LEGISLATION ON SAVINGS BANKS FROM 1844 TO THE PRESENT TIME.
"If there is any question why such importance should be
ascribed to measures of a purely economic character, the
reply is, that these minor matters insensibly build up the
character of the nation; insignificant, it may be in
themselves, they mark, in the aggregate, the well-being or
the suffering of the British people."--_British Quarterly
Review._
It will be remembered that in the third chapter we described the
course of Parliamentary action with regard to Savings Banks down to
the year 1844, and in that chapter left Mr. Hume, after an
unsuccessful attempt to reduce still further the rate of interest to
be given to depositors. The year 1844 is remarkable in the annals of
Savings Banks for the carrying of a measure known as Mr. Goulburn's
Act. The bill which was introduced by that gentleman, who was
Chancellor of the Exchequer in Sir Robert Peel's administration, was
meant in great part to provide against the constantly recurring frauds
in Savings Banks, and still more especially to allay the consternation
among trustees of safe banks, who now loudly complained of the state
of the law with respect to their liability. The discussion in the
House of Lords to which we alluded at the close of the last chapter
may be taken as showing that Savings Bank trustees were by no means
satisfied, several years before this, with the uncertain state of the
law. The great fraud on the Dublin Bank is described as having come
upon many trustees like a thunderbolt, and, aware that they were not
spared by the judicial bench[69] in cases of the kind, they now
threatened open rebellion. Mr. Goulburn received, as he stated
subsequently before a Committee of the House of Commons, a large
number of notices from such officers that, if the law were not
modified, they would resign their trusts. Moved by such considerations
as these, which the Government seem to have felt they could only
disregard at the imminent risk of shaking the credit of the entire
Savings Bank system, Mr. Goulburn introduced his bill (7 & 8 Victoria,
chap. 83,) on the 2d of May, 1844, to amend the laws relating to
Savings Banks.[70] The principal matter with which the bill dealt was
the liability of trustees, but this was by no means the only one.
Second only in importance was the proposal to again reduce the rate of
interest. The remarks with which he introduced his proposal to reduce
the interest rate are curious, to say the least, when viewed in the
light of the speech to which we have previously referred. He felt
confident, he said, that the country _had no right_ to pay upon these
investments a higher rate of interest than could be obtained from an
investment in other securities. The Savings Banks rate was
considerably higher than any other investment of money. Although the
Act of 1828 had tended to reduce materially the number of depositors
of the better classes, and had increased--as we have shown in the last
chapter, we think quite conclusively, so far as figures can show
it--in a still greater proportion the number of those who had
deposited only small amounts, there were still many who were attracted
to Savings Banks on account of the interest given being higher than
that obtained from the Funds. Mr. Goulburn now proposed that the bill
should contain a clause reducing the rate from 2-1/2_d._ per cent. per
day, to 2_d._ With the same object in view, namely, to restrict the
operations of Savings Banks to the class of provident poor, the
Chancellor proposed to reduce the amount which any one could put by in
one year from 30_l._ to 20_l._ and to make the total amount which
could be deposited in any Savings Bank, 120_l_ instead of 150_l._[71]
A further proposition, which provided for another wide-spread evil in
the same direction, was one requiring that no persons should be
permitted to make deposits as trustees without stating the names of
the persons for whom they were acting, and that no payments should be
made in such cases except under a receipt signed by all the parties
interested in the funds deposited. By means of the clauses in previous
acts relating to trust accounts, the law was regularly evaded, and
many persons had considerable sums of their own in Savings Banks,
which they represented as being held in trust for other people, whose
names even they were required not to divulge.[72] This clause was
carried without any trouble, as it met such a palpable evil; provision
was made, however, that the law should not be applicable to trust
accounts opened before the passing of the act. Had it not been for
such an exception, those who had recourse to the stratagem of feigning
the character of a trustee might have lost much of their money, on
account of the difficulty or impossibility of obtaining within the
time the signature of the party apparently interested. Though the
clause was not made retrospective, as some urged it should be, as a
punishment to those who had deceived the managers of Savings Banks, it
was clearly the best thing that could be done to put an end to the
practice, which entirely depended on the powers of the so-called
trustees to draw out the money alone.
Mr. Goulburn spoke next on the question of liability of trustees.
Though the topic was engaging great attention out of doors, little was
said upon the point on this occasion: the section of the act thus
passed so quietly, was, however, pregnant with meaning, and, as it
turned out, pregnant with results. The clause provided that no trustee
or manager of any Savings Bank shall be liable to make good any
deficiency which may hereafter arise in the funds of any of these
institutions, unless these officers shall have respectively declared,
by writing under their hands, _that they are willing to be so
answerable_; and not only so, "but it shall be lawful for each of such
persons, or for such persons collectively, to limit his or their
responsibility to such sums as shall be specified in any such
instrument." This declaration was, of course, to be lodged with the
National Debt Commissioners. On a trustee or manager making it, he
became liable to make good every deficiency that might arise in the
bank with which he was connected, whether through his own
carelessness, or the cupidity of those under him; if a declaration of
this sort were not made, he was liable for nothing.[73]
The above were the three most important changes made in the law of
Savings Banks under Mr. Goulburn's Act, but there were several minor
clauses introduced into the bill which deserve mention, and which
were, there can be no doubt, equally with the more important sections,
the direct results of the systematic frauds already described. With
his eye direct on the Cuffe Street actuary, concerning whom the
Government knew more than was generally known in 1844, the Chancellor,
whilst studiously avoiding all mention of the Dublin case, spoke of
those who, ignorant of business, took their money to improper places,
and made deposits out of office hours. The fourth section of the Act
was, therefore, designed to meet such cases, by declaring any actuary
or cashier who should so take money out of course, and not account for
it at the very first meeting, to be guilty of a misdemeanour, and
liable to be punished for fraud. Section 5 required that deposit-books
should be produced at the bank at least once every year for purposes
of examination and check. Section 17 provided that bonds of sufficient
security shall be given by every officer of a Savings Bank trusted
with the receipt and custody of money, and that these bonds shall be
placed (not with the Clerk of the Peace as before this Act), but under
the charge of the National Debt Commissioners. The old arrangement
likewise for depositing the Rules of the bank with the Clerk of the
Peace was repealed by section 18, and in its place the next section
enacted, that when a new bank was proposed, two written or printed
copies of the Rules of such bank should be transmitted to the
Barrister for his certificate, who, on approval, was to send one copy
back to the Bank authorities, and the other forward to the National
Debt Office. It was the 7 and 8 Vict. which, in addition, conferred
extended powers on the certifying barrister, by appointing him final
Arbitrator in any disputed case. The bill, after having been modified
in one or two respects, and contested on several points,[74] received
the Royal Assent in August, 1844, and was ordered to take effect on
the 20th of November following.
It will not be supposed that the bill, of which the above is an
outline, was passed through its different stages without a word from
Mr. Hume. That member may well be forgiven for alluding on one of
these occasions to the past, and stating, how, so far as the rate of
interest was concerned, he had been fighting for the very thing which
was likely to be brought about. This was clearly a case of patience
and obstinacy rewarded.[75] The bill, however, Mr. Hume stated,
scarcely went far enough for him, though it was in the right
direction. He still held the opinion that persons holding Government
security should be placed on the same footing, and that those who had
20_l._ in the Funds should be dealt with in exactly the same manner as
those who had 1,000_l._ In this, however, we cannot help thinking Mr.
Hume went rather too far, and argued on the assumption that there was
no difference between the shilling of the rich and the shilling of the
poor man. Mr. Goulburn in replying to Mr. Hume said, he knew this was
a favourite point with the member for Montrose; but he could not
concede it: a poor man with 20_l._ in the Funds could not and never
would be able to bear a fall in the Funds so well as the large
stockholder.
Early in 1848 a Committee of the House of Commons, consisting of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Goulburn, Mr. J. A. Smith, Sir J. Y.
Bullar, Mr. Shafto Adair, Mr. Bramston, Mr. Gibson Craig, Mr. Fagan,
Mr. H. Herbert, Mr. Herries, Mr. Hume, Mr. Reynolds, Mr. Poulett
Scrope, and Mr. Ker Seymour, was appointed to inquire into the state
of the Irish banks. As already related in the last chapter, the Cuffe
Street bank soon broke up after the trustees were enabled to take
refuge under the Act of 1844. Into this inquiry, which we have before
referred to, it is unnecessary to enter much further; it presents
little else than information relating to the flagrant breaches of
faith of officers to whom were entrusted the hard earnings of hundreds
of the poorest people living around them. The scope of the inquiry was
limited to Ireland. It seems to have been purposely intended that a
full investigation into the general Savings Bank question should not
now be made. The inquiry was not extended in any sense to the English
banks, though some of the most prominent English managers offered to
give evidence. Doubtless the Government feared that a full exposure of
the frauds in Savings Banks, an inquiry into several matters connected
with the disposal of Savings Bank money already beginning to be
mooted, might have the effect of shaking the confidence of the people.
People were openly saying that Government had not done its best to
make the Savings Bank a secure repository for the people; yet, rather
than raise this issue before a Committee of the House, it submitted to
have the investigation that _was_ made designated "a perfect
star-chamber business," and the members of Government themselves
subjected to great ridicule. The Committee sat only nine days, and
made a report to the House, which Lord George Bentinck characterized
as "the most extraordinary one that ever was presented to Parliament."
"It is as remarkable for its brevity as for its vacuity--as brief as
it is worthless." The report is certainly brief, and may here be given
without curtailment: "Your Committee," it commences, "has proceeded
with the inquiry entrusted to them by the House, but owing to the late
period of the session they have found themselves unable to bring it to
a satisfactory conclusion. They are of opinion that it is advisable
that a further inquiry should take place, either during the recess or
in the next session of Parliament, regulating the liability of
trustees, and providing for the appointment of _auditors_ to Savings
Banks."
The Government immediately set to work to introduce a bill. They saw
that a great mistake had been made four years before, in settling the
question of the liability of trustees in the way it was done, and now
the endeavour must be, if possible, quietly to re-enact the old law in
this particular, making trustees liable in the way they were before
1844. The great mistake in this instance, and that which proved fatal
to the attempt, was in legislating for English as well as Irish banks,
when the inquiry upon which the bill was taken to be founded had been
limited to Ireland, and was not allowed under any circumstances to
extend to England. The debates to which the measure of 1848 gave rise
are certainly the most animated that ever took place in the House on
this subject, and it will be interesting, as in different ways
indicating the feeling of the country, to notice the expressions of
opinion which the discussion elicited. The _Chancellor of the
Exchequer_, Sir Charles Wood, in moving the Bill to amend the Law of
1844, appears[76] to have urged that the clause requiring the trustees
to voluntarily assume responsibility had completely failed; that few
trustees would take the responsibility upon them, and that,
consequently, depositors were losing faith in the banks;[77]
irregularities were increasing; and the trustees had not even the
pretence of a sufficient inducement to make them attend to their
self-imposed duties. In place of no responsibility at all, he proposed
that each trustee should be responsible for a certain sum, which would
be large enough to ensure a reasonable amount of attention, and so
small as not to frighten them into resigning their office altogether.
This sum it was proposed to fix at a hundred pounds. Clauses in the
bill also provided for the appointment of auditors, as suggested by
the Committee of Inquiry, and for the examination of depositors'
books, "that once in each year the books of every depositor shall be
produced at the office of each Savings Bank, for the purpose of being
inspected, examined, and verified with the books of the institution by
the auditor."
More from the way in which this bill was introduced and the
circumstances attending the Committee of Inquiry, than from any
decided opposition to the Government proposals, much agitation
prevailed among Savings Bank officials, which was ultimately made to
extend to depositors.[78] The latter were led to believe that the
proposed legislation would in some way be inimical to their interests,
and petitions were got up, praying that no further Acts should be
passed until a full inquiry was made into every part of the Savings
Bank system. _Sir Henry Willoughby_, who for some years before this
time, and till his death, took much interest in this and cognate
questions, again presided at a meeting of Savings Bank managers in
London about this time, and helped them to concert measures of
opposition. Before speaking in Parliament on the introduction of the
bill under consideration, he presented two large petitions, signed by
79,000 depositors in Savings Banks, praying that Government would
cease their interference with these institutions. This gentleman then
referred to the quietness with which Government had introduced such an
important bill, "not having given such a notice as was invariably
given even with respect to the commonest turnpike road." And the
quietness was a mistake of no ordinary moment. Had the details of the
bill now introduced been understood by the country, there might have
been opposition from managers of Savings Banks, but there could not
well have been so much dissatisfaction expressed by the Press, or by
the body of depositors, whose interest every clause of the bill was
meant to conserve. Sir Henry Willoughby also on this occasion gave
utterance to the feeling which was in many other minds, and which had
led to the opposition then manifested, by alluding to "the impression
which had got abroad and which he believed was perfectly true, that
the money of depositors was used for other purposes by the Government
than those that related to the Savings Banks." Whether the money was
used advantageously or not he would not say, for that was not the
question. _Colonel Thompson_ spoke strongly of the erroneous
impression that everybody had been in about the Savings Banks having
full Government security for their money; so strongly, indeed, that in
another place we shall make further allusion to him. The bitterest
opponent, however, which the Chancellor met with on this occasion was
the leader of the Opposition in the House. _Lord George Bentinck_ felt
sure that the bill was one which its mover (Sir Charles Wood) did not
understand. After going into the details of the measure, and
endeavouring to prove that the examination of depositors' books could
not be accomplished in the larger banks every year,[79] and that the
smaller concerns could not afford to pay for auditors out of the small
surplus of interest which went to pay expenses, Lord George added,
"Surely a Government which had proposed so much and done so little,
can refrain from doing harm, since they cannot do good; and will not
press this most discreditable bill through the House at the end of
August without necessity for it, and against the opinions of those
best calculated to form a judgment." Irish members, seeing the turn
the discussion was taking, urged that, at any rate, the bill might
apply to Ireland. It was patent to everybody that the poor depositors
in Ireland needed every protection, however secure the same classes
might feel in England. In Ireland such a bill was really required, and
was necessary, to restore confidence in Savings Banks;[80] why not
make it apply to Ireland only? After an unsuccessful attempt on the
part of Lord George Bentinck to throw out the bill altogether, it was
decided, on the motion of Mr. Wodehouse, and by a vote of thirty to
eleven, that the words "Great Britain" should be struck out of the
motion, and that the Act should simply apply to Irish Savings Banks.
That the bill now passed was a beneficial change in the law, and a
considerable step in the right direction, no one now doubts; had not
the perverseness of Savings Bank officials prevented the Government
from making its provisions apply to England, much subsequent suffering
and grievous loss would have been saved to many of the best classes of
our industrial population. It was a safeguard such as was wanted in
Ireland, and it answered admirably.
The bill having been made law, and new depositors secured to a
considerable extent from robbery and exaction, the attention of the
Legislature was called to those who had lost their all by past frauds;
and the records of Parliament show that one member after another
reverted to such topics until redress was obtained. On the 29th of
March, 1849, _Mr. Reynolds_, the member for Dublin, moved for the
appointment of a Committee to investigate into the case of the Cuffe
Street bank in Dublin, and to ascertain who were liable for the
extensive frauds in that bank. He alluded to the unsatisfactory result
of the previous inquiry, which was, indeed, not meant to be final. In
making his motion, Mr. Reynolds, who had access, of course, to the
best sources of information, entered into a full account of this bank,
stating, indeed, many of the facts which we have already given. He
complained most bitterly of the Government, who had accepted the
advice of a "flippant barrister," as Mr. Pratt was designated, and who
had suffered the bank to go on when it was known to be in a state of
hopeless insolvency. He described the heartrending scenes which he had
witnessed in Dublin, owing to the failure of the bank, and during the
last eighteen months, and related some of the cases to the House,
where they had ended in insanity, death, or suicide. That the
depositors were mostly poor persons he proved, by stating the average
amount due to each of the 1,664 persons who were creditors of the bank
to be but 27_l._ Mr. Reynolds added, that he had no hesitation in
saying, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, that the
Government ought to make good the loss.[81] If he had not proved that
point, he left it to a Committee of Inquiry to take up. "In the name
not only of justice, but of mercy and compassion," he besought the
House "to agree to his motion, and to save many poor persons from
utter and total ruin." The member for Dublin University (Mr. Napier)
seconded the motion for inquiry, and discussed many of the details of
the failure from a legal point of view. In one remark, he gave
expression to a very general feeling: the course of legislation on
Savings Banks had plainly been to reduce, for strong reasons
doubtless, the responsibility of trustees; in proportion, however, as
that responsibility was reduced, so he, Mr. Napier, thought the moral
responsibility of the commissioners increased. "Precisely in the same
degree as the trustees were relieved, should the vigilance of the
other body have been awakened." Nor was it less unfortunate--though
this is a matter which was not alluded to--that at a time when it was
thought most fitting that the interest on deposits should be reduced,
steps should also be taken to make them less secure as well as less
remunerative.
_Mr. H. A. Herbert_, the member for Kerry, proposed an amendment,
extending the inquiry to this Tralee and Killarney banks, and also to
the single case of failure in Scotland, at Auchterarder. Mr. Herbert
dwelt upon the case of these frauds in an able manner, but we reserve
the consideration of them to the next chapter. The reference to the
Scotch case doubtless called up Mr. Cowen, the member for Edinburgh,
who was sorry to hear of the necessity for any such inquiry in
Scotland; he "had been accustomed to think that they were above
suspicion in Scotland with reference to their banking matters." _Mr.
Cowen_ said that he regarded all discussions on Savings Banks as most
momentous, and as involving the consideration of the most important
national questions. "It was of the greatest importance that Savings
Banks should be placed on a solid foundation, and cleared of all those
injurious anomalies which now attached to them," for he "believed that
they might be made the means of aiding in a great measure to stem that
flood of pauperism which was now overflowing the land." Much warm
discussion followed. The _Chancellor of the Exchequer_ alleged that
the proposed inquiry would be both a useless and an expensive one; and
Mr. Goulburn, the ex-Chancellor, who was equally committed to the same
course of legislation and the difficulties which that legislation had
brought upon the Government, rendered prompt assistance by saying
exactly the same thing. On a division, it was carried by a majority of
three in a House of 100 members, that a Committee should be appointed;
and by a majority of eight, that the inquiry should extend to the
three Irish and the Scotch defaulting bank.[82]
It was one thing, however, to carry a Committee of Inquiry in the face
of both the great parties of the House, and another to nominate the
members who should compose it; and this Mr. Reynolds subsequently
found out to his evident chagrin and disappointment. The Government
had clearly not been sufficiently on the alert, and hence they had
been beaten in the first particular; they secured themselves however
against any further defeat. In the following April, Mr. Reynolds
proceeded according to usage to nominate his Committee, which he
wished should consist of eight English and seven Irish members. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer objected, and wished for the reappointment
of the Committee of the preceding session. Mr. Goulburn promptly
assisted by saying, that it would be a reflection on the Committee of
last year if it was not so reappointed. In that Committee there were
only three Irish members, though the subject then, as now, had
exclusive reference to Ireland. Mr. Reynolds, Mr. Herbert, Sir Henry
Willoughby, stoutly contested the point, which ended in the names of
two additional Irish members being proposed. The Government saw the
importance of the question, and that the inquiry would be made in this
way to turn upon the administration of Savings Banks generally, and
the responsibility of Government in regard to them, and succeeded in
resisting any change by an adverse majority of 111 to 74. The whole of
the names not having been gone through on this occasion, the Irish
members returned to the subject again a few days subsequently. "In the
names of the poor who had been rendered paupers by laws badly
administered," one member asked, "for an impartial jury." Some of the
daily papers had declared that the Government meant to pack the
Committee and so get a favourable decision, and this encouraged the
independent members to persevere. Mr. Herbert said, "the Government
all along most consistently attempted to quash inquiry." He condemned
in strong terms, and under the apparent approbation of the House, the
conduct of Mr. Pratt in relation to the Irish banks. Mr. Reynolds
declared he would divide the House upon all the remaining names
offered by Sir Charles Wood. After two divisions, however, when he was
left in a minority of 42, and 59, in a House of 202 members, he
desisted from carrying out his threat; though he had a close phalanx
of followers, he saw he had no chance against the combined hosts which
the leaders of the two principal parties in the House had brought to
bear.
The members ultimately appointed were the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
the ex-Chancellor, Mr. Herries, Sir George Clerk, Mr. P. Scrope, Sir
G. Y. Bullar, Mr. Ker Seymour, Marquis of Kildare, Mr. Adair, Mr. G.
Craig, Mr. W. Fagan, Mr. Bramston, Mr. J. A. Smith, Mr. H. Herbert,
Mr. Reynolds. This Committee sat thirteen days, and examined nine
witnesses, including several officials connected with the Cuffe Street
bank, Mr. Tidd Pratt, Mr. Higham of the National Debt Office, and Mr.
Boodle of the St. Martin's Place Savings Bank, but came to no
conclusion, and recommended nothing to the House.
On the 13th of May, 1850, the same gentlemen were reappointed under
the self-same conditions as in the previous year: they sat eleven
days, and examined some of the same and other witnesses, and on this
occasion made a long and exhaustive report to the House.[83] This
report, for which all the members except Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Herbert
voted (each of these gentlemen having produced a report of his own
which the Committee would not accept), went over the case of the
defaulting Savings Bank in Dublin very succinctly; exonerated National
Debt Commissioners and their officers from blame; stated that they
found the commissioners did not exercise all the powers they
possessed, but this arose "partly from a misgiving as to the effect of
an exercise of their authority, and partly from an unwillingness to
run the risk of creating a discredit of these institutions;" and that
if the trustees had taken the advice of the commissioners, when in
1845 they advised them to close the bank, the loss to the depositors
would not have exceeded five shillings in the pound. For these and
similar reasons the Committee came to the weighty conclusion, relative
to this particular case of fraud, that "while they cannot admit the
existence of any legal liability on the part of Her Majesty's
Government, they recommend the case of the depositors in the Cuffe
Street bank to the favourable consideration of the Government, with a
view to the adoption of some measure which shall at least mitigate the
extent of their loss." With regard to the other frauds into which they
were instructed to inquire, they reported that there were "no peculiar
features connected with them differing from those of other banks which
have suffered from the dishonesty of their actuaries." They concluded
by expressing their conviction of the unsatisfactory state and working
of the existing law; proper power did not reside with any authority
"to check abuses, however indisputable;" by expressing their opinion
that the provisions of the law of 1844 had worked in a manner
obviously at variance with the intentions of Parliament, and wound up
by the following important paragraph:--
"Your Committee have observed with much satisfaction that
the Chancellor of the Exchequer has introduced a Savings
Banks bill, which is calculated to remedy several
important defects in the existing law, and extends the
responsibility of Her Majesty's Government to the
depositors; and they therefore abstain from all
observations on this part of the subject, further than to
state the conviction, which this inquiry has forced upon
them, of the urgent necessity for further legislation, if
those institutions, which have of late years acquired an
extent and importance so little anticipated by the
original founders of Savings Banks, are to preserve their
hold on the confidence of the country, or produce the
beneficial results expected from them in encouraging and
rewarding the industry and self-denial of the working
classes."
This report was presented to the House on the 1st of August, and at
once referred to a Committee of the whole House. Next day, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed that a grant of 30,000_l._ should
be made to the defrauded depositors in the Cuffe Street bank, out of
the Consolidated Fund. _Sir James Graham_ opposed the grant. If this
money was a matter of charity, he argued, they were opening the door
to a dangerous principle; if of justice or equity, the claim ought to
be paid in full. It was unworthy of the British public to compromise
for ten shillings in the pound. Other members asserted that if Cuffe
Street depositors were paid, the poor creditors of other insolvent
banks would likewise have to be paid. Generally, however, the House
felt with the Committee; it was altogether an exceptional case, the
claims of the former being, as Sir Charles Wood expressed it,
"something between equity, sympathy, and charity." _Mr. Bright_, a
resident of Rochdale, and _Mr. Sharman Crawford_, the member for that
borough, whose ears had lately rung with the tales of heartless
deception practised there, were both for paying these depositors in
full; "there might be no legal claim, but there were the claims of
equity and morality." Mr. Bright, indeed, went so far as to say, that
if Government would bring in a bill to secure other banks in future
from these dreadful calamities, he would willingly vote that all
claims from Savings Bank failures should at once be met by the State.
The House divided on Sir Charles Wood's motion, when 118 members voted
for it, and 39 against it. We may as well say here that several
attempts were subsequently made to get the remaining 30,000_l._ from
Government, but without avail.[84]
It will not be difficult for the reader to understand the position of
affairs up to 1850. The law was clearly unsatisfactory; it had been
pronounced so by Committees which, though composed of nearly the same
members, had sat in three successive years, and patiently examined
into the question in its every detail. The only difference of opinion
indeed in the Committees was, as to the persons who were liable, and
to what extent, for the defective state of the law, and the results to
which it had led. Nor is it at all wonderful that legislation should
have been needed. Savings Banks, as it was often pointed out about the
time, had increased enormously within a short period, and beyond all
proportion to the expectations which were originally formed with
regard to them. When they were first started, many benevolent
individuals entered heartily into the work of managing them, and asked
for no return, except the sense that they had assisted in a humane and
praiseworthy object, for the labour they underwent. Putting two
considerations together--the great increase of business, and the no
less certain decrease in the first ardour attending such
enterprises--the increase of paid officials became absolutely
necessary, and in almost a corresponding ratio did the unpaid
machinery decline. Slowly but surely the management of Savings Banks
went out of the hands of an unpaid into those of a paid staff of
officials, and every year the system of check became more nominal than
real.[85] It was apparent, not less from the proceedings of solvent
Savings Banks than from the exposures made in the case of unsound
ones, that those who had originally taken part in the establishment of
these institutions slowly became honorary in place of active members
of the board; and of those who still continued to take a share in the
work, many had got into the habit of leaving their duties to
subordinates, in some cases signing blank forms, and even cheques, to
be filled up by the acting-manager at his discretion.
At this stage in the history of Savings Banks, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer came forward,--as the reader has already learnt from the
Report of the Committee of 1850,--with a bill to amend the law. This
bill he introduced to the House of Commons on the 29th of April, 1850,
and it forms part of our object to explain in detail the plan now
proposed, inasmuch as for many subsequent years the same measure, with
only trifling modifications, was offered over and over again to the
consideration of the House, and as often declined, through the
overpowering influence of the Savings Bank interest in the country. On
bringing forward his bill, the Chancellor said he wished to avoid all
reference to the past, except in as far as the experience of the past
was a guide to future legislation. He very briefly traced the history
and progress of Savings Banks, remarking at the time that, if he were
not to do so, few could be aware of their real nature, and how they
had grown to their present dimensions. We need not follow Sir Charles
Wood through this account, nor even repeat the reasons which actuated
the Legislature in making changes in the law from time to time up to
the year 1844. Referring to the Act of that session, he described it
as "most defective," and the bill he wished to introduce would amend
it. Speaking of the responsibility as to loss in Savings Banks, which
many persons thought should rest with the Government, he repudiated
the notion, unless Government was allowed to have some control over
the persons who might occasion the loss. On the other hand, he did not
wish to do away with "the most invaluable feature in Savings
Banks--the local management." He thought, however, that Government
might take a medium course, and fairly meet the case by making such
arrangements as "would end in the State bearing nearly the whole
responsibility as regarded the receipt and payment of money." What he
proposed was to alter the enactment that the treasurers of Savings
Banks should receive no emolument, _and to vest the appointment of
Treasurer in the hands of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the
National Debt_. The existing treasurers might in most cases be
continued, and if they wished to work for nothing, they might still
have the option; but he insisted on the Government reappointing such
officers, and upon having a control over them. To this officer, or
some one acting for him, all payments should be made over--the receipt
and payment of money by any other person to be declared illegal.[86]
He considered that this arrangement would guard against the
possibility of fraud. The treasurer and secretary, acting for
different interests, as it were, could scarcely be guilty of
collusion, and the one would in all cases act as a check upon the
other. If this plan were agreed to, the Government would of course be
responsible for every farthing paid to the treasurer.
This was the great and distinguishing feature of the measure which the
Government was disposed to adopt; but there were other features in the
bill of considerable importance, which ought not to go unmentioned.
Thus, it proposed that the Act of 1844 should be repealed, and that
trustees should be responsible for their wilful neglect or default, as
in the Act of 1828. It was clear, however, that under the appointment
of treasurers the responsibility would be little more than nominal.
Another point which the bill provided for was an efficient audit of
the accounts, the trustees of each bank to appoint an auditor, and the
pass-book of each depositor to be annually examined, the auditor in
each case comparing the book with the ledger of the office.[87] The
bill proceeded, further, to give power to the National Debt
Commissioners to send down to any Savings Bank, should they see
occasion for it, an Inspector, to test the accuracy of the accounts of
that bank: with the other provisos already mentioned, depositors would
thus be absolutely safe. The next clause provided against any further
loss to Government. The Chancellor in introducing this subject spoke
of the different rates of interest which had been given to Savings
Banks, and said all of them were higher than could be given without
loss. But this was not all. The loss sustained in having to pay out a
large sum of money whenever called for, no matter how low the Funds
were at the time, was equal almost to the former. After explaining the
case, and giving examples of its working, he added that Government
thus suffered a loss on capital and a loss on interest. "It had been
proposed that Government should merely act as a broker, making
depositors subject to all the fluctuations of the Funds; but," said
the honourable gentleman, "from the numerous communications I have
received from all parts of the country, depositors think much of their
getting their money back as they put it in, and looked to the amount
of interest as a secondary consideration." He then gave a variety of
statistics, and proposed that the limit to the amount of deposits
should be fixed at 100_l._ and that the rate of interest should be
reduced from 3_l._ 5_s._ to 3_l._ for trustees, and 2_l._ 15_s._
instead of 3_l._ 0_s._ 10_d._ to depositors.[88] The Chancellor of the
Exchequer concluded by expressing the wish that the bill of which he
had given the principal clauses, should be discussed fully and
temperately: it involved no party feeling, but it involved many things
intimately connected with the welfare of the classes for which Savings
Banks were established: he said he had done his best to meet the
difficulties of the case, but difficult as it was to do, the matter
ought at once to be settled, and to be settled once for all.[89]
It, however, was not to be settled so soon. Before we refer to any
further expression of opinion on the subject in Parliament and the
ultimate decision in the case, it is only right that we should present
the other--the Savings Bank--view of the matter, as uttered by the
powerful, we had almost said corporate, body at St. Martin's Place.
The Committee of Managers of this important London institution met, as
their custom was, to pass resolutions on any matter affecting Savings
Banks. A petition to Parliament was framed on the resolutions come to
in this as in other instances, and similar petitions were got up and
presented to Parliament from other Savings Banks, who naturally looked
to the St. Martin's Place institution for advice and guidance. At a
meeting held at this representative bank on the 14th of May, 1850,
Lord Walsingham in the chair, the proposals of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer were gone through _seriatim_, and all of them, without
exception, disputed and condemned. It came to the conclusion that (1)
the proposed introduction into Savings Banks of a Government
treasurer, &c., "must lead to great confusion, and eventually to the
disruption of these valuable institutions;" (2) that "the proposed
reduction of the existing rates of interest and the limit in the
amount of deposits will, besides imposing injurious restrictions on
depositors, so diminish the means of defraying the expenses of
management as to render it extremely difficult in some, and impossible
in other cases," to engage efficient assistance; (3) that any further
reduction of the rate of interest to depositors would only tempt them
to withdraw their money from Savings Banks and place it in "more
attractive, but frequently hazardous investments;"[90] (4) that the
grand principle on which well-conducted Savings Banks have hitherto
been so efficiently managed, viz., "that of having the constant
superintendence of gentlemen unconnected with the receipt or payment
of money, will be destroyed if the new bill should be passed into a
law." We ought to add that this Committee did not object to the
abrogation of the law of 1844, which was passed "contrary to their
expressed wishes and recommendations;" that, although they urged that
frauds were comparatively rare, and far less in amount and extent than
in public or mercantile establishments, and that for such reason there
was no just ground for the introduction of an entirely new system such
as was now proposed, they had no objection to a measure adapted still
further to promote the solvency and good management of Savings Banks,
only they must insist that the necessity for such important changes
"should be considered by a Select Committee, and evidence taken from
men of long experience in Savings Bank management." The last
resolution to which this body came was, "That a petition to the House
of Commons, founded upon the foregoing resolutions, be printed and
circulated for the information of other Savings Banks."
To return to the discussion in the House of Commons on the bill now
proposed, _Mr. Hume_ in a temperate speech supported, on the whole,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He held that Government ought to
undertake one of two things--either to leave Savings Banks altogether
alone, or else to ensure perfect security to the depositors, which he
saw no difficulty in doing. Of course he agreed with the proposal to
reduce the rate of interest and the limit of the total amount of
deposits, remarking on the latter subject that he had known many cases
where Savings Banks had been taken advantage of in a way that, he was
about to say, was quite unworthy of them; "but let no man say that
anything was unworthy where profit was the object, for he found in all
ranks and classes a tendency to avail themselves of the folly of the
public." Government, he thought, could not do better than try to
encourage among the labouring classes the habit of saving; "for the
moment a man had a nest-egg he desired to add to it, and thus were
habits of economy and prudence fostered among the mass of the people."
_Sir Henry Willoughby_ opposed the bill; he thought the proposal to
reduce the rate of interest would be "an extremely disagreeable
measure." He referred, however, on this occasion principally to the
management of Savings Bank funds, and expressed his opinion that what
was required was that the management of the affairs of Savings Banks
should be taken out of the hands of the Commissioners of the National
Debt, and a separate commission appointed for the purpose.
Few members questioned the wisdom of the proposals at this time, but
many expressed themselves dissatisfied that the bill would have no
reference to the past, and that the Chancellor had not alluded in any
way to the depositors who had lost their all by the bank failures and
by the action of the bill of 1844. Mr. Crawford spoke of the Rochdale
depositors, Mr. Fagan of the Killarney depositors, and Mr. Herbert of
the Dublin and Tralee depositors. _Mr. Slaney_ thanked the Chancellor
of the Exchequer for the amount of attention which he had bestowed on
the bill, which he "deliberately thought would interest more persons
than any other measure that would be introduced this session." He
thought the security now promised would be real, though he was sorry
the Chancellor meant to make the people pay for it. His opinion (and
he had considered the subject of industrial investments very largely)
was that neither the amount of, nor the interest on, deposits should
be reduced; he would "be most willing to pay a small bonus to tempt
the savings of these poor people." We are glad, however, to say that
this view of the case did not meet with much approval. After several
more appeals from such members as Mr. Bankes and Colonel Thompson,
that Government would come to the rescue of the defrauded depositors
who had, in their ignorance it might be, looked to the country for
security, the bill was ordered to be brought in by the Chancellor and
Mr. Attorney-General. On the motion made to read the bill a second
time on the 8th of August, 1850, Mr. Hume and Sir Henry Willoughby
importuned the Chancellor of the Exchequer to defer the consideration
of the bill to the next session; the former urging that honourable
members might study the reports of the Committees of 1849-50, during
the interim, and the latter that time might be given "to allow of a
consolidation of all the statutes relating to Savings Banks, and an
inquiry into the whole subject." The Chancellor replied, that after
the agitation which had been got up among the managers of Savings
Banks, and the considerable misunderstanding which prevailed relative
to the provisions of the bill, he reluctantly consented to withdraw
it.[91] Several members took the opportunity to urge that the
Chancellor should bring the matter forward the first thing in next
session; but the Savings Bank interest proved still stronger in 1851,
and again Sir Charles Wood got nothing done, and never heartily took
up the question again.
In 1853 an Act was passed to "Amend and Consolidate the Law relating
to the Purchase of Government Annuities." The bill was introduced and
carried through by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This Act continued
the same powers to the Commissioners as were given in 1833, and the
clauses relating to the purchase of annuities, deferred and immediate,
were continued. It further empowered them, however, to grant deferred
annuities for a sum to be paid down at once, and not returnable, and
also to grant annuities otherwise than through Savings Banks. It was
said that the reason why the Act of 1833 had been practically
inoperative was the want of such a clause: that the fact of only being
able to buy a deferred annuity on the condition of money being
returnable, not only caused many lapses, but made the tables heavier
than they ought to be. Under the fresh clause better things were
augured; any one purchasing such an annuity, it was argued, takes the
chance of his not living to receive it, just as the member of a
benefit society takes his chance of never being ill, and therefore
never needing what he pays to secure if his health should fail. The
benefit in return for this risk is, however, proportionally increased,
inasmuch as the contributions of those who do not live to the term
when the annuities commence, go to swell the contributions of those
who may,--the purchase-money, in the case of money being returnable,
being of course much larger than in the other, where more risk is run.
We give the argument for what it is worth; but it is certainly curious
that at a more recent date, when again the law regulating the purchase
of annuities underwent alteration and amendment, a great outcry was
raised, because the tables of rates, "with money returnable," were
temporarily kept back; one respectable organ of public opinion going
so far as to say that the changes would be inoperative till these
tables were produced. An opposition was got up during the progress of
the measure in Parliament, owing to the clause empowering the
Government to grant life assurance policies to those who should
likewise buy annuities. It was said now, just as it was urged, though
much more strongly, subsequently, that there were great objections to
the Government becoming a trading community, or doing anything which
could be carried out by a private company. "The system of life
assurance," said a well-known Scotch member, "was at present carried
on so successfully and so judiciously by the ordinary life assurance
societies, that it would be most unwise to interfere with them."
Another member argued that the annuities scheme had so lacked success
that no amount of tinkering would make it applicable to the country.
The Secretary of the Treasury explained that Government were not
anxious about doing the business of insurance offices, but only
desired to give facilities, which the law did not then allow, for the
conversion of Savings Bank deposits into a satisfactory provision for
want or old age. The bill was read a third time, with a majority of 28
in a House of 56 members, and soon afterwards passed without any
further difficulty, and received the Royal Assent. Such a measure,
whatever the poorer classes might think of it, was well calculated to
spread the spirit of independence amongst them. The State did well to
offer the opportunity of increased facilities; and if those for whose
benefit such schemes were intended did not avail themselves of them to
secure, by a very small amount of temporary sacrifice in seasons of
health and prosperity, a provision against those risks to which all
the poorer classes are liable, of falling through unexpected
contingencies into poverty and pauperism, the blame would rest
elsewhere than with the State.
As we have already said, the session of 1851 passed without any
attempt at legislation, and in the beginning of 1852, there being
still no sign of action on the part of the Executive, the late _Mr.
Herbert_, so well known in connexion with the Irish banks, proposed a
resolution to the effect--
"That this House has observed with regret the continued
neglect of Her Majesty's Government to fulfil their
promise of introducing a bill for the regulation of
Savings Banks, by which those important institutions may
be enabled to preserve their hold on the confidence of the
country, and a due encouragement be thus given to the
industry and providence of the working classes."
There was every reason to believe that this resolution would have
passed, until the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose. _Sir Charles Wood_
admitted that the bill had been far too long delayed; but this was no
fault of his. It was thrown out in 1850; he could not get it
introduced in 1851: it was ready, however, and it should be brought
forward this session. He had not given notice of it, because he had
been engaged in consultation with several members in so preparing the
measure as to ensure its passage through the House. His firm
conviction was, that the delay in the present instance had tended not
only to improve the bill, but to diminish the chances of opposition to
it when introduced. During the last four years the greatest pains had
been taken to frame such a measure as should effectually remove the
evils that had been complained of; and within the past few months they
had had the assistance of a new Comptroller of the National Debt
Office, who had "devoted himself with great diligence to the
subject."[92] He submitted, in conclusion, that he was not deserving
of the censure of the House, especially as it had been settled to try
the measure again during the present session. _Mr. Disraeli_ agreed
with Sir Charles Wood, though the resolution before the House was
apparently justified by the circumstances, it would not be becoming in
them to divide the House after what had been promised. The question
was surrounded with difficulties, but notwithstanding these
difficulties it was the paramount duty of the Legislature to grapple
with it; and an opportunity would be soon afforded. Mr. Disraeli at
this time did not know how soon he was to be in a position to grapple
with the subject himself. Sir Charles Wood's pledge was not kept. All
such measures as those we are considering have suffered greatly from
the vicissitudes of administrations, and it was so in this instance.
Towards the end of 1852 Mr. Disraeli succeeded Sir Charles Wood as
Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Derby's first Ministry; but he had
scarcely time, supposing him to have had the disposition, to take up
the matter where it had been left. When the Derby Administration gave
place to the coalition Ministry of Lord Aberdeen, and Mr. Gladstone
took the place of chief financial minister, there was soon a better
prospect of some settlement. Even under his auspices, however, matters
at first went on very slowly; so multiform were the questions and
interests involved, that even Mr. Gladstone's powers were severely
tried to clear the ground of the incumbrances which time and prejudice
had reared. When Mr. Gladstone left office and was succeeded by Sir
George Lewis much had been done; the necessary preliminary measure of
a full investigation into the Savings Bank question by a Committee of
the House of Commons had been decided; the real nature of the
connexion existing between the Government and the Savings Banks was
better understood: and when after a lapse of two or three years he
returned to his old position, he took the matter up where it had been
left, and carried the subject, by his unapproachable eloquence and
energy to an easy and final solution. Mr. Gladstone's name will go
down to posterity covered with honourable trophies of his great
powers; but we question whether among the great schemes he has carried
any will be remembered longer than those meant to increase among the
lower classes the habits of prudence and frugality.
Early in 1853, and when he had but just succeeded to the office of
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone gave notice that the
subject must be taken up, and if possible settled. A bill[93] was
allowed to pass the second reading without discussion; but when the
subject came up before Committee in July of that year, Mr. Gladstone,
compelled to succumb to the wish that Parliament should be prorogued,
asked that this and other bills might be deferred till the next
meeting of Parliament. He said he had made great progress with the
bill since it was first introduced; he had sought to get the opinion
of the different Savings Bank managers upon it, and he believed he had
acquired a pretty accurate knowledge of the state of feeling in the
country on the subject.[94] All this was favourable to the prospects
of the bill; but now, as the House had lasted since November 1852, he
feared that if it was pushed forward it might fail to pass. He should
have liked to have got the question settled, but he now thought his
object would be more speedily obtained by the delay proposed. Here the
sagacious Minister was mistaken; the old adage of no time being better
than the time present could often be well applied to proposals to
defer desirable matters of legislation to a future session. No mention
was made of the subject for nearly eighteen months; the country had
more pressing, and, for the time, much more serious matters to
consider, which it will be quite unnecessary to particularize.
On the 20th of December, 1854, Mr. Gladstone moved for and obtained
leave to bring in two bills during the session of 1855: the one "to
create a charge on the Consolidated Fund" of the money due on behalf
of the depositors in Savings Banks, and the other, the bill for the
management of Savings Banks which was withdrawn in 1853. In the former
important proposal the Chancellor of the Exchequer desired to make the
law more perfect as to the relation between the depositor and the
State, by giving the latter a better title to the money invested with
the State. He wished, in his own language, "to reduce the obligation
and the contract of the State with the depositor to that simple form
which is adopted by every banker." He would propose, "as respects the
bulk of the funds received from Savings Bank depositors, that they
should be held in this country as they are held in other countries,"
and not in the complicated form of Stock and other public securities.
Mr. Gladstone's view, more than once expressed in strong terms, with
respect to the State using the money belonging to Savings Banks, was
that it was no matter to anybody what was done with the money,[95]
providing it were ready at call and the stipulated interest were
given,--the stability of the country being surely a sufficient
guarantee for its safety. Savings Bank authorities, on the other hand,
disputed the right of the Chancellor to use the money; would prefer to
use it themselves in other investments, if the funds were applied
otherwise than under statute in the purchase of Bank Annuities; and
referred to the uncertain title in law which depositors had for the
money according to the governing statute. Mr. Gladstone's bill
proposed to give this title to every penny so deposited with the
State, by throwing the burden of any deficiency arising on the
Consolidated Fund, and so silence at any rate the last objection.[96]
Early in the session of 1857 the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (the
late Sir George Lewis) was several times asked if the subject of
Savings Banks had not to be brought forward and concluded. These
questions led to his promising to bring in the Government measure
which, often brought forward and as often withdrawn, was still waiting
for a tide of popular favour to carry it into law. On the 27th of
February in this year he gave notice of this intention, and earnestly
trusted that the House would allow it to pass. In a short speech, the
points of which we need not recapitulate--for it dealt with the same
facts and came to the same conclusion as those speeches of previous
Chancellors already described,--he proposed the first reading. Then
came the dissolution of Parliament, and its forcible postponement for
one more session.[97]
In a fortnight from the meeting of the new Parliament Sir G. Lewis,
true to his promise, moved that the House go into Committee on the
Savings Bank Bill, which had even then reached that stage. His motion
was, "That it is expedient to amend the laws relating to Savings
Banks, and to provide for the establishment of Savings Banks with the
security of the Government." The Chancellor said that almost everybody
was agreed as to the principles of the bill, though it was true that
the managers of many Savings Banks contested some of the details. The
greatest objection to the bill when last introduced being the
provision to limit the total amount of deposits to 100_l_., he would
now propose, as it did not affect the bill at all materially, to drop
that clause; the law to remain as it then stood. This was the only
material difference; there were minor points, but they were not worth
pointing out. He then went over the changes which the bill proposed to
make in the law; the ample security he wished to give to all who
deposited money in Savings Banks, at the same time taking no
superfluous securities and imposing no unnecessary restrictions in
order to guard the interest of the public. Should the local
authorities of Savings Banks still be found unwilling to part with
their own control, or admit any interference on the part of the
Government, there was only one course left to him--namely, "to abandon
the bill," to leave things in their present position, and continue a
system by which the depositors are left entirely to the security of
the local officers; while at the same time Government is left wholly
irresponsible, except for the amounts actually lodged in its hands. "I
trust, however, that the plan will be considered a reasonable plan,"
said the Chancellor, in conclusion, "that it will be found not to
impose upon the local authorities any shackles of which they can
reasonably complain, and that no securities are demanded on behalf of
the public beyond what are absolutely necessary."[98] _Sir Henry
Willoughby_ held that the law needed consolidating before any new Act
was passed. It was not long since 200 petitions were presented to the
House for a consolidation of existing statutes, and an inquiry into
the entire system. Let the House take this step first. After speaking
warmly on the subject of the disposal of Savings Bank money, he
appealed to the Chancellor to refer the whole subject to a Select
Committee, who should recommend a clear and well-defined legislative
enactment. _Mr. Sotheron Estcourt_ and _Viscount Goderich_ took the
same view; the former gentleman, however, warmly approved of the
Government bill, which had "happily been re-introduced," and thought
that "most of the alterations made were improvements." As a trustee of
a Savings Bank he would consider his position infinitely improved by
the bill. If, however, the feeling of the House was for a committee,
this course could not prejudice the bill, though it would delay it.
_Mr. Thomas Baring_ thought the matter should go before a Select
Committee; so did Mr. Henley. The Irish members, Mr. Slaney and
others, were for passing the bill, and not deferring legislation any
longer on any pretence. The Chancellor of the Exchequer opposed any
further delay; the adoption of any other resolution would simply tend
to shelve the bill for another session. If honourable gentlemen really
wished to reject the bill, let them resort to the direct and fair
course of doing so. He also was for consolidating the laws relating to
Savings Banks; but till that could be done he thought it by far the
best plan to introduce a few more clauses into the law to remedy
grievances which could not wait to be redressed. The motion was then
agreed to. The second reading came off on the 8th of June. _Mr.
Ayrton_, in a long and animated speech, during which he said that the
greater number of Savings Banks were now most efficiently managed on a
principle which was most conducive in binding the humbler to the more
influential classes, and that he could conceive nothing more
calculated to destroy that sympathy than the present proposals--"felt
inclined to move that the bill be read a second time that day six
months." The result of the proposals would be a step in the direction
of the system which obtained on the Continent, where every function of
the community was usurped "by what was called the civil service of the
country." Amidst cries of "Divide," Mr. Ayrton said he was strenuously
opposed to any such system. _Mr. McCann_ said the whole body of the
people were unanimous in applauding the measure of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer. _Sir Harry Verney_ approved of the principle of the
bill, but said he would like to see the subject referred to a Select
Committee. _Mr. Barrow_ opposed the bill and the Select Committee
also. _Mr. Estcourt_ again, in an admirable and temperate speech,
during which he showed an excellent knowledge of the subject in all
its bearings, assisted the Government in their proposals. To give the
reader a proper idea of the ground taken by Mr. Estcourt, who, when
the committee was eventually appointed, was made chairman of it, we
need only give the concluding part of his speech on this occasion:--
"He earnestly wished that this session would not pass
without a Government Savings Bank bill becoming law, and
he hoped the honourable gentleman would persevere with
this bill; but even should the bill pass, he joined his
voice with that of others in entreating the Government,
after giving the poor man the guarantee which he did not
now possess, to give to the public generally more accurate
information on the whole subject, a clearer account of how
the money was applied, and how the deficit spoken of had
arisen. That information ought to be given, if only for
the purpose of showing the groundlessness of the
suspicious observations made against this bill; and
therefore, though he heartily concurred in giving his
voice for the second reading, he joined with other
gentlemen in entreating the Government to give them a
Select Committee, not in order to shelve the bill for the
session, but, next year, for the purpose of assisting the
Government, and giving the public that information which
they ought to have."