seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others._
As the commons of Rome on recovering their freedom were restored to
their former position—nay, to one still stronger since many new laws
had been passed which confirmed and extended their authority,—it might
reasonably have been hoped that Rome would for a time remain at rest.
The event, however, showed the contrary, for from day to day there
arose in that city new tumults and fresh dissensions. And since the
causes which brought this about have been most judiciously set forth by
Titus Livius, it seems to me much to the purpose to cite his own words
when he says, that “whenever either the commons or the nobles were
humble, the others grew haughty; so that if the commons kept within due
bounds, the young nobles began to inflict injuries upon them, against
which the tribunes, who were themselves made the objects of outrage,
were little able to give redress; while the nobles on their part,
although they could not close their eyes to the ill behaviour of their
young men, were yet well pleased that if excesses were to be committed,
they should be committed by their own faction, and not by the commons.
Thus the desire to secure its own liberty prompted each faction to make
itself strong enough to oppress the other. For this is the common
course of things, that in seeking to escape cause for fear, men come to
give others cause to be afraid by inflicting on them those wrongs from
which they strive to relieve themselves; as though the choice lay
between injuring and being injured.”
Herein, among other things, we perceive in what ways commonwealths are
overthrown, and how men climb from one ambition to another; and
recognize the truth of those words which Sallust puts in the mouth of
Cæsar, that “_all ill actions have their origin in fair
beginnings._”[4] For, as I have said already, the ambitious citizen in
a commonwealth seeks at the outset to secure himself against injury,
not only at the hands of private persons, but also of the magistrates;
to effect which he endeavours to gain himself friends. These he obtains
by means honourable in appearance, either by supplying them with money
or protecting them against the powerful. And because such conduct seems
praiseworthy, every one is readily deceived by it, and consequently no
remedy is applied. Pursuing these methods without hindrance, this man
presently comes to be so powerful that private citizens begin to fear
him, and the magistrates to treat him with respect. But when he has
advanced thus far on the road to power without encountering opposition,
he has reached a point at which it is most dangerous to cope with him;
it being dangerous, as I have before explained, to contend with a
disorder which has already made progress in a city. Nevertheless, when
he has brought things to this pass, you must either endeavour to crush
him, at the risk of immediate ruin, or else, unless death or some like
accident interpose, you incur inevitable slavery by letting him alone.
For when, as I have said, it has come to this that the citizens and
even the magistrates fear to offend him and his friends, little further
effort will afterwards be needed to enable him to proscribe and ruin
whom he pleases.
[4] Quod omnia mala exempla ex bonis initiis orta sunt. (Sall. Cat.
51.)
A republic ought, therefore, to provide by its ordinances that none of
its citizens shall, under colour of doing good, have it in their power
to do evil, but shall be suffered to acquire such influence only as may
aid and not injure freedom. How this may be done, shall presently be
explained.