This translation of Kant’s essay on _Perpetual Peace_ was undertaken
by Miss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor
Ritchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a preface,
indicating the value of Kant’s work in relation to recent discussions
regarding the possibility of “making wars to cease.” In view of the
general interest which these discussions have aroused and of the
vague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised
them, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this wise
and sagacious essay would be both opportune and valuable.[1] His
untimely death has prevented the fulfilment of his promise, and I
have been asked, in his stead, to introduce the translator’s work.
[1] Cf. his _Studies in Political and Social Ethics_, pp. 169,
170.
This is, I think, the only complete translation into English of
Kant’s essay, including all the notes as well as the text, and the
translator has added a full historical Introduction, along with
numerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie’s words)
“to meet the needs (1) of the student of Political Science who
wishes to understand the relation of Kant’s theories to those of
Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader
who wishes to understand the significance of Kant’s proposals
in connection with the ideals of Peace Congresses, and with the
development of International Law from the end of the Middle Ages to
the Hague Conference.”
Although it is more than 100 years since Kant’s essay was written,
its substantial value is practically unimpaired. Anyone who is
acquainted with the general character of the mind of Kant will
expect to find in him sound common-sense, clear recognition of the
essential facts of the case and a remarkable power of analytically
exhibiting the conditions on which the facts necessarily depend.
These characteristics are manifest in the essay on _Perpetual Peace_.
Kant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetual peace is an
unrealisable dream or a consummation devoutly to be feared, nor is
he optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which could easily
be realised if men would but turn their hearts to one another. For
Kant perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely as a speculative Utopian
idea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a moral principle,
which ought to be, and therefore can be, realised. Yet he makes it
perfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach the realisation of
it unless we honestly face political facts and get a firm grasp of
the indispensable conditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the
ideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour
that must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of its own
ends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to
secure perpetual peace between independent nations. Such nations may
make treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is not
to the interest of either party to denounce them. To enforce them
is impossible while the nations remain independent. “There is,” as
Professor Ritchie put it (_Studies in Political and Social Ethics_,
p. 169), “only one way in which war between independent nations can
be prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent.”
But this does not necessarily mean the establishment of a despotism,
whether autocratic or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains
that just as peace between individuals within a state can only be
permanently secured by the institution of a “republican” (that is
to say, a representative) government, so the only real guarantee
of a permanent peace between nations is the establishment of a
federation of free “republican” states. Such a federation he regards
as practically possible. “For if Fortune ordains that a powerful
and enlightened people should form a republic—which by its very
nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre
of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure
conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of
the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind,
the federation would extend further and further.”
Readers who are acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant
will find many traces of its influence in the essay on _Perpetual
Peace_. Those who have no knowledge of his philosophy may find some
of his forms of statement rather difficult to understand, and it
may therefore not be out of place for me to indicate very briefly
the meaning of some terms which he frequently uses, especially in
the Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the beginning of the First
Supplement, Kant draws a distinction between the mechanical and the
teleological view of things, between “nature” and “Providence”,
which depends upon his main philosophical position. According to
Kant, pure reason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. As
concerning knowledge, strictly so called, the _a priori_ principles
of reason (_e.g._ substance and attribute, cause and effect etc.)
are valid only within the realm of possible sense-experience. Such
ideas, for instance, cannot be extended to God, since He is not a
possible object of sense-experience. They are limited to the world
of phenomena. This world of phenomena (“nature” or the world of
sense-experience) is a purely mechanical system. But in order to
understand fully the phenomenal world, the pure theoretical reason
must postulate certain ideas (the ideas of the soul, the world and
God), the objects of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas
are not theoretically valid, but their validity is practically
established by the pure practical reason, which does not yield
speculative truth, but prescribes its principles “dogmatically” in
the form of imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical
reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives upon itself. The
fundamental imperative of the practical reason is stated by Kant in
Appendix I. (p. 175):—“Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim
should be a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.”
If the end of perpetual peace is a duty, it must be necessarily
deduced from this general law. And Kant does regard it as a duty. “We
must desire perpetual peace not only as a material good, but also
as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts
of duty” (_loc. cit._). This is further expressed in the maxim (p.
177):—“Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its
righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of
perpetual peace, will be added unto you.” The distinction between
the moral politician and the political moralist, which is developed
in Appendix I., is an application of the general distinction
between duty and expediency, which is a prominent feature of the
Kantian ethics. Methods of expediency, omitting all reference to
the pure practical reason, can only bring about re-arrangements of
circumstances in the mechanical course of nature. They can never
guarantee the attainment of their end: they can never make it more
than a speculative ideal, which may or may not be practicable. But
if the end can be shown to be a duty, we have, from Kant’s point
of view, the only reasonable ground for a conviction that it is
realisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically _know_ that it is
realisable. “Reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the
series of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us
to predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action,
as they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may
hope that things will turn out as we should desire” (p. 163). On the
other hand, since the idea of perpetual peace is a moral ideal, an
“idea of duty”, we are entitled to believe that it is practicable.
“Nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural
course of human propensities; not indeed with sufficient certainty to
enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal theoretically, but yet
clearly enough for practical purposes” (p. 157). One might extend
this discussion indefinitely; but what has been said may suffice for
general guidance.
The “wise and sagacious” thought of Kant is not expressed in a
simple style, and the translation has consequently been a very
difficult piece of work. But the translator has shown great skill in
manipulating the involutions, parentheses and prodigious sentences
of the original. In this she has had the valuable help of Mr. David
Morrison, M.A., who revised the whole translation with the greatest
care and to whom she owes the solution of a number of difficulties.
Her work will have its fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising
the English-speaking student of politics with a political essay of
enduring value, written by one of the master thinkers of modern times.