustration: STORMING OF FORT WASHINGTON.
Explanation--E, American positions; A-C, British attacks by Harlem
River; B, _via_ King's Bridge; D, from Harlem Plains.]
[Sidenote: Washington moves to White Plains.]
Here he lay inactive for six whole days, within six miles of the road on
which Washington was moving out from King's Bridge to White Plains; for
at the first notice given him of the enemy's movements, which indeed had
all along been anxiously expected, Washington had been drawing out his
forces from Harlem to King's Bridge, first sending forward some light
troops to delay Howe as much as possible, until the army could get into
position. It is evident that but for Howe's delays this purpose could
not have been successfully accomplished.[3]
[Sidenote: Howe marches to give battle.]
Meantime the enemy had been bringing up reenforcements, and on the 18th,
finding the mainland too strongly held at Throg's Neck, for an advance
from that point, they made another landing six miles beyond, whence they
marched toward New Rochelle. From here they again marched (22d) for
White Plains, where Washington was found (27th) drawn up in order of
battle behind the Bronx, waiting for them.
[Sidenote: Battle of White Plains, October 28.]
Here Washington attempted to make a stand, but his right[4] being
vigorously attacked and turned, he was forced to fall back upon a second
position, in which he remained unmolested for several days, when
(November 1) he moved still farther back, to the heights of North
Castle, where he felt himself quite safe from attack.
Howe had now manoeuvred Washington out of all his defences except Fort
Washington, which by General Greene's advice was to be defended, though
now cut off from all support.
[Sidenote: Fort Washington taken.]
Things remained in this situation until November 16, when the fort was
assaulted on three sides, with the result that the whole garrison of
about 3,000 men were made prisoners of war.[5] At some points the
resistance was obstinate, notably at the north, and again at the east,
where one of the attacking divisions attempted to gain the rocky shore
back of the Morris House, under Harlem Heights. A British officer,[6]
there present, says of it that "before landing the fire of cannon and
musketry was so heavy that the sailors quitted their oars and lay down
in the bottom of the boats, and had not the soldiers taken the oars and
pulled on shore we must have remained in this situation."
[Sidenote: Effect on the army.]
[Sidenote: Washington and Lee.]
The loss of the garrison of Fort Washington, 2,000 of whom were regular
troops, was universally regarded as the most severe blow that the
American cause had yet sustained, and it had a most depressing effect
both in and out of the army, but more particularly in the army, as it
tended to develop the growing antagonism between the commander-in-chief
and General Lee, who had ineffectually advocated the evacuation of Fort
Washington when the army was withdrawn from the island. Lee's military
insight had now been most decisively vindicated. His antipathy to
serving as second in command became more and more pronounced, and was
more or less reflected by his admirers, of whom he now had more than
ever. Worse still, it was destined soon to have the most deplorable
results to the army, the cause, and even to Lee himself.
Footnotes:
[1] A British brigade was sent down to the city in the course of the
evening.
[2] A contraction of Throgmorton's Neck. As this was an island at high
tide, the Americans quickly barred the passage to the mainland by
breaking down the bridge.
[3] On account of the want of wagons this was very slowly done, as the
wagons had to be unloaded and sent back for what could not be brought
along with the troops.
[4] This rested on Chatterton's Hill, some distance in front of the main
line. Not having intrenched, the defenders were overpowered, though not
until after making a sharp fight.
[5] An excellent account of the operations at Fort Washington will be
found in Graydon's _Memoirs_, p. 197 _et seq._
[6] Lieut. Martin Hunter, of the Fifty-second Foot.
V
THE SITUATION REVIEWED
[Sidenote: The new situation.]
The dilemma now confronting Washington was hydra-headed. Either way it
was serious. On one side New England lay open to the enemy, on the other
New Jersey. And an advance was also threatened from the North. If he
stayed where he was, the enemy would overrun New Jersey at will. Should
he move his army into New Jersey, Howe could easily cut off its
communications with New England, the chief resource for men and
munitions. Of course this was not to be thought of. On the other hand,
the conquest of New Jersey, with Philadelphia as the ultimate prize, in
all probability would be Howe's next object. At the present moment there
was nothing to prevent his marching to Philadelphia, arms at ease. To
think of fighting in the open field was sheer folly. And there was not
one fortified position between the Hudson and the Delaware where the
enemy's triumphal march might be stayed.
Forced by these adverse circumstances to attempt much more than twice
his present force would have encouraged the hope of doing successfully,
Washington decided that he must place himself between the enemy and
Philadelphia, and at the same time hold fast to his communications with
New England and the upper Hudson. This could only be done by dividing
his greatly weakened forces into two corps, one of which should attempt
the difficult task of checking the enemy in the Jerseys, while the other
held a strong position on the Hudson, until Howe's purposes should be
more fully developed. With Washington it was no longer a choice of
evils, but a stern obedience to imperative necessity.
[Sidenote: The army divided.]
[Sidenote: Washington in New Jersey.]
Lee was now put in command of the corps left to watch Howe's movement
east of the Hudson, loosely estimated at 5,000 men, and ordered back
behind the Croton. Heath, with 2,000 men of his division, was ordered to
Peekskill, to guard the passes of the Highlands, these two corps being
thus posted within supporting distance. With the other corps of 4,000
men Washington crossed into New Jersey, going into camp in the
neighborhood of Fort Lee, where Greene's small force was united with his
own command.[1] Orders were also despatched to Ticonderoga, to forward
at once all troops to the main army that could be spared. Fort Lee had
thus become the last rallying-point for the troops under Washington's
immediate command, and in that sense, also, a menace to the full and
free control of the lower Hudson, which the guns of the fort in part
commanded at its narrowest point. Howe determined to brush away this
last obstruction without delay.
[Sidenote: Fort Lee taken.]
Regarding Fort Lee as no longer serving any important purpose, perhaps
foreseeing that it would soon be attacked, Washington was getting ready
to evacuate it, when on the night of November 19[2] Lord Cornwallis made
a sudden dash across to the New Jersey side, passing Fort Lee
unperceived, landed a little above the fort at a place that had
strangely been left unguarded, climbed the heights unmolested, and was
only prevented from making prisoners of the whole garrison by its
hurried retreat across the Hackensack. Everything in the fort, even to
the kettles in which the men were cooking their breakfasts, was lost.
As regards any further attempt to stay the tide of defeat, all was now
over. The enemy had obtained a secure foothold on the Jersey shore from
which to march across the State, when and how he pleased. Unpalatable as
the admission may be, the fact remains that the Americans had been
everywhere out-generaled and out-fought. Nearly everything in the way of
war material had been lost in the hurried evacuation of New York.[3]
Confidence had been lost. Prestige had been lost. Clearly it was high
time to turn over a new leaf. With this lame affair the first division
of the disastrous campaign of 1776 properly closes, and the second
properly begins. It had been watched with alternate hope, doubt, and
despondency. Excuses are never wanting to bolster up failing
reputations. The generals said they had no soldiers, the soldiers
declared they had no generals; the people hung their heads and were
silent.
[Illustration: AMERICAN POSITION BEHIND THE HACKENSACK.]
Footnotes:
[1] The Eastern troops remained on the east bank of the Hudson, under
Lee's command, while those belonging to the Middle and Southern colonies
crossed the Hudson with Washington. This disposition may have been
brought about by the belief that the soldiers of each section would
fight best on their own ground, but the fact is notorious that a most
bitter animosity had grown up between them.
[2] This movement is assigned to the 18th by Gordon and those who have
followed him. The 19th is the date given by Captain Harris, who was with
the expedition.
[3] An enumeration of these losses will be found in Gordon's _American
Revolution_, Vol. II., p. 360.
VI
THE RETREAT THROUGH THE JERSEYS
It was now the 20th of November. In a few weeks more, at farthest, the
season for active campaigning would be over. Thus far delay had been the
only thing that the Americans had gained; but at what a cost! Yet
Washington's last hopes were of necessity pinned to it, because the
respite it promised was the only means of bringing another army into the
field in season to renew the contest, if indeed it should be renewed at
all.
[Sidenote: Strength of the army.]
[Sidenote: State of public feeling.]
Losses in battle, by sickness or desertion, or other causes, had brought
his dismembered forces down to a total of 10,000 men, of whom 3,500 only
were now under his immediate command, the rest being with Lee and Heath.
And the work of disintegration was steadily going on. Always hopeful so
long as there was even a straw to cling to, Washington seems to have
expected that the people of New Jersey would have flown to arms, upon
hearing that the invader had actually set foot upon the soil of their
State. Vain hope! His appeal had fallen flat. The great and rich State
of Pennsylvania was nearly, if not quite, as unresponsive. Disguise it
as we may, the fire of '76 seemed all but extinct on its very earliest
altars, and in its stead only a few sickly embers glowed here and there
among its ashes. The futility of further resistance was being openly
discussed, and submission seemed only one step farther off.
In one of his desponding moments Washington turned to his old comrade,
Mercer, with the question, "What think you, if we should retreat to the
back parts of Pennsylvania, would the Pennsylvanians support us?"
Though himself a Pennsylvanian by adoption, Mercer's answer was given
with true soldierly frankness. "If the lower counties give up, the back
counties will do the same," was his discouraging reply.
"We must then retire to Augusta County in Virginia," said Washington,
with grave decision, "and if overpowered there, we must cross the
Alleghanies."
A volume would fail to give half as good an idea of the critical
condition of affairs as that brief dialogue.
[Sidenote: Cruelties to prisoners.]
First and foremost among the many causes of the army's disruption was
its losses in prisoners. Not less than 5,000 men were at that moment
dying by slow torture in the foul prisons or pestilential floating
dungeons of New York. Turn from it as we may, there is no escaping the
conviction that if not done with the actual sanction of Sir William
Howe, these atrocities were at least committed with his guilty
knowledge.[1] The calculated barbarities practised upon these poor
prisoners, with no other purpose than to make them desert their cause,
or if that failed, totally to unfit them for serving it more, are almost
too shocking for belief. It was such acts as these that wrung from the
indignant Napier the terrible admission that "the annals of civilized
warfare furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war than the
prison ships of England."
This method of disposing of prisoners was none the less potent that it
was in some sort murder. Washington had not the prisoners to exchange
for them, Howe would not liberate them on parole, and when exchanges
were finally effected, the men thus released were too much enfeebled by
disease ever to carry a musket again.
In brief, more of Washington's men were languishing in captivity in New
York than he now had with him in the Jerseys. And he was not losing
nearly so many by bullets as by starvation.
[Sidenote: Affects recruiting.]
We have emphasized this dark feature of the contest solely for the
purpose of showing its material influence upon it at this particular
time. The knowledge of how they would be treated, should they fall into
the enemy's hands, undoubtedly deterred many from enlisting. In a
broader sense, it added a new and more aggravated complication to the
general question as to how the war was to be carried on by the two
belligerents, whether under the restraints of civilized warfare, or as a
war to the knife.
Thrown back upon his own resources, Washington must now bitterly have
repented leaving Lee in an independent command. If there was any secret
foreboding on his part that Lee would play him false, we do not discover
it either in his orders or his correspondence. If there was secret
antipathy, Washington showed himself possessed of almost superhuman
patience and self-restraint, for certainly if ever man's patience was
tried Washington's was by the shuffling conduct of his lieutenant at
this time; but if aversion there was on Washington's part he resolutely
put it away from him in the interest of the common cause, feeling, no
doubt, that Lee was a good soldier who might yet do good service, and
caring little himself as to whom the honor might fall, so the true end
was reached. It was a great mind lowering itself to the level of a
little one. But Lee could only see in it a struggle for personal favor
and preferment.
[Sidenote: Retreat begins.]
After the evacuation of Fort Lee, Lee was urged, unfortunately not
ordered, to cross his force into the Jerseys, and so bring it into
cooeperation with the troops already there. The demonstrations then
making in his front decided Washington to fall back behind the Passaic,
which he did on the 22d, and on the same day marched down that river to
Newark. On the 24th Cornwallis,[2] who now had assumed control of all
operations in the Jerseys, was reenforced with two British brigades and
a regiment of Highlanders.