"_The Defensive Treaty concluded in the year 1700, between his late
Majesty, King William, of ever-glorious memory, and his present
Swedish Majesty, King Charles XII. Published at the earnest desire
of several members of both Houses of Parliament._
'Nec rumpite foedera pacis,
Nec regnis praeferte fidem.'
--SILIUS, _Lip._ II.
"_Article I._ Establishes between the Kings of Sweden and England 'a
sincere and constant friendship for ever, a league and good
correspondence, so that they shall never mutually or separately molest
one another's kingdoms, provinces, colonies, or subjects, wheresoever
situated, _nor shall they suffer or agree that this should be done by
others, etc._'
"_Article II._ 'Moreover, each of the Allies, his heirs and successors,
shall be obliged to take care of, and promote, as much as in him lies,
the profit and honour of the other, to detect and give notice to his
other ally (as soon as it shall come to his own knowledge) of all
imminent dangers, conspiracies, and hostile designs formed against him,
to withstand them as much as possible, and to prevent them both by
advice and assistance; and therefore _it shall not be lawful for either
of the Allies, either by themselves or any other whatsoever, to act,
treat, or endeavour anything to the prejudice or loss of the other_, his
lands or dominions whatsoever or wheresoever, whether by land or sea;
that one shall in no wise favour the other's foes, either rebels or
enemies, to the prejudice of his Ally,' etc.
"_Query I._ How the words marked in italics agree with our present
conduct, when our fleet acts in conjunction with the enemies of Sweden,
_the Czar commands our fleet, our Admiral enters into Councils of War,
and is not only privy to all their designs, but together with our own
Minister at Copenhagen_ (as the King of Denmark has himself owned it in
a public declaration), _pushed on the Northern Confederates to an
enterprise entirely destructive to our Ally Sweden, I mean the descent
designed last summer upon Schonen_?
"_Query II._ In what manner we also must explain that passage in the
first article by which it is stipulated that one Ally shall not either
by themselves or any other whatsoever, act, treat, or endeavour anything
to the loss of the other's lands and dominions; to justify in particular
our leaving in the year 1715, even when the season was so far advanced
as no longer to admit of our usual pretence of conveying and protecting
our trade, which was then got already safe home, eight men-of-war in the
Baltic, with orders to join in one line of battle with the Danes,
whereby we made them so much superior in number to the Swedish fleet,
that it could not come to the relief of Straelsund, and whereby _we
chiefly occasioned Sweden's entirely losing its German Provinces_, and
even the _extreme danger his Swedish Majesty ran in his own person_, in
crossing the sea, before the surrender of the town.
"_Article III._ By a special defensive treaty, the Kings of Sweden and
England mutually oblige themselves, 'in a strict alliance, to defend one
another mutually, as well as their kingdoms, territories, provinces,
states, subjects, possessions, as their rights and liberties of
navigation and commerce, as well in the Northern, Deucalidonian,
Western, and Britannic Sea, commonly called the Channel, the Baltic, the
Sound; as also of the privileges and prerogatives of each of the Allies
belonging to them, by virtue of treaties and agreements, as well as by
received customs, the laws of nations, hereditary right, against any
aggressors or invaders and molesters in Europe by sea or land, etc.'
"_Query._ It being by the law of nations an indisputable right and
prerogative of any king or people, in case of a great necessity or
threatening ruin, to use all such means they themselves shall judge most
necessary for their preservation; it having moreover been a constant
prerogative and practice of the Swedes, for these several hundred years,
in case of a war with their most dreadful enemies the Muscovites, to
hinder all trade with them in the Baltic; and since it is also
stipulated in this article that amongst other things, _one Ally ought to
defend the prerogatives belonging to the other, even by received
customs, and the law of nations_: how come we now, the King of Sweden
stands more than ever in need of using that prerogative, not only to
dispute it, but also to take thereof a pretence for an open hostility
against him?
"_Articles IV., V., VI., and VII._ fix the strength of the auxiliary
forces England and Sweden are to send each other in case the territory
of either of these powers should be invaded, or its navigation 'molested
or hindered' in one of the seas enumerated in Article III. The invasion
of the _German_ provinces of Sweden is expressly included as a _casus
foederis_.
"_Article VIII._ stipulates that that Ally who is not attacked shall
first act the part of a pacific mediator; but, the mediation having
proved a failure, 'the aforesaid forces shall be sent without delay; nor
shall the confederates desist before the injured party shall be
satisfied in all things.'
"_Article IX._ That Ally that requires the stipulated 'help, has to
choose whether he will have the above-named army either all or any,
either in soldiers, ships, ammunition, or money.'
"_Article X._ Ships and armies serve under 'the command of him that
required them.'
"_Article XI._ 'But if it should happen that the above-mentioned forces
should not be proportionable to the danger, as supposing that perhaps
the aggressor should be assisted by the forces of some other
confederates of his, then one of the Allies, after previous request,
shall be obliged to help the other that is injured, with greater forces,
such as he shall be able to raise with safety and convenience, both by
sea and land....'
"_Article XII._ 'It shall be lawful for either of the Allies and their
subjects to bring their men-of-war into one another's harbours, and to
winter there.' Peculiar negotiations about this point shall take place
at Stockholm, but 'in the meanwhile, the articles of treaty concluded at
London, 1661, relating to the navigation and commerce shall remain, in
their full force, as much as if they were inserted here word for word.'
"_Article XIII._ ' ... The subjects of either of the Allies ... shall no
way, either by sea or land, serve them (the enemies of either of the
Allies), either as mariners or soldiers, and therefore it shall be
forbid them upon severe penalty.'
"_Article XIV._ 'If it happens that either of the confederate kings ...
should be engaged in a war against a common enemy, or be molested by any
other neighbouring king ... in his own kingdoms or provinces ... to the
hindering of which, he that requires help may by the force of this
treaty himself be obliged to send help: then that Ally so molested shall
not be obliged to send the promised help....'
"_Query I._ Whether in our conscience we don't think the King of Sweden
most unjustly attacked by all his enemies; whether consequently we are
not convinced that we owe him the assistance stipulated in these
Articles; whether he has not demanded the same from us, and why it has
hitherto been refused him?
"_Query II._ These articles, setting forth in the most expressing terms,
in what manner Great Britain and Sweden ought to assist one another, can
either of these two Allies take upon him to prescribe to the other who
requires his assistance a way of lending him it not expressed in the
treaty; and if that other Ally does not think it for his interest to
accept of the same, but still insists upon the performance of the
treaty, can he from thence take a pretence, not only to withhold the
stipulated assistance, but also to use his Ally in a hostile way, and to
join with his enemies against him? If this is not justifiable, as even
common sense tells us it is not, how can the reason stand good, which we
allege amongst others, for using the King of Sweden as we do, _id est_,
that demanding a literal performance of his alliance with us, _he would
not accept the treaty of neutrality for his German provinces_, which we
proposed to him some years ago, a treaty which, not to mention its
partiality in favour of the enemies of Sweden, and that it was
calculated only for our own interest, and for to prevent all disturbance
in the empire, whilst we were engaged in a war against France, the King
of Sweden had so much less reason to rely upon, as he was to conclude it
with those very enemies, that had every one of them broken several
treaties in beginning the present war against him, and as it was to be
guaranteed by those powers, who were also every one of them guarantees
of the broken treaties, without having performed their guarantee?
"_Query III._ How can we make the words in the 7th Article, _that in
assisting our injured Ally we shall not desist before he shall be
satisfied in all things_, agree with our endeavouring, to the contrary,
to help the enemies of that Prince, though all unjust aggressors, not
only to take one province after the other from him, but also to remain
undisturbed possessors thereof, blaming all along the King of Sweden for
not tamely submitting thereunto?
"_Query IV._ The treaty concluded in the year 1661, between Great
Britain and Sweden, being in the 11th Article confirmed, and the said
treaty forbidding expressly one of the confederates _either himself or
his subjects to lend or to sell to the other's enemies, men-of-war or
ships of defence_; the 13th Article of this present treaty forbidding
also expressly the subjects of either of the Allies _to help anyways the
enemies of the other, to the inconvenience and loss of such an Ally_;
should we not have accused the Swedes of the most notorious breach of
this treaty, had they, during our late war with the French, lent them
their own fleet, the better to execute any design of theirs against us,
or had they, notwithstanding our representations to the contrary,
suffered their subjects to furnish the French with ships of 50, 60, and
70 guns! Now, if we turn the tables, and remember upon how many
occasions our fleet has of late been entirely subservient to the designs
of the enemies of Sweden, even in most critical times, and that _the
Czar of Muscovy has actually above a dozen English-built ships_ in his
fleet, will it not be very difficult for us to excuse in ourselves what
we should most certainly have blamed, if done by others?
"_Article XVII._ The obligation shall not be so far extended as that all
friendship and mutual commerce with the enemies of that Ally (that
requires the help) shall be taken away; for supposing that one of the
confederates should send his auxiliaries, and should not be engaged in
the war himself, it shall then be lawful for the subjects to trade and
commerce with that enemy of that Ally that is engaged in the war, also
directly and safely to merchandise with such enemies, for all goods not
expressly forbid and called contraband, as in a special treaty of
commerce hereafter shall be appointed.
"_Query I._ This Article being the only one out of twenty-two whose
performance we have now occasion to insist upon from the Swedes, the
question will be whether we ourselves, in regard to Sweden, have
performed all the other articles as it was our part to do, and whether
in demanding of the King of Sweden the executing of this Article, we
have promised that we would also do our duty as to all the rest; if not,
may not the Swedes say that we complain unjustly of the breach of one
single Article, when we ourselves may perhaps be found guilty of having
in the most material points either not executed or even acted against
the whole treaty?
"_Query II._ Whether the liberty of commerce one Ally is, by virtue of
this Article, to enjoy with the other's enemies, ought to have no
limitation at all, neither as to time nor place; in short, whether it
ought even to be extended so far as to destroy the very end of this
Treaty, which is the promoting the safety and security of one another's
kingdoms?
"_Query III._ Whether in case the French had in the late wars made
themselves masters of Ireland or Scotland, and either in new-made
seaports, or the old ones, endeavoured by trade still more firmly to
establish themselves in their new conquest, we, in such a case, should
have thought the Swedes our true allies and friends, had they insisted
upon this Article to trade with the French in the said seaports taken
from us, and to furnish them there with several necessaries of war, nay,
even with armed ships, whereby the French might the easier have annoyed
us here in England?
"_Query IV._ Whether, if we had gone about to hinder a trade so
prejudicial to us, and in order thereunto brought up all Swedish ships
going to the said seaports, we should not highly have exclaimed against
the Swedes, had they taken from thence a pretence to join their fleet
with the French, to occasion the losing of any of our dominions, and
even to encourage the invasion upon us, have their fleet at hand to
promote the same?
"_Query V._ Whether upon an impartial examination this would not have
been a case exactly parallel to that we insist upon, as to a free Trade
to the seaports the Czar has taken from Sweden, and to our present
behaviour, upon the King of Sweden's hindering the same?
"_Query VI._ Whether we have not ever since Oliver Cromwell's time till
1710, in all our wars with France and Holland, without any urgent
necessity at all, brought up and confiscated Swedish ships, though not
going to any prohibited ports, and that to a far greater number and
value, than all those the Swedes have now taken from us, and whether the
Swedes have ever taken a pretence from thence to join with our enemies,
and to send whole squadrons of ships to their assistance?
"_Query VII._ Whether, if we inquire narrowly into the state of
commerce, as it has been carried on for these many years, we shall not
find that the trade of the above-mentioned places was not so very
necessary to us, at least not so far as to be put into the balance with
the preservation of a Protestant confederate nation, much less to give
us a just reason _to make war against that nation, which, though not
declared, has done it more harm than the united efforts of all its
enemies_?
"_Query VIII._ Whether, if it happened two years ago, that this trade
became something more necessary to us than formerly, it is not easily
proved, that it was occasioned only by the Czar's forcing us out of our
old channel of trade to Archangel, and bringing us to Petersburg, and
our complying therewith. So that all the inconveniences we laboured
under upon that account ought to have been laid to the Czar's door, and
not to the King of Sweden's?
"_Query IX._ Whether the Czar did not in the very beginning of 1715
again permit us to trade our old way to Archangel, and whether our
Ministers had not notice thereof a great while before our fleet was sent
that year to protect our _trade to Petersburg_, which by this alteration
in the Czar's resolution was become as unnecessary for us as before?
"_Query X._ Whether the King of Sweden had not declared, that if we
would forbear trading to _Petersburg_, etc., which he looked upon as
ruinous to his kingdom, he would in no manner disturb our trade, neither
in the Baltic nor anywhere else; but that in case we would not give him
this slight proof of our friendship, he should be excused if the
innocent came to suffer with the guilty?
"_Query XI._ Whether, by our insisting upon the trade to the ports
prohibited by the King of Sweden, which besides it being unnecessary to
us, hardly makes one part in ten of that we carry on in the Baltic, we
have not drawn upon us the hazards that our trade has run all this
while, been ourselves the occasion of our great expenses in fitting out
fleets for its protection, and by our joining with the enemies of
Sweden, fully justified his Swedish Majesty's resentment; had it ever
gone so far as to seize and confiscate without distinction all our ships
and effects, wheresoever he found them, either within or without his
kingdoms?
"_Query XII._ If we were so tender of our trade to the northern ports in
general, ought we not in policy rather to have considered the hazard
that trade runs by the approaching ruin of Sweden, and _by the Czar's
becoming the whole and sole master of the Baltic, and all the naval
stores we want from thence_? Have we not also suffered greater hardships
and losses in the said trade from the Czar, than that amounting only to
sixty odd thousand pounds (whereof, by the way, two parts in three may
perhaps be disputable), which provoked us first to send twenty
men-of-war in the Baltic with order to attack the Swedes wherever they
met them? And yet, did not this very Czar, this very aspiring and
dangerous prince, _last summer command the whole confederate fleet_, as
it was called, _of which our men-of-war made the most considerable part?
The first instance that ever was of a Foreign Potentate having the
command given him of the English fleet, the bulwark of our nation_; and
did not our said men-of-war afterwards convey his (the Czar's) transport
ships and troops on board of them, in their return from Zealand,
_protecting them from the Swedish fleet_, which else would have made a
considerable havoc amongst them?
"_Query XIII._ Suppose now, we had, on the contrary, taken hold of the
great and many complaints our merchants have made of the ill-usage they
meet from the Czar, to have sent our fleet to show our resentment
against that prince, to prevent his great and pernicious designs even to
us, _to assist Sweden pursuant to this Treaty_, and effectually to
restore the peace in the North, would not that have been more for our
interest, more necessary, more honourable and just, and more according
to our Treaty; and would not the several 100,000 pounds these our
Northern expeditions have cost the nation, have been thus better
employed?
"_Query XIV._ If the preserving and securing our trade against the
Swedes has been the only and real object of all our measures, as to the
Northern affairs, how came we the year before the last to leave eight
men-of-war in the Baltic and at Copenhagen, when we had no more trade
there to protect, and how came Admiral Norris last summer, although he
and the Dutch together made up the number of twenty-six men-of-war, and
consequently were too strong for the Swedes, to attempt anything against
our trade under their convoy; yet to lay above two whole months of the
best season in the Sound, without convoying our and the Dutch
merchantmen to the several ports they were bound for, whereby they were
kept in the Baltic so late that their return could not but be very
hazardous, as it even proved, both to them and our men-of-war
themselves? Will not the world be apt to think that the hopes of forcing
the King of Sweden to an inglorious and disadvantageous peace, by which
the Duchies of Bremen and Verden ought to be added to the Hanover
dominions, or that some other such view, foreign, if not contrary, to
the true and old interest of Great Britain, had then a greater influence
upon all these our proceedings than _the pretended care of our trade_?
"_Article XVIII._ For as much as it seems convenient for the
preservation of the liberty of navigation and commerce in the Baltic
Sea, that a firm and exact friendship should be kept between the Kings
of Sweden and Denmark; and whereas the former Kings of Sweden and
Denmark did oblige themselves mutually, not only by the public Articles
of Peace made in the camp of Copenhagen, on the 27th of May, 1660, and
by the ratifications of the agreement interchanged on both sides,
sacredly and inviolably to observe all and every one of the clauses
comprehended in the said agreement, but also declared together to ...
Charles II., King of Great Britain ... a little before the treaty
concluded between England and Sweden in the year 1665, that they would
stand sincerely ... to all ... of the Articles of the said peace ...
whereupon Charles II., with the approbation and consent of both the
forementioned Kings of Sweden and Denmark, took upon himself a little
after the Treaty concluded between England and Sweden, 1st March, 1665,
to wit 9th October, 1665, guarantee of the same agreements.... Whereas
an instrument of peace between ... the Kings of Sweden and Denmark
happened to be soon after these concluded at Lunden in Schonen, in 1679,
which contains an express transaction, and repetition and confirmation
of the Treaties concluded at Roskild, Copenhagen, and Westphalia;
therefore ... the King of Great Britain binds himself by the force of
this Treaty ... that if either of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark shall
consent to the violation, either of all the agreements, or of one or
more articles comprehended in them, and consequently if either of the
Kings shall to the prejudice of the person, provinces, territories,
islands, goods, dominions and rights of the other, which by the force of
the agreements so often repeated, and made in the camp of Copenhagen, on
the 27th of May, 1660, as also of those made in the ... peace at Lunden
in Schonen in 1679, were attributed to every one that was interested and
comprehended in the words of the peace, should either by himself or by
others, presume, or secretly design or attempt, or by open molestations,
or by any injury, or by any violence of arms, attempt anything; that
then the ... King of Great Britain ... shall first of all, by his
interposition, perform all the offices of a friend and princely ally,
which may serve towards the keeping inviolable all the frequently
mentioned agreements, and of every article comprehended in them, and
consequently towards the preservation of peace between both kings; that
afterwards if the King, who is the beginner of such prejudice, or any
molestation or injury, contrary to all agreements, and contrary to any
articles comprehended in them, shall refuse after being admonished ...
then the King of Great Britain ... shall ... assist him that is injured
as by the present agreements between the Kings of Great Britain and
Sweden in such cases is determined and agreed.
"_Query._ Does not this article expressly tell us how to remedy the
disturbances our trade in the Baltic might suffer, in case of a
misunderstanding betwixt the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, by obliging
both these Princes to keep all the Treaties of Peace that have been
concluded between them from 1660-1670, and in case either of them should
in an hostile manner act against the said Treaties, by assisting the
other against the aggressor? How comes it then that we don't make use of
so just a remedy against an evil we are so great sufferers by? Can
anybody, though ever so partial, deny but the King of Denmark, though
seemingly a sincere friend to the King of Sweden, from the peace of
Travendahl till he went out of Saxony against the Muscovites, fell very
unjustly upon him immediately after, taking ungenerously advantage of
the fatal battle of Pultava? Is not then the King of Denmark the
violator of all the above-mentioned Treaties, and consequently the true
author of the disturbances our trade meets with in the Baltic? Why in
God's name don't we, according to this article, assist Sweden against
him, and why do we, on the contrary, declare openly against the injured
King of Sweden, send hectoring and threatening memorials to him, upon
the least advantage he has over his enemies, as we did last summer upon
his entering Norway, and even order our fleets to act openly against him
in conjunction with the Danes?
"_Article XIX._ There shall be 'stricter confederacy and union between
the above-mentioned Kings of Great Britain and Sweden, for the future,
_for the defence and preservation of the Protestant, Evangelic, and
reformed religion_.'
"_Query I._ How do we, according to this article, join with Sweden to
_assert, protect, and preserve the Protestant religion_? Don't we suffer
that nation, which has always been a bulwark to the said religion, most
unmercifully to be torn to pieces?... _Don't we ourselves give a helping
hand towards its destruction?_ And why all this? Because our merchants
have lost their ships to the value of sixty odd thousand pounds. _For
this loss, and nothing else, was the pretended reason why, in the year
1715, we sent our fleet in the Baltic, at the expense of L200,000_; and
as to what our merchants have suffered since, suppose we attribute it to
our threatening memorials as well as open hostilities against the King
of Sweden, must we not even then own that that Prince's resentment has
been very moderate?
"_Query II._ How can other Princes, and especially our fellow
Protestants, think us sincere in what we have made them believe as to
our zeal in spending millions of lives and money for to secure the
Protestant interest only in one single branch of it, _I mean the
Protestant succession here_, when they see that that succession has
hardly taken place, before we, only for sixty odd thousand pounds, (for
let us always remember that this paltry sum was the first pretence for
our quarrelling with Sweden) go about to undermine the very foundation
of that interest in general, by helping, as we do, entirely to sacrifice
Sweden, the old and sincere protector of the Protestants, to its
neighbours, of which some are professed Papists, some worse, and some,
at least, but lukewarm Protestants?
"_Article XX._ Therefore, that a reciprocal faith of the Allies and
their perseverance in this agreement may appear ... both the
fore-mentioned kings mutually oblige themselves, and declare that ...
they will not depart a tittle from the genuine and common sense of all
and every article of this treaty under any pretences of friendship,
profit, former treaty, agreement, and promise, or upon any colour
whatsoever: but that they will most fully and readily, either by
themselves, or ministers, or subjects, put in execution whatsoever they
have promised in this treaty ... without any hesitation, exception, or
excuse....
"_Query I._ Inasmuch as this article sets forth that, at the time of
concluding of the treaty, we were under no engagement contrary to it,
and that it were highly unjust should we afterwards, and while this
treaty is in force, which is eighteen years after the day it was signed,
have entered into any such engagements, how can we justify to the world
our late proceedings against the King of Sweden, which naturally seem
the consequences of a treaty either of our own making with the enemies
of that Prince, _or of some Court or other that at present influences
our measures_?
"_Query II._ The words in this article ... how in the name of honour,
faith, and justice, do they agree with the _little and pitiful
pretences_ we now make use of, not only for not assisting Sweden,
pursuant to this treaty, _but even for going about so heartily as we do
to destroy it_?
"_Article XXI._ This defensive treaty shall last for eighteen years,
before the end of which the confederate kings may ... again treat.
"_Ratification of the abovesaid treaty._ We, having seen and considered
this treaty, have approved and confirmed the same in all and every
particular article and clause as by the present. We do approve the same
for us, our heirs, and successors; assuring and promising our princely
word that we shall perform and observe sincerely and in good earnest all
those things that are therein contained, for the better confirmation
whereof we have ordered our great seal of England to be put to these
presents, which were given at our palace of Kensington, 25th of
February, in the year of our Lord 1700, and in the 11th year of our
reign (Gulielmus Rex).[22]
"_Query._ How can any of us that declares himself for the late happy
revolution, and that is a true and grateful lover of King William's for
ever-glorious memory ... yet bear with the least patience, that the said
treaty should (that I may again use the words of the 20th article) be
_departed from, under any pretence of profit, or upon any colour
whatsoever_, especially so insignificant and trifling a one as that
which has been made use of for two years together to employ our ships,
our men, and our money, _to accomplish the ruin of Sweden_, that same
Sweden whose defence and preservation this great and wise monarch of
ours has so solemnly promised, and which he always looked upon to be of
the utmost necessity for to secure the Protestant interest in Europe?"
FOOTNOTE:
[22] The treaty was concluded at the Hague on the 6th and 16th January,
1700, and ratified by William III. on February 5th, 1700.