too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to
objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to
advance himself_.
It has been seen in the preceding chapter how much credit the nobles
gained with the commons by a show of good-will towards them, not only
in providing for their military pay, but also in adjusting taxation.
Had the senate constantly adhered to methods like these, they would
have put an end to all disturbances in Rome, and have deprived the
tribunes of the credit they had with the people, and of the influence
thence arising. For in truth, in a commonwealth, and especially in one
which has become corrupted, there is no better, or easier, or less
objectionable way of opposing the ambition of any citizen, than to
anticipate him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing to
the ends he has in view. This plan, had it been followed by the enemies
of Cosimo de’ Medici, would have proved a far more useful course for
them than to banish him from Florence; since if those citizens who
opposed him had adopted his methods for gaining over the people, they
would have succeeded, without violence or tumult, in taking his most
effective weapon from his hands.
The influence acquired in Florence by Piero Soderini was entirely due
to his skill in securing the affections of the people, since in this
way he obtained among them a name for loving the liberties of the
commonwealth. And truly, for those citizens who envied his greatness it
would have been both easier and more honourable, and at the same time
far less dangerous and hurtful to the State, to forestall him in those
measures by which he was growing powerful, than to oppose him in such a
manner that his overthrow must bring with it the ruin of the entire
republic. For had they, as they might easily have done, deprived him of
the weapons which made him formidable, they could then have withstood
him in all the councils, and in all public deliberations, without
either being suspected or feared. And should any rejoin that, if the
citizens who hated Piero Soderini committed an error in not being
beforehand with him in those ways whereby he came to have influence
with the people, Piero himself erred in like manner, in not
anticipating his enemies in those methods whereby they grew formidable
to him; I answer that Piero is to be excused, both because it would
have been difficult for him to have so acted, and because for him such
a course would not have been honourable. For the paths wherein his
danger lay were those which favoured the Medici, and it was by these
that his enemies attacked him, and in the end overthrew him. But these
paths Piero could not pursue without dishonour, since he could not, if
he was to preserve his fair fame, have joined in destroying that
liberty which he had been put forward to defend. Moreover, since
favours to the Medicean party could not have been rendered secretly and
once for all, they would have been most dangerous for Piero, who, had
he shown himself friendly to the Medici, must have become suspected and
hated by the people; in which case his enemies would have had still
better opportunities than before for his destruction.
Men ought therefore to look to the risks and dangers of any course
which lies before them, nor engage in it when it is plain that the
dangers outweigh the advantages, even though they be advised by others
that it is the most expedient way to take. Should they act otherwise,
it will fare with them as with Tullius, who, in seeking to diminish the
power of Marcus Antonius, added to it. For Antonius, who had been
declared an enemy by the senate, having got together a strong force,
mostly made up of veterans who had shared the fortunes of Cæsar,
Tullius counselled the senate to invest Octavianus with full authority,
and to send him against Antonius with the consuls and the army;
affirming, that so soon as those veterans who had served with Cæsar saw
the face of him who was Cæsar’s nephew and had assumed his name, they
would rally to his side and desert Antonius, who might easily be
crushed when thus left bare of support.
But the reverse of all this happened. For Antonius persuaded Octavianus
to take part with him, and to throw over Tullius and the senate. And
this brought about the ruin of the senate, a result which might easily
have been foreseen. For remembering the influence of that great
captain, who, after overthrowing all opponents, had seized on sovereign
power in Rome, the senate should have turned a deaf ear to the
persuasions of Tullius, nor ever have believed it possible that from
Cæsar’s heir, or from soldiers who had followed Cæsar, they could look
for anything that consisted with the name of Freedom.