TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

This is an age of unions. Not merely in the economic sphere, in

the working world of unworthy ends and few ideals do we find

great practical organizations; but law, medicine, science, art,

trade, commerce, politics and political economy—we might add

philanthropy—standing institutions, mighty forces in our social

and intellectual life, all have helped to swell the number of our

nineteenth century Conferences and Congresses. It is an age of

Peace Movements and Peace Societies, of peace-loving monarchs and

peace-seeking diplomats. This is not to say that we are preparing

for the millennium. Men are working together, there is a newborn

solidarity of interest, but rivalries between nation and nation, the

bitternesses and hatreds inseparable from competition are not less

keen; prejudice and misunderstanding not less frequent; subordinate

conflicting interests are not fewer, are perhaps, in view of changing

political conditions and an ever-growing international commerce,

multiplying with every year. The talisman is, perhaps, self-interest,

but, none the less, the spirit of union is there; it is impossible to

ignore a clearly marked tendency towards international federation,

towards political peace. This slow movement was not born with Peace

Societies; its consummation lies perhaps far off in the ages to come.

History at best moves slowly. But something of its past progress

we shall do well to know. No political idea seems to have so great

a future before it as this idea of a federation of the world. It

is bound to realise itself some day; let us consider what are the

chances that this day come quickly, what that it be long delayed.

What obstacles lie in the way, and how may they be removed? What

historical grounds have we for hoping that they may ever be removed?

What, in a word, is the origin and history of the idea of a perpetual

peace between nations, and what would be the advantage, what is the

prospect of realising it?

The international relations of states find their expression, we are

told, in war and peace. What has been the part played by these great

counteracting forces in the history of nations? What has it been in

prehistoric times, in the life of man in what is called the “state

of nature”? “It is no easy enterprise,” says Rousseau, in more than

usually careful language, “to disentangle that which is original from

that which is artificial in the actual state of man, and to make

ourselves well acquainted with a state which no longer exists, which

perhaps never has existed and which probably never will exist in the

future.” (Preface to the _Discourse on the Causes of Inequality_,

1753, publ. 1754.) This is a difficulty which Rousseau surmounts only

too easily. A knowledge of history, a scientific spirit may fail him:

an imagination ever ready to pour forth detail never does. Man lived,

says he, “without industry, without speech, without habitation,

without war, without connection of any kind, without any need of

his fellows or without any desire to harm them ... sufficing to

himself.”[2] (_Discourse on the Sciences and Arts_, 1750.) Nothing,

we are now certain, is less probable. We cannot paint the life of

man at this stage of his development with any definiteness, but the

conclusion is forced upon us that our race had no golden age,[3] no

peaceful beginning, that this early state was indeed, as Hobbes

held, a state of war, of incessant war between individuals, families

and, finally, tribes.

[2] For the inconsistency between the views expressed by Rousseau

on this subject in the _Discourses_ and in the _Contrat Social_

(Cf. I. Chs. VI., VIII.) see Ritchie’s _Natural Right_, Ch.

III., pp. 48, 49; Caird’s essay on Rousseau in his _Essays on

Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I.; and Morley’s _Rousseau_,

Vol. I., Ch. V.; Vol. II., Ch. XII.

[3] The theory that the golden age was identical with the

state of nature, Professor D. G. Ritchie ascribes to Locke

(see _Natural Right_, Ch. II., p. 42). Locke, he says, “has an

idea of a golden age” existing even after government has come

into existence—a time when people did not need “to examine the

original and rights of government.” [_Civil Government_, II., §

111.] A little confusion on the part of his readers (perhaps in

his own mind) makes it possible to regard the state of nature as

itself the golden age, and the way is prepared for the favourite

theory of the eighteenth century:—

“Nor think in nature’s state they blindly trod;

The state of nature was the reign of God:

Self-love and social at her birth began,

Union the bond of all things and of man.

Pride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid;

Man walk’d with beast, joint tenant of the shade;

The same his table, and the same his bed;

No murder cloath’d him, and no murder fed.”

[_Essay on Man_, III., 147 _seq._]

In these lines of Pope’s the state of nature is identified with

the golden age of the Greek and Latin poets; and “the reign of

God” is an equivalent for Locke’s words, “has a law of nature to

govern it.”

_The Early Conditions of Society._

For the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the exception. His gods,

like those of Greece, are warlike gods; his spirit, at death, flees

to some Valhalla. For him life is one long battle; his arms go with

him even to the grave. Food and the means of existence he seeks

through plunder and violence. Here right is with might; the battle is

to the strong. Nature has given all an equal claim to all things, but

not everyone can have them. This state of fearful insecurity is bound

to come to an end. “Government,” says Locke, (_On Civil Government_,

Chap. VIII., § 105) “is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live

together.”[4] A constant dread of attack and a growing consciousness

of the necessity of presenting a united front against it result in

the choice of some leader—the head of a family perhaps—who acts,

it may be, only as captain of the hosts, as did Joshua in Israel,

or who may discharge the simple duties of a primitive governor or

king.[5] Peace within is found to be strength without. The civil

state is established, so that “if there needs must be war, it may

not yet be against all men, nor yet without some helps.” (Hobbes:

_On Liberty_, Chap. I., § 13.) This foundation of the state is the

first establishment in history of a peace institution. It changes the

character of warfare, it gives it method and system; but it does not

bring peace in its train. We have now, indeed, no longer a wholesale

war of all against all, a constant irregular raid and plunder of one

individual by another; but we have the systematic, deliberate war of

community against community, of nation against nation.[6]

[4] Cf. _Republic_, II. 369. “A state,” says Socrates, “arises

out of the needs of mankind: no one is self-sufficing, but all of

us have many wants.”

[5] See Hume’s account of the origin of government (_Treatise_,

III., Part II., Sect. VIII.). There are, he says, American

tribes “where men live in concord and amity among themselves

without any established government; and never pay submission

to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when their

captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after their

return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the

neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in

the advantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse

to it, when either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any

fortuitous inventions, their riches and possessions have become

so considerable as to make them forget, on every emergence, the

interest they have in the preservation of peace and justice....

Camps are the true mothers of cities; and as war cannot be

administered, by reason of the suddenness of every exigency,

without some authority in a single person, the same kind of

authority naturally takes place in that civil government, which

succeeds the military.”

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