[1] From which the name Huss, or more properly Hus, an abbreviation
adopted by himself about 1396, is derived. Prior to that date he was
invariably known as Johann Hussynecz, Hussinecz, Hussenicz or de
Hussynecz.
HUSSAR, originally the name of a soldier belonging to a corps of light
horse raised by Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary, in 1458, to fight
against the Turks. The Magyar _huszar_, from which the word is derived,
was formerly connected with the Magyar _husz_, twenty, and was explained
by a supposed raising of the troops by the taking of each twentieth man.
According to the _New English Dictionary_ the word is an adaptation of
the Italian _corsaro_, corsair, a robber, and is found in 15th-century
documents coupled with _praedones_. The hussar was the typical Hungarian
cavalry soldier, and, in the absence of good light cavalry in the
regular armies of central and western Europe, the name and character of
the hussars gradually spread into Prussia, France, &c. Frederick the
Great sent Major H. J. von Zieten to study the work of this type of
cavalry in the Austrian service, and Zieten so far improved on the
Austrian model that he defeated his old teacher, General Baranyai, in an
encounter between the Prussian and Austrian hussars at Rothschloss in
1741. The typical uniform of the Hungarian hussar was followed with
modifications in other European armies. It consisted of a busby or a
high cylindrical cloth cap, jacket with heavy braiding, and a dolman or
pelisse, a loose coat worn hanging from the left shoulder. The hussar
regiments of the British army were converted from light dragoons at the
following dates: 7th (1805), 10th and 15th (1806), 18th (1807, and
again on revival after disbandment, 1858), 8th (1822), 11th (1840), 20th
(late 2nd Bengal European Cavalry) (1860), 13th, 14th, and 19th (late
1st Bengal European Cavalry) (1861). The 21st Lancers were hussars from
1862 to 1897.
HUSSITES, the name given to the followers of John Huss (1369-1415), the
Bohemian reformer. They were at first often called Wycliffites, as the
theological theories of Huss were largely founded on the teachings of
Wycliffe. Huss indeed laid more stress on church reform than on
theological controversy. On such matters he always writes as a disciple
of Wycliffe. The Hussite movement may be said to have sprung from three
sources, which are however closely connected. Bohemia, which had first
received Christianity from the East, was from geographical and other
causes long but very loosely connected with the Church of Rome. The
connexion became closer at the time when the schism with its violent
controversies between the rival pontiffs, waged with the coarse
invective customary to medieval theologians, had brought great discredit
on the papacy. The terrible rapacity of its representatives in Bohemia,
which increased in proportion as it became more difficult to obtain
money from western countries such as England and France, caused general
indignation; and this was still further intensified by the gross
immorality of the Roman priests. The Hussite movement was also a
democratic one, an uprising of the peasantry against the landowners at a
period when a third of the soil belonged to the clergy. Finally national
enthusiasm for the Slavic race contributed largely to its importance.
The towns, in most cases creations of the rulers of Bohemia who had
called in German immigrants, were, with the exception of the "new town"
of Prague, mainly German; and in consequence of the regulations of the
university, Germans also held almost all the more important
ecclesiastical offices--a condition of things greatly resented by the
natives of Bohemia, which at this period had reached a high degree of
intellectual development.
The Hussite movement assumed a revolutionary character as soon as the
news of the death of Huss reached Prague. The knights and nobles of
Bohemia and Moravia, who were in favour of church reform, sent to the
council at Constance (September 2nd, 1415) a protest, known as the
"_protestatio Bohemorum_" which condemned the execution of Huss in the
strongest language. The attitude of Sigismund, king of the Romans, who
sent threatening letters to Bohemia declaring that he would shortly
"drown all Wycliffites and Hussites," greatly incensed the people.
Troubles broke out in various parts of Bohemia, and many Romanist
priests were driven from their parishes. Almost from the first the
Hussites were divided into two sections, though many minor divisions
also arose among them. Shortly before his death Huss had accepted a
doctrine preached during his absence by his adherents at Prague, namely
that of "utraquism," i.e. the obligation of the faithful to receive
communion in both kinds (_sub utraque specie_). This doctrine became the
watchword of the moderate Hussites who were known as the Utraquists or
Calixtines (_calix_, the chalice), in Bohemian, _podoboji_; while the
more advanced Hussites were soon known as the Taborites, from the city
of Tabor that became their centre.
Under the influence of his brother Sigismund, king of the Romans, King
Wenceslaus endeavoured to stem the Hussite movement. A certain number of
Hussites lead by Nicolas of Hus--no relation of John Huss--left Prague.
They held meetings in various parts of Bohemia, particularly at Usti,
near the spot where the town of Tabor was founded soon afterwards. At
these meetings Sigismund was violently denounced, and the people
everywhere prepared for war. In spite of the departure of many prominent
Hussites the troubles at Prague continued. On the 30th of July 1419,
when a Hussite procession headed by the priest John of Zelivo (in Ger.
Selau) marched through the streets of Prague, stones were thrown at the
Hussites from the windows of the town-hall of the "new town." The
people, headed by John Zizka (1376-1424), threw the burgomaster and
several town-councillors, who were the instigators of this outrage, from
the windows and they were immediately killed by the crowd. On hearing
this news King Wenceslaus was seized with an apoplectic fit, and died a
few days afterwards. The death of the king resulted in renewed troubles
in Prague and in almost all parts of Bohemia. Many Romanists, mostly
Germans--for they had almost all remained faithful to the papal
cause--were expelled from the Bohemian cities. In Prague, in November
1419, severe fighting took place between the Hussites and the
mercenaries whom Queen Sophia (widow of Wenceslaus and regent after the
death of her husband) had hurriedly collected. After a considerable part
of the city had been destroyed a truce was concluded on the 13th of
November. The nobles, who though favourable to the Hussite cause yet
supported the regent, promised to act as mediators with Sigismund; while
the citizens of Prague consented to restore to the royal forces the
castle of Vysehrad, which had fallen into their hands. Zizka, who
disapproved of this compromise, left Prague and retired to Plzen
(Pilsen). Unable to maintain himself there he marched to southern
Bohemia, and after defeating the Romanists at Sudomer--the first
pitched battle of the Hussite wars--he arrived at Usti, one of the
earliest meeting-places of the Hussites. Not considering its situation
sufficiently strong, he moved to the neighbouring new settlement of the
Hussites, to which the biblical name of Tabor was given. Tabor soon
became the centre of the advanced Hussites, who differed from the
Utraquists by recognizing only two sacraments--Baptism and
Communion--and by rejecting most of the ceremonial of the Roman Church.
The ecclesiastical organization of Tabor had a somewhat puritanic
character, and the government was established on a thoroughly democratic
basis. Four captains of the people (_hejtmane_) were elected, one of
whom was Zizka; and a very strictly military discipline was instituted.
Sigismund, king of the Romans, had, by the death of his brother
Wenceslaus without issue, acquired a claim on the Bohemian crown; though
it was then, and remained till much later, doubtful whether Bohemia was
an hereditary or an elective monarchy. A firm adherent of the Church of
Rome, Sigismund was successful in obtaining aid from the pope. Martin V.
issued a bull on the 17th of March 1420 which proclaimed a crusade "for
the destruction of the Wycliffites, Hussites and all other heretics in
Bohemia." The vast army of crusaders, with which were Sigismund and many
German princes, and which consisted of adventurers attracted by the hope
of pillage from all parts of Europe, arrived before Prague on the 30th
of June and immediately began the siege of the city, which had, however,
soon to be abandoned (see [VZ]I[VZ]KA, JOHN). Negotiations took place
for a settlement of the religious differences. The united Hussites
formulated their demands in a statement known as the "articles of
Prague." This document, the most important of the Hussite period, runs
thus in the wording of the contemporary chronicler, Laurence of
Brezova:--
I. The word of God shall be preached and made known in the kingdom of
Bohemia freely and in an orderly manner by the priests of the Lord....
II. The sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist shall be freely
administered in the two kinds, that is bread and wine, to all the
faithful in Christ who are not precluded by mortal sin--according to
the word and disposition of Our Saviour.
III. The secular power over riches and worldly goods which the clergy
possesses in contradiction to Christ's precept, to the prejudice of
its office and to the detriment of the secular arm, shall be taken and
withdrawn from it, and the clergy itself shall be brought back to the
evangelical rule and an apostolic life such as that which Christ and
his apostles led....
IV. All mortal sins, and in particular all public and other disorders,
which are contrary to God's law shall in every rank of life be duly
and judiciously prohibited and destroyed by those whose office it is.
These articles, which contain the essence of the Hussite doctrine, were
rejected by Sigismund, mainly through the influence of the papal
legates, who considered them prejudicial to the authority of the Roman
see. Hostilities therefore continued. Though Sigismund had retired from
Prague, the castles of Vysehrad and Hradcany remained in possession of
his troops. The citizens of Prague laid siege to the Vysehrad, and
towards the end of October (1420) the garrison was on the point of
capitulating through famine. Sigismund attempted to relieve the
fortress, but was decisively defeated by the Hussites on the 1st of
November near the village of Pankrác. The castles of Vysehrad and
Hradcany now capitulated, and shortly afterwards almost all Bohemia fell
into the hands of the Hussites. Internal troubles prevented them from
availing themselves completely of their victory. At Prague a demagogue,
the priest John of Zelivo, for a time obtained almost unlimited
authority over the lower classes of the townsmen; and at Tabor a
communistic movement (that of the so-called Adamites) was sternly
suppressed by Zizka. Shortly afterwards a new crusade against the
Hussites was undertaken. A large German army entered Bohemia, and in
August 1421 laid siege to the town of Zatec (Saaz). The crusaders hoped
to be joined in Bohemia by King Sigismund, but that prince was detained
in Hungary. After an unsuccessful attempt to storm Zatec the crusaders
retreated somewhat ingloriously, on hearing that the Hussite troops were
approaching. Sigismund only arrived in Bohemia at the end of the year
1421. He took possession of the town of Kutna Hora (Kuttenberg), but was
decisively defeated by Zizka at Nemecky Brod (Deutschbrod) on the 6th of
January 1422. Bohemia was now again for a time free from foreign
intervention, but internal discord again broke out caused partly by
theological strife, partly by the ambition of agitators. John of Zelivo
was on the 9th of March 1422 arrested by the town council of Prague and
decapitated. There were troubles at Tabor also, where a more advanced
party opposed Zizka's authority. Bohemia obtained a temporary respite
when, in 1422, Prince Sigismund Korybutovic of Poland became for a short
time ruler of the country. His authority was recognized by the Utraquist
nobles, the citizens of Prague, and the more moderate Taborites,
including Zizka. Korybutovic, however, remained but a short time in
Bohemia; after his departure civil war broke out, the Taborites opposing
in arms the more moderate Utraquists, who at this period are also called
by the chroniclers the "Praguers," as Prague was their principal
stronghold. On the 27th of April 1423, Zizka now again leading, the
Taborites defeated at Horic the Utraquist army under Cenek of
Wartemberg; shortly afterwards an armistice was concluded at Konopist.
Papal influence had meanwhile succeeded in calling forth a new crusade
against Bohemia, but it resulted in complete failure. In spite of the
endeavours of their rulers, the Slavs of Poland and Lithuania did not
wish to attack the kindred Bohemians; the Germans were prevented by
internal discord from taking joint action against the Hussites; and the
king of Denmark, who had landed in Germany with a large force intending
to take part in the crusade, soon returned to his own country. Free for
a time from foreign aggression, the Hussites invaded Moravia, where a
large part of the population favoured their creed; but, again paralysed
by dissensions, soon returned to Bohemia. The city of Königgrätz
(Králové Hradec), which had been under Utraquist rule, espoused the
doctrine of Tabor, and called Zizka to its aid. After several military
successes gained by Zizka (q.v.) in 1423 and the following year, a
treaty of peace between the Hussites was concluded on the 13th of
September 1424 at Liben, a village near Prague, now part of that city.
In 1426 the Hussites were again attacked by foreign enemies. In June of
that year their forces, led by Prokop the Great--who took the command of
the Taborites shortly after Zizka's death in October 1424--and Sigismund
Korybutovic, who had returned to Bohemia, signally defeated the Germans
at Aussig (Usti nad Labem). After this great victory, and another at
Tachau in 1427, the Hussites repeatedly invaded Germany, though they
made no attempt to occupy permanently any part of the country.
The almost uninterrupted series of victories of the Hussites now
rendered vain all hope of subduing them by force of arms. Moreover, the
conspicuously democratic character of the Hussite movement caused the
German princes, who were afraid that such views might extend to
their own countries, to desire peace. Many Hussites, particularly the
Utraquist clergy, were also in favour of peace. Negotiations for this
purpose were to take place at the oecumenical council which had been
summoned to meet at Basel on the 3rd of March 1431. The Roman see
reluctantly consented to the presence of heretics at this council, but
indignantly rejected the suggestion of the Hussites that members of the
Greek Church, and representatives of all Christian creeds, should also
be present. Before definitely giving its consent to peace negotiations,
the Roman Church determined on making a last effort to reduce the
Hussites to subjection. On the 1st of August 1431 a large army of
crusaders, under Frederick, margrave of Brandenburg, whom Cardinal
Cesarini accompanied as papal legate, crossed the Bohemian frontier; on
the 14th of August it reached the town of Domazlice (Tauss); but on
the arrival of the Hussite army under Prokop the crusaders immediately
took to flight, almost without offering resistance.
On the 15th of October the members of the council, who had already
assembled at Basel, issued a formal invitation to the Hussites to take
part in its deliberations. Prolonged negotiations ensued; but finally a
Hussite embassy, led by Prokop and including John of Rokycan, the
Taborite bishop Nicolas of Pelhrimov, the "English Hussite," Peter
Payne and many others, arrived at Basel on the 4th of January 1433. It
was found impossible to arrive at an agreement. Negotiations were not,
however, broken off; and a change in the political situation of Bohemia
finally resulted in a settlement. In 1434 war again broke out between
the Utraquists and the Taborites. On the 30th of May of that year the
Taborite army, led by Prokop the Great and Prokop the Less, who both
fell in the battle, was totally defeated and almost annihilated at
Lipan. The moderate party thus obtained the upper hand; and it
formulated its demands in a document which was finally accepted by the
Church of Rome in a slightly modified form, and which is known as "the
compacts." The compacts, mainly founded on the articles of Prague,
declare that:--
1. The Holy Sacrament is to be given freely in both kinds to all
Christians in Bohemia and Moravia, and to those elsewhere who adhere
to the faith of these two countries.
2. All mortal sins shall be punished and extirpated by those whose
office it is so to do.
3. The word of God is to be freely and truthfully preached by the
priests of the Lord, and by worthy deacons.
4. The priests in the time of the law of grace shall claim no
ownership of worldly possessions.
On the 5th of July 1436 the compacts were formally accepted and signed
at Iglau, in Moravia, by King Sigismund, by the Hussite delegates, and
by the representatives of the Roman Church. The last-named, however,
refused to recognize as archbishop of Prague, John of Rokycan, who had
been elected to that dignity by the estates of Bohemia. The Utraquist
creed, frequently varying in its details, continued to be that of the
established church of Bohemia till all non-Roman religious services were
prohibited shortly after the battle of the White Mountain in 1620. The
Taborite party never recovered from its defeat at Lipan, and after the
town of Tabor had been captured by George of Podebrad in 1452
Utraquist religious worship was established there. The Bohemian
brethren, whose intellectual originator was Peter Chelcicky, but
whose actual founders were Brother Gregory, a nephew of Archbishop
Rokycan, and Michael, curate of Zamberk, to a certain extent continued
the Taborite traditions, and in the 15th and 16th centuries included
most of the strongest opponents of Rome in Bohemia. J. A. Komensky
(Comenius), a member of the brotherhood, claimed for the members of his
church that they were the genuine inheritors of the doctrines of Hus.
After the beginning of the German Reformation many Utraquists adopted to
a large extent the doctrines of Luther and Calvin; and in 1567 obtained
the repeal of the compacts, which no longer seemed sufficiently
far-reaching. From the end of the 16th century the inheritors of the
Hussite tradition in Bohemia were included in the more general name of
"Protestants" borne by the adherents of the Reformation.
All histories of Bohemia devote a large amount of space to the Hussite
movement. See Count Lützow, _Bohemia; an Historical Sketch_ (London,
1896); Palacky, _Geschichte von Böhmen_; Bachmann, _Geschichte
Böhmens_; L. Krummel, _Geschichte der böhmischen Reformation_ (Gotha,
1866) and _Utraquisten und Taboriten_ (Gotha, 1871); Ernest Denis,
_Huss et la guerre des Hussites_ (Paris, 1878); H. Toman, _Husitské
Válecnictvi_ (Prague, 1898). (L.)
HUSTING (O. Eng. _hústing_, from Old Norwegian _hústhing_), the "thing"
or "ting," i.e. assembly, of the household of personal followers or
retainers of a king, earl or chief, contrasted with the "folkmoot," the
assembly of the whole people. "Thing" meant an inanimate object, the
ordinary meaning at the present day, also a cause or suit, and an
assembly; a similar development of meaning is found in the Latin _res_.
The word still appears in the names of the legislative assemblies of
Norway, the _Storthing_ and of Iceland, the _Althing_. "Husting," or
more usually in the plural "hustings," was the name of a court of the
city of London. This court was formerly the county court for the city
and was held before the lord mayor, the sheriffs and aldermen, for pleas
of land, common pleas and appeals from the sheriffs. It had probate
jurisdiction and wills were registered. All this jurisdiction has long
been obsolete, but the court still sits occasionally for registering
gifts made to the city. The charter of Canute (1032) contains a
reference to "hustings" weights, which points to the early establishment
of the court. It is doubtful whether courts of this name were held in
other towns, but John Cowell (1554-1611) in his _Interpreter_ (1601)
s.v., "Hustings," says that according to Fleta there were such courts at
Winchester, York, Lincoln, Sheppey and elsewhere, but the passage from
Fleta, as the _New English Dictionary_ points out, does not necessarily
imply this (11. lv. _Habet etiam Rex curiam in civitatibus ... et in
locis ... sicut in Hustingis London, Winton, &c._). The ordinary use of
"hustings" at the present day for the platform from which a candidate
speaks at a parliamentary or other election, or more widely for a
political candidate's election campaign, is derived from the application
of the word, first to the platform in the Guildhall on which the London
court was held, and next to that from which the public nomination of
candidates for a parliamentary election was formerly made, and from
which the candidate addressed the electors. The Ballot Act of 1872 did
away with this public declaration of the nomination.
HUSUM, a town in the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, in a
fertile district 2½ m. inland from the North Sea, on the canalized
Husumer Au, which forms its harbour and roadstead, 99 m. N.W. from
Hamburg on a branch line from Tönning. Pop. (1900) 8268. It has steam
communication with the North Frisian Islands (Nordstrand, Föhr and
Sylt), and is a port for the cattle trade with England. Besides a ducal
palace and park, it possesses an Evangelical church and a gymnasium.
Cattle markets are held weekly, and in them, as also in cereals, a
lively export trade is done. There are also extensive oyster fisheries,
the property of the state, the yield during the season being very
considerable. Husum is the birthplace of Johann Georg Forchhammer
(1794-1865), the mineralogist, Peter Wilhelm Forchhammer (1801-1894),
the archaeologist, and Theodore Storm (1817-1888), the poet, to the last
of whom a monument has been erected here.
Husum is first mentioned in 1252, and its first church was built in
1431. Wisby rights were granted it in 1582, and in 1603 it received
municipal privileges from the duke of Holstein. It suffered greatly from
inundations in 1634 and 1717.
See Christiansen, _Die Geschichte Husums_ (Husum, 1903); and
Henningsen, _Das Stiftungsbuch der Stadt Husum_ (Husum, 1904).
HUTCHESON, FRANCIS (1694-1746), English philosopher, was born on the 8th
of August 1694. His birthplace was probably the townland of Drumalig, in
the parish of Saintfield and county of Down, Ireland.[1] Though the
family had sprung from Ayrshire, in Scotland, both his father and
grandfather were ministers of dissenting congregations in the north of
Ireland. Hutcheson was educated partly by his grandfather, partly at an
academy, where according to his biographer, Dr Leechman, he was taught
"the ordinary scholastic philosophy which was in vogue in those
days." In 1710 he entered the university of Glasgow, where he spent six
years, at first in the study of philosophy, classics and general
literature, and afterwards in the study of theology. On quitting the
university, he returned to the north of Ireland, and received a licence
to preach. When, however, he was about to enter upon the pastorate of a
small dissenting congregation he changed his plans on the advice of a
friend and opened a private academy in Dublin. In Dublin his literary
attainments gained him the friendship of many prominent inhabitants.
Among these was Archbishop King (author of the _De origine mali_), who
resisted all attempts to prosecute Hutcheson in the archbishop's court
for keeping a school without the episcopal licence. Hutcheson's
relations with the clergy of the Established Church, especially with the
archbishops of Armagh and Dublin, Hugh Boulter (1672-1742) and William
King (1650-1729), seem to have been most cordial, and his biographer, in
speaking of "the inclination of his friends to serve him, the schemes
proposed to him for obtaining promotion," &c., probably refers to some
offers of preferment, on condition of his accepting episcopal
ordination. These offers, however, were unavailing.
While residing in Dublin, Hutcheson published anonymously the four
essays by which he is best known, namely, the _Inquiry concerning
Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design_, the _Inquiry concerning Moral Good
and Evil_, in 1725, the _Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions
and Affections_ and _Illustrations upon the Moral Sense_, in 1728. The
alterations and additions made in the second edition of these Essays
were published in a separate form in 1726. To the period of his Dublin
residence are also to be referred the _Thoughts on Laughter_ (a
criticism of Hobbes) and the Observations on the _Fable of the Bees_,
being in all six letters contributed to _Hibernicus' Letters_, a
periodical which appeared, in Dublin (1725-1727, 2nd ed. 1734). At the
end of the same period occurred the controversy in the _London Journal_
with Gilbert Burnet (probably the second son of Dr Gilbert Burnet,
bishop of Salisbury); on the "True Foundation of Virtue or Moral
Goodness." All these letters were collected in one volume (Glasgow,
1772).
In 1729 Hutcheson succeeded his old master, Gershom Carmichael, in the
chair of moral philosophy in the university of Glasgow. It is curious
that up to this time all his essays and letters had been published
anonymously, though their authorship appears to have been well known. In
1730 he entered on the duties of his office, delivering an inaugural
lecture (afterwards published), _De naturali hominum socialitate_. It
was a great relief to him after the drudgery of school work to secure
leisure for his favourite studies; "non levi igitur laetitia commovebar
cum almam matrem Academiam me, suum olim alumnum, in libertatem
asseruisse audiveram." Yet the works on which Hutcheson's reputation
rests had already been published.
The remainder of his life he devoted to his professorial duties. His
reputation as a teacher attracted many young men, belonging to
dissenting families, from England and Ireland, and he enjoyed a
well-deserved popularity among both his pupils and his colleagues.
Though somewhat quick-tempered, he was remarkable for his warm feelings
and generous impulses. He was accused in 1738 before the Glasgow
presbytery for "following two false and dangerous doctrines: first, that
the standard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of
others; and second, that we could have a knowledge of good and evil
without and prior to a knowledge of God" (Rae, _Life of Adam Smith_,
1895). The accusation seems to have had no result.
In addition to the works named, the following were published during
Hutcheson's lifetime: a pamphlet entitled _Considerations on Patronage_
(1735); _Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria, ethices et
jurisprudentiae naturalis elementa continens, lib. iii._ (Glasgow,
1742); _Metaphysicae synopsis ontologiam et pneumatologiam complectens_
(Glasgow, 1742). The last work was published anonymously. After his
death, his son, Francis Hutcheson (c. 1722-1773), author of a number of
popular songs (e.g. "As Colin one evening," "Jolly Bacchus," "Where
Weeping Yews"), published much the longest, though by no means the most
interesting, of his works, _A System of Moral Philosophy, in Three
Books_ (2 vols., London, 1755). To this is prefixed a life of the
author, by Dr William Leechman (1706-1785), professor of divinity in the
university of Glasgow. The only remaining work assigned to Hutcheson is
a small treatise on _Logic_ (Glasgow, 1764). This compendium, together
with the _Compendium of Metaphysics_, was republished at Strassburg in
1722.
Thus Hutcheson dealt with metaphysics, logic and ethics. His importance
is, however, due almost entirely to his ethical writings, and among
these primarily to the four essays and the letters published during his
residence in Dublin. His standpoint has a negative and a positive
aspect; he is in strong opposition to Thomas Hobbes and Bernard de
Mandeville, and in fundamental agreement with Shaftesbury (Anthony
Ashley Cooper, 3rd earl of Shaftesbury), whose name he very properly
coupled with his own on the title-page of the first two essays. There
are no two names, perhaps, in the history of English moral philosophy,
which stand in a closer connexion. The analogy drawn between beauty and
virtue, the functions assigned to the moral sense, the position that the
benevolent feelings form an original and irreducible part of our nature,
and the unhesitating adoption of the principle that the test of virtuous
action is its tendency to promote the general welfare are obvious and
fundamental points of agreement between the two authors.
I. _Ethics._--According to Hutcheson, man has a variety of senses,
internal as well as external, reflex as well as direct, the general
definition of a sense being "any determination of our minds to receive
ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure
and pain" (_Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions_, sect.
1). He does not attempt to give an exhaustive enumeration of these
"senses," but, in various parts of his works, he specifies, besides
the five external senses commonly recognized (which, he rightly hints,
might be added to),--(1) consciousness, by which each man has a
perception of himself and of all that is going on in his own mind
(_Metaph. Syn._ pars i. cap. 2); (2) the sense of beauty (sometimes
called specifically "an internal sense"); (3) a public sense, or
sensus communis, "a determination to be pleased with the happiness of
others and to be uneasy at their misery"; (4) the moral sense, or
"moral sense of beauty in actions and affections, by which we perceive
virtue or vice, in ourselves or others"; (5) a sense of honour, or
praise and blame, "which makes the approbation or gratitude of others
the necessary occasion of pleasure, and their dislike, condemnation or
resentment of injuries done by us the occasion of that uneasy
sensation called shame"; (6) a sense of the ridiculous. It is plain,
as the author confesses, that there may be "other perceptions,
distinct from all these classes," and, in fact, there seems to be no
limit to the number of "senses" in which a psychological division of
this kind might result.
Of these "senses" that which plays the most important part in
Hutcheson's ethical system is the "moral sense." It is this which
pronounces immediately on the character of actions and affections,
approving those which are virtuous, and disapproving those which are
vicious. "His principal design," he says in the preface to the two
first treatises, "is to show that human nature was not left quite
indifferent in the affair of virtue, to form to itself observations
concerning the advantage or disadvantage of actions, and accordingly
to regulate its conduct. The weakness of our reason, and the
avocations arising from the infirmity and necessities of our nature,
are so great that very few men could ever have formed those long
deductions of reasons which show some actions to be in the whole
advantageous to the agent, and their contraries pernicious. The Author
of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct than our
moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful
instructions as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has
made virtue a lovely form, to excite our pursuit of it, and has given
us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action."
Passing over the appeal to final causes involved in this and similar
passages, as well as the assumption that the "moral sense" has had no
growth or history, but was "implanted" in man exactly in the condition
in which it is now to be found among the more civilized races, an
assumption common to the systems of both Hutcheson and Butler, it may
be remarked that this use of the term "sense" has a tendency to
obscure the real nature of the process which goes on in an act of
moral judgment. For, as is so clearly established by Hume, this act
really consists of two parts: one an act of deliberation, more or less
prolonged, resulting in an intellectual judgment; the other a reflex
feeling, probably instantaneous, of satisfaction at actions which we
denominate good, of dissatisfaction at those which we denominate bad.
By the intellectual part of this process we refer the action or habit
to a certain class; but no sooner is the intellectual process
completed than there is excited in us a feeling similar to that
which myriads of actions and habits of the same class, or deemed to be
of the same class, have excited in us on former occasions. Now,
supposing the latter part of this process to be instantaneous, uniform
and exempt from error, the former certainly is not. All mankind may,
apart from their selfish interests, approve that which is virtuous or
makes for the general good, but surely they entertain the most widely
divergent opinions, and, in fact, frequently arrive at directly
opposite conclusions as to particular actions and habits. This obvious
distinction is undoubtedly recognized by Hutcheson in his analysis of
the mental process preceding moral action, nor does he invariably
ignore it, even when treating of the moral approbation or
disapprobation which is subsequent on action. None the less, it
remains true that Hutcheson, both by his phraseology, and by the
language in which he describes the process of moral approbation, has
done much to favour that loose, popular view of morality which,
ignoring the necessity of deliberation and reflection, encourages
hasty resolves and unpremeditated judgments. The term "moral sense"
(which, it may be noticed, had already been employed by Shaftesbury,
not only, as Dr Whewell appears to intimate, in the margin, but also
in the text of his _Inquiry_), if invariably coupled with the term
"moral judgment," would be open to little objection; but, taken alone,
as designating the complex process of moral approbation, it is liable
to lead not only to serious misapprehension but to grave practical
errors. For, if each man's decisions are solely the result of an
immediate intuition of the moral sense, why be at any pains to test,
correct or review them? Or why educate a faculty whose decisions are
infallible? And how do we account for differences in the moral
decisions of different societies, and the observable changes in a
man's own views? The expression has, in fact, the fault of most
metaphorical terms: it leads to an exaggeration of the truth which it
is intended to suggest.
But though Hutcheson usually describes the moral faculty as acting
instinctively and immediately, he does not, like Butler, confound the
moral faculty with the moral standard. The test or criterion of right
action is with Hutcheson, as with Shaftesbury, its tendency to promote
the general welfare of mankind. He thus anticipates the utilitarianism
of Bentham--and not only in principle, but even in the use of the
phrase "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" (_Inquiry
concerning Moral Good and Evil_, sect. 3).
It is curious that Hutcheson did not realize the inconsistency of this
external criterion with his fundamental ethical principle. Intuition
has no possible connexion with an empirical calculation of results,
and Hutcheson in adopting such a criterion practically denies his
fundamental assumption.
As connected with Hutcheson's virtual adoption of the utilitarian
standard may be noticed a kind of moral algebra, proposed for the
purpose of "computing the morality of actions." This calculus occurs
in the _Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil_, sect. 3.
Benevolence.
The most distinctive of Hutcheson's ethical doctrines still remaining
to be noticed is what has been called the "benevolent theory" of
morals. Hobbes had maintained that all our actions, however disguised
under apparent sympathy, have their roots in self-love. Hutcheson not
only maintains that benevolence is the sole and direct source of many
of our actions, but, by a not unnatural recoil, that it is the only
source of those actions of which, on reflection, we approve.
Consistently with this position, actions which flow from self-love
only are pronounced to be morally indifferent. But surely, by the
common consent of civilized men, prudence, temperance, cleanliness,
industry, self-respect and, in general, the "personal virtues," are
regarded, and rightly regarded, as fitting objects of moral
approbation. This consideration could hardly escape any author,
however wedded to his own system, and Hutcheson attempts to extricate
himself from the difficulty by laying down the position that a man may
justly regard himself as a part of the rational system, and may thus
"be, in part, an object of his own benevolence" (Ibid.),--a curious
abuse of terms, which really concedes the question at issue. Moreover,
he acknowledges that, though self-love does not merit approbation,
neither, except in its extreme forms, does it merit condemnation,
indeed the satisfaction of the dictates of self-love is one of the
very conditions of the preservation of society. To press home the
inconsistencies involved in these various statements would be a
superfluous task.
The vexed question of liberty and necessity appears to be carefully
avoided in Hutcheson's professedly ethical works. But, in the
_Synopsis metaphysicae_, he touches on it in three places, briefly
stating both sides of the question, but evidently inclining to that
which he designates as the opinion of the Stoics in opposition to what
he designates as the opinion of the Peripatetics. This is
substantially the same as the doctrine propounded by Hobbes and Locke
(to the latter of whom Hutcheson refers in a note), namely, that our
will is determined by motives in conjunction with our general
character and habit of mind, and that the only true liberty is the
liberty of acting as we will, not the liberty of willing as we will.
Though, however, his leaning is clear, he carefully avoids
dogmatizing, and deprecates the angry controversies to which the
speculations on this subject had given rise.
It is easy to trace the influence of Hutcheson's ethical theories on
the systems of Hume and Adam Smith. The prominence given by these
writers to the analysis of moral action and moral approbation, with
the attempt to discriminate the respective provinces of the reason and
the emotions in these processes, is undoubtedly due to the influence
of Hutcheson. To a study of the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson
we might, probably, in large measure, attribute the unequivocal
adoption of the utilitarian standard by Hume, and, if this be the
case, the name of Hutcheson connects itself, through Hume, with the
names of Priestley, Paley and Bentham. Butler's _Sermons_ appeared in
1726, the year after the publication of Hutcheson's two first essays,
and the parallelism between the "conscience" of the one writer and the
"moral sense" of the other is, at least, worthy of remark.
II. _Mental Philosophy._--In the sphere of mental philosophy and logic
Hutcheson's contributions are by no means so important or original as
in that of moral philosophy. They are interesting mainly as a link
between Locke and the Scottish school. In the former subject the
influence of Locke is apparent throughout. All the main outlines of
Locke's philosophy seem, at first sight, to be accepted as a matter of
course. Thus, in stating his theory of the moral sense, Hutcheson is
peculiarly careful to repudiate the doctrine of innate ideas (see, for
instance, _Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil_, sect. 1 ad fin.,
and sect. 4; and compare _Synopsis Metaphysicae_, pars i. cap. 2). At
the same time he shows more discrimination than does Locke in
distinguishing between the two uses of this expression, and between
the legitimate and illegitimate form of the doctrine (Syn. Metaph.
pars i. cap. 2). All our ideas are, as by Locke, referred to external
or internal sense, or, in other words, to sensation and reflection
(see, for instance, _Syn. Metaph._ pars i. cap. 1; _Logicae Compend._
pars i. cap. 1; _System of Moral Philosophy_, bk. i. ch. 1). It is,
however, a most important modification of Locke's doctrine, and one
which connects Hutcheson's mental philosophy with that of Reid, when
he states that the ideas of extension, figure, motion and rest "are
more properly ideas accompanying the sensations of sight and touch
than the sensations of either of these senses"; that the idea of self
accompanies every thought, and that the ideas of number, duration and
existence accompany every other idea whatsoever (see _Essay on the
Nature and Conduct of the Passions_, sect. i. art. 1; _Syn. Metaph._
pars i. cap. 1, pars ii. cap. 1; Hamilton on Reid, p. 124, note).
Other important points in which Hutcheson follows the lead of Locke
are his depreciation of the importance of the so-called laws of
thought, his distinction between the primary and secondary qualities
of bodies, the position that we cannot know the inmost essences of
things ("intimae rerum naturae sive essentiae"), though they excite
various ideas in us, and the assumption that external things are known
only through the medium of ideas (_Syn. Metaph._ pars i. cap. 1),
though, at the same time, we are assured of the existence of an
external world corresponding to these ideas. Hutcheson attempts to
account for our assurance of the reality of an external world by
referring it to a natural instinct (_Syn. Metaph._ pars i. cap. 1). Of
the correspondence or similitude between our ideas of the primary
qualities of things and the things themselves God alone can be
assigned as the cause. This similitude has been effected by Him
through a law of nature. "Haec prima qualitatum primariarum perceptio,
sive mentis actio quaedam sive passio dicatur, non alia similitudinis
aut convenientiae inter ejusmodi ideas et res ipsas causa assignari
posse videtur, quam ipse Deus, qui certa naturae lege hoc efficit, ut
notiones, quae rebus praesentibus excitantur, sint ipsis similes, aut
saltem earum habitudines, si non veras quantitates, depingant" (pars
ii. cap. 1). Locke does speak of God "annexing" certain ideas to
certain motions of bodies; but nowhere does he propound a theory so
definite as that here propounded by Hutcheson, which reminds us at
least as much of the speculations of Malebranche as of those of Locke.
Amongst the more important points in which Hutcheson diverges from
Locke is his account of the idea of personal identity, which he
appears to have regarded as made known to us directly by
consciousness. The distinction between body and mind, _corpus_ or
_materia_ and _res cogitans_, is more emphatically accentuated by
Hutcheson than by Locke. Generally, he speaks as if we had a direct
consciousness of mind as distinct from body (see, for instance, _Syn.
Metaph._ pars ii. cap. 3), though, in the posthumous work on _Moral
Philosophy_, he expressly states that we know mind as we know body "by
qualities immediately perceived though the substance of both be
unknown" (bk. i. ch. 1). The distinction between perception proper and
sensation proper, which occurs by implication though it is not
explicitly worked out (see Hamilton's _Lectures on Metaphysics_, Lect.
24; Hamilton's edition of _Dugald Stewart's Works_, v. 420), the
imperfection of the ordinary division of the external senses into five
classes, the limitation of consciousness to a special mental faculty
(severely criticized in Sir W. Hamilton's _Lectures on Metaphysics_,
Lect. xii.) and the disposition to refer on disputed questions of
philosophy not so much to formal arguments as to the testimony of
consciousness and our natural instincts are also amongst the points in
which Hutcheson supplemented or departed from the philosophy of Locke.
The last point can hardly fail to suggest the "common-sense
philosophy" of Reid.
Thus, in estimating Hutcheson's position, we find that in particular
questions he stands nearer to Locke, but in the general spirit of his
philosophy he seems to approach more closely to his Scottish
successors.
The short _Compendium of Logic_, which is more original than such
works usually are, is remarkable chiefly for the large
proportion of psychological matter which it contains. In these parts
of the book Hutcheson mainly follows Locke. The technicalities of the
subject are passed lightly over, and the book is readable. It may be
specially noticed that he distinguishes between the mental result and
its verbal expression [idea--term; judgment--proposition], that he
constantly employs the word "idea," and that he defines logical truth
as "convenientia signorum cum rebus significatis" (or "propositionis
convenientia cum rebus ipsis," _Syn. Metaph._ pars i. cap 3), thus
implicitly repudiating a merely formal view of logic.
III. _Aesthetics._--Hutcheson may further be regarded as one of the
earliest modern writers on aesthetics. His speculations on this
subject are contained in the _Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order,
Harmony and Design_, the first of the two treatises published in 1725.
He maintains that we are endowed with a special sense by which we
perceive beauty, harmony and proportion. This is a _reflex_ sense,
because it presupposes the action of the external senses of sight and
hearing. It may be called an internal sense, both in order to
distinguish its perceptions from the mere perceptions of sight and
hearing, and because "in some other affairs, where our external senses
are not much concerned, we discern a sort of beauty, very like in many
respects to that observed in sensible objects, and accompanied with
like pleasure" (_Inquiry, &c._, sect. 1). The latter reason leads him
to call attention to the beauty perceived in universal truths, in the
operations of general causes and in moral principles and actions.
Thus, the analogy between beauty and virtue, which was so favourite a
topic with Shaftesbury, is prominent in the writings of Hutcheson
also. Scattered up and down the treatise there are many important and
interesting observations which our limits prevent us from noticing.
But to the student of mental philosophy it may be specially
interesting to remark that Hutcheson both applies the principle of
association to explain our ideas of beauty and also sets limits to its
application, insisting on there being "a natural power of perception
or sense of beauty in objects, antecedent to all custom, education or
example" (see _Inquiry, &c._, sects. 6, 7; Hamilton's _Lectures on
Metaphysics_, Lect. 44 ad fin.).
Hutcheson's writings naturally gave rise to much controversy. To say
nothing of minor opponents, such as "Philaretus" (Gilbert Burnet,
already alluded to), Dr John Balguy (1686-1748), prebendary of
Salisbury, the author of two tracts on "The Foundation of Moral
Goodness," and Dr John Taylor (1694-1761) of Norwich, a minister of
considerable reputation in his time (author of _An Examination of the
Scheme of Morality advanced by Dr Hutcheson_), the essays appear to
have suggested, by antagonism, at least two works which hold a
permanent place in the literature of English ethics--Butler's
_Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue_, and Richard Price's _Treatise
of Moral Good and Evil_ (1757). In this latter work the author
maintains, in opposition to Hutcheson, that actions are _in
themselves_ right or wrong, that right and wrong are simple ideas
incapable of analysis, and that these ideas are perceived immediately
by the understanding. We thus see that, not only directly but also
through the replies which it called forth, the system of Hutcheson, or
at least the system of Hutcheson combined with that of Shaftesbury,
contributed, in large measure, to the formation and development of
some of the most important of the modern schools of ethics (see
especially art. ETHICS).
AUTHORITIES.--Notices of Hutcheson occur in most histories, both of
general philosophy and of moral philosophy, as, for instance, in pt.
vii. of Adam Smith's _Theory of Moral Sentiments_; Mackintosh's
_Progress of Ethical Philosophy_; Cousin, _Cours d'histoire de la
philosophie morale du XVIII^e siècle_; Whewell's _Lectures on the
History of Moral Philosophy in England_; A. Bain's _Mental and Moral
Science_; Noah Porter's Appendix to the English translation of
Ueberweg's _History of Philosophy_; Sir Leslie Stephen's _History of
English Thought in the Eighteenth Century_, &c. See also Martineau,
_Types of Ethical Theory_ (London, 1902); W. R. Scott, _Francis
Hutcheson_ (Cambridge, 1900); Albee, _History of English
Utilitarianism_ (London, 1902); T. Fowler, _Shaftesbury and Hutcheson_
(London, 1882); J. McCosh, _Scottish Philosophy_ (New York, 1874). Of
Dr Leechman's _Biography_ of Hutcheson we have already spoken. J.
Veitch gives an interesting account of his professorial work in
Glasgow, _Mind_, ii. 209-212. (T. F.; X.)