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THE
WAR IN SYRIA.
BY
COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER, K.C.B.,
_&c._, _&c._, _&c._
----------
_IN TWO VOLUMES._
---
VOL. I.
LONDON:
JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND.
---
M.DCCC.XLII.
LONDON:
HARRISON AND CO., PRINTERS,
ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
ADVERTISEMENT.
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In giving an account of the War in Syria, I have endeavoured to state
the facts as they occurred, of most of which I was an eye-witness. The
_Levant Papers_ have furnished me with much useful information, and I
have endeavoured to make no statements that cannot be borne out either
by them or by documents in my own possession.
In writing a work of this kind I have been obliged to publish letters
and extracts of letters from these Papers, in order to save the reader
the trouble of examining them, and, indeed, it is not in the power of
the public to get hold of Parliamentary Papers without a serious
expense; this I trust will be a sufficient excuse for the numerous
documents that I have thought it necessary to give.
_May, 1842._
CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
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PAGE
CHAPTER I.
State of Affairs in the Levant in August, 1839—The Author’s 1
Interview with Hosrew Pacha—Sir Robert Stopford at
Constantinople; his Interview with the Sultan—Impolitic
Junction of the English and French Fleets—Sir John Louis
takes the command of the English Squadron—The Author
tenders his Resignation
CHAPTER II.
The English Fleet winters at Smyrna—Summer 12
Cruise—Insurrection in Lebanon—Opinion on the proper
course of the English Fleet—The Powerful and Edinburgh
sent to Beyrout—Murder of a Frank; conduct of the French
Consul—Insignificance of the Insurrection—Mission of Mr.
Wood—Grievances of the Mountaineers—Author’s Letter to the
Egyptian Admiral—Letter from Souliman Pacha—Suppression of
the Insurrection—Ignorance of the Allied Consuls—Visit to
Tripoli—Excursion into the Mountains—Appearance of the
Country—Ships ordered to Vourla Bay—Author’s Report to the
Admiral
CHAPTER III.
The English ships withdrawn from the coast of Syria—The 29
Author appointed to the command of a Squadron—Letters to
the Egyptian Authorities, the British Consul, the Emir
Bechir, and others—Proclamation to the Syrians—Letters
from the Emir Bechir and Souliman Pacha
CHAPTER IV.
Generous behaviour of Souliman Pacha—Intercepted Letter from 42
Boghos Bey to that Officer—Interview of the Consuls with
Mehemet Ali—A Turkish Squadron equipped—Arrival of the
Turkish Troops—Force of the Egyptian Army—Its proper line
of Action
CHAPTER V.
The Allied Troops landed in D’Jounie 50
Bay—Encampment—Reconnoissances—Submission of the Emir
Abdallah—Beyrout summoned to Surrender—Reply of Souliman
Pacha—Impolicy of the Attack on Beyrout—Forbearance of
Souliman Pacha—Capture of D’Jebail—Captain Martin’s
Report—Reconnoissance to Merouba—Report to the Admiral
CHAPTER VI.
Proposed attack upon Sidon—Correspondence between Sir Robert 69
Stopford and the Author respecting the command—Attack on
the Heights of Ornagacuan—Report to the Admiral—Return to
D’Jounie
CHAPTER VII.
Proposed Attack on Sidon abandoned; 80
resumed—Instructions—Correspondence between the Author and
Sir Robert Stopford—Arrival at Sidon—Letter of Sir R.
Stopford to the Admiralty—Summons to the Governor Report
to the Admiral of the Capture of the Town—Excellent
behaviour of the Allied Troops—Fortitude of a Negro
Soldier—Return to the Camp at D’Jounie
CHAPTER VIII.
State of Affairs at D’Jounie—Effect of the Capture of 94
Sidon—The Emir Bechir Cassim joins the Allies—Overtures
from the Emir Bechir—Movements of Ibrahim Pacha—Capture of
Caiffa, and of Tyre; Captain Collier’s Report—Conflicting
opinions as to future Operations—Letter from Sir Robert
Stopford—Insufficient boating of War Steamers
CHAPTER IX.
Destruction of Stores at Beyrout—Intermeddling of Izzet 108
Pacha—Correspondence between the Author and Sir R.
Stopford—Visit to Tyre and Sidon, and Reconnoissance of
Acre
CHAPTER X.
Osman Pacha defeated by the Emir Bechir Cassim at 113
Merouba—Proposed Attack on Beyrout—Correspondence with Sir
Robert Stopford—Letter from the Emir Bechir Cassim—Letters
to Lords Minto and Palmerston—Visit to the Encampment of
the Emir Bechir Cassim—Comfortless quarters at
Argentoun—Return—Preparations for the Attack of Beyrout
CHAPTER XI.
March towards Beyrout—Apprehensions of the 122
Admiral—Arrangements in case of Disaster—Letters to and
from the Emir Bechir Cassim—Skirmish—Position at
Boharsof—Omar Bey dispatched to join the Emir—Letter to
the Admiral—Arrival of Sir Charles Smith—The Author
ordered to return to the Camp
CHAPTER XII.
Impossibility of immediately retiring—Letter to the 134
Admiral—His Answer—Arrival of the Emir—Advance upon the
Enemy—Doubtful character of the Forces on both
sides—Novelty of the Author’s situation—Battle of
Boharsof—Defeat and Flight of Ibrahim—An awkward Mistake—A
Green Egyptian Flag taken, and said to be lost
again—Promptitude of Omar Bey—Turkish mode of
Rejoicing—Second Letter of Recall—Note to the
Admiral—Letter respecting the Author’s return to
D’Jounie—Official Report of the Battle of Boharsof
CHAPTER XIII.
Necessity for disobeying the Orders to return to 152
D’Jounie—Advantageous results—Difference with Izzet
Pacha—his Character—Unmolested retreat of Souliman
Pacha—he should have been closely followed up—Letter from
the Admiral—The Author resigns the Command—Letter to Lord
Ponsonby—Unsuccessful attack on Tortosa
CHAPTER XIV.
Interview of the Author with the Admiral and Sir Charles 169
Smith—Returns to Beyrout—Urges various enterprises upon
the Admiral, which are disapproved of—Correspondence with
the Emir Bechir Cassim—Surrender of the old Emir
Bechir—Retrospect of the Successes of the
Expedition—Speculations as to the Attack upon Acre—Visit
to the Emir at Ammanah—Scenery of Lebanon—Reconnoissance
of Ibrahim’s Position—Letter to the Admiral—Conduct of the
Turkish Authorities—Visit to the Emir’s Palace at
Ibteddin—Accident to the Young Prince—Departure of the
Squadron for Acre
CHAPTER XV.
Letter of Congratulation from Lord Ponsonby to the 187
Author—Ibrahim Pacha’s Standard, missing from the Field of
Boharsof—Letters to Lord Ponsonby, Colonel Hodges, and the
Admiral respecting it—Lord Ponsonby’s Speech to the
Sultan, and Letter to the Author—Colonel Hodges’
Explanation—The Affair never satisfactorily cleared up
CHAPTER XVI.
Former Sieges of Acre—Arrival of the Allied 196
Squadron—Proposed mode of Attack—Objections—Survey of the
North Channel—The Squadron under weigh—The Author attacks
from the North—Conduct of the different
Divisions—Explosion of the Grand Magazine—Close of the
Action—Evacuation of the Town—Fate of the Sick and Wounded
CHAPTER XVII.
Difference between the Admiral and the Author—The Author’s 212
Orders—Captain Berkeley’s Orders—The Author applies for a
Court Martial, but is refused—Correspondence with the
Admiral—The Admiral’s Dispatches
CHAPTER XVIII.
Second Explosion at Acre—Prisoners sent to Beyrout—The 232
Author ordered to Alexandria with a Squadron—Letter from
the Emir—Neglected State of his Troops—English
Commissary-General appointed—Excursion to the
Mountains—Padre Ryllo—French Priests in Lebanon—Visit to
the Wife of an Emir—Bad conduct of the Turks—Letters to
Lords Ponsonby, Palmerston, and Minto on the subject
CHAPTER XIX.
The Author sent to Alexandria—Defences of the Town—Lord 248
Palmerston’s Instructions to Lord Ponsonby—Lord Ponsonby’s
dislike to Mehemet Ali—The Author’s Correspondence with
Boghos Bey—Interview with the Pacha—His Arsenal—Further
Correspondence—Signature of the Convention
APPENDIX.
Treaty of 15th July, 1840, for the Pacification of the 285
Levant
Separate Act and Protocols 293
INTRODUCTION.
In writing the history of the War in Syria, I began after the battle of
Nizib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, which had well nigh laid
Turkey prostrate at the feet of her powerful vassal; but it is necessary
that the uninformed reader should be acquainted how Mehemet Ali, who
began a simple soldier, should have risen to such a height of power as
to attract the attention of the nations of Europe, and cause them to
come forward, at the imminent risk of a European war, to interfere
between the vassal and the master.
Mehemet Ali is of low origin, and was born at Cavallo, in Roumelia, in
1769. He left his parents when young, and began his career as a
tobacco-merchant, but soon tired of trade, became a soldier, and was
sent to Egypt, at the time of the French invasion, at the head of a body
of Arnauts (Albanians.) After the evacuation of Egypt by the French, he
made himself extremely useful to Kourschid Pacha, the governor of Egypt,
who was unpopular with the Mamelukes, and disliked by his own soldiers.
Mehemet was too clever for the Governor, and soon began to see an
opening for himself. Kourschid became jealous, and endeavoured to get
rid of him; but the future Pacha of Egypt had gained over his countrymen
to his interest, and, with the assistance of the Mamelukes, deposed the
Pacha, and stepped into his shoes. His own talent, and the weakness of
the Porte, kept him in place; though many attempts were made to remove
him.
Mehemet Ali never openly opposed the Porte; he was the most submissive
of Pachas, and always managed to gain his point, and each unsuccessful
attempt of the Porte to displace him left him more powerful than ever.
When the British landed at Damietta, in 1807, Mehemet Ali ruled in
Egypt, and it was principally owing to his energetic conduct that the
expedition failed.
The massacre of the Mamelukes, which took place in 1811, cannot be
justified, even according to Eastern ideas. That they were extremely
troublesome and dangerous there cannot be a doubt; they would have had
no hesitation whatever in overthrowing Mehemet Ali’s government, and
putting him to death; and had he openly attacked them, he would have
been justified; but a breach of hospitality is a greater crime in the
East than in the West. He had invited the Mamelukes to eat salt with
him, and he treacherously attacked and butchered them in the citadel of
Cairo in cold blood. One alone escaped; he took a desperate leap over
the battlements, his horse was killed on the spot, and he alone, of
between 400 and 500, survived to tell the story of the massacre of his
fellows.
About this time the Pacha began to extend his views beyond Egypt, and
his first step was to take advantage of the opening afforded by the
depredations of the Wahabees, a reforming military sect of Arabs, who
had captured Mecca and Medina, plundered the caravans, and put a stop to
the pilgrimages of the Faithful. Less actuated, it may be fairly
supposed, by religious zeal than by political wisdom, he procured orders
from the Porte, by virtue of which he attacked, and at length, after
several campaigns, succeeded in subduing them; his two sons Toussoon and
Ibrahim greatly exerting themselves in the war. The pachalic of the Holy
Cities was in consequence granted by the Sultan to Ibrahim, but Mehemet
Ali pushed his arms still further, and did not desist till he had got
into his possession the most valuable parts of the coast of Arabia.
Shortly after the massacre of the Mamelukes, Mehemet, with the
assistance of Colonel Seve (now Souliman Pacha), an officer of merit in
the French service, set to work to raise an army and to discipline it on
the European model. The latter was no easy task; he had to contend
against the habits and prejudices of the Arabs, but nevertheless, he
succeeded in this, as he has done in most of his undertakings. In 1824
he was enabled to send a powerful army and fleet to Greece to assist in
putting down the insurrection; here the Allies interfered; the
“untoward” battle of Navarino destroyed his fleet, and not more than
half his army returned to the land of their birth. As a reward for his
services, however, the government of Candia was conferred on him by the
Porte.
From this time to 1831 Mehemet Ali employed himself in improving his
country, and perfecting his establishments; and though according to our
notions, the means he employed were not very mild or humane, the public
works he executed in a short time were almost as wonderful as those of
Peter the Great.
His military and naval conscriptions, and other acts of tyranny, induced
many of the inhabitants of Egypt to abandon their country and take
refuge in Syria, and they were protected by Abdallah Pacha, the Governor
of the province in which stands the celebrated fortress of St. Jean
d’Acre. This Pacha was under considerable obligation to Mehemet Ali;
but, nevertheless, disregarded all his remonstrances. Mehemet Ali was
not a man to be trifled with; and, under the pretence of recovering his
Fellahs and punishing Abdallah Pacha, he took steps from which the
far-famed Eastern Question at length arose.
He assembled an army of 40,000 men, including eight regiments of
cavalry, and several thousand Bedouins, a large park of artillery and a
battering train. At the head of this army he placed his son Ibrahim
Pacha. A squadron of five sail-of-the-line and several frigates were
despatched to Acre in the month of November, 1831, a season of the year
rather too late to commence a campaign. Nevertheless, Ibrahim having
crossed the Desert, set himself down before Acre in December.
The Grand Prince of Lebanon, the Emir Bechir, after much hesitation,
paid him a visit in his camp before Acre, and brought presents of horses
for Ibrahim and Abbas Pachas, and endeavoured to make his visit one of
compliment only. Ibrahim, seeing the immense advantage of gaining him
over to his interest, either by force or persuasion, detained him in his
camp for several months, and at last obtained a promise of his
co-operation; he was then permitted to return to Ibteddin, leaving,
however, his grandson, the Emir Mahmoud, as a hostage for his fidelity.
The siege was conducted with so little skill both by land and sea, that
six months elapsed before the fortress fell into the possession of
Ibrahim Pacha, and then it was taken by storm. The following, extracted
from the work of Mr. St. John, is the best account I have been able to
procure[1].
Footnote 1:
_Egypt under Mohammed Ali_, vol. ii., pp. 493-496.
“Ibrahim on the 26th of May, ordering the generals, colonels, and chiefs
of battalions into his tent, made the following arrangements for
carrying the place by storm. Ahmed Bey, General of Brigade, with the
first battalion of the second regiment of infantry, was directed to
mount the breach near the tower of Kapoo-Boorjou; to the second
battalion, the breach opposite Nebi-Saleh was assigned, and to the
third, that of Zavié; each assaulting party to be supported by a party
in reserve. About an hour after midnight, scaling ladders were commanded
to be brought to the trench near the tower of Kerim Boorjou. Each
officer, moreover, received particular instructions. During the night
the batteries kept up a continual fire upon the city, and immediately
after sunrise the order for the assault was given. The breaches of Zavié
and Nebi-Saleh were at once carried; but the detachment which had been
directed against the tower of Kapoo-Boorjou, meeting with some
resistance, exhibited signs of trepidation, and was about to give
ground. Observing this, Ibrahim, sabre in hand, advanced towards them,
and succeeded, by vehement menaces, in arresting their retrograde
movement. At the same time the reserve advanced to their support, and
while a part of the men kept the enemy in check by a well-directed fire,
the others threw up an intrenchment.
“In the city, the Turkish soldiers, whose numbers had been reduced to
about 2000, with the chivalrous Abdallah Pacha at their head, exhibited
eminent proofs of bravery. In one hour and a half they made three
different sallies, and though constantly repulsed, left upon the minds
of the besiegers a high idea of their indomitable intrepidity. The
cannonading continued all day on both sides. At the breach of Zavié, the
Arabs having penetrated to the gate near the tower of the Khazné,
Abdallah Pacha, followed by his staff, attacked them in person, and
driving them beyond the ditch where they were exposed to the fire of the
besieged, they retired under the cover of their own battery. Ibrahim,
supported by a great number of inferior officers, endeavoured to bring
them once more to the charge; but they again gave way, and retired
before the Turks. He now ordered one of his chaooshes to snatch the
colours from the standard-bearer, and advance towards the enemy. The
soldier refused to deliver them. A second was sent, and met with the
same refusal; but the standard-bearer himself now marching forward to
the breach, was followed by the Arabs, who returned to the charge with
so much fury, that they succeeded in reaching the parapet, from behind
which they dislodged the enemy with stones. Such was the nature of the
contest for hours, a series of successes and disasters, more fatal,
however, to the Turks than to the Arabs, since, their numbers being
small, every man was missed. At length the firing ceased on both sides;
and this suspension of slaughter continued until half past five in the
afternoon.
“In this interval, the principal engineer was directed to reconnoitre a
part of the wall, where Ibrahim supposed the scaling ladders might be
successfully applied; and his report confirming the suspicion of the
General, orders were issued to commence the escalade. As the operation
was conducted in the teeth of the enemy, who maintained a constant and
murderous fire, the number of men who fell in effecting it was
considerable; but their efforts were at length crowned with success, and
a party of horse also throwing themselves into the town, the besieged
perceived that all further defence was impracticable, and demanded
quarter. Immediately afterwards, a deputation consisting of certain
officers of artillery, with the mufti and imam of Abdallah Pacha,
arrived, imploring the clemency of the victor. They were graciously
received by Ibrahim, who promised them his protection, and even allowed
the officers to retain their arms. To Abdallah Pacha, life only was
guaranteed. By this time the city was filled with soldiers, and those
excesses and atrocities, too common on the storming of towns, took
place; but such property as could be discovered was next day restored to
the owners. It has been asserted, upon the authority of an European
consul, then in the city, that the soldiers of Ibrahim were allowed
seven days’ sack of the town; but the author of this report is an ardent
partisan of Abdallah Pacha; and it may be further remarked that, since
Mohammed Ali aimed at gaining a permanent footing in Syria, the thing
itself is improbable.
“Abdallah Pacha, two days after the taking of Acre, was sent prisoner
into Egypt, where he was received with the honours due to a brave man,
and had a palace, situated on the island of Rhouda, assigned him for his
residence.”
The Turkish Government were not unwilling to see Abdallah Pacha deprived
of Acre, as they thought he had assumed an air of too much independence,
and they also hoped that Mehemet Ali, who they saw with a jealous eye
was becoming too powerful, would exhaust his resources by undertaking a
campaign in Syria. After the capture of Acre the Porte soon began to
perceive that Abdallah Pacha’s position was taken possession of by a
more powerful, a more ambitious, and a more dangerous vassal; they
therefore ordered him immediately to withdraw from Syria, and not
expecting compliance, collected an army of 20,000 men on the banks of
the Orontes, and advanced another from Anatolia, to oppose him.
Mehemet Ali, however, had no idea of satisfying himself with the capture
of Acre. He had now passed the Rubicon, and he directed Ibrahim to
advance a part of his army on Balbeck to watch the operations of Hussein
Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman army, and to occupy Damascus with the
remainder. Ali Pacha, who commanded the Turkish troops in that city,
evacuated it without firing a shot, and retired on Homs, by the old road
of Palmyra, and joined the Turkish army.
Ibrahim Pacha, having now possession of Damascus, advanced on Khan
Kousseir, where he arrived on the 6th of July. The next morning he
attacked and defeated a part of the Turkish army, and took 3000
prisoners and 13 field pieces. On the 8th the Egyptian army entered
Homs, and took 1500 prisoners and 14 guns. The remains of the Ottoman
army retired on Aleppo, and formed a junction with the force under
Hussein Pacha; from thence they continued their retreat, in two columns,
on Beylan, and soon after Ibrahim took possession of Aleppo, where he
halted a short time to reorganize his army. On the 29th he again came in
sight of the Ottoman army, again attacked, and again defeated them,
taking 25 guns and 2000 prisoners. On the following day the Egyptians
entered Alexandretta, where they found 14 guns and abundance of stores
and provisions; and the Turks now retired on Mount Taurus.
The Sultan becoming alarmed for the stability of his throne, made great
exertions, and speedily collected an army of 50,000 men, and a good
train of artillery, and placed them under the command of Rechid Pacha,
the Grand Vizier. The Egyptian army had now assembled at Adana, and on
the 14th of October they drove the Turks from the defiles of Mount
Taurus, and on the 20th the Egyptian advanced guard occupied Erekli,
where they remained till the 27th of November.
On the 13th of December, the whole army was put in motion, and arrived
at Koniyeh on the 17th, the day after the Turks had evacuated it. From
that time to the 20th of December, various movements took place on both
sides, and on the 21st the battle of Koniyeh was fought, when the
Ottoman army was totally defeated and dispersed by Ibrahim Pacha, and
the Grand Vizier taken prisoner.
Nothing now hindered the conqueror from marching on Scutari, where he
might have arrived early in January, and before the Russians had reached
the Bosphorus. Had he followed this course, Constantinople would have
been revolutionized, and the power of the Sultan overturned, and most
probably Mehemet Ali would have been placed on the throne of Osman.
The Egyptian army did not leave Koniyeh till the 20th of January, 1833,
and reached Kutayah on the 1st of February. The Russians had by that
time arrived in the Bosphorus, called in by the Sultan, who, being
neglected by his natural friends, was obliged to apply to his natural
enemy to protect him from the rebellion of one of his own subjects.
The arrival of the Russian squadron and army in the Bosphorus decided
Ibrahim to enter into negociations, and the Treaty of Kutayah, by which
the Ottoman empire was saved from immediate destruction, was signed, the
Pachalic of Adana and the whole of Syria (by far the most valuable part
of their conquests,) being entrusted to Mehemet Ali and his son.
This Treaty, so mortifying to the Sultan’s pride, was followed by that
of Unkiar Skelessi, and the consequent departure of the Russian squadron
from the Bosphorus; they had, however, learnt the road to
Constantinople, which neither the British nor French Governments ought
to have permitted, and the time is not far distant when they will profit
by their experience.
Shortly after the Treaty of Kutayah, Ibrahim retired within the defiles
of the Taurus, and the whole province was formally put under the
government of Mehemet Ali.
Had the Pacha of Egypt been a wise man, and ameliorated, in the
slightest degree, the condition of the people he had released from the
barbarous rule of the Turks, so as to have made them feel the
difference, he might have consolidated his power both in Syria and
Egypt, and restored these two fine countries to prosperity. His tribute
to the Porte was small, and he possessed the power to render the people
both prosperous and happy. The conduct of his army, too, when passing
through Syria had been most exemplary, and the inhabitants had to their
astonishment observed the wonderful difference between an irregular and
undisciplined Turkish force and the order and regularity of the Egyptian
troops, and, generally speaking, were most favourable to the change of
masters. But Mehemet Ali, though possessing ten times the intelligence
and energy of a Turk, was still an Oriental, and only knew how to govern
the people entrusted to his charge with Eastern despotism.
The powers of Europe now turned their attention to Egypt with increased
interest, and England was the first to establish a permanent agent and
Consul at the Court of Alexandria; her example was followed, shortly
after, by the other great powers of Europe. Mehemet Ali had been
permitted to send his officers to England, and they were instructed in
our dockyards in the art of ship-building, and were even received on
board our ships to be instructed in seamanship and discipline. What
greater proof could we have given of the interest we took in Mehemet
Ali, than such a distinguished mark of favour? and what other conclusion
could he have drawn, than that we were favourable to his government? The
French were not behind us; they even went farther. A French officer of
distinction had disciplined the Pacha’s army; he had now also a French
Admiral at the head of the navy; and great credit is due to both for the
state of order and discipline into which they have brought both arms of
the service.
Had Mehemet Ali been now satisfied, he might have lived to see the
inhabitants of the countries he ruled rich and prosperous, and invoking
blessings on his head for having given them happiness, tranquillity, and
security of property; but the old man, either mistrusting Turkey, or
having a lurking ambition to be seated on the throne of Osman, instead
of reducing his armies, and remitting part of the imposts on the people,
began his government in Syria by increasing the taxation, and afterwards
introduced the conscription, of all measures the most unpopular in
Eastern countries.
Ibrahim was not insensible to the imprudence of those measures, and
remonstrated with his father, and shortly after entirely withdrew from
the management of the civil affairs of the country; when Scheriff Pacha
was appointed civil governor of Syria, and established the seat of
government at Damascus.
Mehemet Ali’s first new financial measure was the ferdeh, a tax on all
males from twelve years upwards, varying from fifteen to five hundred
piastres, according to their means. This was paid by all classes and
religions, and the Christians, who before paid a poll-tax, were also
obliged to pay the ferdeh, in addition to the regular taxes. Forced
contributions were also occasionally raised to supply the exigencies of
the government. According to Mr. Farren, the Syrian contributions was
raised from 20,000 to 32,000 purses.
The Governor and local officers, it is true, were not allowed to receive
bribes; but the people gained little by this. Besides the regular taxes,
and the occasional forced contributions, the government was in the habit
of purchasing what was required for the maintenance of the army at their
own price, the inhabitants being obliged to deliver it into the
government stores at their own risk and cost. They were also liable to
be pressed to work at the public establishments, and even transported to
distant parts of the country, receiving pay hardly sufficient to keep
body and soul together.
In addition to these oppressions, whenever the army was put in motion
the inhabitants were obliged to furnish animals to transport baggage and
provisions, and were paid two-thirds less than the common wages of the
country. If horses or mules were wanted for the government, they were
seized without any respect to persons, and paid for at whatever price
the authorities thought proper to give. Vessels for the transport of
provisions and government stores were seized in like manner, and the
owners paid about a third of the freight they could have gained in
trade.
Tampering with the currency was a source of dishonest gain to the Pacha:
taxes were ordered to be paid in certain coins, Mehemet Ali fixing the
value always below its standard; in short, there was a system of legal
pillage established from one end of the country to the other.
These oppressions were nevertheless borne with, for they are common in
Eastern governments; and, had not their new ruler commenced the
disarmament of the people, and the forced levies, they probably would
never have endeavoured to shake off his yoke. But his measures, odious
in themselves, were rendered quite intolerable by the mode in which they
were executed. According to Mr. Farren, the conscription in Syria
amounted to 11 per cent. on the male population; the classes who were
exempt from the conscription were obliged to find substitutes either by
fine or purchase, and many who had been seized and drafted into
regiments more than once, and obtained their discharge by purchase, were
again seized, and their remonstrances wholly disregarded.
“The periods,” says Mr. Farren, in his excellent letter to Lord
Lindsay[2], “of the forced levies are kept secret, and generally
commence on a Friday, when the mosques are resorted to. At the hour of
prayer numerous parties of soldiers are distributed through the quarters
of the cities, and intelligence is conveyed to them by the firing of a
gun of the moment to commence. They then rush on all the citizens who
may be in the streets, and drive or drag them struggling along to the
great square of the Serai, when, having left them in its inclosure, they
return to make fresh captives of all upon their routes. A short time
suffices to spread a thrill of fear and despair throughout the city.
Women may be seen rushing wildly through the streets, followed by their
children, to seek the husband, son, or father, who but a few hours
before had left them to provide for their daily wants, and now are
separated, perhaps for ever, from their families without a parting
benediction.
Footnote 2:
_Letters from the Holy Land_, vol. ii.
“Within the inclosure, which files of armed troops surround, the
wretched victims are crowded together, bowed down with despair, while,
pressing upon every avenue, their wives and daughters and aged mothers
may be seen, wildly darting their frenzied glances through the captives
in search of a missing relative, or bursting into paroxysms of despair
on beholding the lost objects of their fears; and, all around, the air
is rent by the cries of these unfortunates, cursing, as I have heard
them, the very name of their prophet, and invoking the Deity himself to
avenge the cause of the poor and the oppressed. The wretched conscripts
are taken immediately before the medical men of the army, and, unless
physically disqualified, are sent off to the Castle, confined there,
dressed as soldiers, and in a week or fortnight, marched out of the
place and drafted into the regiments. This is no exaggerated picture,
and many travellers in England—and one especially, Sir Edwin Pearson,
who was lately with me at Damascus during one of these scenes,—can
verify this statement, and attest the general wretchedness of the
people. In the dead of the night the quarters of the city have been
entered by armed soldiers, the houses forcibly opened, and their male
inmates dragged from them. At these times the shops are closed for days,
and all business is suspended. Considerable loss is consequently
sustained by all classes, and as the debts that may be due by those who
are seized are seldom or never recovered, large sums are lost in that
manner to the citizens.
“The soldiers avail themselves of the general panic to get money from
the aged or maimed,—and even by entering houses and seizing children in
them, who are liberated by their frightened mothers at any immediate
sacrifice.”
It is not surprising that people, thus driven to despair, should revolt.
In the year 1834 the insurrections began in the Haouran, and spread
afterwards to the country of the Druses and Naplousians. These
insurrections, however, Mehemet Ali managed with his usual energy to put
down, and established more security to the people from being plundered
by anybody but himself; that, and a greater facility and safety in
travelling through the country, appear to have been the only merits of
Mehemet Ali’s government in Syria. Thus things proceeded for a while,
the Pacha exerting himself to fortify the passes of Taurus, and building
barracks at Antioch and other places, particularly at St. Jean d’Acre,
while Ibrahim and his officers laboured to introduce new cultures, as of
the sugar-cane, the indigo plant, &c., and with some success; but this
could not reconcile the Syrians to the grinding monopolies and vexatious
burdens of their ruler, and very strong measures were required to keep
up the Egyptian authority.
In the year 1838 Mehemet Ali first began to talk of independence, and
announced to the Consuls his intention, at no distant period, of
declaring himself. Shortly after this he set out on an expedition to the
mines of Sennaar, and was absent some considerable time.
The Sultan, as might have been expected, had never ceased to form plans
for the recovery of Syria to his rule, and as early as the year 1834 he
had committed the charge of several of the pachalics of the eastern part
of Asia Minor to a Circassian soldier, named Hafiz Pacha, in order that
he might there raise an army for that purpose. Hafiz laboured with great
zeal in the cause, and from the remoteness of the districts, his
progress was unnoticed by the European Powers. At length, in the
beginning of 1839 the Porte more openly made preparations for war; and
on the 12th of February of that year, Count Molé for the first time
brought the affairs of the East under the consideration of Lord
Granville, the British Ambassador[3]; and Lord Palmerston repeatedly
wrote to Lord Ponsonby to discourage, by every possible means, the Porte
from again embroiling themselves in war with Mehemet Ali; declaring, at
the same time, that if the Porte was attacked, assistance would be
given; but, if on the other hand they became the aggressors, it might
change the whole face of affairs.
Footnote 3:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 1.
Notwithstanding the advice given to the Porte by the Allied Ministers at
Constantinople, the Sultan, relying on the reports of the efficiency of
his army in Asia Minor, communicated to him by his General, gave
directions for the advance of the Turkish army, and they actually
marched beyond Bir, which is only sixty miles distant from Aleppo.
Mehemet Ali determined, however, not to be the aggressor, and directed
Ibrahim to refrain from making any movement in advance.
Russia and Austria becoming alarmed lest the peace of Europe should be
disturbed, instructed their Consuls at Alexandria to request that
Mehemet Ali would desire Ibrahim to withdraw his troops towards
Damascus, assuming that Ibrahim was the first to put his army in motion,
which certainly was not the case. France seeing the possibility also of
a rupture between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, expressed a strong desire
that Great Britain would act in concert with her, and proposed to send a
fleet of eight or nine sail of the line to the Levant, to co-operate
with the British fleet, which she supposed would consist of ten sail of
the line.
Whether Mehemet Ali was sincere in his desire to avoid hostilities with
the Porte or not, is not very easy to divine; but his actions certainly
seem in his favour. He not only remitted the tribute to the Porte, but
he declared to M. Cochelet, the Consul-General of France, that if the
troops of the Sultan were withdrawn on the other side of the Euphrates,
he would order his army to retrograde, and direct Ibrahim to return to
Damascus; nay more, if the Turks would retire still further, he would
recall Ibrahim into Egypt; and if the Four Powers would guarantee peace,
and procure him the hereditary succession, he would withdraw a great
part of his army from Syria[4].
Footnote 4:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 54.
Notwithstanding all this, Lord Ponsonby, so early as the 20th of May,
1839, declared the Pacha the aggressor, and sided with Russia. He
finishes a long despatch to Lord Palmerston with these remarkable words,
“Russia has declared a truth—a limited truth—the Great Powers cannot
deny it; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the
aggressor[5].”
Footnote 5:
Ibid., p. 29.
In the beginning of May, Ibrahim seeing all prospect of peace at an end,
left his agricultural pursuits at Khan Jouman, distant five hours from
Aleppo, and immediately gave orders for the assembling of his army at
the latter place. The army of Ibrahim was said to consist of 55,000
infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 196 guns, besides 6000 irregular cavalry.
That of the Sultan was supposed to amount to 80,000 men of all arms, and
170 guns.
On the 7th of June Mehemet Ali received intelligence from Ibrahim that
the Turks had driven back a detachment of Egyptian cavalry. He
immediately invited the Consuls to a conference, and asked their advice
as to his future conduct. They unanimously advised him to act on the
defensive; and above all, not to send his fleet to sea, which he had
determined on doing. This advice he decided for the present to follow,
but a circumstance soon occurred to alter his determination.
On the 9th of June the Turkish fleet sailed for the Dardanelles, under
the command of the Capudan Pacha; Captain Walker of the British Navy
embarked with him as his adviser; and the Capudan Pacha intended to
remain six or eight days in the Dardanelles. On the same day, Mehemet
Ali, having received letters from Ibrahim, giving an account that the
advanced guard of the Turkish army had attacked some of his troops on
the territory under his government, lost all patience, and, in spite of
the remonstrance of the Consuls at Alexandria, sent orders to Ibrahim to
drive the Turks out of his territory, and then march on the main body;
and, if victorious, occupy Malatiyeh, Kharput, Urfah, and Diyarbekr.
On the 16th of June Captain Caillier, an aide-de-camp of Marshal
Soult’s, arrived at Alexandria, with orders to call upon Mehemet Ali to
suspend hostilities, whereupon the Pacha gave him a letter to Ibrahim,
desiring him not to pass the frontier; and, if in the Turkish territory,
to halt, unless Hafiz Pacha continued to advance; he was then to engage
him. On the 16th of June the first division of the Egyptian squadron
sailed, and the remainder on the following day. Captain Caillier left
Alexandria on the 19th for Alexandretta.
On the 25th and 26th of June, orders were sent by the English and French
Governments to their naval Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, to
proceed to the coast of Syria, and prevent a collision between the
Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and urge them to return to their respective
ports, in the event of their having sailed. They were also directed to
open a communication with the Turkish and Egyptian Generals, and exert
their influence to bring about a suspension of arms, and a wider
separation between the hostile armies. Should the Turkish General refuse
to agree to these propositions, it was to be pointed out to him that all
communication by sea would be closed, and his supplies cut off. If the
refusal, on the other hand, should proceed from Ibrahim Pacha, similar
representations were to be made to him, and communication cut off
between Alexandria and Syria. In some respects the English instructions
differed from the French. The English Admiral had no orders to cut off
the Turkish supplies by sea, in the event of their refusing the
armistice; nor had he any orders to receive a Russian squadron should
they tender their services; but the English Admiral was at liberty to
force the Dardanelles should a Russian fleet arrive at Constantinople,
which the French Admiral was not authorized to do without fresh
instructions.
On the 2nd of July a further instruction was sent to Sir Robert Stopford
in accordance with the instructions of the French Admiral, to receive a
Russian force should it offer its co-operation[6].
Footnote 6:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., pp. 90, 93, 101, 122.
Lord Ponsonby having written to Sir Robert Stopford, that war was
inevitable between the Turks and Egyptians, the Admiral, on the 7th of
June, being then in Palermo Bay, despatched Sir Thomas Fellowes in the
Vanguard, together with a brig, to the Levant, to watch the Turkish
squadron, but with positive orders to observe the strictest neutrality.
At this time the Commander-in-Chief had received no instructions how to
act.
Sir Thomas Fellowes arrived in Besika Bay on the 29th of June, and the
following day received a visit from Captain Walker, accompanied by M.
Etienne Pisani, and Mr. Lander, the British Consul at the Dardanelles,
with an offer, on the part of the Capudan Pacha, of provision, and also
to ascertain whether Sir Robert Stopford was expected, and whether he
would interfere with the Turkish fleet. This, of course, Sir Thomas
Fellowes declined answering. M. Pisani then went on board the ship of
the Capudan Pacha, who distinctly informed him that he had orders to
attack the Egyptian fleet, and should sail in a few days. He was under
some apprehensions that the French would interrupt him, but he assured
M. Pisani, that, unless the English interfered also, he should proceed
in the execution of the Sultan’s orders.
On the 30th of June Sultan Mahmoud, who had been in bad health for some
time, died, and his son, Abdul Medjid, a youth of sixteen, was declared
of age by the Divan, and proclaimed Emperor. Orders were immediately
forwarded to Hafiz Pacha to suspend hostilities, and the Capudan Pacha
was directed not to quit the Dardanelles.
A few days after the Sultan’s death, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign
Affairs communicated to the Ambassadors that the young Sultan was
disposed to confer the hereditary Government of Egypt on Mehemet Ali, on
condition that he would restore Syria, Candia, and the Holy Cities, to
the Porte[7]. These pacific intentions, however, were too late, for on
the 24th of June Ibrahim Pacha had attacked and totally defeated the
Turkish army at Nezib, who lost all their guns, ammunition, and baggage,
and the remainder repassed the frontier in complete disorder. In
addition to this misfortune, the Capudan Pacha had sailed from the
Dardanelles, and on falling in with Admiral Lalande, sent his second in
command on board to say, that when he heard of the Sultan’s death he was
of opinion that he had been poisoned by Hosrew and Halil Pacha, who were
devoted to Russia; and under this impression he had written to Hafiz
Pacha to march on Constantinople; that he should apply to Mehemet Ali
for assistance, and in the mean while take the Turkish fleet to Candia.
This M. Lalande advised him not to do, and he then intimated his
intention of going to Rhodes.
Footnote 7:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 183.
The French and English Ambassadors, in consequence of these untoward and
unexpected events, wrote to the Grand Vizier to assure him of their
support, and Lord Ponsonby also wrote to Sir Robert Stopford to
recommend him not to be at any distance from the centre of affairs.
The Admiral left Malta on the 2nd of July, in consequence of a private
letter from Lord Minto, desiring him to proceed off the south end of
Cyprus, and there wait for orders. His arrival there he communicated to
Lord Ponsonby under date of the 11th of July. It does not appear that at
this time Sir Robert Stopford had received Lord Palmerston’s
instructions of the 25th of June, which pointed out to him the course he
ought to follow in the event of the defeat of the Turkish army, and on
the Egyptian and Turkish squadron meeting each other at sea. Had these
instructions arrived, the Admiral, no doubt, would have conceived it his
duty to have taken still stronger steps to have prevented the defection
of the Turkish fleet; and it is to be regretted that in the absence of
instructions he had not taken upon himself to have immediately proceeded
off Alexandria, and forced the Capudan Pacha to return to his duty,
particularly if he had received in time Lord Ponsonby’s reply (dated
July 19,) to his letter announcing his arrival off Cyprus, in which his
Lordship states,
“I think the spirit and the end of your instructions indicate that it
would be proper to consider the Ottoman fleet, thus removed from the
authority of its legitimate Sovereign by the rebellious act of the
Capudan Pacha, as being thereby subjected to the vigorous exertion of
your power; and I think it would be right to take all safe and proper
means to prevent that fleet being delivered up to the Pacha of Egypt, if
there should be fortunately still time left for so doing; and I am of
opinion it will be equally advantageous and just to restore it to the
Sultan.
“I have stated my opinion in consequence of your desire, and I have only
to add that there is perfect tranquillity here.”
Sir Thomas Fellowes’s orders were so strict, that though he kept company
with the Ottoman fleet for several days, he had no communication with
the Capudan Pacha; but even if he had, he could not have discovered his
intentions, because Captain Walker himself, who was on board, had no
notion that they were going off Alexandria for any other purpose than
attacking the Egyptian squadron. This, however, was very far from the
Turkish Admiral’s intention.
On the 9th of July an Ottoman corvette arrived at Alexandria, having on
board Sheriff Aga, the kiaya of the Capudan Pacha, who was the bearer of
a letter to Mehemet Ali; Mehemet did not conceal its contents, which
were to ask permission to bring the fleet to Alexandria as a friend,
stating that the Capudan Pacha disapproved of the election of Hosrew to
the post of Grand Vizier, and that he would co-operate with Mehemet Ali
in placing him as vakeel to the young Sultan, as the only person fit to
rule the empire. On the same evening Mehemet Ali sent the Nile steamer
with his reply to the Capudan Pacha, and on the 10th the Rhadamanthus
left Alexandria to communicate this intelligence to the
Commander-in-Chief, as appears by Colonel Campbell’s despatch to Lord
Palmerston of the 11th of July[8].
Footnote 8:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 219.
On the same day that the Rhadamanthus left, a Turkish steamer arrived
with despatches from Hosrew Pacha to Mehemet Ali, who was very
communicative to Colonel Campbell. The purport of this despatch was, to
announce the accession of Abdul Medjid, and his pardon of Mehemet Ali:
that it was his intention to send him the nichan iftikhar, a decoration
indicative of high favour, and grant him the hereditary succession of
Egypt and its dependencies; and that he had ordered the Turkish troops
to retire from the frontiers of Syria.
On the reception of this, Mehemet Ali said he should consider the war at
an end, and should order Ibrahim to retire on Marash. That he hoped the
Allies would be satisfied; and as soon as everything was settled, he
would proceed to Constantinople to do homage to his sovereign. That
should Achmet Pacha wish to deliver up the fleet, he would not accept
it, but send it back to Constantinople; and that as for the post of
vakeel, he would rather remain in his present position. All this seemed
very well; but we shall shortly see how he acted.
On the 14th of July the Turkish fleet arrived off Alexandria, and, as no
doubt had been previously arranged, formed a junction with the Egyptian
fleet. The following morning, the Nile steamer, bearing the flag of the
Capudan Pacha, arrived in the harbour, and the traitor was well received
by Mehemet Ali[9].
Footnote 9:
The following is a portion of the account of the reception of the
Turkish Admiral by the Pacha, furnished by the dragoman of the British
Consul-General, and published at length in the _Levant Papers_:
“When the Nile steamer anchored, Mushir Achmet went into the boat, and
immediately a salute of nineteen guns was fired by the Nile, which
salute was repeated by the forts the moment he landed, when he was
received by the Pacha’s civil officers of rank, and he rode upon the
Pacha’s own horse; and thus preceded by the said officers, cawasses,
and chiaushes, went to the Pacha’s palace between two files of the
troops that were placed all the way. As soon as he entered the palace
gate, Mehemet Ali walked out of his room to meet him, when the Admiral
seeing him, unbuckled his sword, gave it to one of the officers behind
him, and walked respectfully towards the Viceroy, and bowed to the
ground as if meaning to kiss his dress, while the Viceroy embraced and
kissed him, saying, ‘Welcome, brother.’ After this, they walked arm in
arm into the Viceroy’s room, all the officers following them. They sat
near each other on the middle of the sofa. The Capudan Pacha then told
his Highness that, for a long time past, it was his wish to have the
honour of seeing him. After coffee, and pipes, the Viceroy dismissed
all the bystanders, and this was at half-past nine o’clock; when
Sheriff Aga, the Capudan Pacha’s Kiaya, who was still within, walked
up to the Viceroy, and kissing his feet, told him, ‘Now you are both
together, with your leave I retire,‘ meaning that he had accomplished
his object, and fulfilled his duty so far. His Highness and the
Capudan Pacha remained by themselves in the room till half-past ten
o‘clock, after which the Capudan Pacha walked out of the room
bare-footed, his own servant not being there to give him his shoes,
and was obliged to walk about twenty paces without shoes, until his
servant brought them, as well as his sword, upon which he went to the
Musappi Serai (the palace for guests), accompanied in the same way as
he had arrived. When he entered the palace assigned to him, all the
civil officers, as well as Houssein Pacha, kissed his foot, and he
asked them to take seats, and gave them coffee, telling them, ‘Thank
God, my wishes to meet the Viceroy are accomplished, and you may know
that I have obtained his Highness’s permission for the landing of the
Vice and the Rear Admirals.’
“With the Capudan Pacha ten officers landed, two of whom are Beys
(Colonels), and one is the brother of Osman Pacha, the ex-Egyptian
Admiral, who deserted to Constantinople more than five years ago.”
So secret was all this kept on board the Capudan Pacha’s ship, that
Captain Walker, who was with him, had no notion of what the Turkish
Admiral was about, until he sent a steamer to direct two ships, who,
being bad sailers, were left astern, to rendezvous off Alexandria. On
speaking to the Capudan Pacha, he was assured that Mehemet Ali had put
the Egyptian fleet under his orders, and that he was proceeding to Egypt
to confer with Mehemet Ali on what were the best steps to be taken for
the good of the Turkish empire. When the Turkish fleet anchored, Captain
Walker landed, and left Alexandria for Constantinople on the 20th, much
to the annoyance of the Capudan Pacha, who wished him to remain.
The Allied Consuls used all their endeavours in vain to advise Mehemet
Ali to send back the fleet. He said he would have nothing to do with
Hosrew, who was his bitter foe; and that he had written to him to send
in his resignation; and should Hosrew do so, all would be right.
Mehemet Ali’s enmity to Hosrew was much strengthened by the latter
having sent, through the hands of the French Consul, letters to the
General and inferior Admirals of the Turkish fleet, calling upon them to
return to their allegiance. These letters M. Cochelet gave to Mehemet
Ali, who delivered them to the Admirals, when, as might have been
expected from the position they were in, they tore them up with
indignation.
On the 16th about sixty of the principal officers of the Turkish fleet
came on shore, and were presented to the Pacha, who received them in a
gracious manner. By the 28th the whole of the Turkish and Egyptian
fleets had entered the port of Alexandria, so that had the
Commander-in-Chief proceeded off there immediately after the
Rhadamanthus had joined him, or even had he proceeded after his receipt
of the despatch of the 25th of June which I believe arrived by the
Hydra, there would have been ample time to have secured them. This would
have completely anticipated Lord Palmerston’s instructions of the 7th of
August[10], which directed the Admiral to use his utmost efforts to
prevent the Turkish fleet going into Alexandria, and to endeavour to
oblige them to return under the authority of the Sultan.
Footnote 10:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 255.
The Commander-in-Chief, however, may have had other instructions, which
do not appear in the _Levant Papers_, for the guidance of his conduct,
or he might have thought that the force under his orders, without the
co-operation of the French squadron, was not sufficient to have enforced
his demand on the Capudan Pacha to return to his allegiance if supported
in his treason by the Egyptian fleet. But, nevertheless, I think the
experiment might have been tried, and probably would have succeeded to a
certain extent, because the entrance into the harbour of Alexandria is
so difficult and so shallow that large ships must be considerably
lightened before they can enter, and neither the Egyptian nor Turkish
Admiral would have ventured to weaken their squadron by either entering
in detail or lightening the ships in the presence of a British squadron
hostile to their measures. The Commander-in-Chief, however, as I have
before said, may have had other instructions, or he took a different
view of the case, for instead of going off Alexandria he repaired to
Besika Bay, where he was joined the same evening by the Powerful,
Ganges, and Implacable. At this point, then, my history of the War in
Syria commences.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE WAR IN SYRIA.
-------------------------
CHAPTER I.
State of Affairs in the Levant in August, 1839—The Author’s Interview
with Hosrew Pacha—Sir Robert Stopford at Constantinople; his
Interview with the Sultan—Impolitic Junction of the English and
French Fleets—Sir John Louis takes the command of the English
Squadron—The Author tenders his Resignation.
The loss of the battle of Nizib, the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, and
the defection of the Turkish fleet, threatened to place Turkey at the
mercy of Mehemet Ali, or under the protection of Russia. At the earnest
desire of France Ibrahim Pacha halted, and in the beginning of August,
1839, the combined squadrons of England and France assembled in Besika
Bay, ready to proceed to Constantinople, should Ibrahim march, or should
the Russians leave Sebastapol.
The allied ministers, however, do not appear to have considered how the
squadrons were to pass the Dardanelles; the current runs constantly to
the southward, and the prevailing winds are generally from the opposite
direction. It rarely happens that a favourable breeze sufficiently
strong springs up to enable ships to pass the Hellespont; and we had not
an adequate number of steam vessels to take the ships in tow. Russia had
a strong fleet and army at Sebastapol, and could approach the Sultan’s
capital at pleasure, whereas we were powerless, and as for being able to
protect the Porte from a sudden attack, either from Russia or Ibrahim
Pacha, we might just as well have been in Malta Harbour.
As forty-eight hours would have been sufficient for a Russian fleet and
army to arrive at Constantinople, it always appeared to me, after the
unforeseen misfortunes which had befallen the Porte, the ambassadors and
admirals ought to have taken the responsibility on themselves, and
anchored the squadrons in the Golden Horn the first favourable
opportunity; the ministers of the different Powers could then have
treated the Eastern Question on an equal footing. Russia would, no
doubt, have stormed, threatened, and, perhaps, withdrawn her ambassador,
but she would not have gone to war, and, after a time, would have sent
her squadron to Constantinople to join that of England and France;
strong detachments should then have appeared off Alexandria, and, most
probably, Mehemet Ali, seeing a close union between the great Powers of
Europe, would have given up the Turkish fleet, and restored Syria to the
Porte.
This was not done, and France soon began to take a new view of the
Eastern Question, and shortly after refused to send the combined fleets
to Alexandria to demand the Turkish squadron, and, under all
circumstances, I think she was right; a hostile fleet could not enter
the harbour easily, or indeed at all, if proper precautions were taken.
We had no troops to land, and the absence of the Russian squadron would
have given Mehemet Ali reason to believe the four Powers were not
united. Alexandria might have been bombarded, it is true, and the fleet
burnt, but that would have been almost as untoward an event as the
battle of Navarino, and certainly would not have tended to strengthen
the Turkish empire; it might have provoked Mehemet Ali to order Ibrahim
to advance, which would have brought the Russians to Constantinople, and
once there, they most assuredly would not have permitted us to pass the
Dardanelles.
About this time the Admiral and many of the officers were at
Constantinople, when it was intimated to him that he might shortly
expect decided instructions; leave was immediately stopped, and the
officers were ordered to rejoin their ships forthwith. These
instructions were supposed to be, to proceed to Alexandria, but they
never arrived, as France objected to the measure. Admiral Roussin was
recalled, we became cool with France, and began to draw near to Russia.
During my sojourn at Constantinople, I had an opportunity of examining
the sea defences, the capital, and the Bosphorus, and I sent Colonel
Napier, who was with me, to examine the land fortifications. The
batteries were numerous, well placed, and mounted many heavy guns; but
with a strong wind and current a fleet might pass down without much
damage, and if that fleet was accompanied by an army the fortifications
could be taken in reverse; the defences of the Dardanelles are strong to
the sea, but weak to the land; a fleet might descend with the stream,
but it would be no easy matter to go against it.
When at Constantinople I had an interview with the Grand Vizier, Hosrew
Pacha. The old man appeared nearly eighty; he is of low stature, and a
good deal deformed; his countenance fresh, with a most intelligent and
penetrating eye, his dress simple. On entering his apartment he
immediately rose, kissed my cheek, complimented Colonel Napier on his
soldier-like appearance, and begged us to be seated; seeing us in boots,
he called for his, which he drew on in great haste, apparently to be on
a footing with us. Pipes and coffee were produced, and, after a few
puffs, he began the conversation through Mr. Redhouse, the interpreter,
by expressing his satisfaction at seeing me in the Sultan’s capital. I
replied that I hoped to have an opportunity of performing some services
for His Imperial Majesty, and that I thought the first step he ought to
take, should be, inviting the combined fleets to Constantinople. The old
man appeared to apprehend more danger from Mehemet Ali than from Russia,
and did not relish this proposal; he roundly asserted that it would
cause an insurrection, and the Christians would be massacred; that he
was not afraid of Russia, and although the empire had been brought to a
very low ebb by the incapacity of the men the late Sultan had placed at
the head of the army, followed by the defection of the Turkish fleet,
she was still strong; that he had no fears of Russia, and should her
troops advance on Constantinople he would put himself at the head of the
Ottoman army and defeat them. I asked him where his army was, as it had
been destroyed at Nizib and replaced by boys; remarking that Russia
would never think of marching, but would come by sea, pass the Bosphorus
in spite of all the batteries, and take possession of Constantinople
with the greatest ease.
To this he replied that, in the neighbourhood of the capital there was
an army of 30,000 men, which was quite sufficient for its defence, and
it would be much better if one half of the fleet was to remain at the
mouth of the Dardanelles and the other half proceed to Alexandria. To
this I answered, that nothing could be done at Alexandria without
troops, that the entrance of the harbour was too shallow for ships to
enter with their guns, and that Mehemet Ali had declared that if the
fleet appeared there, he should instantly direct Ibrahim to march on
Scutari; this would inevitably bring down the Russians, who would object
to the French and English approaching Constantinople, even if they could
get a fair wind, and the probability would be that it would embroil
Europe in war, and Turkey would be sacrificed.
The Vizier inquired why an English army could not be spared to attack
Alexandria. To this I replied, we had already too much on our hands;
what with the troubles in Canada, the war in India, the prospect of an
outbreak in China, and the Chartists at home, it was impossible to spare
troops, and that I was sure Parliament would not grant supplies for such
an expedition. This ended our conversation. Hosrew was strongly
suspected of being in the interest, if not the pay of Russia; how far
that is true, is hard to say.
The Admiral obtained firmans to see the mosques and other curiosities at
Constantinople, which have been so often described that I shall not
torment the reader with a repetition of an often told tale.
After passing ten days pleasantly enough between Constantinople and
Therapia, and being entertained by the ambassadors, we embarked on board
the Carysfort, which bore the Admiral’s flag, and, in tow of a steamer,
left Therapia, and shortly after anchored abreast of the Sultan’s
Asiatic palace. A royal salute was then fired, and returned by the
batteries in the vicinity of the Imperial residence. Nothing can be more
beautiful than the passage down the Bosphorus, and nothing more
magnificent than the Sultan’s palaces and the country-houses situated on
its banks.
Mahmoud was fond of building, and just before his death had finished a
new palace on the European shore. With Colonel Napier’s permission, I
give the account of an interview with the Sultan in nearly his own
words.
“The household troops, such as they were, received the Admiral and his
suite on landing, and we proceeded into a handsome apartment on the
ground floor, where we were received by the Sultan’s brother-in-law, the
Seraskier, Halil Pacha. Pipes were in this instance dispensed with, and
after partaking of coffee and sweetmeats, handed round in gold filagree
cups and saucers, richly studded with diamonds, a very common-place
conversation took place, through the medium of the interpreter, between
Sir Robert and the commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces.
“In about a quarter of an hour his ‘Highness’ sent word that he was
ready to receive us, whereupon the whole suite, consisting of about a
dozen British officers, proceeded, ‘booted‘ as we were, up a magnificent
staircase, and through numerous apartments, the floors of which shone
forth in all the splendour of the rarest and most highly-polished woods;
and whilst the Turkish courtiers glided noiselessly along, in their
purple slippers of thin morocco leather, a most martial tramp proclaimed
our entrance into the presence chamber, where, on a sofa, sat the
effeminate-looking Sultan, girded with the Sword of Osman.
“Abdul Medjid, the youthful Sultan, far from being
A man of solemn port,
Shawled to the nose and bearded to the eyes,
was a pale and sickly-looking youth, of apparently three or four and
twenty, though in reality his age exceeded not seventeen; but it is said
that his frequent visits to the harem had given him this appearance of
premature age.
“He was plainly dressed, not in the Oriental style, but in a plain cloth
military surtout and pantaloons, a short blue cloak, gracefully placed
on his left shoulder, and a fez on his head. The only sign of regal
magnificence displayed by him was a few brilliants on the clasp of his
belt, with which the hilt of the sabre was likewise thickly studded.
“We formed half a circle round his Imperial Majesty, who did not deign
to rise, and were presented by the Seraskier. Sir Robert Stopford then
said, that the gratification he had received at seeing Constantinople,
together with the attention he had met with, was very great. The Sultan,
through Halil Pacha, who seemed to prompt him in all he uttered,
replied, he was very glad his Excellency had felt so gratified.
“The Admiral then said, that he had been entrusted by Her Britannic
Majesty with the command of a fleet, to render any service which might
be required by the Sublime Porte. To this the Sultan bowed. Here ended
the conference; we retired with the Seraskier, partook of the parting
bowl of sherbet, and in four-and-twenty hours were once more in the
midst of the fleet in Besika Bay.”
The fleets remained there till the end of October; the English then
proceeded to Vourla for the winter, and were shortly followed by the
French squadron, part of which went to Smyrna. The English now consisted
of twelve sail of the line; the French of nine. The French ships were
much larger and better manned than ours, and Admiral Lalande was
indefatigable in exercising them, and I must admit that in harbour
manœuvres they were equally as expert as ourselves, and in some
respects superior; and I cannot refrain from observing that keeping the
two fleets so much together was a most impolitic measure. When the
French squadron first joined Sir Pulteney Malcolm in the Downs they were
all abroad; the five or six years they had been almost constantly in
company with the British had brought about a most astonishing change for
the better, and although it may be very advantageous to have an alliance
with France, there ought to be no acting together with fleets if it can
possibly be avoided.
On the 22nd of January, 1840, Commodore Hyde Parker sailed for England,
(his broad blue pennant had been up a few months,) and the
Commander-in-chief shortly after obtained leave to proceed to Malta,
with six sail of the line, and Sir John Louis, the Superintendant of
Malta Dockyard, was ordered to Vourla, to take command of the remainder
of the squadron; this was an unusual measure, and by no means
complimentary to myself, who was the next senior officer. I in
consequence proffered my resignation to the Admiral, which he declined
to accept, and after some explanation with him my letter was withdrawn,
and I pocketed the affront.