Necessity for disobeying the Orders to return to D’Jounie—Advantageous
results—Difference with Izzet Pacha—his Character—Unmolested retreat
of Souliman Pacha—he should have been closely followed up—Letter
from the Admiral—The Author resigns the Command—Letter to Lord
Ponsonby—Unsuccessful attack on Tortosa.
It is necessary in war, and I think quite justifiable, to take
responsibility on oneself in unforeseen cases, running of course the
risk of answering for the consequences; it is more dangerous, however,
to disobey orders; but there are instances in which events may justify
such disobedience; the reader will judge whether what I have related may
be considered one of them.
I saw clearly that the Admiral was not at all aware of the critical
position in which I was placed. When I left D’Jounie it was with the
intention of joining the Grand Prince, and attacking Souliman Pacha, who
was encamped before Beyrout, leaving four battalions in our position, to
secure it against an unforeseen attack. On my arrival on the heights of
Ornagacuan, I was as much surprised to find myself in front of Ibrahim,
as I suppose he was to find himself opposed to me; he was evidently
collecting troops to attack D’Jounie, which he ought to have done long
before, and we were collecting ours to attack Souliman. Finding
ourselves unexpectedly opposed to each other, it was distinctly my game
to attack him before his force was assembled. Had I obeyed the orders
that were sent me to return to D’Jounie I should have had a most
difficult and dangerous retreat, and been harassed by an enemy to whom
we should have restored confidence. It would have been impossible to
have sent timely notice to Omar Bey or the Prince, both of whom would
have been sacrificed, the Turks would have lost confidence, and as the
season was fast advancing I have no doubt the whole would have been
re-embarked, and the expedition entirely failed. What, on the contrary,
happened? the ships going to Beyrout, and my advance, caused the
abandonment of the town; the victory, the dispersion of Ibrahim Pacha’s
army, and, as will be shortly seen, the disorganization of the Egyptian
troops, and the retreat of Souliman.
On the morning of the 11th Izzet Pacha joined me, and shortly after I
received information that 2000 of Souliman’s soldiers had deserted; I
immediately put the troops in motion, intending to march on him, having
had no information that he had decamped; to this Izzet objected; the old
man was afraid of being left at D’Jounie, and insisted on two battalions
being sent there. I offered him one for his protection; this did not
satisfy him; he invented all sorts of stories,—first, that Ibrahim was
again collecting his forces, and was advancing,—and many others of the
same nature; and when he found I was inexorable, he said the weather was
changing and the troops would all get wet. This was quite true; we had
not seen a cloud the whole summer, but now the sky became overcast, and
there was every appearance of a storm; I, however, observed to old Izzet
that I never understood that a shower of rain was a sufficient reason to
prevent an attack upon an enemy’s camp. The troops were ordered to
march, and Izzet returned to D’Jounie, and on announcing his approach by
firing his pistols in the usual way, one went off by accident and
wounded him in the leg; it is a pity it had not gone through his head,
for never was there a more unfit man to govern a country than the man in
question: he had once before lost a Turkish army by starvation, had cut
off his own wife’s head, and was a notorious tyrant and savage; and this
was the man chosen to govern the Syrians. Representations were made to
the Porte, and they very wisely recalled him.
On my arrival at the beach I found Souliman had decamped during the
night, leaving his artillery behind, removing, however, the day before,
all his tent equipage near the town, without being at all molested.
Had intelligence been sent to me early on the 11th I should have had no
difficulty in advancing on Souliman, and probably cutting off the
greater part of his division, as well as preventing Ibrahim from
retiring on Corneille and collecting his forces there; such a movement
would have encouraged the advance of the mountaineers, instead of
remaining in the neighbourhood of Basquinta and allowing Ibrahim and
Souliman to retire quietly with a defeated army, and assemble at Zachle,
a little above the plain of the Bekaa.
Before I went off to the flag-ship I received the following letter from
the Admiral:—
“Beyrout, Oct. 11, 1840.
“My dear Commodore,
“Colonel Hodges is on board, and has described your splendid operations
of yesterday, to the merits of which no words of mine can do justice.
You have nothing to fear from Souliman Pasha; 2000 of his men came into
Beyrout to-day and delivered themselves up, with their arms; more are
expected. His field pieces, nearly 30, remain about four miles off, and
we are going to get them in. Sir Charles Smith wants as many of your
troops as you can spare, consistently with guarding your prisoners, and
your security in reaching the camp. The men had better go on board the
Gorgon and Hydra to be conveyed here.
“I do most heartily assure you of being fully sensible of the benefit
which I and the whole expedition have received from your indefatigable
services, and on your rejoining the Powerful, your conscience may be
perfectly satisfied on your having accomplished all that could be done.
“According to the plans from Constantinople, Sidon and Tyre are to be
put into a good state of security for the troops, to which Beyrout will
now be added.
“There is no news from England; but Lord Palmerston’s letters are not to
risk the Turks beyond the means of retreat to the shipping; also the
marines; and saying, that Acre is not to be attacked at present.
“From all this I apprehend some negotiation is going on, which will be
much assisted by our successes here.
“As the capture of Beyrout was the principal object of our expedition
from D’Jounie, I had no conception of your having another enterprise in
hand; and therefore, after the possession of Beyrout, imagined that you
had better fall back upon the camp, which has been left in a very
defenceless state.
“I wish you to remain at D’Jounie for the present, and am most anxious
to hear from Alexandria, where it is certain some large ships will come
out if possible.
“No Cambridge; she left Malta on the 26th, ten days before the
Confiance.
“Very truly yours,
“ROBERT STOPFORD.”
Two battalions were sent back to the camp at D’Jounie, and the rest
marched to Beyrout; and I went on board the flag-ship and of course
resigned my command, after having held it one month. I then addressed
the following letter to the Ambassador:—
“Powerful, D’Jounie,
Oct. 11, 1840.
“My Lord,
“Hodges will tell your Lordship all that has passed here. We want arms
very bad; Cambridge has brought none. Selim Pacha is a very good man,
and a brave one. Izzet Pacha would be much better at Constantinople than
here; I have no opinion of him in any one way whatever. I do hope when
Lebanon is settled, something will be done for the mountaineers; Sidon,
Beyrout, and Tripoli ought to be added to their territory; they ought to
be free, paying a fixed tribute to the Porte. This country would then
flourish, and British interests and commerce would be greatly benefited
by such an arrangement. I hope your Lordship has received the various
letters I have written to your Lordship, though I have no replies.
“I have the honour to be,
“Your Lordship’s obedient servant,
“CHARLES NAPIER.”
“To the Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”
The day before I took Sidon, Captain Houston Stewart, with the Benbow,
Carysfort, and Zebra, attacked Tortosa, but failed in consequence of the
boats grounding on an unknown reef. Both officers and men displayed
great gallantry, but his loss was severe. Subjoined is Captain Stewart’s
letter to the Admiral on the subject:—
“H.M.S. Benbow, off Ruad,
September 26, 1840.
“Sir,
“I have the honour to acquaint you that the Benbow, Carysfort, and
Zebra, anchored here on Sunday last, the 20th instant.
“We found the island without troops or arms of any kind, but an immense
population just arrived from Tripoli, Tortosa, and other parts of the
coast, at present menaced with military operations.
“About 200 cavalry and two field-pieces were encamped at the
watering-place on the main land, immediately opposite to the island, and
I was informed that two squadrons (each of 200 men, with two
field-pieces) were stationed about nine miles distant to the north and
south, with orders to prevent any persons taking water, and to obstruct
all communication between the inhabitants of the country and the ships.
We also learned that the whole of these troops depended upon the stores
in Tortosa for subsistence, and that these stores were very
considerable, consisting of grain, rice, &c. The island of Ruad is very
small, and dependent on tanks and cisterns for water, which are
generally quite sufficient for its ordinary population, said to amount
to 1500; but, in consequence of the influx of refugees, there cannot be
less than 5000 souls upon it just now, and therefore an extra supply of
water became necessary; but the cavalry prevented any boats from the
island approaching the watering-place. We therefore, at daylight next
morning, dislodged them by throwing a few shot and shells, and the ships
were moved nearer the watering-place, and, every precaution being taken,
all Her Majesty’s ships were completed with water; and ever since the
place (being under our guns) has been quite free to the people of Ruad
to water.
“My attention was now anxiously turned towards Tortosa; all information
concurred in representing its great importance to the enemy’s troops,
and all agreed in declaring that, could we destroy the provisions, the
troops must shift their quarters, and thus leave the communication with
the mountains (whose inhabitants were most anxious for arms)
comparatively open. We were also informed that the chief storehouses
were situated close to the sea, that a breach might be made in the outer
wall, and immediate access obtained to them.
“I therefore directed some large bags of powder, with bores and fuzees,
to be prepared, and ordered the Carysfort and Zebra to anchor close off
it, which they did within 500 yards. Four successive deserters from the
enemy’s cavalry (each arriving on different days) stated that there were
no soldiers quartered in Tortosa, but a party was regularly sent down
every night to bring away sufficient provisions for their different
detachments, and the last deserter, who left Tortosa so late as the
night of the 24th, stated confidently that there was not then a soldier
in it—that even had any come in after his departure, they could only be
dismounted cavalry, with short carbines—that a sort of council of war
had been held two days before, when it was resolved, that, as they had
no infantry, cavalry alone could not protect it, and that they must get
camels, &c., to remove the stores from it as speedily as possible: and
he offered, if we could give him an axe, to land with a single boat’s
crew, and break the corn store door open; and the three other deserters
likewise offered to go.
“This determined me to make an attempt either to take the town, or at
least to destroy the stores, and the following plan of operations was
decided upon:—The boats to rendezvous on board the Carysfort, and she
and the Zebra to cannonade the walls, and especially a large built-up
archway in the centre, until sufficiently opened for entrance.
Lieutenant Charlewood being prepared with the necessary means for
blowing up stores, buildings, &c., and accompanied by Mr. Turner, gunner
of this ship, with eight steady men as pioneers, to land in the cutter,
and be immediately followed by the portion of marines at present on
board the Benbow, together with those of the Zebra; and 20 seamen of the
Benbow, under Lieutenants Maitland, R.N., and Harrison, R.M.; and that
all the boats (after the disembarkation) under the command of Lieutenant
Stevens, of the Carysfort, should lie off, prepared to cover the landing
party with their guns and small arms, and to re-embark them.
“The space from the margin of the sea to the breach does not exceed
sixteen yards. We could perceive only a few loopholes commanding that
spot, and I concluded, that even should a fire be opened from them, the
advance from the boats would be too rapid to admit of its being
effective, and that, being once within the breach, our men would easily
make good their way.
“Accordingly, yesterday, at 15 minutes past 1, P.M., the Carysfort and
Zebra commenced an admirably well-directed fire, and very soon opened
the archway, and showed us a large clear space within, and the boats
shoved off. The beach under the town appeared so smooth and deep, and so
similar to all the other parts where we had landed, that a doubt of the
heavy boats being able to reach it never presented itself until they
went in, when a ledge of rocks or ancient building was found to extend
itself across at some distance from the shore, with such deep water
inside that no man could land and keep his ammunition dry; only the
light boats, of which there were but two, could pass over it. Thus the
marines (in the launch, barge, and two pinnaces) were unable to land;
had they done so, I feel confident that we should have completely
succeeded in destroying the magazines of provisions, and have driven the
enemy out of the vaults, and even from the town, although not without
loss, as subsequent intelligence has reached me that 200 infantry (from
the northward), and 100 dismounted cavalry, had entered the town the
same morning, three hours before daylight. Lieutenant Charlewood being
in the cutter with the pioneers’ powder, and the three deserters as
guides, landed at once, and proceeded towards the breach, and had nearly
reached it before a shot was fired; but the moment the large boats
touched the rocks, they became exposed to a destructive fire from every
minute loop and crevice, and even from the holes which our cannon-shot
had just made. Lieutenant Maitland had succeeded in getting about 14 of
his men, with himself, landed by another turn of the same cutter, and my
only reason for not instantly recalling the boats when the fire opened
was, that I could not know what these officers were doing inside, and I
entertained great hopes that they might be able to find out and blow up
the provision stores, and thus effect our principal object. The guides
who had landed fled back to the boats at the commencement of the firing,
but they are now all on board, and free from any suspicion of treachery.
Lieutenant Charlewood, proceeding with his pioneers, broke open several
stores, and at length reached one filled with rice, and another with
corn, when he immediately ran back to inform Lieutenant Maitland, and
get more hands forward. Unfortunately, during his momentary absence, his
men had hewn open another door, when, to their surprise, they found it
entered upon a place filled with infantry soldiers, and a struggle
ensued. Two soldiers were killed by the three pioneers, but having
nothing but axes, they were obliged to give way, but Mr. Charlewood’s
return checked the enemy’s advance, and they never followed him.
“Becoming anxious at the delay, and seeing Lieutenant Maitland still in
the breach, I hastened in my gig, and, hailing that officer, I learned
from him that there was no longer any prospect of success, his
ammunition being expended, and much of that of the marines wet (from the
attempt to get out), and I immediately ordered all to retire, and
succeeded in getting every man off, Lieutenant Charlewood even bringing
his exploding apparatus away.
“It is now my duty to allude to a more grateful theme—the merits of the
officers and men employed. Where all did their duty, it is a difficult
and somewhat delicate task to particularize; but I should be very unjust
did I not bear my cordial testimony to the very gallant conduct of
Lieutenants Maitland and Charlewood: the latter officer was the first
man on shore, and the very last off, and his quiet, determined
resolution, was the theme of praise with every person.
“I annex a list of the boats employed, with the names of the officers
commanding them, together with a return of casualties in each boat. The
first cutter, being a light boat, was extremely serviceable, and much
and constantly exposed. Mr. J.C. Dalrymple Hay, midshipman, and his
crew, deserve every credit for their very spirited conduct.
“The jolly-boat of the Carysfort (the only other light boat), commanded
by Mr. W.H. Stewart, midshipman, was also very useful, and Lieutenant
Maitland speaks in favourable terms of that young officer’s proceedings.
“To Captain Martin and Commander James Stopford my grateful thanks are
justly due; all that was done was in perfect concord with them, and from
both these officers I derived the most cordial support and assistance.
The precision of the fire from their ships over the boats and men during
the whole of the attack was quite astonishing, and by rendering the aim
of the enemy unsteady, must have saved many lives.
“I have, &c.,
“HOUSTON STEWART, _Captain_.”
“To
Admiral
“The
_Benbow’s._—Launch, Mr. William King Hall, mate; Lieut. Harrison,
R.M.—Killed, 3 marines, 1 seaman.—Wounded, 1 marine, (since
dead).—Wounded, 4 marines, 2 seamen.—Barge,—Mr. G.F. Day, mate.—Wounded,
4 seamen.—1st Gig,—Hon. A. Cochrane, volunteer, 1st Class.—Pinnance,—Mr.
A. G. West, midshipman.—Wounded, 1 seaman.—1st Cutter,—Mr. J.C.D. Hay,
midshipman.—Killed, 1 seaman.—Wounded, 2 seamen.—Landing Party,—Mr. F.H.
Stanfell, mate; Mr. J. F. Ross, midshipman.—Wounded, 1 seaman.
_Carysfort’s_—Pinnance, Lieut. Stephens; Hon.—Douglas, midshipman; none
killed or wounded.—Barge,—Mr. Genneys mate; Mr. Loney, second
master.—Jolly-boat,—Mr. W. Houston Stewart, midshipman.
_Zebra’s_—Pinnance, Mr. J. Simpson, mate.—Wounded, 3 marines.
Return of officers and men killed and wounded, belonging to Her
Majesty’s ships and vessels, in an attack by the boats of those ships on
the town of Tortosa, the 25th of September, 1840.
_Benbow_—Killed, 2 seamen; 3 royal marines.—Wounded, 9 seamen; 3 royal
marines severely.—Wounded, 1 seaman; 1 royal marine, slightly.
_Zebra_—Wounded, 2 seamen; 1 royal marine, slightly.
Total killed—5.—Total wounded—17.