Division of the Church in 1844—Slavery only the Occasion—Action of the
General Conference in 1836—Slavery in the Church in 1796 and
in 1836—No Change of its Moral Aspects in 1844—Facts
Perverted—Constitutional Powers of the Church—Bishop Andrew, a
Scapegoat—Protest of the Southern Conferences—Resolution and Plan of
Separation—Dr. Elliott and Schism—The Vote—The Question in the
South—Louisville Convention in 1845—Division—The Bishops of the M.
E. Church Accept the Division the following July—Failure to Change
the Sixth Restrictive Rule—General Conference of 1848
Pronounce the Whole Proceedings Null and Void—Dr. Lovick
Pierce Rejected—Fraternization Denied—Responsibility of
Non-Fraternization—Northern Church Refuse to Make any Division of
Property—Appeal to the Civil Courts—Decision of the United States
Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York—Justice
McLean—United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of
Ohio—Judge Leavitt’s Decision—Supreme Court of the United
States—Points Decided—The Decision of the Supreme Court in Full.
It is due to the uninformed that a true statement be made here of the
causes, conditions, plan and immediate results of the great division, in
1844, of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States. This is
made the more necessary by the misrepresentation of the facts made by
the press and pulpit of the Northern wing of the Church, and the
political and other uses a perversion of the facts was made to subserve
in Missouri.
1. Slavery was not, in any proper sense, the _cause_ of division, but
was made, incidentally, the _occasion_ only. American slavery had
existed in the Church for sixty years in the same form, and under the
same civil and religious sanctions that authorized and covered it in
1844. If it was the “sum of all evils” in 1844, it was the same in 1796;
and the moral character of the institution was not changed in 1836, when
the General Conference in Cincinnati, by a vote of 120 to 14, adopted
the following _preamble_ and resolutions:
“WHEREAS, Great excitement has prevailed in this country on the subject
of modern abolitionism, which is reported to have been increased in this
city recently by the unjustifiable conduct of two members of the General
Conference, in lecturing upon and in favor of that agitating subject;
and, whereas, such a course on the part of any of its members is
calculated to bring upon this body the suspicions and distrust of the
community, and to misrepresent its sentiments in regard to the points at
issue; and, whereas, in this aspect of the case, a duo regard for its
own character, as well as a just concern for the interests of the Church
confided to its care, demand a full, decided and unequivocal expression
of the ideas of the General Conference in the premises; therefore,
“_Resolved_, By the delegates of the Annual Conferences in General
Conference assembled, that they disapprove, in the most unqualified
sense, the conduct of two members of the General Conference, who are
reported to have lectured in this city recently upon and in favor of
modern abolitionism.
“_Resolved_, That they are decidedly opposed to modern abolitionism, and
wholly disdain any right, wish or intention to interfere in the civil
and political relation between master and slave as it exists in the
slaveholding States of this Union.”—_Bangs’ History of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, vol. 4, pp. 245, 246._
This is rather strong language, but not more so than the pastoral
address issued by the same General Conference. In that address the
following language is used: “It can not be unknown to you that the
question of slavery in these United States, by the constitutional
compact which binds us together as a nation, is left to be regulated by
the several State legislatures themselves, and thereby is put beyond the
control of the general government _as well as that of all ecclesiastical
bodies_, it being manifest that in the slaveholding States themselves
the entire responsibility of its existence or non-existence rests with
those State legislatures; and such is the aspect of affairs in reference
to this question that whatever else might tend to ameliorate the
condition of the slave, it is evident to us, from what we have witnessed
of abolition movements, that these are the least likely to do him good.”
Reasons are given amply sufficient to prove that abolition speeches and
publications all “tend injuriously to affect his temporal and spiritual
condition, by hedging up the way of the missionary who is sent to preach
to him Jesus and the resurrection, and thereby abridging his civil and
religious privileges.”
“These facts,” the address continues, “which are only mentioned here as
reasons for the friendly admonition which we wish to give you, constrain
us, as your pastors, who are called to watch over your souls, as they
who must give an account, to exhort you to abstain from all abolition
movements and associations, and to refrain from patronizing any of their
publications, and especially from those of that inflammatory character
which denounce in unmeasured terms those of the brethren who take the
liberty to dissent from them.” * * * * “From every view of the subject
which we have been able to take, and from the most calm and
dispassionate survey of the whole ground, we have come to the solemn
conviction that the only _safe_, _scriptural_ and _prudent_ way for us,
both as ministers and people, to take, is wholly to refrain from this
agitating subject which is now convulsing the country, and consequently
the Church, from end to end, by calling forth inflammatory speeches,
papers and pamphlets. While we cheerfully accord to such all the
sincerity they ask for their belief and motives, we can not but
disapprove of their measures as alike destructive to the peace of the
Church and the happiness of the slave.”—_Bangs’ History of the M. E.
Church, vol. 4, pp. 258, 260._
It is patent to every candid observer that the Church in 1836 did not
consider the subject of slavery as the “sum of all evils,” and therefore
to be extirpated at whatever cost to Church and State, but rather that
the danger to the peace of the Church and country was not in slavery
itself, but in the “abolition movements,” “speeches and papers” that
were “convulsing the country and Church from end to end,” and “that the
only _safe_, _scriptural_ and _prudent_ way for both ministers and
people was wholly to refrain from this agitating subject.” Slavery was,
according to this address, “_beyond the control of all ecclesiastical
bodies_,” and it would have been fortunate for the peace and welfare of
both the Church and the country had it remained beyond their control,
and had the teachings and deliverances of all ecclesiastical bodies upon
this subject remained just as this General Conference expressed it in
1836. Slavery remained unchanged; and if it was “safe, scriptural and
prudent” for the Church in ’36 to let it alone, and leave it under the
“control of the State legislatures,” where “the constitutional compact
which binds us together as a nation placed it,” why was it not “safe,
scriptural and prudent” to do the same in ’44? Did slavery, as a
domestic, moral or civil institution present any new aspects in 1844?
What civil or moral questions were applicable to slavery in 1844 that
did not equally apply in 1836 or 1796? Had slavery just been admitted
into the Church for the first time, then those who contend that it was
the cause of division would have some show of reason. If slavery was the
“sum of all villainy” in 1844 it was in 1798, unless time can change the
character of “villainy,” for it _did not_ change the character of
slavery. If a slaveholder was “a thief, a robber, a murderer and a
sinner above all others” in 1844, he was the same in 1836. Nathan Bangs,
George Peck, Charles Elliott, Orange Scott, and many others were members
of the General Conference of 1836, but they did not discover such mighty
man-defrauding, God-defying wrongs in slavery and slaveholders then.
Their optics were different when, in 1844, the effort to make the
institution of slavery a proper subject for ecclesiastical legislation,
by deposing Bishop James O. Andrew from the Episcopal office because his
wife had inherited slaves, revealed the dangerous advances the Church
had made toward the control of civil questions.
In this case “certain constructions of the constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the General Conference were assumed and acted on, which
were oppressive and destructive of the rights of the numerical minority
represented in that highest judicatory of the Church.” It was upon the
“construction of the constitutional powers of the church” that they
differed, and in the discussions and decisions that followed “certain
principles were developed in relation to the political aspects of
slavery, involving the right of ecclesiastical bodies to handle and
determine matters lying wholly outside of their proper jurisdiction.”
No candid man who will study the philosophy of that memorable Conference
in the light of the plain facts can believe that slavery was more than
the occasion for the separation.
When men willfully pervert the facts of history, or misrepresent the
connection and bearing of these facts, they must have a motive, and
candid men are justified in suspecting an end that can not be reached by
straightforward, honorable means.
Northern Methodist preachers had become fanatical on the subject of the
abolition of slavery—had recently discovered great moral wrong in the
“peculiar institution,” and commenced a war upon everything that favored
the existing relations of master and slave. All at once it was
discovered that all the resolutions and pastoral address of 1836 were in
sympathy with the “sum of all villainies,” and for that reason should be
disregarded. It was discovered that ministers of the gospel were
slaveholders—which had been the case from the beginning—and the most
noted instance then existing was James O. Andrew, a man of unblemished
character, unswerving integrity and singular purity of heart and life.
Why not take him for a scapegoat? They needed one, for many of them had
been connected with the same institution in one way or another. But how
could they reach his case? Did the law of the Church cover the case? Did
the constitution of the Church confer upon the General Conference the
power to depose a Bishop because his wife had inherited a slave, and the
laws of the State would not admit of emancipation? Could not a majority
of the General Conference so interpret and construe the law that the
case could be reached, and the “abolition movement” that had been
unequivocally condemned eight years before be just as unequivocally
indorsed now and greatly advanced by the great Methodist Church in the
United States? And what if this assumption of constitutional power
should be rejected? Aye, there was the rub. _This was the cause._ Admit
the authority of the General Conference to depose a man from office for
incidental or even positive complicity with slavery, and with it the
right is established to depose a man from the ministry for complicity
with democracy, republicanism, or any thing else purely political. The
same authority extends to the ballotbox and all the distinctive
privileges of citizenship.
There were other questions incidentally brought out at the Conference of
1844 which tested the _animus_ of the delegates from the North, and
disclosed the construction placed by their leaders upon the
constitutional prerogatives of the college of Bishops.
Any one at all acquainted with ecclesiastical government can readily see
how these questions could divide the Church whether slavery had an
existence or not. The same questions have produced division in
ecclesiastical bodies since slavery was abolished.
It was not the three cents a pound upon tea that caused the American
revolution of 1776, but the right to tax tea to that amount involved the
right to make every man in the British colonies a slave; and the right
to depose Bishop Andrew implied the right to depose every man from the
ministry who differed from the numerical majority upon any political
question whatever.
To all sober, unbiased, right-thinking, candid men this position will be
undeniable—unanswerable. To others it will be like “casting pearls
before swine.”
2. The _plan_ of division provided a remedy for the _cause_ of division.
The one stands in the light of the other. When the action in the case of
Bishop Andrew was taken in the General Conference of 1844 the delegates
from thirteen Annual Conferences, making fifty-one in all, drew up a
declaration in which they set forth the fact that in the slaveholding
States the objects and purposes of the ministry would be defeated by it.
Upon this protest the General Conference raised a committee of nine, six
from the Northern Conferences and three from the Southern Conferences,
to whom the declaration was referred. After deliberation they submitted
what is known in history and in law as the “Plan of Separation.”
It begins thus:
“WHEREAS, A declaration has been presented to this Conference, with the
signatures of fifty-one delegates of the body from thirteen Annual
Conferences in the slaveholding States, representing that, for various
reasons enumerated, the objects and purposes of the Christian ministry
and church organizations can not be successfully accomplished by them
under the jurisdiction of the General Conference as now constituted;
and,
“WHEREAS, In the event of a separation, a contingency to which the
declaration asks attention as not improbable, we esteem it the duty of
this General Conference to meet the contingency with Christian kindness
and the strictest equity; therefore,
“_Resolved 1_, Provided that should the Annual Conferences in the
slaveholding States find it necessary to unite in a distinct
ecclesiastical connection, all the societies, stations and Conferences
bordering on the line of division, adhering by vote of a majority of the
members of the society, station or Conference to either the Church in
the South or the M. E. Church, shall remain under the unmolested
pastoral care of the church to which they do adhere.”
The rule was not to apply to interior charges, which shall, in all
cases, be left to the care of that church within whose territory they
are situated.
It should be observed that the Plan of Separation was thus agreed upon
by the General Conference: “Should the Annual Conferences in the
slaveholding States find it necessary to unite in a distinct
ecclesiastical connection.” They were to be the sole judges of the
_necessity_ of such “distinct ecclesiastical connection.” The “plan”
also provided for “ministers of every grade and office” adhering either
North or South, “without blame,” and for a change of the sixth
restrictive rule by a constitutional vote of all the Annual Conferences,
so that in the event of separation an equitable _pro rata_ division of
the Book Concerns at New York and Cincinnati, and the Chartered Fund at
Philadelphia, could be made. It provided, also, for the division of the
property by a joint commission, in which N. Bangs, S. Peck and J. B.
Finly were to represent the Church North; and the ninth resolution was
as follows:
“_Resolved 9_, That all the property of the Methodist Episcopal Church
in meeting-houses, parsonages, colleges, schools, conference funds,
cemeteries, and of every kind within the limits of the Southern
organization, shall be forever free from any claim set up on the part of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, so far as this resolution can be of
force in the premises.”
It is pertinent to the case to state here that on the day the “committee
of nine” was raised, and before it was formed or announced, the
following resolution was passed, without debate:
“_Resolved_, That the committee appointed to take into consideration the
communication of the delegates from the Southern Conferences be
instructed—provided they can not, in their judgment, devise a plan for
the amicable adjustment of the difficulties now existing in the Church
on the subject of slavery—to devise, if possible, a constitutional plan
for a mutual and friendly division of the Church.”
The adoption of this resolution, without debate, embodied and announced
the decision of the General Conference upon the constitutional powers of
the body to divide the Church.
An effort was made to strike the word “constitutional” from the
resolution, but it failed, and the resolution as passed forms a part of
the history of the division, bearing directly upon the constitutional
prerogatives of the General Conference.
Dr. Charles Elliott, who subsequently made himself notorious by
denouncing the Church, South, as a secession, and by making war upon the
“Plan of Separation” and all that it accomplished, was the first man in
the General Conference to move the adoption of the report of the
committee of nine, and in a long speech he urged, with many arguments,
the practicability, the propriety, the necessity and the expediency of a
division of the Church, avowing distinctly that “were the present
difficulty out of the way there would be good reason for passing the
resolutions contained in the report. The body was too large to do
business advantageously. The measure contemplated was _not schism_, but
separation for their mutual convenience and prosperity.
After much debate and a full and free discussion of every possible point
that could be raised by that able body of men, amongst whom were many of
the best constitutional lawyers of the Church, the report was adopted;
the vote on the several resolutions varying from 135 to 153 in the
affirmative, and from 22 to 12 in the negative. These were certainly
very large majorities, and show plainly the _animus_ of the General
Conference of 1844.
With implicit confidence in the sincerity and good faith of this action,
the Southern Conferences proceeded to ascertain whether there existed a
necessity in the Southern States for the separation thus provided for.
The Southern Conferences were to be the _sole judges_ of the necessity
for such action as would make this provisional separation a real one;
and that in their judgment such necessity did exist, the history is in
proof. However greatly the opinions and purposes of men may change, the
facts of history that have gone to official record can not change. Upon
such facts intelligent judgment alone can rest, and to such facts an
honest public will always make a final appeal.
“The Annual Conferences in the slaveholding States” _did_ “find it
necessary to unite in a distinct ecclesiastical connection,” and for
that purpose met in convention, in Louisville, Ky., in 1845, and reduced
the possible contingency to fact. In the organization of a “distinct
ecclesiastical connection” the Louisville convention adhered strictly to
the plan adopted by the General Conference of 1844. The division of the
church into two distinct co-ordinate branches, which was considered a
contingency, and, as such, provided for in 1844, was, by the action of
the “Annual Conferences in the slaveholding States” represented in the
convention at Louisville, made an accomplished fact in 1845. After this
convention erected the “Annual Conferences in the slaveholding States”
into a “distinct ecclesiastical connection” the Bishops of the M. E.
Church (North) met in New York, July, 1845, and passed, among others,
the following resolution:
“_Resolved_, That the plan adopted in regard to a distinct
ecclesiastical connection, should such a course be found necessary by
the Annual Conferences of the slaveholding States, is regarded by us as
of binding obligation in the premises, so far as our administration is
concerned.”
They also gave instructions respecting the voting of “those societies
bordering on the line of division, to decide for themselves whether they
would adhere to the Church North or South.” And they further declared
that they did not feel justified in presiding over the Conferences
South, and struck them from their plan of Episcopal visitation. Thus the
Bishops of the Church, North, quietly and gracefully resigned their
jurisdiction over the Southern Conferences, because they considered the
“Plan of Separation” adopted in 1844 of “binding obligation.”
The division of the Church was recognized by the Bishops of the North as
an accomplished fact, and the “Plan of Separation” as of “binding
obligation.” And it may fairly be assumed that, had there been no
property interests to be divided according to that plan, _pro rata_,
there would have been “a mutual and friendly division of the Church.”
But after the separation had been accomplished and recognized as
legitimate and of “binding obligation,” the Northern wing of the Church
discovered that the required vote of the Annual Conferences to change
the sixth restrictive rule was not obtained, and the pretext was
furnished them to refuse a _pro rata_ or any other division of the
property that was held by the Northern Church, which consisted of a Book
Concern in New York, what was known as a Chartered Fund in Philadelphia,
and a Book Concern in Cincinnati.
To ignore and set aside the claims of the Church, South, to the common
property it was necessary to pronounce the General Conference of 1844
incompetent to divide the Church, and to declare the “Plan of Separation
null and void,” so that “there should exist no obligations to observe
its provisions.” This was done by the Northern General Conference of
1848, after the separation had been acknowledged by their Bishops as an
accomplished fact, and the “Plan of Separation” as of “binding
obligation.”
Dr. Lovick Pierce, father of Bishop Pierce, and the noblest Roman of
all, was duly accredited to this General Conference of 1848 as the
fraternal messenger of the Church, South, to express to that body the
Christian regards and fraternal salutations of his Church. Upon the
reception of his credentials the General Conference “_Resolved_, That as
there are serious questions and difficulties existing between the two
bodies it is not proper at present to enter into fraternal relations
with the M. E. Church, South.”
Fraternal intercourse was declined by official action. The door was
shut, and the fraternal messenger of the Church, South, stood without,
feeling most keenly the unchristian rejection. That he felt the
dishonor, the humiliation, the insult thus offered to his Church most
sensibly the closing words of his communication to that body, upon being
notified of his rejection, is in evidence: “You will now regard this
communication as _final_ on the part of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
South. She can never renew the offer of fraternal relations between the
two great bodies of Wesleyan Methodism in the United States. But the
proposition can be renewed at any time, either now or hereafter, by the
Methodist Episcopal Church; and if ever made, upon the basis of the Plan
of Separation as adopted by the General Conference of 1844, the Church,
South, will cordially entertain the proposition.”
His language to the General Conference of the Church, South, in
submitting his report to that body, was worthy of the great cause he was
delegated to serve, worthy of his Church, and worthy of himself. One
single sentence of that report illustrates the whole, and reflects the
highest honor on his head and heart: “Thus ended the well-intended
commission from your body. Upon this noble effort I verily believe the
smile of Divine approbation will rest when the heavenly bodies
themselves have ceased to shine. We did affectionately endeavor to make
and preserve peace, but our offer was rejected as of no deserving.”
He returned home and, with his entire Church, had to accept the
situation thus decreed by the M. E. Church, North. And with the
responsibility of non-fraternization rests the shame and disgrace of the
fact, in the estimation of the enlightened Christian world, as well as
all the damaging results.
But the Church, North, knowing that the Church, South, could not be
divested of her legal rights to the property otherwise, proceeded to set
aside the Plan of Separation, to pronounce the Church, South, a schism,
and to decline all fraternal intercourse. Thus cut off as illegitimate,
as schismatics and as secessionists, by an action wholly _ex parte_, all
claim upon the common Church property was denied, and all the authority
of commissions to settle with the Church, South, was revoked.
An appeal to the civil courts was thus made necessary, and the strong
arm of the civil law was evoked to force the unwilling conscience of the
Northern Church, and to become “a judge and a divider over us.”
It is unnecessary to give in detail the history of these civil suits.
Suffice it to say, that the United States Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York and the Supreme Court of the United States both
recognized and affirmed the authority of the General Conference to
divide the Church, pronounced that body competent to provide a plan of
separation, fix a boundary line, determine the _status_ of ministers,
adjust the rights of property, and erect two separate and distinct
ecclesiastical bodies, of co-ordinate existence and authority, out of
the M. E. Church of the United States. These highest judicial tribunals
of the country did affirm the validity of the “Plan of Separation”
adopted by the General Conference of 1844 to be of “binding obligation”
in every part and particular; and, notwithstanding the failure of the
sixth restrictive rule, the United States Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York caused a decree to be entered, November 26th, 1851,
ordering a _pro rata_ share of the property of the New York Book
Concern, including both capital and produce, to be transferred to the
agents of the M. E. Church, South, and it was referred to the Clerk of
the Court to ascertain the amount and value of the property. When he
reported, exceptions were filed, the Court could not agree upon some
points, and the case was certified to the Supreme Court of the United
States for decision.
Judge McLean, a leading member of the M. E. Church, and at the time one
of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, induced the
Commissioners of the two parties to come together in New York. The
result of this interview was an agreement between them about dividing
the property of the New York Book Concern, which agreement was afterward
made a part of the decree of the U. S. Circuit Court, December 8th,
1852. By this decree the property of the New York Book Concern was
settled, of which the Church, South, obtained about $191,000.
It may not be out of place to insert here a part of the decision of the
United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York,
Justice Nelson and Judge Betts presiding. The former delivered the
opinion of the Court.
After analyzing the Plan of Separation, the decision of the Court goes
on to say: “Now, it will be seen from this analysis of the Plan of
Separation that the only condition or contingency upon which an absolute
division of the Church organization was made to depend was the action of
the several Annual Conferences in the slaveholding States. If these
should find it necessary to unite in favor of a distinct organization,
by the very terms of the Plan the separation was to take place according
to the boundary designated. It was left to them to judge of the
necessity, and their judgment is made final in the matter. And when the
division is made, and the Church divided into two separate bodies, it is
declared that ministers of every grade and office in the Methodist
Episcopal Church may, as they prefer, remain in that Church, or without
blame attach themselves to the Church, South. The whole Plan of
Separation confirms this view. As soon as the separation takes place, in
accordance with the first resolution, all the property in
meeting-houses, parsonages, colleges, schools, Conference funds and
cemeteries, within the limits of the Southern organization is declared
to be free from any claim on the part of the Northern Church. The
general and common property, such as notes and other obligations,
together with the property and effects belonging to the printing
establishments at Charleston, Richmond and Nashville, and the capital
and produce of the Book Concern at New York, was reserved for future
adjustment. This was necessary on account of the restrictive article
upon the power of the General Conference. * * * When the Annual
Conferences in the slaveholding States acted, and organized a Southern
Church, as they did, _the division_ of the Methodist Episcopal Church
into two organizations _became complete_. And so would the adjustment of
the common property between them, if the assent of all the Annual
Conferences had been given to the change of the restrictive article. The
failure to give that has left this part of the plan open, the only
consequence of which is to deprive the Southern division of its share of
the property dependent upon this assent, and leave it to get along as it
best may, unless a right to recover its possession legally results from
the authorized division into two separate organizations.”
The suit for a division in the Cincinnati Book Concern was brought in
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Ohio, July 12th,
1849. The evidence agreed on by the counsel for both parties was the
same used in the New York case. Justice McLean declined to sit in the
case, because he had previously expressed his opinion that the Sixth
Restrictive Rule could be constitutionally modified by the General and
Annual Conferences so as “to authorize an equitable division of the fund
with the M. E. Church, South.”
Judge Leavitt presided, and reached the decision that “the General
Conference possessed no authority, directly or indirectly, to divide the
Church.” And that, as the Annual Conferences did not change the Sixth
Restrictive Rule, the Church, South, could not recover; and dismissed
the suit. He said, however, that the power to divide the Church “rested
with the body of the traveling ministry, assembled _en masse_ in a
conventional capacity.” This was fatal to his whole decision; for since
the first delegated General Conference in 1808, the whole body of the
traveling ministry had been assembling by delegation every four years,
and, authorized to exercise all the powers of the entire body of
traveling preachers, six clearly defined restrictions on its powers only
excepted.
From the decision of Judge Leavitt the Commissioners of the M. E.
Church, South, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. That
august tribunal was then composed of Chief Justice Taney, and Associate
Justices McLean, Wayne, Catron, Daniel, Nelson, Grier, Curtis and
Campbell. (Justice McLean did not sit in the case.)
The cause was heard in Washington City, in April, 1854, and the decision
in favor of the rights of the Church, South, was without dissent from
any of the Justices. Judge Nelson delivered the opinion of the Court,
April 25th, 1854. The main points settled by that decision are these:
(1) That the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States was
divided. (2) It was not a secession of a part from the main body. (3) By
it neither division lost its interest in the common property. (4) The
General Conference of 1844 had the power to divide the Church into two
distinct ecclesiastical bodies. (5) The six restrictive articles did not
deprive the General Conference of the authority and power to divide the
Church. (6) The proposed change of the Sixth Restrictive Rule was not a
condition of separation, but to enable the General Conference to carry
out its purpose. (7) The separation of the Church into two distinct
parts being legally accomplished, the “Plan of Separation” must be
carried out in good faith, and a division of the joint property by a
Court of Equity follows as a matter of course.
By this decision of the Supreme Court the M. E. Church, South, obtained
from the Cincinnati Book Concern, in money, bonds, Southern notes and
accounts, about 893,000.
These facts have all been gathered from official documents, and will not
be denied. If they serve to place before the public, in a succinct form,
the true history of the division of the Church, and by so doing
countervail the many misrepresentations and mischievous falsehoods that
have led to the unprovoked persecutions of the ministers of the M. E.
Church, South, in Missouri and elsewhere, the end will be reached and
the labor will not be in vain.
As the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the above
case is not accessible to every reader, it may serve the purpose of
history, while it serves the cause of truth and righteousness, to put in
convenient form, and as a befitting close to this chapter, that decision
in full—except so much of it as was necessary to carry out the decree of
the Court in detail.
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
“WILLIAM A. SMITH, _et al._, _vs._ LEROY SWORMSTEDT, _et al._
“This was the appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Ohio, which dismissed the bill.
“This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio, and was
argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is ordered, adjudged and
decreed by this Court that the decree of said Circuit Court in this
cause be and the game is hereby reversed and annulled; and this Court
doth farther find, adjudge and decree:
“1. That under the resolution of the General Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, holden at the city of New York, according to the usage
and discipline of said Church, passed on the eighth day of June, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-four (in the
pleadings mentioned), it was, among other things, and in virtue of the
power of said General Conference, well agreed and determined by the
Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of America, as then
existing, that in case the Annual Conferences in the slaveholding States
should find it necessary to unite in a distinct ecclesiastical
connection, the ministers, local and traveling, of every grade and
office in the Methodist Episcopal Church, might attach themselves to
such new ecclesiastical connection without blame.
“2. That the said Annual Conferences in the slaveholding States did find
and determine that it was right, expedient and necessary to erect the
Annual Conferences last aforesaid into a distinct ecclesiastical
connection, based upon the discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church
aforesaid, comprehending the doctrines and entire moral and
ecclesiastical rules and regulations of the said discipline (except only
in so far as verbal alterations might be necessary to or for a distinct
organization), which new ecclesiastical connection was to be known by
the name and style of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and that
the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, was duly organized under said
resolutions of the said Annual Conferences last aforesaid, in a
convention thereof held at Louisville, in the State of Kentucky, in the
month of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
forty-five.
That by force of the said resolutions of June the eighth, eighteen
hundred and forty-four, and of the authority and power of the said
General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, as then existing,
by which the same were adopted; and by virtue of the said finding and
determination of the said Animal Conferences in the slaveholding States
therein mentioned, and by virtue of the organization of such Conferences
into a distinct ecclesiastical connection as last aforesaid, _the
religious association known as the Methodist Episcopal Church in the
United States of America, as then existing, was divided into two
associations, or distinct Methodist Episcopal Churches, as in the bill
of complaint is alleged_.
That the property denominated the Methodist Book Concern at Cincinnati,
in the pleadings mentioned, was, at the time of said division and
immediately before, a fund subject to the following use, that is to say,
that the profits arising therefrom, after retaining a sufficient capital
to carry on the business thereof, were to be regularly applied toward
the support of the deficient traveling, supernumerary, superannuated and
worn-out preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, their wives,
widows and children, according to the rules and Discipline of said
church, and that the said fund and property are held under the act of
incorporation in the said answer mentioned by the said defendants, Leroy
Swormstedt and John H. Power, as agents of said Book Concern, and in
trust for the purposes thereof.
“5. That, in virtue of the said division of said Methodist Episcopal
Church in the United States, the deficient, traveling, supernumerary,
superannuated and worn-out preachers, their wives, widows and children
comprehended in, or in connection with the Methodist Episcopal Church,
South, were, are, and continue to be, beneficiaries of the said Book
Concern to the same extent and as fully as if the said division had not
taken place, and in the same manner and degree as persons of the same
description who are comprehended in, or in connection with, the other
association, denominated, since the division, the Methodist Episcopal
Church, and that as well the principal as the profits of said Book
Concern, since said division, should of right be administered and
managed by the respective General and Annual Conferences of the said two
associations and Churches under the separate organizations thereof, and
according to the shares or proportions of the same as hereinafter
mentioned, and in conformity with the rules and Discipline of said
respective associations, so as to carry out the purposes and trusts
aforesaid.
“6. That so much of the capital and property of said Book Concern at
Cincinnati, wherever situated, and so much of the produce and profits
thereof as may not have been heretofore accounted for to said Church,
South, in the New York case hereinafter mentioned, or otherwise, shall
be paid to said Church, South, according to the rate and proportions
following, that is to say: In respect to the capital, such share or part
as corresponds with the proportion which the number of the traveling
preachers in the Annual Conferences which formed themselves into the
Methodist Episcopal Church, South, bore to the number of all the
traveling preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church before the
division thereof, which numbers shall be fixed and ascertained as they
are shown by the minutes of the several Annual Conferences next
preceding the said division and new organization in the month of May, A.
D. eighteen hundred and forty-five.
“And in respect to the produce and profits, such share or part as the
number of Annual Conferences which formed themselves into the Methodist
Episcopal Church, South, bore at the time of said division in May, A. D.
1845, to the whole number of Annual Conferences then being in the
Methodist Episcopal Church, excluding the Liberia Conference, so that
the division or apportionment of said produce and profits shall be had
by Conferences, and not by numbers of the traveling preachers.
“7. That said payment of capital and profits, according to the ratios of
appointment so declared, shall be made and paid to the said Smith,
Parsons and Green, as Commissioners aforesaid, or their successors, on
behalf of said Church, South, and the beneficiaries therein, or to such
other person or persons as may be thereto authorized by the General
Conference of said Church, South, the same to be subsequently managed
and administered so as to carry out the trusts and uses aforesaid,
according to the Discipline of said Church, South, and the regulations
of the General Conference thereof.”