CHAPTER VIII.

ON PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNMENT SAVINGS BANKS.

"I do not imagine that there can be any more important end

and object of a State than to encourage frugality, and the

investment of the savings of the poor, and nothing in

which I should be more tempted to step out of my way to

encourage, if I were a legislator; but I think the great

test and object of whatever investment I provide specially

for them, must be extreme and perfect certainty, and great

facility of conversion.... Increase in amount of interest

or profit, is as nothing compared to security."--MR. H.

BELLENDEN KER.

For reasons which we have adduced at great length in the last chapter,

the feeling grew that a sweeping change would require to be made in

the institution of Savings Banks. Supplementary banks of different

kinds were established, and they met in great part the object for

which they were designed; meanwhile, the great majority of Savings

Banks took no steps to provide more conveniences for the public, or

they were powerless to effect them.[152] When reasonable changes were

resisted between 1850 and 1860, it occurred to several that agencies

might be contrived to do the same work after a different fashion, and

that this project should be carried out, even were the ultimate result

to diminish the usefulness of most of the older banks, or gradually to

set them aside. It is to proposals having the former object in view

that we must now turn.

It is not a little curious that long before Savings Banks were

legalized by Act of Parliament, and even before Dr. Duncan began his

earnest and self-denying efforts to establish them on a safe footing,

at least two different efforts were made to promote the growth of

provident habits by a system of Savings Banks which should extend

throughout the entire country. We refer to Jeremy Bentham's scheme of

"Frugality Banks," and Mr. Whitbread's "Poor Fund and Assurance

Office."

The plan of the former is detailed in Bentham's works; the latter

scheme, partly described in an earlier portion of this volume (pages

23-4) was submitted to Parliament in 1807, and a bill,--a full

Abstract of which will be found in the _Appendix_,--founded upon it,

actually passed the House in some of its earlier stages. Some of the

provisions of this bill were admirable; and some, owing to the state

of the Post Office of that time, would not have been so easily worked

through that department as was intended. As it was, the country

preferred the class of banks just then rising into notice; and in 1817

the Legislature forgetting Mr. Whitbread's scheme, gave its sanction

and countenance to the banks which had been established on purely

benevolent principles, and which were totally independent of each

other. In the course of years, that system having been tried in every

possible way without producing the safety and convenience so much

desired in institutions of this sort, the principle of a uniform plan

of banks in connexion with the Post Office advocated by Mr. Whitbread

again came up, the story of the proposals for and the introduction of

which we are about to tell.

Previously, however, we ought not to omit, for several reasons, to

give the outline of the scheme proposed by Bentham even before Mr.

Whitbread's proposals. The reader will perceive how thoroughly

conversant the philosopher was with the every-day habits of the poor,

and how completely he understood their wants and requirements, and

sought to provide for them. It is only necessary to add that Bentham

advocated this plan as one of many measures of pauper management; that

the scheme was to be generally applied throughout the country, and to

be taken up and worked by means of a company; the place where the

banks should be held to be called "'Industry Houses,' in

contradistinction to the 'Public Houses' of friendly Societies."

"Should this not be enough," says Bentham, "the vestry room of each

place of worship presents an office as near, and the clerk an officer

or sub-agent as suitable, as can be desired."[153] After fully going

into the hindrances to the spread of saving habits among the poor

around him, and the difficulties incident to the laying up and

improvement of their surplus moneys,--hindrances and difficulties

which had not yet all been surmounted,--he gives the following

comprehensive and exhaustive list, which shows how thoroughly he would

have mastered the obstacles of a more recent period:--

"Properties to be wished for in a system of Frugality

Banks, commensurate to the whole population of the

self-maintaining poor: viz.

"1. _Fund_, solid and secure:--proof against the

several causes of failure.

"2. _Plan of Provision_, all _comprehensive_:

comprehensive, as far as may be, of all sorts of

exigencies, and at all time, as well as of all

persons, in the character of customers: thence the

amount of the deposits transferable from exigency

to exigency, at the will of the customer, at any

time.

"3. _Scale of Dealing_, commensurate to the peculiar

faculties of each customer: _i.e._ on each

occasion as large as or as small as his

convenience can require.

"4. _Terms of Dealing_ sufficiently advantageous to

the customer: (the more so, of course the better),

regard being had, in the necessary degree to

solidity.

"5. _Places_ of transacting business _suitable_:

adapted in point of _vicinity_, as well as in

other respect, to the conveniency of the customer.

"6. _Mode_ of transacting business _accommodating_:

suited to the circumstances of the customer in

respect of times of receipt and payment, and

_quantam_ of receipt and payment at each time.

"7. _Mode of operation, prompt_, consuming as little

of the customer's time in attendance as may be.

"8. Mode of book-keeping, clear and satisfactory."

There can be little doubt from the above extract, that if Bentham did

not make a very practical proposal, he had an excellent idea of the

description of agency required.

Another proposal which shared the same fate as did those of Bentham

and Whitbread was ventilated in the _Quarterly Review_ for 1827, in an

article on "The Substitution of Savings Banks for Poor Laws." This was

no new scheme, though the agency by which the scheme was sought to be

carried out certainly was original. During the eighteenth century the

plan of masters compulsorily deducting payments from the wages they

were expected to pay to their servants, in order that the money might

form a fund for a time of need, was frequently recommended, and even

proposed to Parliament. De Foe, in his "Giving Alms no Charity," tells

us how at his own period attempts were made to effect a legislative

substitution of savings for poors' rates, and to pass Acts of

Parliament which "shall make drunkards take care of wife and children;

spendthrifts lay up for a wet day; lazy fellows diligent; and

thoughtless, sottish men careful and provident." But all the plans, as

might be expected, came to nothing. In 1827, however, the Savings Bank

principle having become recognised, and the Post Office machinery

tolerably efficient it was said that the scheme might be made to work.

The writer advocated the establishment of a National Savings Bank, to

which the Savings Banks in the country might contribute; "and

perhaps," said the _Quarterly Reviewer_, as if recognising the fact of

the insufficient distribution of banks, "the remittances to be made

might, especially in rural districts, be allowed to be paid into the

nearest Post Office, and remitted with its own money to the General

Post Office, by whom it might be paid over to the Commissioners of the

National Debt." This scheme attracted little or no attention at the

time, and nothing came of it. In more than one respect, however, it

contained the germ of a plan subsequently carried out, and it is not

impossible that some of the numerous claimants for the honour of

having originally proposed Savings Banks in connexion with the Post

Office may have carefully studied the details.

And this brings us to the early history of Post Office Savings Banks,

and to the numerous suggestions which at one time or another seem to

have been made with regard to them. No less in respect to the place

which these banks are designed to occupy as important public

institutions--the people's principal purse--(and that their position

in the country will at no distant period be a commanding one there

cannot be a reasonable doubt) than for their present attained position

and intrinsic value, the question of their early history is a matter

for most careful investigation, and one which must not be lightly

passed over. The matter of the authorship of the scheme was the

subject of considerable discussion at an early stage in its history;

and that discussion was not without its value in elucidating some

points of considerable importance, and as affording materials for more

deliberately investigating many claims which have been put forward. It

naturally forms part of our plan, not only to offer a description of

the working of the new class of banks--as will be done in a subsequent

chapter--but to show, as we propose to do here, in a strictly

impartial manner, to whom the country is indebted for the agency now

in operation.[154]

Confining ourselves at present to the origination of the _principle_

of Post Office Banks, without reference to the wonderfully simple and

efficacious scheme afterwards organized, we find that several

different gentlemen had between the years 1850 and 1860, and acting

entirely unknown to each other, matured plans, and in one way or

another actually proposed them, to remedy the deficiencies of the

existing banks, on some such principle as that eventually adopted. To

Mr. Sikes, of Huddersfield, however,--of whose previous labours in the

cause of Savings Bank reform we have already spoken,--belongs the

undoubted merit and honour of having independently originated and

matured a plan of operation more or less equal to the object in view;

of having persevered in the object of bringing the matter prominently

before the public; and of being so fortunate as to have proposed his

scheme at a period when the country possessed in Mr. Gladstone a

statesman of extraordinary versatility and power at the head of its

financial operations, and who has given abundant evidence of his

willingness to grapple with uncommon difficulties where a need is

proved and the principles of a measure are shown to be sound. As we

shall show presently, the same propositions, only differing as to

details, were submitted once, if not twice, to Sir Charles Wood when

Chancellor of the Exchequer, and once more, by a totally different

individual, to Sir George C. Lewis when he held that office. How much,

therefore, the measures subsequently carried are primarily due to Mr.

Gladstone's sharp-sightedness and energy the reader may judge.

Returning to an account of those who have been represented as

suggesting the principle of Postal Banks, we think the number may be

fairly reduced by several names. And in that number we would class Dr.

W. Neilson Hancock, of Dublin. Of Dr. Hancock's exertions in connexion

with the frauds in Savings Banks, and his description of the feeling

of insecurity which they engendered, we have already spoken; those

exertions related exclusively, so far as we can gather from his

pamphlets, to a remedy for this grievance. In a paper[155] read by Dr.

Hancock before the Dublin Statistical Society in 1852, and republished

in a pamphlet form four years afterwards, we find him saying, that

private enterprise had not had a fair trial,--if it had, and failed,

then Government should undertake the work, _as it did Money Order

business_:--

"That part of the natural business of bankers which

consists in receiving deposits from the poor might be

undertaken by some public officers appointed for the

purpose, _just as_ the granting of Money Orders, another

part of the same business, is carried on by the officers

of the Post Office. Such an institution would be called a

Savings Bank; and in it the Government would be

responsible to the depositors for the acts of the clerks.

So that the entire responsibility of management would rest

with the members of Government in charge of that

department, and the depositors would have perfect security

for any money actually paid to a clerk.... My own

impression is, that if our laws were framed with a view to

allow of small deposits and small investments, private

enterprise is quite adequate to supply a complete system

of safe investments for the poor. But whether that opinion

be sound or not, a Government institution _like the Money

Order Office_, with Government officers and Government

security for those officers, would be infinitely better

than the present system of divided responsibility and

absence of security."

In a further paper, read and published in a pamphlet form in

1855,[156] Dr. Hancock made no further proposal towards the object

immediately in our view, although he said--

"The Money Order Office of the Post Office shows that a

large part of the business of banking for the poor can be

cheaply and efficiently conducted by the officers of a

public department. The first step towards the adoption of

such measures is to produce in the public mind a

conviction of the utter instability of banks as now

constituted, and that conviction I have endeavoured to

create."

We believe Dr. Hancock went somewhat further than this, by calling the

attention of the Post Office authorities to the matter though, as he

presented no distinct scheme to their consideration, it is not very

wonderful that the question should rest where he left it. Though Dr.

Hancock does not seem ever to have gone so far as to propose "the

opening of banks for the poor in connexion with the Money Order

Office," much less to develop a plan which should have that end in

view--a construction which has been put upon his references to the

Post Office machinery,[157]--it is only fair to that gentleman to say

that he was one of the first to recognise the merits of such a measure

when it was proposed, and to urge its full adoption.

Another name, which has in our opinion been very unnecessarily and

erroneously connected with the early history of Post Office Banks, is

that of Mr. Ayrton, the member for the Tower Hamlets. To all who

remember the strong opposition which Mr. Ayrton offered, not only to

the project when before Parliament, but previously to other reasonable

reforms in the Savings Bank institution, this association of his name

with the origination of the present plan must be very amusing; and yet

this is an error into which several have fallen, though traceable,

perhaps, to one source.[158] Mr. Ayrton certainly seems to have had a

notion, though not till 1858, that the Post Office might be more

useful to Savings Banks than it was; and in the Committee of that

year, of which he was a member, he asked one of the witnesses--who was

actuary to a bank that had several branches in country places--a

series of questions, with the object of eliciting the opinion that it

would be an advantage to Savings Banks if money orders could be

procured in country places at a cheaper rate than 3_d._ and 6_d._,

when any person desired to send a Savings Bank deposit to an adjacent

town.[159] In the draft report proposed by Mr. Ayrton after the close

of the investigation (which was not carried), the following clause

appeared:--"That the Committee recommend the Postmaster-General to

afford every facility practicable for the remittance of money to

Savings Banks, but they do not deem legislation in this respect

expedient;" and in our humble view it would have been exceedingly cool

if they had! There can be no question that this simple incident has

given rise to the misapprehension to which we have just alluded.

We can now come to veritable proposals. Though it is due to Mr. Sikes

to say that the fact of prior proposals, with the same object in view,

were either forgotten or only came to light for the first time after

he had publicly made and urged his plans on the country, it seems not

to admit of question that two gentlemen had been, quite unknown to him

or the public generally, over the same ground before him, and, whether

wisely or not we will not attempt to decide, had desisted from

pressing their plans after obtaining an adverse decision with regard

to them. So far as the Post Office is concerned, it is only fair to

say that the authorities up to quite a recent period have had their

hands sufficiently full in completing the plan of Penny Postage Reform

which, for several years after the passing of the Act of 1839, was

almost held in abeyance; and that, inundated with crude and

undeveloped schemes, it was requisite that a plan in which so much was

involved should be well matured, and go weighted with the stamp of

public approval. Whether, however, the Post Office system was prepared

so early as 1851,--the date of the earliest proposal,--to undertake

Savings Bank business, is a question which, considering the transition

state in which it then was, admits of some doubt.

In 1852, the Rev. George Hans Hamilton, the Vicar of

Berwick-upon-Tweed, and now Archdeacon of Lindisfarne, proposed

through his relative, Mr. G. A. Hamilton of the Treasury, a national

system of Savings Banks to be worked by means of the Post Office,[160]

which it is but justice to say presents many, if not most, of the

features of the plan eventually produced. Mr. Hamilton met with

varying success; his proposals were not taken up warmly, but were

understood by him to present difficulties which might ultimately be

overcome. Had this gentleman persevered in the advocacy of the scheme

which he propounded, or had he had the good fortune, to have fallen on

more favourable times, with Mr. Gladstone as Chancellor of the

Exchequer, there can be little doubt that his plan would have been

cordially taken up and his name ever associated with it. As it was,

his exertions were recognised by Mr. Gladstone when he came to deal

with the matter, that gentleman referring on one occasion to the

valuable suggestions he had made. It should be added, that Mr.

Hamilton has, since the plans came into operation, urged a

modification of one of its features (to be referred to hereafter), and

it is little to say, considering the value and the shrewdness of his

original suggestions, that he is well entitled to be heard on the

point.

The other gentleman who somewhat later than Mr. Hamilton, and quite

unknown to him, made proposals to the same effect, was Mr. John

Bullar, the eminent counsel, of the Temple. Mr. Bullar himself informs

us that his attention was attracted to the subject by observing the

working of a Penny Bank at Putney, which was established in the year

1850. Being a member of the Committee of this bank, he was led to

think much over "the then existing system of Savings Banks, and how

some of the defects of the system could be remedied." After thinking

the matter well over, he drew up the memorandum which we give

_verbatim_:--

It is admitted that the present system of Savings Banks is

defective, and that a new system is much wanted.

Among the defects of the present system are:--Want of

perfect security to depositors: risk of loss to trustees

by defaulting clerks, and want of opportunities for the

labouring classes to make deposits as soon as they have

anything to deposit.

Many of the present Savings Banks are only opened for two

or three hours once a week; so that those who would

deposit in them are forced to be their own bankers during

the rest of the week, and are exposed to the constant

temptation of spending what they have in their pockets;

the particular temptation from which Savings Banks were

intended to relieve them.

In order to give perfect security to depositors, they

ought to have the security of the nation.

The establishment of Savings Banks for the whole of the

labouring classes being a matter of national importance,

they ought to be a national, and not merely a

philanthropic institution.

In order that they may confer the greatest amount of

benefit on the labouring classes, they ought to be open

during the whole of every working day.

The principle of a National Savings Bank as a National

institution is already admitted in the Savings Banks for

the Army, the Navy, and the Mercantile Marine.

The principle of Government acting as Banker for the

Nation is already admitted in the Money Order department

of the Post Office.

That department is, in fact, a National Bank. It receives

money from all comers; it retains the money for divers

periods, from four-and-twenty hours to several weeks; and

it pays the money to those who are entitled to demand it.

It would be a mere extension in point of detail if that

department received more money from more comers, retained

the money for longer periods, and paid it out with the

addition of interest upon it.

It is therefore suggested that the Money Order department

of the Post Office should be made a National Savings Bank,

investing the deposits in Government securities, paying a

moderate rate of interest (say two and a half per cent.)

and paying interest only on round pounds deposited for not

less than a quarter of a year.

The trustees of existing Savings Banks should be

authorized (except so far as any depositors might object)

to transfer their deposits to the department.

In all probability the deposits with the department would

amount to at least thirty millions in the course of a year

or so; and at the present price of Consols, this would

give to the Post Office about 200,000_l._ beyond the

interest which they would have to pay to the depositors.

If this would not meet the expenses, the rate of interest

might be 2_l._ per cent., giving to the department an

additional 150,000_l._ a year.

The principle being admitted, there would be no

insuperable difficulty in arranging the details.

JOHN BULLAR.

_Temple, November 8, 1856._

This memorandum was written in November, 1856. Mr. Bullar describes

that at that period he was too much occupied to enter into the matter

so fully as was necessary, or to agitate by means of the press for

some such scheme; but Mr. Bullar's friend, Mr. Joseph Burnley Hume

(eldest son of the late Mr. Joseph Hume, M.P.), who had some leisure

at command, and perhaps some of his father's desire to achieve an

amendment of the Savings Bank system, undertook to bring the matter

forward in the proper official quarters. He early saw Mr. Frederic

Hill, who was in charge of the Money Order department of the Post

Office, and learned from him that the same scheme had already been

suggested to the Post Office, and rejected after full consideration. A

month afterwards Mr. Hume saw the Duke of Argyll, who was then

Postmaster-General, and received a courteous hearing from him. The

Duke also said that the Post Office had had the question, or something

like it, before them, and that he thought the Chancellor of the

Exchequer still had something of the kind under consideration; but

gave no definite reply. Subsequently he saw Sir Alexander Spearman,

the Comptroller of the National Debt Office, and Mr. Tidd Pratt. "He

gathered from them," to use Mr. Bullar's own words, "that they were

with him in principle, but regarded the proposed Money Order

department as visionary, and that the Government had under

consideration a different scheme, which they preferred."[161] Having

in this way met with enough discouragement to hinder them--or any

other person who might be cognizant of the proceedings that had been

taken--from going further, they dropped any further steps to bring

about this desirable change.

Happily, however,--for happy, in one sense, it was,--these schemes and

the hitherto abortive attempts to carry them into execution, did not

reach the public ear, or others might have desisted from entertaining

similar plans. As it was, it was still open to any one else to take up

the matter _de novo_; and this is what actually did happen. We can

well believe, without the assurance with which he has favoured us,

that the next adventurer in these apparently difficult seas had no

notion that they had been previously navigated. This circumstance does

not take from his merit; but it certainly increased his difficulties.

How the matter was eventually brought about in the face of the adverse

decisions which we have just given, though somewhat better known, is

within our province to tell.

In the hands of Mr. Sikes, of Huddersfield, any matter once taken up

was not likely to fail for want of thorough ventilation and earnest

advocacy. This gentleman had for years interested himself in the

extension of Savings Banks. We have already spoken of the fruits of

his industrious pen; and now he was once more to propose in a similar

manner, and with his accustomed eagerness, another new scheme which he

had carefully thought over and developed in his own mind. Once sure of

it himself, he resolved to devote himself to its advocacy; to bring it

not only before the proper authorities, "but before the public, at the

proper time." Mr. Sikes evidently did not dally with the matter. As he

made no sort of mention of the Post Office in his evidence before the

Savings Bank Committee of 1858, we may fairly assume that at that time

the idea of using the Post Office had not occurred to him. He himself

states, that, occupied with a favourite idea which he had long

cherished, of bringing a Savings Bank "within less than an hour's walk

of the fireside of every working man in the kingdom," the organization

of the Post Office suddenly occurred to him, and he dwelt upon it till

he had struck upon some scheme for applying the one to the other.

As in the case of the other proposals, the leading principle of Mr.

Sikes's plan was to employ the machinery of the Money Order Office to

collect and forward deposits to a central bank which he proposed

should be established in London. Among the principal details of the

plan were--the opening in every town, not previously supplied with a

Savings Bank, of a Money Order Office, for the reception of Savings

Bank deposits; that the money should be remitted to London in the form

of Money Orders; that the deposits should be in sums of not less than

a pound; and that in return for these deposits or remittances, Savings

Bank "Interest Notes" should be issued in London; and that the

interest on these notes should be at the rate of 2-1/2 per cent. per

annum. That Mr. Sikes did not proceed boldly enough, and that there

were some defects and omissions in his scheme, we shall have to show

further on; here it is sufficient to indicate in what his plan

consisted.

On the reasons for a large and comprehensive reform of this kind, Mr.

Sikes was most full and explicit; as, however, we have already been

over this ground, and also said much in connexion with the name of

this energetic Savings Bank reformer, it is quite unnecessary to

repeat here his well-arranged statistics and his generally conclusive

observations as they are given in the pamphlet before us.[162] Suffice

it to say, that he adduced abundant evidence to show that additional

facilities were required, and that if they were given, a proportionate

increase of business would be the result; that the existing banks were

totally inadequate to meet the requirements of the provident poor,

much less to stimulate and increase the number of provident people;

and that if his plan, or something like it, were carried out, both

objects would be gained. Mr. Sikes argued that in a case of this sort,

as in many others, increased facilities would bring increased

business, and, in support, he adduced as an instance the Money Order

Office itself. Quoting from the Postmaster-General's report for 1856,

he gave an extract accounting for the increase of business in that

office by the fact of the large additions that had been made to the

number of Offices, and to further relaxations in the regulations

regarding the issue and payment of Money Orders. "The establishment of

a Post Office," said Mr. Sikes, with very great truth, "has unfailing

influence in developing the correspondence; and of the Money Order

Office, the remittances of a district." Mr. Sikes then instituted a

comparison which, though not always to the point (for reasons quite

obvious), was scarcely an unfair one, of the relative progress of

Savings Banks with their small improvement as to facilities, and the

Money Order Offices, with their increased facilities. Within the years

1846 and 1858, the former had progressed at the rate of seven and a

half per cent.; the business of the latter had increased at the rate

of seventy-nine per cent. He then asked if the stagnation in the

business of Savings Banks was not to be traced to the non-increase of

their number, their absence in many very populous localities, the

slight accommodation given, and the arbitrary routine, and

restrictions imposed. If Savings Banks were worth anything, were they

not worth improving? And would not those supplementary banks do much

themselves, and very probably cause an improvement in existing ones?

Having matured his plan in June, 1859, Mr. Sikes communicated it to

Mr. Edward Baines, the member for Leeds, in the form of a printed

Letter; and this gentleman, well known for his wide sympathy with the

industrious classes, after studying its details, expressed his warm

approval of the project, and engaged to bring it under the notice of

Sir (then Mr.) Rowland Hill, the Secretary of the Post Office. That

there was now no indisposition--if ever there was--on the part of the

authorities to such a measure is evident from the reception it met

with at their hands, as shown by the letter below.[163] Encouraged to

persevere, Mr. Baines and Mr. Sikes had an interview with the

Secretary and some of the principal heads of departments at the Post

Office, when the draft of a plan was read to them for working such a

measure, the official gentlemen concerned assuring them that this

might be done "with great ease and simplicity."

The next step which Mr. Sikes took was to place himself in

communication with the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and as a

preparatory step, he printed his scheme afresh, extending it somewhat,

in the form of a Letter to Mr. Gladstone. The communication was met by

a cordial acknowledgment, in which that right hon. gentleman promised

his best attention in examining the scheme, not only on account of the

interest attaching to the subject, but "of the authority with which it

was invested," in proceeding from the quarter whence it did. The

letter was then given to the public, and immediately attracted general

attention, and warm expressions of approval. It was read before the

Social Science Association which met in Bradford in the autumn of that

year, Lord Brougham having also mentioned the matter in his inaugural

address. For a few weeks it was a common subject of discussion, public

opinion being somewhat divided as to its advisability as well as

practicability. Several Liberal newspapers, however, went warmly into

an advocacy of the principles of the measure, if not of the measure

itself; and in the early part of November, 1859, the members of the

Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce strengthened the hands of their

townsman, by passing an unanimous sentence of commendation upon it;

and not only so, but they resolved to send Mr. Sikes's tract to all

the Chambers of Commerce in the kingdom, recommending them to support

the plan, which several of them eventually did.

During the interval, when the ball was kept rolling in this manner,

Mr. Gladstone had amply fulfilled his promise to give the subject his

best attention, as sufficiently appears from a letter which, belonging

now to the history of Post Office Savings Banks, we append below.[164]

Expressions of opinion on the advantage of some such scheme still

continued to be sent to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Sikes, which must have

encouraged them both to persevere, and which made it very apparent

that the public had made up its mind not to allow the matter to

drop--at any rate, quietly.

The most important petitions sent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer

emanated from Liverpool, Leeds, and York; but a resolution passed by

the Dublin Statistical Society, presided over by Dr. Whately, the late

Archbishop of Dublin, and signed by Dr. W. Neilson Hancock as

secretary, deserves special notice, were it only for the weight

attaching to Dr. Hancock's own name.[165] In answer to these and

similar memorials, Mr. Gladstone seems to have generally replied that

the matter was under his most careful consideration; "that he received

with cordial satisfaction this expression of opinion, proceeding from

persons well qualified to judge, and that he earnestly hoped it may be

practicable to frame a plan by which the objects in view may be

extensively attained."

And now the curtain may be said to have fallen upon the scheme, and

for fully twelve months it is beyond the public gaze, and entirely

beyond public criticism. We find that now and then Mr. Sikes was busy

during the period in answering objections to his plan, with as much

energy and good sense as he had previously displayed in his advocacy

of it, before he had the good fortune to enlist the services of Mr.

Gladstone in its behalf. Now, however, it may be said to have passed

out of his hands, and to have fallen into those of others, who, no way

averse or unfriendly to his project, saw that it would be necessary

largely to remodel it, in order to make it fit into the machinery, (of

the working of which Mr. Sikes was necessarily ignorant,) upon which

it would have to be engrafted. Furthermore, among much approving

criticism of the scheme, there had been not a little feeling exhibited

among influential organs of the public press, that Mr. Sikes had not

gone far enough in his proposals, and that on some points the details

were not nearly so liberal as they ought to be made. As an ardent

friend to the Savings Bank system, Mr. Sikes had doubtless well

considered the objections which Savings Bank managers were likely to

urge; and, to stave off opposition on the part of many of his friends,

had apparently sacrificed a detail here and there in a matter where

boldness of action was most essential to success. If one thing is more

clear than another in the history of our great reforms, it is that the

projector who plunged right into the stream was always surer of

ultimate success than he who paddled about in the shallows, or kept as

close as possible to the brink. In this way, therefore, it seems to

have come about that not only must modifications be made, but steps

must be taken to perfect the plan, and present it in such a shape as a

measure of reform as should silence cavil and complaint. Twelve months

for such a work might seem long--might, indeed, be unnecessary; but

few will say that the scheme,--so much remodelled as fairly to be

considered a new one, did not amply atone for the delay.

The task of adopting Mr. Sikes's proposals just as they originally

stood, and which proposals the Post Office authorities had generally

acquiesced in, seems to have been abandoned on account of the

practical difficulties which stood in the way; one of which Mr.

Gladstone indicated in the letter we have already given. The object

now, therefore, was to originate a mode of working altogether

independent of Mr. Sikes's plan, in which the desirable modifications

to be made in Mr. Sikes's scheme should also be introduced. Before,

however, we show how this was eventually accomplished, it is necessary

to say in what these important modifications consisted.

1. Mr. Sikes's scheme was proposed to be worked by a

Commission who should preside over a central bank and

employ the agency of the Post Office. Such a division of

authority would have been unprecedented, and must have led

to confusion and great expense, if even it could have been

so arranged.

2. The Commissioners were to have been empowered to

receive Money Orders as deposits and acknowledge them in

the form of an expensive description of "Interest Notes."

The Money Orders and the "Notes" themselves would have

required all the surplus interest to have been expended

upon them, and there would have been little chance of the

scheme turning out self-supporting.

3. Mr. Sikes proposed to open only 1,527 Money Order

Offices as Savings Banks. He proved at great length that

the system he proposed was not only the best, but the

cheapest; yet at the solicitation, we believe, of several

Savings Bank actuaries, he did not go the length of

including any town where provision had been made for

provident people. This, of course, restricted the

inhabitants of 600 towns to the dearer mode of operation,

though the cheaper one was shown to hold out anticipations

of producing by far the best article. Such considerations

could not, we should imagine, weigh with the Post Office

when once the matter was taken in hand, and no arbitrary

test of the above nature could ever have been entertained.

4. Most unsatisfactory, however, was the proposal to make

1_l._ the minimum sum that could be received. There were

thousands of depositors in the ordinary banks whose

average deposits were not half that sum. Moreover, the

plan was designed to meet the wants of the poorest; to

encourage and foster the habit of small savings among

those who had not yet begun to save. No provision,

therefore, could have been more unfortunate; and it is

well that Mr. Sikes's fears--such as, that if a less sum

were taken the measure would not pay--were soon shown to

be groundless.

It is not our intention to trouble the reader with much detail as to

what passed during the preparation, or, we may call it, the

organization of this interesting and beneficent measure. It is,

perhaps, sufficient to say, that differences of opinion rose upon

it--that some of the authorities of the Post Office thought Mr.

Sikes's scheme, with many important modifications, might be worked;

while others of them held that no amount of alteration would enable

the department to work it by means of Money Orders. In this way

several months passed in discussion, and it is scarcely too much to

say, that but for the unceasing vigilance of Mr. Gladstone, who

continued to urge further efforts to overcome the natural obstacles

that presented themselves, the temporary fate of many a good measure

might have been the fate of this.

It was when matters were in this state of abeyance, and when the

difficulties in the way fairly threatened to overwhelm the scheme

altogether, that a gentleman, since prominently connected with all

that relates to Post Office Banks, was induced to turn his attention

to the subject. Mr. Chetwynd, one of the staff officers of the Money

Order Office, took up the matter of applying the Post Office machinery

to Savings Banks; and, discarding all the other plans for working then

in dispute, addressed the Postmaster-General in November, 1860, and

proposed a plan which he thought would, notwithstanding all the

difficulties that had been experienced, meet all the reasonable

requirements of the case. Mr. Chetwynd's scheme was based on the

principle that Savings Bank business might be done "through the

various Money Order Offices in a much more economical manner than by

the issue and payment of Money Orders;" and that the plan should be so

comprehensive as not to need the restriction which had been previously

put upon it that sums under 1_l._ could not be received,--that sum, as

Mr. Chetwynd truly said, being "so large as seriously to reduce the

value of the benefit proposed to be conferred on the provident portion

of the public."

The following outline, necessarily brief, gives all the material

points of the plan proposed, and which has in its integrity been since

carried out, and forms the basis of existing arrangements:--

1. That every holder of a Money Order Office shall act as

an agent of a Central Savings Bank, and shall receive

deposits of any amount within the limit fixed by statute.

2. That he shall enter each deposit in a numbered

depositor's book, to be kept by the depositor, and in an

account to be forwarded to London daily with his Money

Order account. That on the occasion of a first payment,

the depositor shall make the declaration prescribed by

statute, and also sign his name in his depositor's book.

3. That the holder of the Money Order Office shall charge

himself in his Money Order account with the total of the

deposits thus received.

4. That this account should, on arrival in London, be

regularly examined by the examiner of the Money Order

accounts; and that when this has been done the daily

schedule shall be forwarded to the Central Savings Bank.

5. That the Central Savings Bank shall immediately send an

acknowledgment for every deposit direct to the depositor

through the Post Office.

6. That a depositor who may wish to withdraw money, shall

give notice in writing[166] to the Central Savings Bank,

and shall receive therefrom a warrant for the required

amount, payable at the nearest Money Order Office.

7. That in presenting this warrant for payment, the

depositor must also present his depositor's book.

8. That the holder of the Money Order Office shall enter

withdrawals in the depositor's book, and shall account for

the money he shall pay, in the same manner as already

described in the case of deposits, and shall be credited

with the sums daily.

9. That the depositors' books shall be forwarded to London

annually, in order that they may be compared with the

ledgers in the Central Savings Bank, and in order that the

interest due may be inserted in them.

The first step which appears to have been taken in regard to the

scheme of Mr. Chetwynd was to refer it to Mr. Scudamore, who then

filled the office of Receiver and Accountant-General,--an office the

holder of which is at the head of the financial operations of the Post

Office. After going carefully over the plan which had been submitted

to him, he came to the conclusion that it was the best of those which

had as yet been framed; "that it will be productive of very great

advantages to the working classes, and that it will be self-supporting."

He also characterised it as exceedingly simple, and thought, that if

the execution of the plan were difficult, that difficulty would be due

to the amount rather than to the nature of the business to be

transacted. In conjunction with the projector, Mr. Scudamore then

proposed some important modifications and additions to the plan,[167]

and proceeded to enter fully into arguments and calculations to show

that it would offer the largest amount of convenience to the public,

and be at the same time the least expensive mode of operations so far

as the State was concerned. Into these and other purely technical

matters there is no need that we should further enter, beyond saying

that, so recommended, the scheme was warmly approved by the

Postmaster-General; and in a month from the date of Mr. Scudamore's

report, it fell into the hands of Mr. Gladstone, and became, as it

were, the property of the nation. How the Legislature dealt with it

will fittingly bring this chapter to a close.

On the 9th of February, 1861, _Mr. Gladstone_ took the first step

towards bringing the subject forward in Parliament, by moving a

resolution in the House, of which he had previously given

notice:--"That it is expedient to charge upon the Consolidated Fund of

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland the deficiency, if any

such should arise, in the sums which may be held on account of Post

Office Savings Banks, to meet the lawful demand of depositors in such

banks, in the event of their being established by law." This, which

was according to the usage of the House the first necessary

preliminary, provided that the burden of the measure should be thrown

upon the State. Mr. Gladstone stated[168] that in submitting this

resolution he did not wish to pledge members either to the principle

or the details of the bill which he intended to found upon it. His

sole object was to afford new facilities for the deposit of small

savings to those who did not possess them, or possessed them

imperfectly. He would not only like to do this, but also to improve

materially the existing facilities, so as to enable many more to take

advantage of them; but this was a more difficult problem,--an object

often attempted, yet little accomplished. The main difficulty, the

responsibility of trustees, had baffled all attempts to deal with it.

How true this was, the reader who has followed us in our account of

the legislation on the subject will readily believe. In this

difficulty he had been led to see if they could not avail themselves

of another description of machinery altogether, "recommended by its

incomparable convenience," for the purpose of carrying out the same

objects for which Savings Banks were originally set on foot. He then

went fully into such statistics of the number and conveniences of

existing banks as those which we have already furnished, and compared

that machinery with the Money Order system at the Post Office and its

ramifications all over the country. Not only were the Money Order

Offices open every day for a considerable number of hours, but the

Postmasters were open and adequate to the transaction of increased

business. Mr. Gladstone then dwelt on the want of facilities, which,

he said, exercised an important influence on the amount of the savings

of the poor; "the experience of this winter, 1860-61, must have

demonstrated to anybody who thought upon the subject, that the

resources of this class had not of late years increased in proportion

to the rate of wages and the improvement in their standard of living."

A smaller portion of their gross income was, he thought, laid by at

that moment than was laid by twenty years before. He was sanguine

enough to expect that, if readier means were afforded than of laying

by in a season of prosperity, their ability to cope with the distress

of the future must be largely increased. Now, the banks which he

intended to propose would afford these means; and not only so, but

under the arrangements of the measure, he would answer for it that the

Post Office machinery should be applied carefully and gradually--the

most neglected districts to be supplied first. Mr. Gladstone then went

into the object and details of the measure. His proposal was that the

Post Office should receive and return deposits, with interest, in the

same way as Money Orders were dealt with, charging merely a fair

remunerative price for the work performed. In one respect the

principle upon which the new banks would be founded would be

essentially different from that of the old ones. The latter had been

established with the notion that the State might very fairly offer to

the labouring classes a certain premium by way of inducing them to

make deposits; but while he was far from desiring to cast any censure

upon the principle, he did not deem it right in the present case to

hold out to depositors the expectation of obtaining any high rate of

interest. He proposed to give a rate of interest 10_s._ less than that

given by the ordinary banks, with a proviso that it might be increased

to that rate, if found necessary, "and within certain limits."

Mr. Gladstone provided an ample set-off against a less remunerative

return for the money, in the security which he now proposed to give

for its safe custody. The responsibility of the State, on account of

Savings Bank money had always been a subject of the greatest

difficulty; he argued on this occasion with perfect reasonableness, as

many of his predecessors in office had argued before, that the State

could only be responsible for the acts of its own officers; and as up

to this time no plan had been devised by which the State could

participate in all the proceedings of Savings Banks, it was impossible

to carry out the principle of a perfect Government guarantee. What,

however, could not be done with the old banks, might and should be

done with the new. In his proposals there was something so essentially

different from anything they had been accustomed to, that a Government

guarantee was an easy and a possible thing. The money would be

received by Government officials: it would be invested by these

servants in Government securities; and it would be inexcusable to

refuse a Government guarantee for the full amount. Hence the motion

which he had made. The only effective form which this guarantee could

take was the technical one, to pass a resolution providing that if any

difficulty arose in the means of meeting the lawful demands of lawful

depositors, that difficulty might be met by a charge on the

Consolidated Fund. Mr. Gladstone, in concluding, hoped honourable

gentlemen would not be alarmed at his resolution, as he would

expressly state then that the great basis of this new arrangement was

that it should be self-supporting.[169]

_Mr. Francis Crossley_ (now Sir Francis) went over the ground of the

very deficient means of investment for the surplus cash of the poor,

producing statistics of a kind with which our readers are now

sufficiently familiar, and stated that it was impossible to

over-estimate the advantages which must accrue to certain classes in

the country from the carrying out of the proposals which had been

submitted to them. "A great deal of fault," said Mr. Crossley, "had

been found with the improvidence of the working people in not saving

money, but let them first see what the Government had done to help

them. The State provided beer-shops in every street for working men to

spend their money in as fast as they earned it; but hitherto he did

not think it had been sufficiently forward in giving them facilities

for saving their money." He then alluded to the fear which working men

had of the ordinary banks, from their masters being connected with

them, and who from that connexion would be able to see what they were

able to save. "Under the Postmasters, this would, or should be,

different." The country was indebted to Mr. Gladstone for the amount

of attention he had bestowed on the proposals of Mr. Sikes. Mr.

Crossley concluded: He "did not think Government ought to seek to make

a profit on the new business; nor did he think they ought to lose by

it. The working classes of the country did not want charity, they only

wanted a fair field and no favour, and it seemed that at length they

were about to get it. If at any time the rate of interest could be

raised without loss or inconvenience, he hoped it would be done."

_Colonel Sykes_ said that no praise could be too high for anything of

this sort, which tended to induce the working classes to lay by

against a bad time. He contented himself with referring to two or

three subjects connected with the mode of working the scheme. _Mr.

Arthur Kinnaird_ thought the scheme simple and practical. He "heartily

congratulated the Chancellor of the Exchequer on having at last

succeeded in one of the fondest hopes of his heart--that of creating a

two and a half per cent. stock." Mr. Gladstone at once demurred to

this, and stated that he had no notion of establishing a national

bank. The money which came into the hands of Government by means of

the bill would simply be applied as under the existing Savings Bank

law. Mr. Gladstone, in closing the debate, took the opportunity of

referring to Mr. Sikes, "who had devoted a great amount of labour to

the subject. He felt greatly indebted to him. At the same time, the

bill was not intended to embody altogether Mr. Sikes's plan, though

this was a matter of detail into which he would not then enter."

Three days after this discussion the Post Office Savings Banks bill

was introduced into the House of Commons _pro formá_ by Mr. Massey,

the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. F. Peel. Mr. Sotheron

Estcourt on this occasion commented on the importance of the bill, and

objected to a first reading without an explanation of its provisions;

all that was known of it being that the Government were about to frame

on its provisions banks of deposit on a gigantic scale, and thus by a

merely formal proceeding were about to lay the foundation for very

important consequences.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved the second and principal reading

of the bill on the 18th of March, 1861. _Mr. Estcourt_, whose intimate

acquaintance with such subjects made his remarks carry considerable

weight, made a long speech. He first expressed his doubts whether the

persons employed by the Post Office would ever be able to perform the

additional and important duties which would be assigned to them.

Government were undertaking a great risk. "No doubt the plan would

become popular, for several reasons; the Post Office Banks would

absorb not only all future deposits, but also a great part, if not

all, of those which had been made in the existing banks

themselves."[170] It would be for the House to decide whether this

result would be good or bad, or what could be done that the two kinds

of banks need not come into collision. Mr. Estcourt threw out several

hints as to how this might be done. They might, for example, limit the

sum to be received at post offices, so that the new might not come

into competition with the old class; or they might dovetail the new

system into the old, by making the Post Office Banks auxiliary and

subsidiary to the existing banks. Much had been done in the way of

trying to amend the constitution of the old class of banks, without

effect; and he thought that, looking to the probable result of the new

arrangement, it would be far better to look the evil fairly in the

face, and supersede at once the old by the new kind of banks, or at

least say which of the two ought to be retained. This speaker further

apprehended that the Post Office Banks would not take root in the

villages, where they were most wanted, and would be almost exclusively

confined to the towns where they were least needed, and where they

would overthrow the existing Savings Banks by drawing away their

deposits. Though Mr. Estcourt seemed to feel strongly on the different

points touched upon by him, he concluded by stating that he should not

oppose the second reading of the bill. _Mr. W. E. Forster_ said, in

his opinion the scheme would provide good Savings Banks where none now

existed, and, a very desirable matter, _safe_ banks where they did

exist. He thought it was not possible that the one class of banks

could dovetail into the other; and if it was, it was not desirable.

Where Government took the responsibility, it ought to have the

control. _Mr. Thompson Hankey_ hoped that the proposed scheme, if

found practicable, would entirely supersede the existing banks, and

the sooner the better. _Mr. Baines_ followed in the same strain; he

would not regret if the new banks superseded the old, inasmuch as that

result could only be brought about by the proved superiority of the

new system. The member for Leeds said, "he had been assured by Sir

Rowland Hill, and all the gentlemen whose departments at the Post

Office would be charged with the carrying out of the plan, that it

would work exceedingly well;" and he could state that, though it

differed materially from his plan, Mr. Sikes of Huddersfield was a

"hearty supporter" of the scheme which the Post Office had

adopted.[171]

_Mr. Gladstone_ could not say whether the old would suffer from the

new banks; if they did, it would only be because the latter were the

safest and the best. Whether or no, the object of the bill was not

competition with the old banks. He wanted to supply facilities which

at present did not exist, and the first duty of the Postmaster-General

would be to look to the establishment of Savings Banks in those places

where no banks existed, or where the accommodation was very narrow. As

to their application to the Money Order Offices of the country, it

would be gradual and slow, and so as not in any way to endanger the

machinery of the Post Office; the Postmaster-General would select at

first a moderate number to be opened, and extend them in proportion as

he found occasion, the test and index of the occasion being the demand

for such banks by the public. Mr. Gladstone then referred to the rate

of interest which would be allowed, and said that in this respect the

Post Office Banks would have somewhat less attraction; "the present

banks were established on the principle of giving a bonus; the new

system must be strictly self-supporting." He would not feed them at

the expense of the Post Office, or any other revenue, and in that case

the rate of interest must be such as can be safely paid. With regard

to the forebodings of Mr. Estcourt relating to the risks which

Government would run, Mr. Gladstone stated that the system of Savings

Banks had been established for forty-five years, during which time

they had had every description of speculation, the severity of a

commercial crisis, the pressure of a dreadful famine, and almost every

trial that could befal a new system; and although the Government was

always holding a great amount of money at call, there had been but a

small pecuniary loss, in comparison with which loss the establishment

and progress of such a system was immeasurably of greater value. After

stating that he thought "the Post Office machinery admirably suited

for the purposes of the new measure," the bill passed the second

reading.

The bill was introduced into Committee on the 8th of April, 1861,[172]

where trifling alterations were made in several of its clauses. _Mr.

Slaney_, who had paid great attention to subjects of this nature,

hoped that the deposits would not be restrained, as under the old

system, he thought no limit should be placed upon the providence of

the labouring classes. _Mr. Vance_, an Irish member, alluded, as he

did on subsequent occasions, to what he considered the centralizing

tendencies of the scheme. He thought Dublin ought to be the centre of

operations for Ireland as under the Money Order system. The principal

opponent of the measure on this occasion was _Mr. Ayrton_, the member

for the Tower Hamlets, who in some quarters has been credited with the

advocacy of the scheme before this period. In a long speech, Mr.

Ayrton took exception to most of the details of the measure as they

were now proposed, and to the principles of the measure as a whole.

Mr. Ayrton held that data enough had not been presented to enable

members to form an opinion as to whether the scheme would pay or not.

"It was all very well to talk of subjects being self-sustaining, and

even economical, but under such statements our expenses had gone on

continually increasing." He adduced at length the case of the County

Courts bill, and the Government Superannuation Allowances bill, which

he said were introduced and passed under some such pretences. It would

be the same with the Savings Banks; the Government would never be able

to keep to the two and a half per cent., but would have to be guided

by the rate allowed to other bankers. "The scheme of a national bank,"

continued the honourable member, "_however plausible_ it might look at

the outset, would lead to the most serious consequences." The

Committee which sat on the subject, and of which he, the speaker, was

a member, came to the decided and unanimous conclusion that it was

desirable to separate the operation of banking for the people from the

National Treasury. It was thought that these national banks would act

as a powerful inducement to the working men to entrust their money to

the Government rather than to their own Benefit Societies, which were

regarded as too much associated with Trade Societies. In his opinion

Benefit Societies and Trade Societies had been the means of

regenerating the people, and were eminently conservative; and it was

not expedient to discourage these societies by means of the proposed

banks. Nor was this all. It was desirable that the country gentlemen

should take an interest in the welfare of the working people

surrounding them; and to supersede their exertions by mere

stipendiaries of the State would weaken that social system on which

the liberties of the people were mainly founded. _Mr. Alderman

Sidney_, "as one conversant with figures," ventured to say, that if

the scheme were carried out, our national establishment must be

greatly augmented; and if it proved successful, "the establishment

that would be required would be of the same gigantic proportions as

the Bank of England!" It was absurd to think that depositors would be

satisfied with less interest than the national creditor. The scheme,

he believed, was founded upon error; it would interfere with the

self-working of existing establishments, and would entail a large

expense upon the country at large. _The Chancellor of the Exchequer_

replied, especially aiming his powerful shafts at Mr. Ayrton. He said

he would not follow that gentleman through his speech, as that was a

task beyond his powers. Mr. Ayrton often gave the House notable

examples of his discursive powers; but he (Mr. Gladstone) never knew

an occasion on which the honourable gentleman had more signally

distinguished himself than on the present occasion. "When he rose into

the air on eagle wing, he passed over the limits of time and space,

and was not subject to any of the conditions that bound the efforts of

ordinary mortals." However, to confine himself to just that which bore

on the subject before the Committee, he was strongly opposed to the

principle of making the working classes pensioners on the Exchequer;

he would do his best to provide against such a result. He did not

know, and could not tell, what amount of business the banks would

attract; he expected it would be gradual, and the development of the

agency would be gradual. The extension of the system would be in

precise proportion to the demand; and the expense would be throughout

proportionate to the extension. The opinion of the Post Office

authorities was, generally, that the work would be done much cheaper

than in the ordinary banks; _for sixpence or sevenpence against one

shilling for each transaction_. Some even thought that the work might

be done cheaper than the work in the Money Order Office. Once started,

any tendency to excess would, of course, be corrected; but it was

impossible to argue on any assumed number of deposits. He had a

sanguine hope that every statement he had made would be verified, and

that the measure would entail no charge upon the public.

Again and again the question was asked and argued, whether it was

meant that the new banks should be subversive or auxiliary to the old.

To this question, which was asked on this occasion, Mr. Gladstone gave

it as his opinion that the one class of depositors who preferred

perfect security would patronize the new banks; whilst another class

who wished to act under the immediate view of their local superiors,

would prefer the existing banks. In reply to Mr. Briscoe, he said he

would not limit the establishment of the new banks to those places

where no other sort of banks existed,--though, of course, the Post

Office would commence operations there first. Such an arrangement

would exclude the great centres of trade and population,--our large

towns--which were not sufficiently served with banks. An important

discussion took place on the 10th clause of the Act relating to the

investment of the fund deposited in the Post Office Banks. _Sir H.

Willoughby_, as he so often did before, condemned the system of

operating on the Stock-market with this money. Mr. Gladstone replied,

that the loss which was so often dwelt upon in connexion with the old

banks was nothing like loss; "the money so deposited with Government

had enabled successive administrations to effect an economy in the

management of the public money transcending ten times over the charge

the State had been put to." He saw no reason whatever to alter the

arrangements in this particular. The amendment which Sir H. Willoughby

proposed was then negatived without a division. Three days afterwards

the bill passed the third reading and was sent up to the Lords.

No time was lost in bringing the bill forward in the House of Lords.

It was read a first time on the 15th of April, and a second time on

that day week. The conduct of the bill in the Lords was naturally

committed to the Postmaster-General, Lord Stanley of Alderley. On this

occasion his lordship went over[173] the ground covered by the

bill--the insufficiency in number, and the inadequacy of accommodation

of existing banks, and the insecurity as regards repayment until the

money had actually reached the hands of the National Debt

Commissioners. Lord Stanley added that Savings Banks had by no means

increased in number in proportion to the population, or to the

increase of the money circulating among the working classes. He

adduced several facts and a quantity of statistics on this head

similar to those which we have already given to the reader. From these

facts it was obvious, that when a working man formed a good intention

to invest his small savings, there was a great danger that he would

spend his money, if there were no means of his depositing it, or if he

could not do it comparatively easily. He then spoke of the losses

caused by the failures of Savings Banks. Referring to Mr. Whitbread's

proposals in 1807, Lord Stanley stated that this measure was very like

the scheme then proposed, which actually passed through the House of

Commons in that year; that Mr. Sikes had originally proposed something

similar in an admirable letter to Mr. Gladstone; and that the

Government, with the assistance of two able gentlemen in the Post

Office department, had matured the present plan, which he proceeded

very clearly to describe. Lord Stanley, in concluding, said it was

somewhat remarkable that nine-tenths of the depositors in Savings

Banks were domestic servants and clerks, and that only one-tenth

belonged to what are usually known as the "working classes;" yet large

numbers of these latter are in receipt of wages far exceeding the

incomes of many who possessed Savings Bank accounts.[174] He hoped

that working men, when they received their wages, would be induced,

before going home, to invest a portion of them at the receiving houses

they would pass; if so, the result to them and the country could not

but be highly beneficial. The banks must be looked upon as an

experiment. If an extension should be demanded, it could only be by

reason of the greater security and greater facilities they would

offer.

Lord Colchester, an ex-Postmaster-General, admitted the merits of the

plan, but doubted the ability of the Post Office officials to carry on

the work in every town. Among the Lords, however, the strongest and

bitterest opponent of the measure was Lord Monteagle of Brandon (once

Chancellor of the Exchequer as Mr. Spring Rice).[175] He made a long

speech on this occasion. He thought it was wrong to establish new

banks, or to make them rest on the deficiencies of the old ones,

inasmuch as it was easy to improve the latter. He went into the

history of Savings Banks, and endeavoured to show that their progress

up to 1850, (a fact which no one disputed,) had been far from slow.

As, however, it was the period principally between 1850 and 1860 when

they were most stationary, this was the time with which he should have

dealt. He expressed an opinion that the Post Office would not be equal

to the work. He strongly urged the inexpediency of giving increased

funds to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with which to speculate. And

this measure would tend to destroy the healthy feeling which was

growing up between the higher and the lower classes, through the

medium of Savings Banks. Not only did the higher classes give their

time and energy to the work of Savings Banks, but they gave their

money too; and Lord Monteagle was unlucky enough to cite the case of

several noble lords who paid a thousand pounds each to atone for their

neglect in connexion with a Hertfordshire Savings Bank, and the fraud

there, which we have previously described at length. "Such was the

spirit," triumphantly exclaimed the noble lord, "which this bill

proposed to crush." Not less unfortunate was Lord Monteagle, as the

result has proved, in his endeavour to be amusing and prophetic. "The

only comfort," said he, "which I have derived from the speech of the

noble lord who moved the second reading, was his assurance that the

measure was to be of an _experimental_ character." Under such

circumstances he would not trouble the House with a division, as he

would await without much anxiety the result of the "experiment!" Next

year, they would see whether the working of the new system would

compare with that "which for nearly half a century had been the glory

of England, and had served as a model for all Europe." Lord Redesdale

also strongly opposed the bill, but he did not bring to its

consideration much of the practical knowledge of the preceding

speaker. He "frankly owned" that, from what he understood "would be

the manner of keeping the accounts, they would soon get into a state

of confusion, out of which extrication would be almost impossible."

From the confusion of the above sentence, it is not impossible that

the attempt to understand the mode of keeping the accounts had

confused the speaker. Curiously, too, the same speaker objected to one

of the most convenient clauses of the bill. He called the proposed

mode of transfer of deposits from one bank to another, an unnecessary

arrangement, saying it would be _much better_ that the parties

themselves should take it out of the one, and put it into the other

bank. Acquaintance with the habits and wants of the poorer classes

would have convinced Lord Redesdale to the contrary. Lord Redesdale

said, in concluding, that "he was afraid the scheme would produce much

disappointment to the public, and a great loss to the nation." _The

Marquis of Clanricarde_ gave a very qualified and hesitating adhesion

to the bill. Lord Stanley of Alderley satisfactorily replied to the

arguments that had been adduced, and the bill was then referred to a

Committee of the whole House.

On the 25th of April the bill passed the Committee. Four days

afterwards, Lord Monteagle again opposed it, saying that he saw, "with

great alarm and regret," what seemed to him to be meant to produce a

break-up of existing Savings Banks, and the substitution of the action

of a salaried Government department for what he might call a great

public charity, directed by benevolent persons acting gratuitously in

their own neighbourhood. He went over the ground he had taken only a

few days before, but in a spirit very much more subdued and less

confident; and when the bill passed, he entered a long and laboured

"protest" against it (_vide_ _Hansard_, vol. clxii. page 1213, where

many more of Lord Monteagle's "protests" may be found). The Post

Office Savings Bank Act, which we give _in extenso_,[176] received the

Royal Assent on the 17th of May, 1861.

[152] From this statement the ten or twelve principal banks in the

country, many of which are open every day, and all in a

flourishing financial condition, are of course excepted.

[153] _Tracts on Poor Laws and Pauper Management_, included in the

_Works of Jeremy Bentham_, edited by Sir John Bowring, vol. viii.

edit. 1843, page 408. The punctuation and the italics of the above

extract are Bentham's own.

[154] A little _Handy Book_ on the subject, published in 1861, by

Mr. H. Riseborough Sharman, one of the Editors of the _Insurance

Gazette_, and which deservedly had a large sale, went over very

ably, though in a way which produced considerable acrimony from

some portion of the public press, some of this ground. Though it

is open to question whether at so early a date it was not

premature, and, whether in the peculiar form of a manual for

intending depositors, it was wise to enter upon a discussion of

these points, it is certain that by means of this pamphlet and

other advocacy, Mr. Sharman laboured very hard and very zealously

to prepare the public mind for the adoption of the scheme of

Postal Banks, and to spread a knowledge of their benefits after

the measure had become law.

[155] _Duties of the Public with respect to Charitable Savings

Banks._ Dublin 1852.

[156] _On the present State of the Savings Bank Question._ Dublin,

1855.

[157] Mr. Sharman's _Handy Book_, p. 10, 2d edit.

[158] Mr. Sharman's _Handy Book_, p. 11, 2d edit.

[159] It is pretty generally known, that no profit whatever

accrues to the Post Office on orders for which threepence only is

charged; yet in spite, as it were, of this fact, we find that Mr.

Scratchley, in his _Practical Treatise_, takes up Mr. Ayrton's

proposals, and "recommends" that "Money Order officials receive

deposits on behalf of the nearest Savings Bank," and "that this

should be done at a cost to the depositor of one penny for any sum

not exceeding 5_l._" "It is also," adds Mr. Scratchley, "very

desirable that the valuable privilege of freedom from postage

recommended by Mr. Whitbread should be granted for the books and

documents required to be transmitted on behalf of Savings Banks."

Mr. Whitbread, it will remembered, made this one of the conditions

of his scheme of National Banks; and it is quite evident that none

but National institutions could obtain such a provision. "The

valuable privilege of freedom from postage," would, we should

think, be considered very desirable by a variety of different

societies and interests, if only they could obtain it!

[160] The following were the details of the reverend gentleman's

scheme, of the authenticity of which we have fully convinced

ourselves:--

1. That deposits from 1_s._ to 10_l._ be received

daily at every Post Office in the United Kingdom

at which Post Office Orders are now issued, and

the amount forwarded _daily_ to the National

Savings Bank, London.

2. That the Postmaster, upon receiving a deposit, do

issue a document of acknowledgment to the

depositor, with printed instructions attached

thereto, directing the depositor to write to the

London office, if a receipt be not received by

him through the Post from the London office

within ---- days.

The following advantages would follow:--

1. _Universality of operation_, by which the Savings

Bank system would be forthwith placed within the

reach of every member of the community.

2. _Cheapness of management._--All rents for offices,

and annual salaries to clerks, avoided.

Postmasters who are now enabled to issue Post

Office Orders, are already admitted to have

character sufficient to be entrusted with the

receipt of money, which by this system would

never exceed one day's deposits.

3. The only expenses of management would be, (1) the

London office, which ought to be as near the

General Post Office as possible; and (2) some

small payment to Postmasters upon each deposit. In

large towns, it may in time be necessary to employ

an additional clerk in the Post Office, but in

these cases the payment on each deposit would

suffice to enable the Postmaster to keep such

clerk.

4. It would not interfere with the existing Savings

Banks,--leaving it to the public to adopt either

the old or the new system as they please. By this

means the old system would probably be superseded

by slow degrees, and without hardship or

inconvenience to any one.

GEO. HANS HAMILTON.

[161] Like Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Bullar has subsequently proposed a

plan for giving increased facilities in one direction to

depositors, which will be referred to at the proper place.

[162] _Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer_, 1859.

[163] Mr. Rowland Hill to Mr. Baines, M.P., 2d August, 1859.

"MY DEAR SIR,--With modifications which could readily be

introduced, Mr. Sikes's plan is, in my opinion, practicable

so far as the Post Office is concerned.

"The plan also appears to me to be practicable in its other

parts; but on these I would suggest the expediency of taking

the opinion of some one thoroughly conversant with ordinary

banking business, and who is acquainted also with Savings

Banks.

"I need not add, that if carried into effect, the plan would

in my opinion prove highly useful to the public, and in some

degree advantageous to the revenue.

"I shall be most happy, when the time arrives for doing so,

to submit it for the approval of the Postmaster-General.

"Faithfully yours,

"ROWLAND HILL."

[164] Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Sikes, 30th November, 1859.

"DEAR SIR,--I have read with much interest your tract on Post

Office Savings Banks, and have discussed the subject with Sir

A. Spearman, who has also had some communication with the

Post Office authorities.

"The difficulties are very serious, chiefly in connexion with

the question of interest and the mode of account for it.

"At the same time there is so much of promise in the plan on

the face of it, that we are unwilling to let it drop without

a most careful examination.

"If you are likely to be in London, or were disposed to come

hither, personal communication on details might be of

advantage. Sir A. Spearman would be most ready to see you for

the purpose of entering into them fully, and I should be very

desirous myself to give any aid in my power at the proper

time."

[165] "The Council of the Statistical Society of Dublin having had

under their consideration the plan of Post Office Savings Banks

proposed by Mr. C. W. Sikes of Huddersfield, desire to record

their entire approval of the principles of his plan, and consider

it to be specially applicable to Ireland, where a well-founded

feeling of distrust in Savings Banks as now constituted has been

produced by its being demonstrated that the depositors have not

Government security for their money. That the Council believe that

Post Office Savings Banks with perfect Government security would

be very successful in Ireland, and could be readily managed with a

central Savings Bank in Dublin, as Government Stock is

transferable in the Bank of Ireland. That the Council direct the

Secretary to bring these resolutions under the consideration of

the Chief Secretary for Ireland, with a view to their being

transmitted by him to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. By order,

"W. NEILSON HANCOCK."

At the same meeting the Council elected Mr. Sikes a Corresponding

Member of the Society.

[166] Forms for doing so were immediately afterwards provided.

[167] Such, for example, as the extraordinary facilities now

enjoyed for the depositing and withdrawal of money--of which we

shall speak in the proper place. Suffice it to say here, that

these facilities had never been dreamt of for a moment outside the

Post Office; that they were such facilities as no agency but the

post-office ever attempted to give, and, more than that, could not

possibly have given.

[168] His speech on the occasion has not been reported _verbatim_,

or we would never have ventured to have given it in the third

person.

[169] _Hansard_, vol. clxi. p. 262; and _Times_ newspaper, 1861.

[170] _Hansard_, vol. clxi. p. 2190; and _Times_, 1861.

[171] That this was the case appears further from the circular

which Mr. Sikes addressed to every member of the House before the

second reading, in which he expressed his cordial approval of the

bill, and craved the support of members in carrying it through

Parliament.

[172] _Hansard_, vol. clxii. 1861.

[173] _Hansard_, vol. clxii. p. 880; and _Times_, April 23, 1861.

[174] The phrase "working classes," applied to the industrial

population, seems as inaccurate as the phrase "lower orders,"

applied generally fifty years ago, is obnoxious. The distinction

does not lie in this class being "working" while others are "idle"

people. Something very different indeed is the fact. The tendency

of late years has been that professional people should work

harder, and "working" people less, and very few men who live by

their profession work fewer hours than the handicraftsmen of our

towns. Lord Stanley might have gone even further in his comments

on the earnings of the industrial classes. Even putting aside the

important consideration of how much the professional man spends of

time and money in preparing himself to work at all, a great and

ever increasing number of the wage-receiving class have now as

good incomes as many hundreds of the less successful classes above

them, while their expected or necessary expenditure is in almost

all cases very much smaller.

[175] News of this able nobleman's death has just reached us; but,

though bearing in mind the spirit of the well-known maxim, we see

no reason to alter our text.

[176] See Appendix (F.)

A History of Banks for Savings in Great Britain and Ireland · 第 9 / 13 章