WASHINGTON, _September 4, 1837_.
_Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives_:
The act of the 23d of June, 1836, regulating the deposits of the public
money and directing the employment of State, District, and Territorial
banks for that purpose, made it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to discontinue the use of such of them as should at any time refuse to
redeem their notes in specie, and to substitute other banks, provided a
sufficient number could be obtained to receive the public deposits upon
the terms and conditions therein prescribed. The general and almost
simultaneous suspension of specie payments by the banks in May last
rendered the performance of this duty imperative in respect to those
which had been selected under the act, and made it at the same time
impracticable to employ the requisite number of others upon the
prescribed conditions. The specific regulations established by Congress
for the deposit and safe-keeping of the public moneys having thus
unexpectedly become inoperative, I felt it to be my duty to afford you
an early opportunity for the exercise of your supervisory powers over
the subject.
I was also led to apprehend that the suspension of specie payments,
increasing the embarrassments before existing in the pecuniary affairs
of the country, would so far diminish the public revenue that the
accruing receipts into the Treasury would not, with the reserved five
millions, be sufficient to defray the unavoidable expenses of the
Government until the usual period for the meeting of Congress, whilst
the authority to call upon the States for a portion of the sums
deposited with them was too restricted to enable the Department to
realize a sufficient amount from that source. These apprehensions have
been justified by subsequent results, which render it certain that this
deficiency will occur if additional means be not provided by Congress.
The difficulties experienced by the mercantile interest in meeting
their engagements induced them to apply to me previously to the actual
suspension of specie payments for indulgence upon their bonds for
duties, and all the relief authorized by law was promptly and cheerfully
granted. The dependence of the Treasury upon the avails of these bonds
to enable it to make the deposits with the States required by law led me
in the outset to limit this indulgence to the 1st of September, but it
has since been extended to the 1st of October, that the matter might be
submitted to your further direction.
Questions were also expected to arise in the recess in respect to the
October installment of those deposits requiring the interposition of
Congress.
A provision of another act, passed about the same time, and intended to
secure a faithful compliance with the obligation of the United States to
satisfy all demands upon them in specie or its equivalent, prohibited
the offer of any bank note not convertible on the spot into gold or
silver at the will of the holder; and the ability of the Government,
with millions on deposit, to meet its engagements in the manner thus
required by law was rendered very doubtful by the event to which I have
referred.
Sensible that adequate provisions for these unexpected exigencies
could only be made by Congress; convinced that some of them would be
indispensably necessary to the public service before the regular period
of your meeting, and desirous also to enable you to exercise at the
earliest moment your full constitutional powers for the relief of
the country, I could not with propriety avoid subjecting you to the
inconvenience of assembling at as early a day as the state of the
popular representation would permit. I am sure that I have done but
justice to your feelings in believing that this inconvenience will be
cheerfully encountered in the hope of rendering your meeting conducive
to the good of the country.
During the earlier stages of the revulsion through which we have just
passed much acrimonious discussion arose and great diversity of opinion
existed as to its real causes. This was not surprising. The operations
of credit are so diversified and the influences which affect them so
numerous, and often so subtle, that even impartial and well-informed
persons are seldom found to agree in respect to them. To inherent
difficulties were also added other tendencies which were by no means
favorable to the discovery of truth. It was hardly to be expected that
those who disapproved the policy of the Government in relation to the
currency would, in the excited state of public feeling produced by the
occasion, fail to attribute to that policy any extensive embarrassment
in the monetary affairs of the country. The matter thus became connected
with the passions and conflicts of party; opinions were more or less
affected by political considerations, and differences were prolonged
which might otherwise have been determined by an appeal to facts, by the
exercise of reason, or by mutual concession. It is, however, a cheering
reflection that circumstances of this nature can not prevent a community
so intelligent as ours from ultimately arriving at correct conclusions.
Encouraged by the firm belief of this truth, I proceed to state my
views, so far as may be necessary to a clear understanding of the
remedies I feel it my duty to propose and of the reasons by which I have
been led to recommend them.
The history of trade in the United States for the last three or four
years affords the most convincing evidence that our present condition
is chiefly to be attributed to overaction in all the departments of
business--an over-action deriving, perhaps, its first impulses from
antecedent causes, but stimulated to its destructive consequences
by excessive issues of bank paper and by other facilities for the
acquisition and enlargement of credit. At the commencement of the year
1834 the banking capital of the United States, including that of the
national bank, then existing, amounted to about $200,000,000, the bank
notes then in circulation to about ninety-five millions, and the loans
and discounts of the banks to three hundred and twenty-four millions.
Between that time and the 1st of January, 1836, being the latest period
to which accurate accounts have been received, our banking capital was
increased to more than two hundred and fifty-one millions, our paper
circulation to more than one hundred and forty millions, and the loans
and discounts to more than four hundred and fifty-seven millions.
To this vast increase are to be added the many millions of credit
acquired by means of foreign loans, contracted by the States and State
institutions, and, above all, by the lavish accommodations extended
by foreign dealers to our merchants.
The consequences of this redundancy of credit and of the spirit of
reckless speculation engendered by it were a foreign debt contracted
by our citizens estimated in March last at more than $30,000,000; the
extension to traders in the interior of our country of credits for
supplies greatly beyond the wants of the people; the investment of
$39,500,000 in unproductive public lands in the years 1835 and 1836,
whilst in the preceding year the sales amounted to only four and a
half millions; the creation of debts, to an almost countless amount,
for real estate in existing or anticipated cities and villages,
equally unproductive, and at prices now seen to have been greatly
disproportionate to their real value; the expenditure of immense sums
in improvements which in many cases have been found to be ruinously
improvident; the diversion to other pursuits of much of the labor that
should have been applied to agriculture, thereby contributing to the
expenditure of large sums in the importation of grain from Europe--an
expenditure which, amounting in 1834 to about $250,000, was in the first
two quarters of the present year increased to more than $2,000,000; and
finally, without enumerating other injurious results, the rapid growth
among all classes, and especially in our great commercial towns, of
luxurious habits founded too often on merely fancied wealth, and
detrimental alike to the industry, the resources, and the morals of
our people.
It was so impossible that such a state of things could long continue
that the prospect of revulsion was present to the minds of considerate
men before it actually came. None, however, had correctly anticipated
its severity. A concurrence of circumstances inadequate of themselves to
produce such widespread and calamitous embarrassments tended so greatly
to aggravate them that they can not be overlooked in considering their
history. Among these may be mentioned, as most prominent, the great loss
of capital sustained by our commercial emporium in the fire of December,
1835--a loss the effects of which were underrated at the time because
postponed for a season by the great facilities of credit then existing;
the disturbing effects in our commercial cities of the transfers of
the public moneys required by the deposit law of June, 1836, and the
measures adopted by the foreign creditors of our merchants to reduce
their debts and to withdraw from the United States a large portion of
our specie.
However unwilling any of our citizens may heretofore have been to assign
to these causes the chief instrumentality in producing the present state
of things, the developments subsequently made and the actual condition
of other commercial countries must, as it seems to me, dispel all
remaining doubts upon the subject. It has since appeared that evils
similar to those suffered by ourselves have been experienced in Great
Britain, on the Continent, and, indeed, throughout the commercial world,
and that in other countries as well as in our own they have been
uniformly preceded by an undue enlargement of the boundaries of trade,
prompted, as with us, by unprecedented expansions of the systems of
credit. A reference to the amount of banking capital and the issues of
paper credits put in circulation in Great Britain, by banks and in other
ways, during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836 will show an augmentation
of the paper currency there as much disproportioned to the real wants
of trade as in the United States. With this redundancy of the paper
currency there arose in that country also a spirit of adventurous
speculation embracing the whole range of human enterprise. Aid was
profusely given to projected improvements; large investments were
made in foreign stocks and loans; credits for goods were granted with
unbounded liberality to merchants in foreign countries, and all the
means of acquiring and employing credit were put in active operation and
extended in their effects to every department of business and to every
quarter of the globe. The reaction was proportioned in its violence
to the extraordinary character of the events which preceded it. The
commercial community of Great Britain were subjected to the greatest
difficulties, and their debtors in this country were not only suddenly
deprived of accustomed and expected credits, but called upon for
payments which in the actual posture of things here could only be made
through a general pressure and at the most ruinous sacrifices.
In view of these facts it would seem impossible for sincere inquirers
after truth to resist the conviction that the causes of the revulsion
in both countries have been substantially the same. Two nations, the
most commercial in the world, enjoying but recently the highest degree
of apparent prosperity and maintaining with each other the closest
relations, are suddenly, in a time of profound peace and without any
great national disaster, arrested in their career and plunged into a
state of embarrassment and distress. In both countries we have witnessed
the same redundancy of paper money and other facilities of credit;
the same spirit of speculation; the same partial successes; the same
difficulties and reverses, and at length nearly the same overwhelming
catastrophe. The most material difference between the results in the
two countries has only been that with us there has also occurred an
extensive derangement in the fiscal affairs of the Federal and State
Governments, occasioned by the suspension of specie payments by the
banks.
The history of these causes and effects in Great Britain and the United
States is substantially the history of the revulsion in all other
commercial countries.
The present and visible effects of these circumstances on the operations
of the Government and on the industry of the people point out the
objects which call for your immediate attention.
They are, to regulate by law the safe-keeping, transfer, and
disbursement of the public moneys; to designate the funds to be received
and paid by the Government; to enable the Treasury to meet promptly
every demand upon it; to prescribe the terms of indulgence and the mode
of settlement to be adopted, as well in collecting from individuals the
revenue that has accrued as in withdrawing it from former depositories;
and to devise and adopt such further measures, within the constitutional
competency of Congress, as will be best calculated to revive the
enterprise and to promote the prosperity of the country.
For the deposit, transfer, and disbursement of the revenue national and
State banks have always, with temporary and limited exceptions, been
heretofore employed; but although advocates of each system are still to
be found, it is apparent that the events of the last few months have
greatly augmented the desire, long existing among the people of the
United States, to separate the fiscal operations of the Government from
those of individuals or corporations.
Again to create a national bank as a fiscal agent would be to
disregard the popular will, twice solemnly and unequivocally expressed.
On no question of domestic policy is there stronger evidence that the
sentiments of a large majority are deliberately fixed, and I can not
concur with those who think they see in recent events a proof that these
sentiments are, or a reason that they should be, changed.
Events similar in their origin and character have heretofore frequently
occurred without producing any such change, and the lessons of
experience must be forgotten if we suppose that the present overthrow of
credit would have been prevented by the existence of a national bank.
Proneness to excessive issues has ever been the vice of the banking
system--a vice as prominent in national as in State institutions. This
propensity is as subservient to the advancement of private interests
in the one as in the other, and those who direct them both, being
principally guided by the same views and influenced by the same motives,
will be equally ready to stimulate extravagance of enterprise by
improvidence of credit. How strikingly is this conclusion sustained
by experience! The Bank of the United States, with the vast powers
conferred on it by Congress, did not or could not prevent former and
similar embarrassments, nor has the still greater strength it has been
said to possess under its present charter enabled it in the existing
emergency to check other institutions or even to save itself. In Great
Britain, where it has been seen the same causes have been attended with
the same effects, a national bank possessing powers far greater than are
asked for by the warmest advocates of such an institution here has also
proved unable to prevent an undue expansion of credit and the evils that
flow from it. Nor can I find any tenable ground for the reestablishment
of a national bank in the derangement alleged at present to exist in the
domestic exchanges of the country or in the facilities it may be capable
of affording them. Although advantages of this sort were anticipated
when the first Bank of the United States was created, they were regarded
as an incidental accommodation, not one which the Federal Government was
bound or could be called upon to furnish. This accommodation is now,
indeed, after the lapse of not many years, demanded from it as among its
first duties, and an omission to aid and regulate commercial exchange
is treated as a ground of loud and serious complaint. Such results only
serve to exemplify the constant desire among some of our citizens to
enlarge the powers of the Government and extend its control to subjects
with which it should not interfere. They can never justify the creation
of an institution to promote such objects. On the contrary, they justly
excite among the community a more diligent inquiry into the character
of those operations of trade toward which it is desired to extend such
peculiar favors.
The various transactions which bear the name of domestic exchanges
differ essentially in their nature, operation, and utility. One class of
them consists of bills of exchange drawn for the purpose of transferring
actual capital from one part of the country to another, or to anticipate
the proceeds of property actually transmitted. Bills of this description
are highly useful in the movements of trade and well deserve all the
encouragement which can rightfully be given to them. Another class is
made up of bills of exchange not drawn to transfer actual capital nor
on the credit of property transmitted, but to create fictitious capital,
partaking at once of the character of notes discounted in bank and of
bank notes in circulation, and swelling the mass of paper credits to a
vast extent in the most objectionable manner. These bills have formed
for the last few years a large proportion of what are termed the
domestic exchanges of the country, serving as the means of usurious
profit and constituting the most unsafe and precarious paper in
circulation. This species of traffic, instead of being upheld, ought
to be discountenanced by the Government and the people.
In transferring its funds from place to place the Government is on the
same footing with the private citizen and may resort to the same legal
means. It may do so through the medium of bills drawn by itself or
purchased from others; and in these operations it may, in a manner
undoubtedly constitutional and legitimate, facilitate and assist
exchanges of individuals founded on real transactions of trade. The
extent to which this may be done and the best means of effecting it
are entitled to the fullest consideration. This has been bestowed by
the Secretary of the Treasury, and his views will be submitted to you
in his report.
But it was not designed by the Constitution that the Government should
assume the management of domestic or foreign exchange. It is indeed
authorized to regulate by law the commerce between the States and to
provide a general standard of value or medium of exchange in gold and
silver, but it is not its province to aid individuals in the transfer
of their funds otherwise than through the facilities afforded by the
Post-Office Department. As justly might it be called on to provide for
the transportation of their merchandise. These are operations of trade.
They ought to be conducted by those who are interested in them in the
same manner that the incidental difficulties of other pursuits are
encountered by other classes of citizens. Such aid has not been deemed
necessary in other countries. Throughout Europe the domestic as well as
the foreign exchanges are carried on by private houses, often, if not
generally, without the assistance of banks; yet they extend throughout
distinct sovereignties, and far exceed in amount the real exchanges of
the United States. There is no reason why our own may not be conducted
in the same manner with equal cheapness and safety. Certainly this might
be accomplished if it were favored by those most deeply interested; and
few can doubt that their own interest, as well as the general welfare of
the country, would be promoted by leaving such a subject in the hands of
those to whom it properly belongs. A system founded on private interest,
enterprise, and competition, without the aid of legislative grants or
regulations by law, would rapidly prosper; it would be free from the
influence of political agitation and extend the same exemption to
trade itself, and it would put an end to those complaints of neglect,
partiality, injustice, and oppression which are the unavoidable
results of interference by the Government in the proper concerns of
individuals. All former attempts on the part of the Government to carry
its legislation in this respect further than was designed by the
Constitution have in the end proved injurious, and have served only
to convince the great body of the people more and more of the certain
dangers of blending private interests with the operations of public
business; and there is no reason to suppose that a repetition of them
now would be more successful.
It can not be concealed that there exists in our community opinions and
feelings on this subject in direct opposition to each other. A large
portion of them, combining great intelligence, activity, and influence,
are no doubt sincere in their belief that the operations of trade ought
to be assisted by such a connection; they regard a national bank as
necessary for this purpose, and they are disinclined to every measure
that does not tend sooner or later to the establishment of such an
institution. On the other hand, a majority of the people are believed
to be irreconcilably opposed to that measure; they consider such a
concentration of power dangerous to their liberties, and many of them
regard it as a violation of the Constitution. This collision of opinion
has doubtless caused much of the embarrassment to which the commercial
transactions of the country have lately been exposed. Banking has become
a political topic of the highest interest, and trade has suffered in
the conflict of parties. A speedy termination of this state of things,
however desirable, is scarcely to be expected. We have seen for nearly
half a century that those who advocate a national bank, by whatever
motive they may be influenced, constitute a portion of our community too
numerous to allow us to hope for an early abandonment of their favorite
plan. On the other hand, they must indeed form an erroneous estimate
of the intelligence and temper of the American people who suppose that
they have continued on slight or insufficient grounds their persevering
opposition to such an institution, or that they can be induced by
pecuniary pressure or by any other combination of circumstances to
surrender principles they have so long and so inflexibly maintained.
My own views of the subject are unchanged. They have been repeatedly and
unreservedly announced to my fellow-citizens, who with full knowledge
of them conferred upon me the two highest offices of the Government.
On the last of these occasions I felt it due to the people to apprise
them distinctly that in the event of my election I would not be able to
cooperate in the reestablishment of a national bank. To these sentiments
I have now only to add the expression of an increased conviction that
the reestablishment of such a bank in any form, whilst it would not
accomplish the beneficial purpose promised by its advocates, would
impair the rightful supremacy of the popular will, injure the character
and diminish the influence of our political system, and bring once more
into existence a concentrated moneyed power, hostile to the spirit and
threatening the permanency of our republican institutions.
Local banks have been employed for the deposit and distribution of
the revenue at all times partially and on three different occasions
exclusively: First, anterior to the establishment of the first Bank of
the United States; secondly, in the interval between the termination of
that institution and the charter of its successor; and thirdly, during
the limited period which has now so abruptly closed. The connection thus
repeatedly attempted proved unsatisfactory on each successive occasion,
notwithstanding the various measures which were adopted to facilitate
or insure its success. On the last occasion, in the year 1833, the
employment of the State banks was guarded especially, in every way which
experience and caution could suggest. Personal security was required for
the safe-keeping and prompt payment of the moneys to be received, and
full returns of their condition were from time to time to be made by the
depositories. In the first stages the measure was eminently successful,
notwithstanding the violent opposition of the Bank of the United States
and the unceasing efforts made to overthrow it. The selected banks
performed with fidelity and without any embarrassment to themselves or
to the community their engagements to the Government, and the system
promised to be permanently useful; but when it became necessary, under
the act of June, 1836, to withdraw from them the public money for the
purpose of placing it in additional institutions or of transferring it
to the States, they found it in many cases inconvenient to comply with
the demands of the Treasury, and numerous and pressing applications were
made for indulgence or relief. As the installments under the deposit law
became payable their own embarrassments and the necessity under which
they lay of curtailing their discounts and calling in their debts
increased the general distress and contributed, with other causes, to
hasten the revulsion in which at length they, in common with the other
banks, were fatally involved.
Under these circumstances it becomes our solemn duty to inquire whether
there are not in any connection between the Government and banks of
issue evils of great magnitude, inherent in its very nature and against
which no precautions can effectually guard.
Unforeseen in the organization of the Government and forced on the
Treasury by early necessities, the practice of employing banks was in
truth from the beginning more a measure of emergency than of sound
policy. When we started into existence as a nation, in addition to the
burdens of the new Government we assumed all the large but honorable
load of debt which was the price of our liberty; but we hesitated to
weigh down the infant industry of the country by resorting to adequate
taxation for the necessary revenue. The facilities of banks, in return
for the privileges they acquired, were promptly offered, and perhaps too
readily received by an embarrassed Treasury. During the long continuance
of a national debt and the intervening difficulties of a foreign war the
connection was continued from motives of convenience; but these causes
have long since passed away. We have no emergencies that make banks
necessary to aid the wants of the Treasury; we have no load of national
debt to provide for, and we have on actual deposit a large surplus. No
public interest, therefore, now requires the renewal of a connection
that circumstances have dissolved. The complete organization of our
Government, the abundance of our resources, the general harmony which
prevails between the different States and with foreign powers, all
enable us now to select the system most consistent with the Constitution
and most conducive to the public welfare. Should we, then, connect the
Treasury for a fourth time with the local banks, it can only be under a
conviction that past failures have arisen from accidental, not inherent,
defects.
A danger difficult, if not impossible, to be avoided in such an
arrangement is made strikingly evident in the very event by which it has
now been defeated. A sudden act of the banks intrusted with the funds
of the people deprives the Treasury, without fault or agency of the
Government, of the ability to pay its creditors in the currency they
have by law a right to demand. This circumstance no fluctuation of
commerce could have produced if the public revenue had been collected
in the legal currency and kept in that form by the officers of the
Treasury. The citizen whose money was in bank receives it back since
the suspension at a sacrifice in its amount, whilst he who kept it in
the legal currency of the country and in his own possession pursues
without loss the current of his business. The Government, placed in the
situation of the former, is involved in embarrassments it could not have
suffered had it pursued the course of the latter. These embarrassments
are, moreover, augmented by those salutary and just laws which forbid it
to use a depreciated currency, and by so doing take from the Government
the ability which individuals have of accommodating their transactions
to such a catastrophe.
A system which can in a time of profound peace, when there is a large
revenue laid by, thus suddenly prevent the application and the use of
the money of the people in the manner and for the objects they have
directed can not be wise; but who can think without painful reflection
that under it the same unforeseen events might have befallen us in the
midst of a war and taken from us at the moment when most wanted the use
of those very means which were treasured up to promote the national
welfare and guard our national rights? To such embarrassments and to
such dangers will this Government be always exposed whilst it takes the
moneys raised for and necessary to the public service out of the hands
of its own officers and converts them into a mere right of action
against corporations intrusted with the possession of them. Nor can
such results be effectually guarded against in such a system without
investing the Executive with a control over the banks themselves,
whether State or national, that might with reason be objected to. Ours
is probably the only Government in the world that is liable in the
management of its fiscal concerns to occurrences like these.
But this imminent risk is not the only danger attendant on the surrender
of the public money to the custody and control of local corporations.
Though the object is aid to the Treasury, its effect may be to introduce
into the operations of the Government influences the most subtle,
founded on interests the most selfish.
The use by the banks, for their own benefit, of the money deposited with
them has received the sanction of the Government from the commencement
of this connection. The money received from the people, instead of
being kept till it is needed for their use, is, in consequence of this
authority, a fund on which discounts are made for the profit of those
who happen to be owners of stock in the banks selected as depositories.
The supposed and often exaggerated advantages of such a boon will always
cause it to be sought for with avidity. I will not stop to consider
on whom the patronage incident to it is to be conferred. Whether the
selection and control be trusted to Congress or to the Executive, either
will be subjected to appeals made in every form which the sagacity of
interest can suggest. The banks under such a system are stimulated to
make the most of their fortunate acquisition; the deposits are treated
as an increase of capital; loans and circulation are rashly augmented,
and when the public exigencies require a return it is attended with
embarrassments not provided for nor foreseen. Thus banks that thought
themselves most fortunate when the public funds were received find
themselves most embarrassed when the season of payment suddenly arrives.
Unfortunately, too, the evils of the system are not limited to the
banks. It stimulates a general rashness of enterprise and aggravates the
fluctuations of commerce and the currency. This result was strikingly
exhibited during the operations of the late deposit system, and
especially in the purchases of public lands. The order which ultimately
directed the payment of gold and silver in such purchases greatly
checked, but could not altogether prevent, the evil. Specie was indeed
more difficult to be procured than the notes which the banks could
themselves create at pleasure; but still, being obtained from them as a
loan and returned as a deposit, which they were again at liberty to use,
it only passed round the circle with diminished speed. This operation
could not have been performed had the funds of the Government gone into
the Treasury to be regularly disbursed, and not into banks to be loaned
out for their own profit while they were permitted to substitute for it
a credit in account.
In expressing these sentiments I desire not to undervalue the benefits
of a salutary credit to any branch of enterprise. The credit bestowed
on probity and industry is the just reward of merit and an honorable
incentive to further acquisition. None oppose it who love their country
and understand its welfare. But when it is unduly encouraged; when it
is made to inflame the public mind with the temptations of sudden and
unsubstantial wealth; when it turns industry into paths that lead sooner
or later to disappointment and distress, it becomes liable to censure
and needs correction. Far from helping probity and industry, the ruin to
which it leads falls most severely on the great laboring classes, who
are thrown suddenly out of employment, and by the failure of magnificent
schemes never intended to enrich them are deprived in a moment of their
only resource. Abuses of credit and excesses in speculation will happen
in despite of the most salutary laws; no government, perhaps, can
altogether prevent them, but surely every government can refrain from
contributing the stimulus that calls them into life.
Since, therefore, experience has shown that to lend the public money
to the local banks is hazardous to the operations of the Government, at
least of doubtful benefit to the institutions themselves, and productive
of disastrous derangement in the business and currency of the country,
is it the part of wisdom again to renew the connection?
It is true that such an agency is in many respects convenient to the
Treasury, but it is not indispensable. A limitation of the expenses
of the Government to its actual wants, and of the revenue to those
expenses, with convenient means for its prompt application to the
purposes for which it was raised, are the objects which we should seek
to accomplish. The collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and disbursement
of the public money can, it is believed, be well managed by officers of
the Government. Its collection, and to a great extent its disbursement
also, have indeed been hitherto conducted solely by them, neither
national nor State banks, when employed, being required to do more than
keep it safely while in their custody, and transfer and pay it in such
portions and at such times as the Treasury shall direct.
Surely banks are not more able than the Government to secure the money
in their possession against accident, violence, or fraud. The assertion
that they are so must assume that a vault in a bank is stronger than
a vault in the Treasury, and that directors, cashiers, and clerks not
selected by the Government nor under its control are more worthy of
confidence than officers selected from the people and responsible to the
Government--officers bound by official oaths and bonds for a faithful
performance of their duties, and constantly subject to the supervision
of Congress.
The difficulties of transfer and the aid heretofore rendered by banks
have been less than is usually supposed. The actual accounts show that
by far the larger portion of payments is made within short or convenient
distances from the places of collection; and the whole number of
warrants issued at the Treasury in the year 1834--a year the result of
which will, it is believed, afford a safe test for the future--fell
short of 5,000, or an average of less than 1 daily for each State; in
the city of New York they did not average more than 2 a day, and at the
city of Washington only 4.
The difficulties heretofore existing are, moreover, daily lessened by an
increase in the cheapness and facility of communication, and it may be
asserted with confidence that the necessary transfers, as well as the
safe-keeping and disbursements of the public moneys, can be with safety
and convenience accomplished through the agencies of Treasury officers.
This opinion has been in some degree confirmed by actual experience
since the discontinuance of the banks as fiscal agents in May last--a
period which from the embarrassments in commercial intercourse presented
obstacles as great as any that may be hereafter apprehended.
The manner of keeping the public money since that period is fully stated
in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury. That officer also
suggests the propriety of assigning by law certain additional duties to
existing establishments and officers, which, with the modifications and
safeguards referred to by him, will, he thinks, enable the Department
to continue to perform this branch of the public service without any
material addition either to their number or to the present expense. The
extent of the business to be transacted has already been stated; and in
respect to the amount of money with which the officers employed would be
intrusted at any one time, it appears that, assuming a balance of five
millions to be at all times kept in the Treasury, and the whole of it
left in the hands of the collectors and receivers, the proportion of
each would not exceed an average of $30,000; but that, deducting one
million for the use of the Mint and assuming the remaining four millions
to be in the hands of one-half of the present number of officers--a
supposition deemed more likely to correspond with the fact--the sum
in the hands of each would still be less than the amount of most of the
bonds now taken from the receivers of public money. Every apprehension,
however, on the subject, either in respect to the safety of the money
or the faithful discharge of these fiscal transactions, may, it appears
to me, be effectually removed by adding to the present means of
the Treasury the establishment by law at a few important points of
offices for the deposit and disbursement of such portions of the public
revenue as can not with obvious safety and convenience be left in the
possession of the collecting officers until paid over by them to the
public creditors. Neither the amounts retained in their hands nor
those deposited in the offices would in an ordinary condition of the
revenue be larger in most cases than those often under the control of
disbursing officers of the Army and Navy, and might be made entirely
safe by requiring such securities and exercising such controlling
supervision as Congress may by law prescribe. The principal officers
whose appointments would become necessary under this plan, taking the
largest number suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, would not
exceed ten, nor the additional expenses, at the same estimate, $60,000
a year.
There can be no doubt of the obligation of those who are intrusted
with the affairs of Government to conduct them with as little cost to
the nation as is consistent with the public interest; and it is for
Congress, and ultimately for the people, to decide whether the benefits
to be derived from keeping our fiscal concerns apart and severing the
connection which has hitherto existed between the Government and banks
offer sufficient advantages to justify the necessary expenses. If the
object to be accomplished is deemed important to the future welfare of
the country, I can not allow myself to believe that the addition to
the public expenditure of comparatively so small an amount as will be
necessary to effect it will be objected to by the people.
It will be seen by the report of the Postmaster-General herewith
communicated that the fiscal affairs of that Department have been
successfully conducted since May last upon the principle of dealing
only in the legal currency of the United States, and that it needs no
legislation to maintain its credit and facilitate the management of its
concerns, the existing laws being, in the opinion of that officer, ample
for those objects.
Difficulties will doubtless be encountered for a season and increased
services required from the public functionaries; such are usually
incident to the commencement of every system, but they will be greatly
lessened in the progress of its operations.
The power and influence supposed to be connected with the custody and
disbursement of the public money are topics on which the public mind is
naturally, and with great propriety, peculiarly sensitive. Much has been
said on them in reference to the proposed separation of the Government
from the banking institutions; and surely no one can object to any
appeals or animadversions on the subject which are consistent with facts
and evince a proper respect for the intelligence of the people. If a
Chief Magistrate may be allowed to speak for himself on such a point,
I can truly say that to me nothing would be more acceptable than the
withdrawal from the Executive, to the greatest practicable extent, of
all concern in the custody and disbursement of the public revenue; not
that I would shrink from any responsibility cast upon me by the duties
of my office, but because it is my firm belief that its capacity for
usefulness is in no degree promoted by the possession of any patronage
not actually necessary to the performance of those duties. But under our
present form of government the intervention of the executive officers
in the custody and disbursement of the public money seems to be
unavoidable; and before it can be admitted that the influence and power
of the Executive would be increased by dispensing with the agency of
banks the nature of that intervention in such an agency must be
carefully regarded, and a comparison must be instituted between its
extent in the two cases.
The revenue can only be collected by officers appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The public moneys in the
first instance must therefore in all cases pass through hands selected
by the Executive. Other officers appointed in the same way, or, as in
some cases, by the President alone, must also be intrusted with them
when drawn for the purpose of disbursement. It is thus seen that even
when banks are employed the public funds must twice pass through the
hands of executive officers. Besides this, the head of the Treasury
Department, who also holds office at the pleasure of the President, and
some other officers of the same Department, must necessarily be invested
with more or less power in the selection, continuance, and supervision
of the banks that may be employed. The question is then narrowed to the
single point whether in the intermediate stage between the collection
and disbursement of the public money the agency of banks is necessary
to avoid a dangerous extension of the patronage and influence of the
Executive. But is it clear that the connection of the Executive with
powerful moneyed institutions, capable of ministering to the interests
of men in points where they are most accessible to corruption, is less
liable to abuse than his constitutional agency in the appointment and
control of the few public officers required by the proposed plan? Will
the public money when in their hands be necessarily exposed to any
improper interference on the part of the Executive? May it not be hoped
that a prudent fear of public jealousy and disapprobation in a matter so
peculiarly exposed to them will deter him from any such interference,
even if higher motives be found inoperative? May not Congress so
regulate by law the duty of those officers and subject it to such
supervision and publicity as to prevent the possibility of any serious
abuse on the part of the Executive? And is there equal room for such
supervision and publicity in a connection with banks, acting under the
shield of corporate immunities and conducted by persons irresponsible
to the Government and the people? It is believed that a considerate and
candid investigation of these questions will result in the conviction
that the proposed plan is far less liable to objection on the score of
Executive patronage and control than any bank agency that has been or
can be devised.
With these views I leave to Congress the measures necessary to regulate
in the present emergency the safe-keeping and transfer of the public
moneys. In the performance of constitutional duty I have stated to them
without reserve the result of my own reflections. The subject is of
great importance, and one on which we can scarcely expect to be as
united in sentiment as we are in interest. It deserves a full and
free discussion, and can not fail to be benefited by a dispassionate
comparison of opinions. Well aware myself of the duty of reciprocal
concession among the coordinate branches of the Government, I can
promise a reasonable spirit of cooperation, so far as it can be indulged
in without the surrender of constitutional objections which I believe
to be well founded. Any system that may be adopted should be subjected
to the fullest legal provision, so as to leave nothing to the Executive
but what is necessary to the discharge of the duties imposed on him;
and whatever plan may be ultimately established, my own part shall be
so discharged as to give to it a fair trial and the best prospect of
success.
The character of the funds to be received and disbursed in the
transactions of the Government likewise demands your most careful
consideration.
There can be no doubt that those who framed and adopted the
Constitution, having in immediate view the depreciated paper of the
Confederacy--of which $500 in paper were at times only equal to $1 in
coin--intended to prevent the recurrence of similar evils, so far at
least as related to the transactions of the new Government. They gave
to Congress express powers to coin money and to regulate the value
thereof and of foreign coin; they refused to give it power to establish
corporations--the agents then as now chiefly employed to create a paper
currency; they prohibited the States from making anything but gold
and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; and the First Congress
directed by positive law that the revenue should be received in nothing
but gold and silver.
Public exigency at the outset of the Government, without direct
legislative authority, led to the use of banks as fiscal aids to the
Treasury. In admitted deviation from the law, at the same period and
under the same exigency, the Secretary of the Treasury received their
notes in payment of duties. The sole ground on which the practice
thus commenced was then or has since been justified is the certain,
immediate, and convenient exchange of such notes for specie. The
Government did, indeed, receive the inconvertible notes of State banks
during the difficulties of war, and the community submitted without a
murmur to the unequal taxation and multiplied evils of which such a
course was productive. With the war this indulgence ceased, and the
banks were obliged again to redeem their notes in gold and silver. The
Treasury, in accordance with previous practice, continued to dispense
with the currency required by the act of 1789, and took the notes of
banks in full confidence of their being paid in specie on demand; and
Congress, to guard against the slightest violation of this principle,
have declared by law that if notes are paid in the transactions of the
Government it must be under such circumstances as to enable the holder
to convert them into specie without depreciation or delay.
Of my own duties under the existing laws, when the banks suspended
specie payments, I could not doubt. Directions were immediately given
to prevent the reception into the Treasury of anything but gold and
silver, or its equivalent, and every practicable arrangement was made
to preserve the public faith by similar or equivalent payments to
the public creditors. The revenue from lands had been for some time
substantially so collected under the order issued by directions of my
predecessor. The effects of that order had been so salutary and its
forecast in regard to the increasing insecurity of bank paper had become
so apparent that even before the catastrophe I had resolved not to
interfere with its operation. Congress is now to decide whether the
revenue shall continue to be so collected or not.
The receipt into the Treasury of bank notes not redeemed in specie on
demand will not, I presume, be sanctioned. It would destroy without the
excuse of war or public distress that equality of imposts and identity
of commercial regulation which lie at the foundation of our Confederacy,
and would offer to each State a direct temptation to increase its
foreign trade by depreciating the currency received for duties in its
ports. Such a proceeding would also in a great degree frustrate the
policy so highly cherished of infusing into our circulation a larger
proportion of the precious metals--a policy the wisdom of which none can
doubt, though there may be different opinions as to the extent to which
it should be carried. Its results have been already too auspicious and
its success is too closely interwoven with the future prosperity of
the country to permit us for a moment to contemplate its abandonment.
We have seen under its influence our specie augmented beyond eighty
millions, our coinage increased so as to make that of gold amount,
between August, 1834, and December, 1836, to $10,000,000, exceeding
the whole coinage at the Mint during the thirty-one previous years.
The prospect of further improvement continued without abatement until
the moment of the suspension of specie payments. This policy has now,
indeed, been suddenly checked, but is still far from being overthrown.
Amidst all conflicting theories, one position is undeniable--the
precious metals will invariably disappear when there ceases to be
a necessity for their use as a circulating medium. It was in strict
accordance with this truth that whilst in the month of May last they
were everywhere seen and were current for all ordinary purposes they
disappeared from circulation the moment the payment of specie was
refused by the banks and the community tacitly agreed to dispense with
its employment. Their place was supplied by a currency exclusively of
paper, and in many cases of the worst description. Already are the bank
notes now in circulation greatly depreciated, and they fluctuate in
value between one place and another, thus diminishing and making
uncertain the worth of property and the price of labor, and failing to
subserve, except at a heavy loss, the purposes of business. With each
succeeding day the metallic currency decreases; by some it is hoarded
in the natural fear that once parted with it can not be replaced, while
by others it is diverted from its more legitimate uses for the sake
of gain. Should Congress sanction this condition of things by making
irredeemable paper money receivable in payment of public dues, a
temporary check to a wise and salutary policy will in all probability
be converted into its absolute destruction.
It is true that bank notes actually convertible into specie may be
received in payment of the revenue without being liable to all these
objections, and that such a course may to some extent promote individual
convenience--an object always to be considered where it does not
conflict with the principles of our Government or the general welfare
of the country. If such notes only were received, and always under
circumstances allowing their early presentation for payment, and if at
short and fixed periods they were converted into specie to be kept by
the officers of the Treasury, some of the most serious obstacles to
their reception would perhaps be removed. To retain the notes in the
Treasury would be to renew under another form the loans of public money
to the banks, and the evils consequent thereon.
It is, however, a mistaken impression that any large amount of specie
is required for public payments. Of the seventy or eighty millions
now estimated to be in the country, ten millions would be abundantly
sufficient for that purpose provided an accumulation of a large amount
of revenue beyond the necessary wants of the Government be hereafter
prevented. If to these considerations be added the facilities which will
arise from enabling the Treasury to satisfy the public creditors by its
drafts or notes receivable in payment of the public dues, it may be
safely assumed that no motive of convenience to the citizen requires
the reception of bank paper.
To say that the refusal of paper money by the Government introduces an
unjust discrimination between the currency received by it and that used
by individuals in their ordinary affairs is, in my judgment, to view it
in a very erroneous light. The Constitution prohibits the States from
making anything but gold and silver a tender in the payment of debts,
and thus secures to every citizen a right to demand payment in the legal
currency. To provide by law that the Government will only receive its
dues in gold and silver is not to confer on it any peculiar privilege,
but merely to place it on an equality with the citizen by reserving to
it a right secured to him by the Constitution. It is doubtless for this
reason that the principle has been sanctioned by successive laws from
the time of the first Congress under the Constitution down to the last.
Such precedents, never objected to and proceeding from such sources,
afford a decisive answer to the imputation of inequality or injustice.
But in fact the measure is one of restriction, not of favor. To forbid
the public agent to receive in payment any other than a certain kind of
money is to refuse him a discretion possessed by every citizen. It may
be left to those who have the management of their own transactions to
make their own terms, but no such discretion should be given to him who
acts merely as an agent of the people--who is to collect what the law
requires and to pay the appropriations it makes. When bank notes are
redeemed on demand, there is then no discrimination in reality, for the
individual who receives them may at his option substitute the specie for
them; he takes them from convenience or choice. When they are not so
redeemed, it will scarcely be contended that their receipt and payment
by a public officer should be permitted, though none deny that right
to an individual; if it were, the effect would be most injurious to
the public, since their officer could make none of those arrangements
to meet or guard against the depreciation which an individual is at
liberty to do. Nor can inconvenience to the community be alleged as
an objection to such a regulation. Its object and motive are their
convenience and welfare.
If at a moment of simultaneous and unexpected suspension by the banks
it adds something to the many embarrassments of that proceeding, yet
these are far overbalanced by its direct tendency to produce a wider
circulation of gold and silver, to increase the safety of bank paper,
to improve the general currency, and thus to prevent altogether such
occurrences and the other and far greater evils that attend them.
It may indeed be questioned whether it is not for the interest of the
banks themselves that the Government should not receive their paper.
They would be conducted with more caution and on sounder principles.
By using specie only in its transactions the Government would create a
demand for it, which would to a great extent prevent its exportation,
and by keeping it in circulation maintain a broader and safer basis for
the paper currency. That the banks would thus be rendered more sound
and the community more safe can not admit of a doubt.
The foregoing views, it seems to me, do but fairly carry out the
provisions of the Federal Constitution in relation to the currency, as
far as relates to the public revenue. At the time that instrument was
framed there were but three or four banks in the United States, and had
the extension of the banking system and the evils growing out of it
been foreseen they would probably have been specially guarded against.
The same policy which led to the prohibition of bills of credit by the
States would doubtless in that event have also interdicted their issue
as a currency in any other form. The Constitution, however, contains no
such prohibition; and since the States have exercised for nearly half
a century the power to regulate the business of banking, it is not to
be expected that it will be abandoned. The whole matter is now under
discussion before the proper tribunal--the people of the States. Never
before has the public mind been so thoroughly awakened to a proper
sense of its importance; never has the subject in all its bearings
been submitted to so searching an inquiry. It would be distrusting the
intelligence and virtue of the people to doubt the speedy and efficient
adoption of such measures of reform as the public good demands. All
that can rightfully be done by the Federal Government to promote the
accomplishment of that important object will without doubt be performed.
In the meantime it is our duty to provide all the remedies against a
depreciated paper currency which the Constitution enables us to afford.
The Treasury Department on several former occasions has suggested the
propriety and importance of a uniform law concerning bankruptcies of
corporations and other bankers. Through the instrumentality of such a
law a salutary check may doubtless be imposed on the issues of paper
money and an effectual remedy given to the citizen in a way at once
equal in all parts of the Union and fully authorized by the
Constitution.
The indulgence granted by Executive authority in the payment of bonds
for duties has been already mentioned. Seeing that the immediate
enforcement of these obligations would subject a large and highly
respectable portion of our citizens to great sacrifices, and believing
that a temporary postponement could be made without detriment to other
interests and with increased certainty of ultimate payment, I did not
hesitate to comply with the request that was made of me. The terms
allowed are to the full extent as liberal as any that are to be found
in the practice of the executive department. It remains for Congress to
decide whether a further postponement may not with propriety be allowed;
and if so, their legislation upon the subject is respectfully invited.
The report of the Secretary of the Treasury will exhibit the condition
of these debts, the extent and effect of the present indulgence, the
probable result of its further extension on the state of the Treasury,
and every other fact necessary to a full consideration of the subject.
Similar information is communicated in regard to such depositories of
the public moneys as are indebted to the Government, in order that
Congress may also adopt the proper measures in regard to them.
The receipts and expenditures for the first half of the year and an
estimate of those for the residue will be laid before you by the
Secretary of the Treasury. In his report of December last it was
estimated that the current receipts would fall short of the expenditures
by about $3,000,000. It will be seen that the difference will be much
greater. This is to be attributed not only to the occurrence of greater
pecuniary embarrassments in the business of the country than those
which were then predicted, and consequently a greater diminution in
the revenue, but also to the fact that the appropriations exceeded by
nearly six millions the amount which was asked for in the estimates
then submitted. The sum necessary for the service of the year, beyond
the probable receipts and the amount which it was intended should be
reserved in the Treasury at the commencement of the year, will be about
six millions. If the whole of the reserved balance be not at once
applied to the current expenditures, but four millions be still kept
in the Treasury, as seems most expedient for the uses of the Mint and
to meet contingencies, the sum needed will be ten millions.
In making this estimate the receipts are calculated on the supposition
of some further extension of the indulgence granted in the payment of
bonds for duties, which will affect the amount of the revenue for the
present year to the extent of two and a half millions.
It is not proposed to procure the required amount by loans or increased
taxation. There are now in the Treasury $9,367,214, directed by the act
of the 23d of June, 1836, to be deposited with the States in October
next. This sum, if so deposited, will be subject under the law to be
recalled if needed to defray existing appropriations; and as it is now
evident that the whole, or the principal part, of it will be wanted
for that purpose, it appears most proper that the deposit should be
withheld. Until the amount can be collected from the banks, Treasury
notes may be temporarily issued, to be gradually redeemed as it is
received.
I am aware that this course may be productive of inconvenience to many
of the States. Relying upon the acts of Congress which held out to
them the strong probability, if not the certainty, of receiving this
installment, they have in some instances adopted measures with which
its retention may seriously interfere. That such a condition of things
should have occurred is much to be regretted. It is not the least among
the unfortunate results of the disasters of the times; and it is for
Congress to devise a fit remedy, if there be one. The money being
indispensable to the wants of the Treasury, it is difficult to conceive
upon what principle of justice or expediency its application to that
object can be avoided. To recall any portion of the sums already
deposited with the States would be more inconvenient and less efficient.
To burden the country with increased taxation when there is in fact a
large surplus revenue would be unjust and unwise; to raise moneys by
loans under such circumstances, and thus to commence a new national
debt, would scarcely be sanctioned by the American people.
The plan proposed will be adequate to all our fiscal operations during
the remainder of the year. Should it be adopted, the Treasury, aided by
the ample resources of the country, will be able to discharge punctually
every pecuniary obligation. For the future all that is needed will be
that caution and forbearance in appropriations which the diminution of
the revenue requires and which the complete accomplishment or great
forwardness of many expensive national undertakings renders equally
consistent with prudence and patriotic liberality.
The preceding suggestions and recommendations are submitted in the
belief that their adoption by Congress will enable the executive
department to conduct our fiscal concerns with success so far as their
management has been committed to it. Whilst the objects and the means
proposed to attain them are within its constitutional powers and
appropriate duties, they will at the same time, it is hoped, by their
necessary operation, afford essential aid in the transaction of
individual concerns, and thus yield relief to the people at large in
a form adapted to the nature of our Government. Those who look to the
action of this Government for specific aid to the citizen to relieve
embarrassments arising from losses by revulsions in commerce and credit
lose sight of the ends for which it was created and the powers with
which it is clothed. It was established to give security to us all
in our lawful and honorable pursuits, under the lasting safeguard of
republican institutions. It was not intended to confer special favors on
individuals or on any classes of them, to create systems of agriculture,
manufactures, or trade, or to engage in them either separately or in
connection with individual citizens or organized associations. If
its operations were to be directed for the benefit of any one class,
equivalent favors must in justice be extended to the rest, and the
attempt to bestow such favors with an equal hand, or even to select
those who should most deserve them, would never be successful.
All communities are apt to look to government for too much. Even in
our own country, where its powers and duties are so strictly limited,
we are prone to do so, especially at periods of sudden embarrassment
and distress. But this ought not to be. The framers of our excellent
Constitution and the people who approved it with calm and sagacious
deliberation acted at the time on a sounder principle. They wisely
judged that the less government interferes with private pursuits the
better for the general prosperity. It is not its legitimate object to
make men rich or to repair by direct grants of money or legislation in
favor of particular pursuits losses not incurred in the public service.
This would be substantially to use the property of some for the benefit
of others. But its real duty--that duty the performance of which makes
a good government the most precious of human blessings--is to enact and
enforce a system of general laws commensurate with, but not exceeding,
the objects of its establishment, and to leave every citizen and every
interest to reap under its benign protection the rewards of virtue,
industry, and prudence.
I can not doubt that on this as on all similar occasions the Federal
Government will find its agency most conducive to the security and
happiness of the people when limited to the exercise of its conceded
powers. In never assuming, even for a well-meant object, such powers as
were not designed to be conferred upon it, we shall in reality do most
for the general welfare. To avoid every unnecessary interference with
the pursuits of the citizen will result in more benefit than to adopt
measures which could only assist limited interests, and are eagerly,
but perhaps naturally, sought for under the pressure of temporary
circumstances. If, therefore, I refrain from suggesting to Congress any
specific plan for regulating the exchanges of the country, relieving
mercantile embarrassments, or interfering with the ordinary operations
of foreign or domestic commerce, it is from a conviction that such
measures are not within the constitutional province of the General
Government, and that their adoption would not promote the real and
permanent welfare of those they might be designed to aid.
The difficulties and distresses of the times, though unquestionably
great, are limited in their extent, and can not be regarded as affecting
the permanent prosperity of the nation. Arising in a great degree from
the transactions of foreign and domestic commerce, it is upon them
that they have chiefly fallen. The great agricultural interest has in
many parts of the country suffered comparatively little, and, as if
Providence intended to display the munificence of its goodness at the
moment of our greatest need, and in direct contrast to the evils
occasioned by the waywardness of man, we have been blessed throughout
our extended territory with a season of general health and of uncommon
fruitfulness. The proceeds of our great staples will soon furnish the
means of liquidating debts at home and abroad, and contribute equally
to the revival of commercial activity and the restoration of commercial
credit. The banks, established avowedly for its support, deriving their
profits from it, and resting under obligations to it which can not be
overlooked, will feel at once the necessity and justice of uniting their
energies with those of the mercantile interest.
The suspension of specie payments at such a time and under such
circumstances as we have lately witnessed could not be other than a
temporary measure, and we can scarcely err in believing that the period
must soon arrive when all that are solvent will redeem their issues
in gold and silver. Dealings abroad naturally depend on resources and
prosperity at home. If the debt of our merchants has accumulated or
their credit is impaired, these are fluctuations always incident to
extensive or extravagant mercantile transactions. But the ultimate
security of such obligations does not admit of question. They are
guaranteed by the resources of a country the fruits of whose industry
afford abundant means of ample liquidation, and by the evident interest
of every merchant to sustain a credit hitherto high by promptly applying
these means for its preservation.
I deeply regret that events have occurred which require me to ask your
consideration of such serious topics. I could have wished that in making
my first communication to the assembled representatives of my country
I had nothing to dwell upon but the history of her unalloyed prosperity.
Since it is otherwise, we can only feel more deeply the responsibility
of the respective trusts that have been confided to us, and under the
pressure of difficulties unite in invoking the guidance and aid of the
Supreme Ruler of Nations and in laboring with zealous resolution to
overcome the difficulties by which we are environed.
It is under such circumstances a high gratification to know by
long experience that we act for a people to whom the truth, however
unpromising, can always be spoken with safety; for the trial of whose
patriotism no emergency is too severe, and who are sure never to
desert a public functionary honestly laboring for the public good.
It seems just that they should receive without delay any aid in their
embarrassments which your deliberations can afford. Coming directly from
the midst of them, and knowing the course of events in every section of
our country, from you may best be learnt as well the extent and nature
of these embarrassments as the most desirable measures of relief.
I am aware, however, that it is not proper to detain you at present
longer than may be demanded by the special objects for which you are
convened. To them, therefore, I have confined my communication; and
believing it will not be your own wish now to extend your deliberations
beyond them, I reserve till the usual period of your annual meeting that
general information on the state of the Union which the Constitution
requires me to give.