A secret article in negotiations concerning public right is, when
looked at objectively or with regard to the meaning of the term,
a contradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective
standpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person
who dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private
consideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity
to acknowledge such an article as originating from him.
The only article of this kind is contained in the following
proposition:—“The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the
conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into
consideration by states armed for war.”
It seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the legislative
authority of a state—to which we must of course attribute all
wisdom—to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand philosophers)
about the rules of its behaviour to other states. At the same time,
it is very advisable that this should be done. Hence the state will
silently invite suggestion for this purpose, while at the same time
keeping the fact secret. This amounts to saying that the state will
allow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal
principles governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace;
for they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition is laid
upon them.[145] The arrangement between states, on this point, does
not require that a special agreement should be made, merely for
this purpose; for it is already involved in the obligation imposed
by the universal reason of man which gives the moral law. We would
not be understood to say that the state must give a preference to
the principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions of
the jurist, the representative of state authority; but only that he
should be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol the scales
of right and the sword of justice,[146] generally uses that sword not
merely to keep off all outside influences from the scales; for, when
one pan of the balance will not go down, he throws his sword into it;
and then _Væ victis_! The jurist, not being a moral philosopher, is
under the greatest temptation to do this, because it is his business
only to apply existing laws and not to investigate whether these
are not themselves in need of improvement; and this actually lower
function of his profession he looks upon as the nobler, because it
is linked to power (as is the case also in both the other faculties,
theology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very low position
compared with this combined power. So that it is said, for example,
that she is the handmaid of theology; and the same has been said of
her position with regard to law and medicine. It is not quite clear,
however, “whether she bears the torch before these gracious ladies,
or carries the train.”
[145] Montesquieu speaks thus in praise of the English state:—“As
the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation,
consists in every man’s being allowed to speak his thoughts and
to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or
write whatever the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or
written.” (_Esprit des Lois_, XIX. Ch. 27.) Hobbes is opposed to
all free discussion of political questions and to freedom as a
source of danger to the state. [Tr.]
[146] Kant is thinking here not of the sword of justice, in the
moral sense, but of a sword which is symbolical of the executive
power of the actual law. [Tr.]
That kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, is not
to be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the possession
of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason. But
it is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment as to the
full significance of their vocations, that both kings and sovereign
nations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of equality,
should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid
the expression of their opinions, but should allow them to speak
openly. And since this class of men, by their very nature, are
incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes of
political agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism.