body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible
where Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not_.
Though what we have to fear or hope from cities that have grown
corrupted has already been discussed, still I think it not out of place
to notice a resolution passed by the senate touching the vow which
Camillus made to Apollo of a tenth of the spoil taken from the
Veientines. For this spoil having fallen into the hands of the people,
the senate, being unable by other means to get any account of it,
passed an edict that every man should publicly offer one tenth part of
what he had taken. And although this edict was not carried out, from
the senate having afterwards followed a different course, whereby, to
the content of the people, the claim of Apollo was otherwise satisfied,
we nevertheless see from their having entertained such a proposal, how
completely the senate trusted to the honesty of the people, when they
assumed that no one would withhold any part of what the edict commanded
him to give; on the other hand, we see that it never occurred to the
people that they might evade the law by giving less than was due, their
only thought being to free themselves from the law by openly
manifesting their displeasure. This example, together with many others
already noticed, shows how much virtue and how profound a feeling of
religion prevailed among the Roman people, and how much good was to be
expected from them. And, in truth, in the country where virtue like
this does not exist, no good can be looked for, as we should look for
it in vain in provinces which at the present day are seen to be
corrupted; as Italy is beyond all others, though, in some degree,
France and Spain are similarly tainted. In which last two countries, if
we see not so many disorders spring up as we see daily springing up in
Italy, this is not so much due to the superior virtue of their
inhabitants (who, to say truth, fall far short of our countrymen), as
to their being governed by a king who keeps them united, not merely by
his personal qualities, but also by the laws and ordinances of the
realm which are still maintained with vigour. In Germany, however, we
do see signal excellence and a devout religious spirit prevail among
the people, giving rise to the many free States which there maintain
themselves, with such strict observance of their laws that none, either
within or without their walls, dare encroach on them.
That among this last-named people a great share of the ancient
excellence does in truth still flourish, I shall show by an example
similar to that which I have above related of the senate and people of
Rome. It is customary with the German Free States when they have to
expend any large sum of money on the public account, for their
magistrates or councils having authority given them in that behalf, to
impose a rate of one or two in the hundred on every man’s estate; which
rate being fixed, every man, in conformity with the laws of the city,
presents himself before the collectors of the impost, and having first
made oath to pay the amount justly due, throws into a chest provided
for the purpose what he conscientiously believes it fair for him to
pay, of which payment none is witness save himself. From this fact it
may be gathered what honesty and religion still prevail among this
people. For we must assume that each pays his just share, since
otherwise the impost would not yield the sum which, with reference to
former imposts, it was estimated to yield; whereby the fraud would be
detected, and thereupon some other method for raising money have to be
resorted to.
At the present time this virtue is the more to be admired, because it
seems to have survived in this province only. That it has survived
there may be ascribed to two circumstances: _first_, that the natives
have little communication with their neighbours, neither visiting them
in their countries nor being visited by them; being content to use such
commodities, and subsist on such food, and to wear garments of such
materials as their own land supplies; so that all occasion for
intercourse, and every cause of corruption is removed. For living after
this fashion, they have not learned the manners of the French, the
Italians, or the Spaniards, which three nations together are the
corruption of the world. The _second_ cause is, that these republics in
which a free and pure government is maintained will not suffer any of
their citizens either to be, or to live as gentlemen; but on the
contrary, while preserving a strict equality among themselves, are
bitterly hostile to all those gentlemen and lords who dwell in their
neighbourhood; so that if by chance any of these fall into their hands,
they put them to death, as the chief promoters of corruption and the
origin of all disorders.
But to make plain what I mean when I speak of _gentlemen_, I say that
those are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the
revenues of their estates, without concerning themselves with the
cultivation of these estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their
support. Such persons are very mischievous in every republic or
country. But even more mischievous are they who, besides the estates I
have spoken of, are lords of strongholds and castles, and have vassals
and retainers who render them obedience. Of these two classes of men
the kingdom of Naples, the country round Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy
are full; and hence it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth
or free form of government has ever existed; because men of this sort
are the sworn foes to all free institutions.
And since to plant a commonwealth in provinces which are in this
condition were impossible, if these are to be reformed at all, it can
only be by some one man who is able there to establish a kingdom; the
reason being that when the body of the people is grown so corrupted
that the laws are powerless to control it, there must in addition to
the laws be introduced a stronger force, to wit, the regal, which by
its absolute and unrestricted authority may curb the excessive ambition
and corruption of the great. This opinion may be supported by the
example of Tuscany, in which within a narrow compass of territory there
have long existed the three republics of Florence, Lucca, and Siena,
while the other cities of that province, although to a certain extent
dependent, still show by their spirit and by their institutions that
they preserve, or at any rate desire to preserve, their freedom: and
this because there are in Tuscany no lords possessed of strongholds,
and few or no gentlemen, but so complete an equality prevails, that a
prudent statesman, well acquainted with the history of the free States
of antiquity, might easily introduce free institutions. Such, however,
has been the unhappiness of this our country, that, up to the present
hour, it has never produced any man with the power and knowledge which
would have enabled him to act in this way.
From what has been said, it follows, that he who would found a
commonwealth in a country wherein there are many gentlemen, cannot do
so unless he first gets rid of them; and that he who would found a
monarchy or princedom in a country wherein great equality prevails,
will never succeed, unless he raise above the level of that equality
many persons of a restless and ambitious temperament, whom he must make
gentlemen not in name merely but in reality, by conferring on them
castles and lands, supplying them with riches, and providing them with
retainers; that with these gentlemen around him, and with their help,
he may maintain his power, while they through him may gratify their
ambition; all others being constrained to endure a yoke, which force
and force alone imposes on them. For when in this way there comes to be
a proportion between him who uses force and him against whom it is
used, each stands fixed in his own station.
But to found a commonwealth in a country suited for a kingdom, or a
kingdom in a country suited to be a commonwealth, requires so rare a
combination of intelligence and power, that though many engage in the
attempt, few are found to succeed. For the greatness of the undertaking
quickly daunts them, and so obstructs their advance they break down at
the very outset. The case of the Venetian Republic, wherein none save
gentlemen are permitted to hold any public office, does, doubtless,
seem opposed to this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen it
is impossible to found a commonwealth. But it may be answered that the
case of Venice is not in truth an instance to the contrary; since the
gentlemen of Venice are gentlemen rather in name than in reality,
inasmuch as they draw no great revenues from lands, their wealth
consisting chiefly in merchandise and chattels, and not one of them
possessing a castle or enjoying any feudal authority. For in Venice
this name of gentleman is a title of honour and dignity, and does not
depend on any of those circumstances in respect of which the name is
given in other States. But as in other States the different ranks and
classes are divided under different names, so in Venice we have the
division into gentlemen (_gentiluomini_) and plebeians (_popolani_), it
being understood that the former hold, or have the right to hold all
situations of honour, from which the latter are entirely excluded. And
in Venice this occasions no disturbance, for reasons which I have
already explained.
Let a commonwealth, then, be constituted in the country where a great
equality is found or has been made; and, conversely, let a princedom be
constituted where great inequality prevails. Otherwise what is
constituted will be discordant in itself, and without stability.