THE JORDAN VALLEY CANAL.

Haifa, Nov. 10.—In one of my former letters I described the nature of

the concession which had been obtained by some capitalists at Beyrout

for the construction of a railway from Haifa to Damascus, and of the

survey of the line, which had already been completed half-way to the

latter city. The matter has been the subject of a good deal of financial

intrigue, and the capital which was sought for in London has not been

forthcoming in consequence. A new element of uncertainty has just been

imported into the project by the agitation created by the proposal to

connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean by means of a ship canal,

which, commencing at Haifa, should be cut through the plain of Esdraelon

to the valley of the Jordan, letting the waters of the Mediterranean

into the Ghor, as that valley is called, and connecting the lower end of

the Dead Sea with the Red Sea by a canal which should debouch at Akaba.

This project originated principally among British shipowners and

capitalists, who have hoped in this way to destroy the monopoly which M.

de Lesseps claims to possess of water communication between the

Mediterranean and the Red Sea across the Isthmus of Suez. As the

proposed canal does not touch the isthmus, the French company would have

no ground of complaint. As, however, great uncertainty still exists as

to the practicability of the scheme, a sum of £10,000 has been

subscribed by the promoters of the proposed company to make the

preliminary surveys, and to obtain the necessary permission from the

sultan to do so. According to the first accounts, his majesty set his

face against any survey of the kind proposed, but the latest advices

would go to show that he has changed his mind, and it would seem not

only that the requisite permission has been granted, but that the

surveying party are actually on their way to Port Said.

It will now be interesting to consider, by the light of our present

information, what are the chances of success, what is the nature of the

obstacles the scheme will have to encounter, and how it proposes to

overcome them, so far as they are known. In the first place, it does not

follow, because the sultan has granted permission for the survey, that

he will afterwards, supposing it to be found practicable, grant a firman

for the accomplishment of the work. The advantages he will derive from

it are: Easy access to his dominions in Arabia, which extend as far

south as Aden; an enormous sum of money, which will be paid to him in

compensation for about fifteen hundred square miles of land submerged,

chiefly government property, and a large annual income to be derived

from tolls on the canal, and the development of extensive tracts of

fertile country, especially to the east of the Jordan, which are now

inaccessible and unproductive. That such a canal would add immensely to

the resources of the empire, and be a source of great profit, there can

be no doubt. On the other hand, it would almost amount to the virtual

annexation of Palestine by England, whose influence in that country,

backed by the enormous expenditure of capital which would be involved,

would be supreme. It is a question, therefore, whether the sultan would

consider that the pecuniary advantage which he would gain would be

compensated by the political sacrifice which would have to be incurred.

In regard to the engineering difficulties, so far as they are known, the

only records of levels which we have of the elevation of the land

between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea are those made at different times

by three Frenchmen—Mons. Lartet, Mons. Vigne, and Mons. Luynes. These

only differ nineteen feet—the lowest being seven hundred and eighty-one

feet, the highest eight hundred; but it must be remembered that these

are not the result of actual survey, but of rough estimates, and there

may be depressions in the dividing ridge which may have escaped these

gentlemen's observation.^[2] The dividing ridge is said to be calcareous

rock—the summit level distant fifty-two miles from the Red Sea and

fifty-eight from the Dead Sea, which is nearly thirteen hundred feet

lower than the level of the ocean—and it is assumed that the engineering

work would be facilitated by the scour which would be caused by the sea

rushing down such a steep incline in a distance of one hundred miles. It

is not, however, proposed to let the full force of the ocean in from

this end. The operation of flooding the Jordan valley would be commenced

at Haifa; from this point to the sea-level in the Ghor is only

twenty-five miles. The highest point in the plain of Esdraelon is one

hundred and fifty-seven feet above the sea. Through this it is proposed

to cut a canal two hundred feet wide and forty feet deep. The volume of

water thus let in, it is calculated, would be regulated to an inflow

which would equal about twenty Jordans, and, allowing for evaporation,

it is estimated that in five years the Dead Sea and the whole valley of

the Jordan would be submerged to the sea-level.

The effect of this submergence would be, of course, to bury the Dead Sea

under twelve hundred feet of ocean, and to create an inland sea about

ninety miles long and from four to six wide. Jericho, Beisan (the

ancient Bethshean), and Tiberias would be the principal places

submerged, besides a few small villages. With the exception of Tiberias,

none of these are, however, of any importance. Tiberias contains a

population of over three thousand, chiefly Jews, and a Latin and Greek

monastery. Apart from the question of compensating this population, and

paying for the fertile lands which they occupy, a very important

political question enters into consideration. The French have been the

protectors of the Latin monastery at Tiberias from time immemorial, and

the Russians occupy the same position with regard to the Greek

monastery. Are these two powers, whose interests would be in different

ways vitally affected by the success of the scheme, likely to be induced

to consent to it by any proposal of pecuniary indemnification? Its

success would utterly ruin the Suez Canal and almost extinguish French

influence in Syria, while Russia, which now aims at the annexation of

Palestine and the occupation of Jerusalem, where her influence is at

this moment greater than that of any other European nation, would find

herself practically cut off from it by an inland sea, the private

property of her traditional enemy. In both countries the governments

could appeal to the religious sentiment of the people to support them in

resisting, even to a war if necessary, the flooding of the holy places

at Tiberias which they have guarded for so many centuries.

Nor would this sentimental feeling be confined to France and Russia.

Even in England and America there would be a strong objection to the

Lake of Tiberias, with the historic sites of Capernaum and the other

cities on its margin, which were the scenes of some of the most

remarkable ministrations of our Lord, being buried five hundred feet

deep beneath the sea. Curiously enough, the project is no less keenly

supported by one set of religionists than it is condemned by the other.

The former pin their faith to the prophecy contained in the

forty-seventh chapter of Ezekiel, eighth to tenth verses, where it is

predicted that “fishers shall stand upon the sea from En-gedi even unto

En-eglaim,” but even this would not be the case if the scheme were

carried out, for then En-gedi would be several hundred feet below the

surface of the sea.

The sanguine supporters of the scheme maintain that it can be

accomplished for eight millions sterling, while its opponents have

entered upon an elaborate calculation to prove that the lowest figure is

£225,573,648 and some odd shillings. Supposing, as seems not impossible,

that the one set prove too little, and the other too much, if it could

be done for fifty millions sterling it would pay a fair interest. The

last year's receipts of the Suez Canal, which cost twenty millions, were

£4,800,000. The whole length of the canal would be two hundred and fifty

miles, of which, however, only about one hundred and twenty would be

actual cutting, but cutting of a nature unparalleled in the history of

engineering. My own impression is that, both from a political and an

engineering point of view, it will be found to be impracticable; but who

can say in these days what science may not accomplish or what

combinations of the Eastern question may not arise to remove political

difficulties?

[2] Since the above was written the dividing range has been carefully

surveyed, and the lowest part found to be between six and seven hundred

feet above the level of the Red Sea.

Haifa; or, Life in modern Palestine · 第 50 / 85 题