Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither
as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be
altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.
Certainly not.
And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and
then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that
which has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly
within nor wholly without anything.
True.
And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no
parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot
come into being either as a part or as a whole?
Clearly.
Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, nor by
going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change
in itself?
Very true.
Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
Immoveable.
But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?
Yes, we said so.
Then it is never in the same?
Why not?
Because if it were in the same it would be in something.
Certainly.
And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?
True.
Then one is never in the same place?
It would seem not.
But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
Never.
One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?
It certainly appears so.
Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than
itself or other.
How is that?
If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.
True.
And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so
that upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but
would be other than one?
It would.
Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
It will not.
Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one,
but only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.
True.
Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?
Certainly not.
But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not
by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will
not be other than anything?
Right.
Neither will one be the same with itself.
How not?
Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.
Why not?
It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes
one.
What of that?
Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many
and not one.
True.
But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a
thing became the same, it would always become one; and when it became
one, the same?
Certainly.
And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with
itself, and will therefore be one and also not one.
Surely that is impossible.
And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with
itself.
Impossible.
And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation
to itself or other?
No.
Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.
Why not?
Because likeness is sameness of affections.
Yes.
And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?
That has been shown.
But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it would
be affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is impossible.
True.
Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with
another or with itself?
Clearly not.
Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?
No.
Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected
in such a way as to be more than one.
It would.
That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike
itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness.
True.
But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike
itself or other?
Never.
Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?
Plainly not.
Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal either
to itself or to other.
How is that?
Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to
which it is equal.
True.
And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the
one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that
which is greater?
Yes.
And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have
greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is
greater.
Certainly.
But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the
same measures or have anything else the same?
Impossible.
And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with
itself or with another?
It appears so.
But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many
parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one
but will have as many parts as measures.
Right.
And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it
has been shown to be incapable of equality.
It has.
Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few,
nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be
greater or less than itself, or other?
Certainly.
Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything,
or of the same age with it?
Why not?
Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must
partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did
not partake either of equality or of likeness?
We did say so.
And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.
Very true.
How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than
anything, or have the same age with it?
In no way.
Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with
itself or with another?
Clearly not.
Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must
not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?
Certainly.
And that which is older, must always be older than something which is
younger?
True.
Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same
time younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older
than.
What do you mean?
I mean this:--A thing does not need to become different from another
thing which is already different; it IS different, and if its different
has become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will
be different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot
have been, or be about to be, or yet be, a different--the only different
possible is one which is becoming.
That is inevitable.
But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to
nothing else.
True.
Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time,
become younger than itself?
Yes.
But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a
shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become,
and be about to be, for the same time with itself?
That again is inevitable.
Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case,
I suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also become at
once older and younger than themselves?
Yes.
But the one did not partake of those affections?
Not at all.
Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?
So the argument shows.
Well, but do not the expressions 'was,' and 'has become,' and 'was
becoming,' signify a participation of past time?
Certainly.
And do not 'will be,' 'will become,' 'will have become,' signify a
participation of future time?
Yes.
And 'is,' or 'becomes,' signifies a participation of present time?
Certainly.
And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never
had become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or
is becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be,
hereafter.
Most true.
But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?
There are none.
Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?
That is the inference.
Then the one is not at all?
Clearly not.
Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were
and partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to be
trusted, the one neither is nor is one?
True.
But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?
Of course not.
Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor
knowledge of it?
Clearly not.
Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does
anything that is perceive it.
So we must infer.
But can all this be true about the one?