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SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
* * * * *
_Demy 8vo, pp._ 656, xvi. 10_s._ 6_d._
THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the Crimean War.
By KARL MARX.
Edited by ELEANOR MARX AVELING and EDWARD AVELING.
OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.
"With all Marx's faults and his extravagant abuse of high political
personages, one cannot but admire the man's strength of mind, the
courage of his opinions, and his scorn and contempt for everything
small, petty, and mean. Although many and great changes have taken
place since these papers appeared, they are still valuable not only
for the elucidation of the past, but also for throwing a clearer
light upon the present as also upon the future."--_Westminster
Review._
"All that Marx's hand set itself to do, it did with all its might,
and in this volume, as in the rest of his work, we see the
indefatigable energy, the wonderful grasp of detail, and the keen
and marvellous foresight of a master mind."--_Justice._
"A very masterly analysis of the condition, political, economic and
social, of the Turkish Empire, which is as true to-day as when it
was written."--_Daily Chronicle._
"The letters contain an enormous amount of well-digested
information, and display great critical acumen, amounting in some
cases almost to prevision. The biographical interest of the volume
is also pronounced, for prominent men of that period are dissected
and analysed with a vigour and freedom which are as refreshing to
readers as they would be disconcerting to their subjects were they
alive. A perusal of the book must greatly tend to a clearer
perception of the later Eastern issues, which are now engaging the
attention and testing the diplomatic talents of the ambassadors at
Constantinople."--_Liverpool Post._
LONDON: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED.
* * * * *
SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
BY
KARL MARX
Edited by his Daughter ELEANOR MARX AVELING
[Illustration: Logo]
LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED
PATERNOSTER SQUARE
1899
* * * * *
BUTLER & TANNER,
THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,
FROME, AND LONDON.
* * * * *
PUBLISHER'S PREFACE
In the Preface to "The Eastern Question," by Karl Marx, published in
1897, the Editors, Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, referred to
two series of papers entitled "The Story of the Life of Lord
Palmerston," and "Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century,"
which they promised to publish at an early date.
Mrs. Aveling did not live long enough to see these papers through the
press, but she left them in such a forward state, and we have had so
many inquiries about them since, that we venture to issue them without
Mrs. Aveling's final revision in two shilling pamphlets.
THE PUBLISHERS.
Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century
CHAPTER I
NO. 1. MR. RONDEAU TO HORACE WALPOLE.
"PETERSBURG, _17th August, 1736_.[1]
" ... I heartily wish ... that the Turks could be brought to condescend
to make the first step, for this Court seems resolved to hearken to
nothing till that is done, to mortify the Porte, that has on all
occasions spoken of the Russians with the greatest contempt, which the
Czarina and her present Ministers cannot bear. Instead of being obliged
to Sir Everard Fawkner and Mr. Thalman (the former the British, the
latter the Dutch Ambassador at Constantinople), for informing them of
the good dispositions of the Turks, Count Oestermann will not be
persuaded that the Porte is sincere, and seemed very much surprised that
they had written to them (the Russian Cabinet) without order of the King
and the States-General, or without being desired by the Grand Vizier,
and that their letter had not been concerted with the Emperor's Minister
at Constantinople.... I have shown Count Biron and Count Oestermann the
two letters the Grand Vizier has written to the King, and at the same
time told these gentlemen that as there was in them several hard
reflections on this Court, I should not have communicated them if they
had not been so desirous to see them. Count Biron said that was nothing,
for they were used to be treated in this manner by the Turks. I desired
their Excellencies not to let the Porte know that they had seen these
letters, which would sooner aggravate matters than contribute to make
them up...."
NO. 2. SIR GEORGE MACARTNEY TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH.
"ST. PETERSBURG, _1st (12th) March, 1765_.
"Most Secret.[2]
" ... Yesterday M. Panin[3] and the Vice-Chancellor, together with M.
Osten, the Danish Minister, signed a treaty of alliance between this
Court and that of Copenhagen. By one of the articles, a war with Turkey
is made a _casus foederis_; and whenever that event happens, Denmark
binds herself to pay Russia a subsidy of 500,000 roubles per annum, by
quarterly payments. Denmark also, by a most secret article, promises to
disengage herself from all French connections, demanding only a limited
time to endeavour to obtain the arrears due to her by the Court of
France. At all events, she is immediately to enter into all the views of
Russia in Sweden, and to act entirely, though not openly, with her in
that kingdom. Either I am deceived or M. Gross[4] has misunderstood his
instructions, when he told your lordship that Russia intended to stop
short, and leave all the burden of Sweden upon England. However desirous
this Court may be that we should pay a large proportion of every
pecuniary engagement, yet, I am assured, she will always choose to take
the lead at Stockholm. Her design, her ardent wish, is to make a common
cause with England and Denmark, for the total annihilation of the French
interest there. This certainly cannot be done without a considerable
expense; but Russia, at present, does not seem unreasonable enough to
expect that WE SHOULD PAY THE WHOLE. It has been hinted to me that
L1,500 per annum, on our part, would be sufficient to support our
interest, and absolutely prevent the French from ever getting at
Stockholm again.
"The Swedes, highly sensible of, and very much mortified at, the
dependent situation they have been in for many years, are extremely
jealous of every Power that intermeddles in their affairs, and
particularly so of their neighbours the Russians. This is the reason
assigned to me for this Court's desiring that we and they should act
upon SEPARATE bottoms, still preserving between our respective Ministers
a confidence without reserve. That our first care should be, not to
establish a faction under the name of a Russian or of an English
faction; but, as even the wisest men are imposed upon by a mere name, to
endeavour to have OUR friends distinguished as the friends of liberty
and independence. At present we have a superiority, and the generality
of the nation is persuaded how very ruinous their French connections
have been, and, if continued, how very destructive they will be of their
true interests. M. Panin does by no means desire that the smallest
change should be made in the constitution of Sweden.[5] He wishes that
the royal authority might be preserved without being augmented, and that
the privileges of the people should be continued without violation. He
was not, however, without his fears of the ambitious and intriguing
spirit of the Queen, but the great ministerial vigilance of Count
Oestermann has now entirely quieted his apprehensions on that head.
"By this new alliance with Denmark, and by the success in Sweden, which
this Court has no doubt of, if properly seconded, M. Panin will, in some
measure, have brought to bear his grand scheme of uniting the Powers of
the North.[6] Nothing, then, will be wanted to render it entirely
perfect, but the conclusion of a treaty alliance with Great Britain. I
am persuaded this Court desires it most ardently. The Empress has
expressed herself more than once, in terms that marked it strongly. Her
ambition is to form, by such an union, a certain counterpoise to the
family compact,[7] and to disappoint, as much as possible, all the views
of the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, against which she is irritated
with uncommon resentment. I am not, however, to conceal from your
lordship that we can have no hope of any such alliance, unless we agree,
by some secret article, to pay a subsidy in case of a Turkish war, for
no money will be desired from us, except upon an emergency of that
nature. I flatter myself I have persuaded this Court of the
unreasonableness of expecting any subsidy in time of peace, and that an
alliance upon an equal footing will be more safe and more honourable for
both nations. I can assure your lordship that a Turkish war's being a
_casus foederis_, inserted either in the body of the treaty or in a
secret article, will be a _sine qua non_ in every negotiation we may
have to open with this Court. The obstinacy of M. Panin upon that point
is owing to the accident I am going to mention. When the treaty between
the Emperor and the King of Prussia was in agitation, the Count
Bestoucheff, who is a mortal enemy to the latter, proposed the Turkish
clause, persuaded that the King of Prussia would never submit to it, and
flattering himself with the hopes of blowing up that negotiation by his
refusal. But this old politician, it seemed, was mistaken in his
conjecture, for his Majesty immediately consented to the proposal on
condition that Russia should make no alliance with any other Power but
on the same terms.[8] This is the real fact, and to confirm it, a few
days since, Count Solme, the Prussian Minister, came to visit me, and
told me that if this Court had any intention of concluding an alliance
with ours without such a clause, he had orders to oppose it in the
strongest manner. Hints have been given me that if Great Britain were
less inflexible in that article, Russia will be less inflexible in the
article of export duties in the Treaty of Commerce, which M. Gross told
your lordship this Court would never depart from. I was assured at the
same time, by a person in the highest degree of confidence with M.
Panin, that if we entered upon the Treaty of Alliance the Treaty of
Commerce would go on with it _passibus aequis_; that then the latter
would be entirely taken out of the hands of the College of Trade, where
so many cavils and altercations had been made, and would be settled only
between the Minister and myself, and that he was sure it would be
concluded to our satisfaction, provided the Turkish clause was admitted
into the Treaty of Alliance. I was told, also, that in case the
Spaniards attacked Portugal, we might have 15,000 Russians in our pay to
send upon that service. I must entreat your lordship on no account to
mention to M. Gross the secret article of the Danish Treaty.... That
gentleman, I am afraid, is no well-wisher to England."[9]
NO. 3.--SIR JAMES HARRIS TO LORD GRANTHAM.
"Petersburg, 16 (27 August), 1782.
"(Private.)
" ... On my arrival here I found the Court very different from what it
had been described to me. So far from any partiality to England, its
bearings were entirely French. The King of Prussia (then in possession
of the Empress' ear) was exerting his influence against us. Count Panin
assisted him powerfully; Lacy and Corberon, the Bourbon Ministers, were
artful and intriguing; Prince Potemkin had been wrought upon by them;
and the whole tribe which surrounded the Empress--the Schuwaloffs,
Stroganoffs, and Chernicheffs--were what they still are, _garcons
perruquiers de Paris_. Events seconded their endeavours. The assistance
the French affected to afford Russia in settling its disputes with the
Porte, and the two Courts being immediately after united as mediators at
the Peace of Teschen, contributed not a little to reconcile them to each
other. I was, therefore, not surprised that all my negotiations with
Count Panin, _from February, 1778, to July, 1779_, should be
unsuccessful, as he meant to prevent, not to promote, an alliance. It
was in vain we made concessions to obtain it. He ever started fresh
difficulties; had ever fresh obstacles ready. A very serious evil
resulted, in the meanwhile, from my apparent confidence in him. He
availed himself of it to convey in his reports to the Empress, not the
language I employed, and the sentiments I actually expressed, but the
language and sentiments he wished I should employ and express. He was
equally careful to conceal her opinions and feelings from me; and while
he described England to her as obstinate, and overbearing, and reserved,
he described the Empress to me as displeased, disgusted, and indifferent
to our concerns; and he was so convinced that, by this double
misrepresentation, he had shut up every avenue of success that, at the
time when I presented to him the Spanish declaration, he ventured to say
to me, ministerially, '_That Great Britain had, by its own haughty
conduct, brought down all its misfortunes on itself; that they were now
at their height; that we must consent to any concession to obtain peace;
and that we could expect neither assistance from our friends nor
forbearance from our enemies._' I had temper enough not to give way to
my feelings on this occasion.... I applied, without loss of time, to
Prince Potemkin, and, by his means, the Empress _condescended_ to see me
alone at Peterhoff. I was so fortunate in this interview, as not only to
efface all bad impressions she had against us, but by stating in its
true light, our situation, and THE INSEPARABLE INTERESTS OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, to raise in her mind a decided resolution to assist
us. _This resolution she declared to me in express words._ When this
transpired--and Count Panin was the first who knew it--he became my
implacable and inveterate enemy. He not only thwarted by falsehoods and
by a most undue exertion of his influence my public negotiations, but
employed every means the lowest and most vindictive malice could suggest
to depreciate and injure me personally; and from the very infamous
accusations with which he charged me, had I been prone to fear, I might
have apprehended the most infamous attacks at his hands. This relentless
persecution still continues; it has outlived his Ministry.
_Notwithstanding the positive assurances I had received from the Empress
herself_, he found means, first to stagger, and afterwards to alter her
resolutions. He was, indeed, very officiously assisted by his Prussian
Majesty, who, at the time, was as much bent on oversetting our interest
as he now seems eager to restore it. I was not, however, disheartened by
this first disappointment, and, by redoubling my efforts, _I have twice
more, during the course of my mission, brought the Empress to the verge_
(!) _of standing forth our professed friend_, and, each time, my
_expectations were grounded on assurances from her own mouth_. The first
was when _our enemies conjured up the armed_ neutrality;[10] the other
WHEN MINORCA WAS OFFERED HER. Although, on the first of these occasions,
I found the same opposition from the same quarter I had experienced
before, yet I am compelled to say that the principal cause of my failure
was attributable to the very awkward manner in which we replied to the
famous neutral declaration of February, 1780. As I well knew from what
quarter the blow would come, I was prepared to parry it. _My opinion
was: 'If England feels itself strong enough to do without Russia, let it
reject at once these new-fangled doctrines; but if its situation is such
as to want assistance, let it yield to the necessity of the hour,
recognise them as far as they relate to_ RUSSIA ALONE, _and by a
well-timed act of complaisance insure itself a powerful friend._'[11] My
opinion was _not_ received; an ambiguous and trimming answer was given;
_we seemed equally afraid to accept or dismiss them. I was instructed
secretly to oppose, but avowedly to acquiesce in them_, and some
unguarded expressions of one of its then confidential servants, made use
of in speaking to Mr. Simolin, in direct contradiction to the temperate
and cordial language that Minister had heard from Lord Stormont,
_irritated_ the Empress to the last degree, and completed the _dislike_
and _bad opinion_ she entertained of that Administration.[12] Our
enemies took advantage of these _circumstances_.... I SUGGESTED THE IDEA
OF GIVING UP MINORCA TO THE EMPRESS, _because, as it was evident to me
we should at the peace be compelled to make sacrifices, it seemed to me
wiser to make them to our friends than to our enemies_. THE IDEA WAS
ADOPTED AT HOME IN ITS WHOLE EXTENT,[13] _and nothing could be more
perfectly calculated to the meridian of this Court than the judicious
instructions I received on this occasion from Lord Stormont. Why_ this
project failed I am still at a loss to learn. _I never knew the Empress
incline so strongly to any one measure as she did to this, before I had
my full powers to treat, nor was I ever more astonished than when I
found her shrink from her purpose when they arrived._ I imputed it at
the same time, in my own mind, to the _rooted aversion she had for our
Ministry_, and her _total want of confidence in them_; but I since am
more strongly disposed to believe that she consulted the Emperor (of
Austria) on the subject, and that he not only prevailed on her to
decline the offer, but betrayed the secret to France, and that it thus
became public. I cannot otherwise account for this rapid _change of
sentiment in the Empress_, particularly as _Prince Potemkin_ (whatever
he might be in other transactions) was certainly in this _cordial and
sincere_ in his support, and both from what I saw at the time, and from
what has since come to my knowledge, _had its success at heart as much
as myself_. You will observe, my lord, that _the idea of bringing the
Empress forward as a friendly mediatrix went hand-in-hand with the
proposed cession of Minorca_. As this idea has given rise to what has
since followed, and involved us in all the dilemmas of the present
mediation, it will be necessary for me to explain what my views then
were, and to exculpate myself from the blame of having placed my Court
in so embarrassing a situation, _my wish and intention was that she
should be sole mediatrix without an adjoint_; if you have perused what
passed between her and me, in December, 1780, your lordship will readily
perceive how very potent reasons I had to imagine she would be a
friendly and even a partial one.[14] I knew, indeed, she was unequal to
the task; but I knew, too, how greatly _her vanity_ would be flattered
by this distinction, and was well aware that when once engaged she would
persist, and be inevitably involved in our quarrel, particularly when it
should appear (and appear it would) that we had _gratified_ her with
Minorca. The annexing to the mediation the other (Austrian) Imperial
Court entirely overthrew this plan. It not only afforded her a pretence
for not keeping her word, but piqued and mortified her; and it was under
this impression that she made over the whole business to the colleague
we had given her, and ordered her Minister at Vienna to subscribe
implicitly to whatever the Court proposed. Hence all the evils which
have since arisen, and hence those we at this moment experience. I
myself could never be brought to believe that the Court of Vienna, as
long as Prince Kaunitz directs its measures, can mean England any good
or France any harm. It was not with that view that I endeavoured to
promote its influence here, but because _I found that of Prussia in
constant opposition to me_; and because I thought that if I could by any
means smite this, I should get rid of my greatest obstacle. I was
mistaken, and, by a singular fatality, the Courts of Vienna and Berlin
seem never to have agreed in anything but in the disposition to
prejudice us here by turns.[15] The proposal relative to Minorca was the
last attempt I made to induce the Empress to stand forth. I had
exhausted my strength and resources; the freedom with which I had spoken
in my last interview with her, though respectful, had _displeased_; and
_from this period to the removal of the late Administration_, I have
been reduced to act on the defensive.... I have had more difficulty in
preventing the Empress from doing harm than I ever had in attempting to
engage her to do us good. It was to prevent evil, that I inclined
strongly for the acceptation of _her single mediation between us and
Holland, when her Imperial Majesty first offered it_. The _extreme
dissatisfaction_ she expressed _at our refusal_ justified my opinion;
and I TOOK UPON ME, when it was proposed a second time, _to urge the
necessity of its being agreed to_ (ALTHOUGH I KNEW IT TO BE IN
CONTRADICTION OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MY PRINCIPAL), since I firmly
believed, had we again declined it, the Empress would, in a _moment of
anger_, have joined the Dutch against us. As it is, _all has gone on
well_; our _judicious_ conduct has transferred to them the _ill-humour_
she originally was in with us, and she now is as partial to our cause as
she was before partial to theirs. _Since the new Ministry in England, my
road has been made smoother_; the great and new path struck out by _your
predecessor,[16] and which you, my lord, pursue_, has operated a most
advantageous change in our favour upon the Continent. Nothing, indeed,
but events which come home to her, will, I believe, ever induce her
Imperial Majesty to take an active part; but there is now a _strong glow
of friendship_ in our favour; she approves our measures; she _trusts_
our Ministry, and _she gives way to that predilection she certainly has
for our nation_. Our enemies know and feel this; it keeps them in awe.
This is a succinct but accurate sketch of what has passed at this Court
from the day of my arrival at Petersburg to the present hour. Several
inferences may be deduced from it.[17] That the Empress is led by her
passions, not by reason and argument; that her prejudices are very
strong, easily acquired, and, when once fixed, irremovable; while, on
the contrary, there is no sure road to her good opinion; that even when
obtained, it is subject to perpetual fluctuation, and liable to be
biassed by the most trifling incidents; that till she is fairly embarked
in a plan, no assurances can be depended on; but that when once fairly
embarked, she never retracts, and may be carried any length; that with
very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon sagacity, she wants
_judgment_, _precision of idea_, _reflection_, _and_ L'ESPRIT DE
COMBINAISON(!!) That her Ministers are either ignorant of, or
indifferent to, the welfare of the State, and act from a passive
submission to her will, or from motives of party and private
interests."[18]
4. (MANUSCRIPT) ACCOUNT OF RUSSIA DURING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE REIGN
OF THE EMPEROR PAUL, DRAWN UP BY THE REV. L. K. PITT, CHAPLAIN TO THE
FACTORY OF ST. PETERSBURG, AND A NEAR RELATIVE OF WILLIAM PITT.[19]
_Extract._
"There can scarcely exist a doubt concerning the real sentiments of
the late Empress of Russia on the great points which have, within
the last few years, convulsed the whole system of European
politics. She certainly felt from the beginning the fatal tendency
of the new principles, but was not, perhaps, displeased to see
every European Power exhausting itself in a struggle which raised,
in proportion to its violence, her own importance. It is more than
probable that the state of the newly acquired provinces in Poland
was likewise a point which had considerable influence over the
political conduct of Catherine. The fatal effects resulting from an
apprehension of revolt in the late seat of conquest seem to have
been felt in a very great degree by the combined Powers, who in the
early period of the Revolution were so near reinstating the regular
Government in France. The same dread of revolt in Poland, which
divided the attention of the combined Powers and hastened their
retreat, deterred likewise the late Empress of Russia from entering
on the great theatre of war, until a combination of circumstances
rendered the progress of the French armies a more dangerous evil
than any which could possibly result to the Russian Empire from
active operations.... The last words which the Empress was known to
utter were addressed to her Secretary when she dismissed him on the
morning on which she was seized: 'Tell Prince' (Zuboff), she said,
'to come to me at twelve, and to remind me of signing the Treaty of
Alliance with England.'"
Having entered into ample considerations on the Emperor Paul's acts and
extravagances, the Rev. Mr. Pitt continues as follows:
"When these considerations are impressed on the mind, the nature of
the late secession from the coalition, and of the incalculable
indignities offered to the Government of Great Britain, can alone
be fairly estimated.... BUT THE TIES WHICH BIND HER (GREAT BRITAIN)
TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE ARE FORMED BY NATURE, AND INVIOLABLE. United,
these nations might almost brave the united world; divided, the
strength and importance of each is FUNDAMENTALLY impaired. England
has reason to regret with Russia that the imperial sceptre should
be thus inconsistently wielded, but it is the sovereign of Russia
alone who divides the Empires."
The reverend gentleman concludes his account by the words:
"As far as human foresight can at this moment penetrate, the
despair of an enraged individual seems a more probable means to
terminate the present scene of oppression than any more systematic
combination of measures to restore the throne of Russia to its
dignity and importance."
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This letter relates to the war against Turkey, commenced by the
Empress Ann in 1735. The British diplomatist at St. Petersburg is
reporting about his endeavours to induce Russia to conclude peace with
the Turks. The passages omitted are irrelevant.
[2] England was at that time negotiating a commercial treaty with
Russia.
[3] To this time it has remained among historians a point of
controversy, whether or not Panin was in the pay of Frederick II. of
Prussia, and whether he was so behind the back of Catherine, or at her
bidding. There can exist no doubt that Catherine II., in order to
identify foreign Courts with Russian Ministers, allowed Russian
Ministers ostensibly to identify themselves with foreign Courts. As to
Panin in particular, the question is, however, decided by an authentic
document which we believe has never been published. It proves that,
having once become the man of Frederick II., he was forced to remain so
at the risk of his honour, fortune and life.
[4] The Russian Minister at London.
[5] The oligarchic Constitution set up by the Senate after the death of
Charles XII.
[6] Thus we learn from Sir George Macartney that what is commonly known
as Lord Chatham's "grand conception of the Northern Alliance," was, in
fact, Panin's "grand scheme of uniting the Powers of the North." Chatham
was duped into fathering the Muscovite plan.
[7] The compact between the Bourbons of France and Spain concluded at
Paris on August, 1761.
[8] This was a subterfuge on the part of Frederick II. The manner in
which Frederick was forced into the arms of the Russian Alliance is
plainly told by M. Koch, the French professor of diplomacy and teacher
of Talleyrand. "Frederick II.," he says, "having been abandoned by the
Cabinet of London, could not but attach himself to Russia." (See his
_History of the Revolutions in Europe_.)
[9] Horace Walpole characterises his epoch by the words--"_It was the
mode of the times to be paid by one favour for receiving another._" At
all events, it will be seen from the text that such was the mode of
Russia in transacting business with England. The Earl of Sandwich, to
whom Sir George Macartney could dare to address the above despatch,
distinguished himself, ten years later, in 1775, as First Lord of the
Admiralty, in the North Administration, by the vehement opposition he
made to Lord Chatham's motion for an equitable _adjustment of the
American difficulties_. "He could not believe it (Chatham's motion) _the
production of a British peer_; it appeared to him rather _the work of
some American_." In 1777, we find Sandwich again blustering: "he would
hazard every drop of blood, as well as the last shilling of the national
treasure, rather than allow Great Britain to be defied, bullied, and
dictated to, by her disobedient and rebellious subjects." Foremost as
the Earl of Sandwich was in entangling England in war with her North
American colonies, with France, Spain, and Holland, we behold him
constantly accused in Parliament by Fox, Burke, Pitt, etc., "of keeping
the naval force inadequate to the defence of the country; of
intentionally opposing small English forces where he knew the enemy to
have concentrated large ones; of utter mismanagement of the service in
all its departments," etc. (See debates of the House of Commons of 11th
March, 1778; 31st March, 1778; February, 1779; Fox's motion of censure
on Lord Sandwich; 9th April, 1779, address to the King for the dismissal
of Lord Sandwich from his service, on account of misconduct in service;
7th February, 1782, Fox's motion that there had been gross mismanagement
in the administration of naval affairs during the year 1781.) On this
occasion Pitt imputed to Lord Sandwich "all our naval disasters and
disgraces." The ministerial majority against the motion amounted to only
22 in a House of 388. On the 22nd February, 1782, a similar motion
against Lord Sandwich was only negatived by a majority of 19 in a House
of 453. Such, indeed, was the character of the Earl of Sandwich's
Administration that more than thirty distinguished officers quitted the
naval service, or declared they could not act under the existing system.
In point of fact, during his whole tenure of office, serious
apprehensions were entertained of the consequences of the dissensions
then prevalent in the navy. Besides, the Earl of Sandwich was openly
accused, and, as far as circumstantial evidence goes, convicted of
PECULATION. (See debates of the House of Lords, 31st March, 1778; 9th
April, 1779, and _seq._) When the motion for his removal from office was
negatived on April 9th 1779, thirty-nine peers entered their protest.
[10] Sir James Harris affects to believe that Catherine II. was not the
author of, but a convert to, the armed neutrality of 1780. It is one of
the grand stratagems of the Court of St. Petersburg to give to its own
schemes the form of proposals suggested to and pressed on itself by
foreign Courts. Russian diplomacy delights in those _quae pro quo_. Thus
the Court of Florida Bianca was made the responsible editor of the armed
neutrality, and, from a report that vain-glorious Spaniard addressed to
Carlos III., one may see how immensely he felt flattered at the idea of
having not only hatched the armed neutrality but allured Russia into
abetting it.
[11] This same Sir James Harris, perhaps more familiar to the reader
under the name of the Earl of Malmesbury, is extolled by English
historians as the man who prevented England from surrendering the right
of search in the Peace Negotiations of 1782-83.
[12] It might be inferred from this passage and similar ones occurring
in the text, that Catherine II. had caught a real Tartar in Lord North,
whose Administration Sir James Harris is pointing at. Any such delusion
will disappear before the simple statement that the first partition of
Poland took place under Lord North's Administration, without any protest
on his part. In 1773 Catherine's war against Turkey still continuing,
and her conflicts with Sweden growing serious, France made preparations
to send a powerful fleet into the Baltic. D'Aiguillon, the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, communicated this plan to Lord Stormont,
the then English Ambassador at Paris. In a long conversation,
D'Aiguillon dwelt largely on the ambitious designs of Russia, and the
common interest that ought to blend France and England into a joint
resistance against them. In answer to this confidential communication,
he was informed by the English Ambassador that, "if France sent her
ships into the Baltic, they would instantly be followed by a British
fleet; that the presence of two fleets would have no more effect than a
neutrality; and however the British Court might desire to preserve the
harmony now subsisting between England and France, it was impossible to
foresee the contingencies that might arise from accidental collision."
In consequence of these representations, D'Aiguillon countermanded the
squadron at Brest, but gave new orders for the equipment of an armament
at Toulon. "On receiving intelligence of these renewed preparations, the
British Cabinet made instant and vigorous demonstrations of resistance;
Lord Stormont was ordered to declare that every argument used respecting
the Baltic applied equally to the Mediterranean. A memorial also was
presented to the French Minister, accompanied by a demand that it should
be laid before the King and Council. This produced the desired effect;
the armament was countermanded, the sailors disbanded, and the chances
of an extensive warfare avoided."
"_Lord North_," says the complacent writer from whom we have borrowed
the last lines, "_thus effectually served the cause of his ally_
(Catherine II.), _and facilitated the treaty of peace_ (of
Kutchuk-Kainardji) _between Russia and the Porte_." Catherine II.
rewarded Lord North's good services, first by withholding the aid she
had promised him in case of a war between England and the North American
Colonies, and in the second place, by conjuring up and leading the armed
neutrality against England. Lord North DARED NOT _repay, as he was
advised by Sir James Harris_, this treacherous breach of faith by giving
up to Russia, and to _Russia alone_, the maritime rights of Great
Britain. Hence the irritation in the nervous system of the Czarina; the
hysterical fancy she caught all at once of "entertaining a bad opinion"
of Lord North, of "disliking" him, of feeling a "rooted aversion"
against him, of being afflicted with "a total want of confidence," etc.
In order to give the Shelburne Administration a warning example, Sir
James Harris draws up a minute psychological picture of the feelings of
the Czarina, and the disgrace incurred by the North Administration, for
having wounded these same feelings. His prescription is very simple:
surrender to Russia, as our friend, everything for asking which we would
consider every other Power our enemy.
[13] It is then a fact that the English Government, not satisfied with
having made Russia a Baltic power, strove hard to make her a
Mediterranean power too. The offer of the surrender of Minorca appears
to have been made to Catherine II. at the end of 1779, or the beginning
of 1780, shortly after Lord Stormont's entrance into the North
Cabinet--the same Lord Stormont we have seen thwarting the French
attempts at resistance against Russia, and whom even Sir James Harris
cannot deny the merit of having written "_instructions perfectly
calculated to the meridian of the Court of St. Petersburg_." While Lord
North's Cabinet, at the suggestion of Sir James Harris, offered Minorca
to the _Muscovites_, the English Commoners and people were still
trembling for fear lest the _Hanoverians_ (?) should wrest out of their
hands "one of the keys of the Mediterranean." On the 26th of October,
1775, the King, in his opening speech, had informed Parliament, amongst
other things, that he had Sir James Graham's own words, when asked why
they should not have kept up some blockade pending the settlement of the
"plan," "_They did not take that responsibility upon themselves._" The
responsibility of executing their orders! The despatch we have quoted is
the only despatch read, except one of a later date. The despatch, said
to be sent on the 5th of April, in which "the Admiral is ordered to use
the _largest discretionary power_ in blockading the Russian ports in the
Black Sea," is not read, nor any replies from Admiral Dundas. The
Admiralty sent _Hanoverian_ troops to Gibraltar and Port Mahon
(Minorca), to replace such British regiments as should be drawn from
those garrisons for service in America. An amendment to the address was
proposed by Lord John Cavendish, strongly condemning "the confiding
_such important fortresses as Gibraltar and Port Mahon to foreigners_."
After very stormy debates, in which the measure of entrusting Gibraltar
and Minorca, "_the keys of the Mediterranean_," as they were called, to
_foreigners_, was furiously attacked; Lord North, acknowledging himself
the adviser of the measure, felt obliged to bring in a _bill of
indemnity_. However, these foreigners, these Hanoverians, were the
English King's own subjects. Having virtually surrendered Minorca to
Russia in 1780, Lord North was, of course, quite justified in treating,
on November 22, 1781, in the House of Commons, "with utter scorn the
insinuation that _Ministers were in the pay of France_."
Let us remark, _en passant_, that Lord North, one of the most base and
mischievous Ministers England can boast of, perfectly mastered the art
of keeping the House in perpetual laughter. So had Lord Sunderland. So
has Lord Palmerston.
[14] Lord North having been supplanted by the Rockingham Administration,
on March 27, 1782, the celebrated Fox forwarded peace proposals to
Holland through the mediation of the _Russian_ Minister. Now what were
the consequences of the _Russian mediation_ so much vaunted by this Sir
James Harris, the servile account keeper of the Czarina's sentiments,
humours, and feelings? While preliminary articles of peace had been
convened with France, Spain, and the American States, it was found
impossible to arrive at any such preliminary agreement with Holland.
Nothing but a simple cessation of hostilities was to be obtained from
it. So powerful proved the _Russian mediation_, that on the 2nd
September, 1783, just one day before the conclusion of _definitive
treaties_ with America, France, and Spain, Holland condescended to
accede to _preliminaries of peace_, and this not in consequence of the
_Russian mediation_, but through the influence of _France_.
[15] How much was England not prejudiced by the Courts of Vienna and
Paris thwarting the plan of the British Cabinet of ceding Minorca to
Russia, and by Frederick of Prussia's resistance against the great
Chatham's scheme of a Northern Alliance under Muscovite auspices.
[16] The predecessor is Fox. Sir James Harris establishes a complete
scale of British Administrations, according to the degree in which they
enjoyed the favour of his almighty Czarina. In spite of Lord Stormont,
the Earl of Sandwich, Lord North, and Sir James Harris himself; in spite
of the partition of Poland, the bullying of D'Aiguillon, the treaty of
Kutchuk-Kainardji, and the intended cession of Minorca--Lord North's
Administration is relegated to the bottom of the heavenly ladder; far
above it has climbed the Rockingham Administration, whose soul was Fox,
notorious for his subsequent intrigues with Catherine; but at the top we
behold the Shelburne Administration, whose Chancellor of the Exchequer
was the celebrated William Pitt. As to Lord Shelburne himself, Burke
exclaimed in the House of Commons, that "if he was not a Catalina or
Borgia in morals, it must not be ascribed to anything but his
understanding."
[17] Sir James Harris forgets deducing the main inference, that the
Ambassador of England is the agent of Russia.
[18] In the 18th century, English diplomatists' despatches, bearing on
their front the sacramental inscription, "Private," are despatches to be
withheld from the King by the Minister to whom they are addressed. That
such was the case may be seen from Lord Mahon's _History of England_.
[19] "To be burnt after my death." Such are the words prefixed to the
manuscript by the gentleman whom it was addressed to.