that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice._
A terrible pestilence breaking out in Rome seemed to the Equians and
Volscians to offer a fit opportunity for crushing her. The two nations,
therefore, assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians
and laid waste their country. Whereupon the Latins and Hernicians were
forced to make their case known to the Romans, and to ask to be
defended by them. The Romans, who were sorely afflicted by the
pestilence, answered that they must look to their own defence, and with
their own forces, since Rome was in no position to succour them.
Here we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of the Roman senate, and
how at all times, and in all changes of fortune, they assumed the
responsibility of determining the course their country should take; and
were not ashamed, when necessary, to decide on a course contrary to
that which was usual with them, or which they had decided to follow on
some other occasion. I say this because on other occasions this same
senate had forbidden these nations to defend themselves; and a less
prudent assembly might have thought it lowered their credit to withdraw
that prohibition. But the Roman senate always took a sound view of
things, and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best. So
that, although it was distasteful to them not to be able to defend
their subjects, and equally distasteful—both for the reasons given, and
for others which may be understood—that their subjects should take up
arms in their absence, nevertheless knowing that these must have
recourse to arms in any case, since the enemy was upon them, they took
an honourable course in deciding that what had to be done should be
done with their leave, lest men driven to disobey by necessity should
come afterwards to disobey from choice. And although this may seem the
course which every republic ought reasonably to follow, nevertheless
weak and badly-advised republics cannot make up their minds to follow
it, not knowing how to do themselves honour in like extremities.
After Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to yield to
his terms, desiring to return to Rome through Tuscany, he sent one of
his people to Florence to ask leave for himself and his army to pass. A
council was held in Florence to consider how this request should be
dealt with, but no one was favourable to the leave asked for being
granted. Wherein the Roman method was not followed. For as the Duke had
a very strong force with him, while the Florentines were so bare of
troops that they could not have prevented his passage, it would have
been far more for their credit that he should seem to pass with their
consent, than that he should pass in spite of them; because, while
discredit had to be incurred either way, they would have incurred less
by acceding to his demand.
But of all courses the worst for a weak State is to be irresolute; for
then whatever it does will seem to be done under compulsion, so that if
by chance it should do anything well, this will be set down to
necessity and not to prudence. Of this I shall cite two other instances
happening in our own times, and in our own country. In the year 1500,
King Louis of France, after recovering Milan, being desirous to restore
Pisa to the Florentines, so as to obtain payment from them of the fifty
thousand ducats which they had promised him on the restitution being
completed, sent troops to Pisa under M. Beaumont, in whom, though a
Frenchman, the Florentines put much trust. Beaumont accordingly took up
his position with his forces between Cascina and Pisa, to be in
readiness to attack the town. After he had been there for some days
making arrangements for the assault, envoys came to him from Pisa
offering to surrender their city to the French if a promise were given
in the king’s name, not to hand it over to the Florentines until four
months had run. This condition was absolutely rejected by the
Florentines, and the siege being proceeded with, they were forced to
retire with disgrace. Now the proposal of the Pisans was rejected by
the Florentines for no other reason than that they distrusted the good
faith of the King, into whose hands their weakness obliged them to
commit themselves, and did not reflect how much more it was for their
interest that, by obtaining entrance into Pisa, he should have it in
his power to restore the town to them, or, failing to restore it,
should at once disclose his designs, than that remaining outside he
should put them off with promises for which they had to pay. It would
therefore have been a far better course for the Florentines to have
agreed to Beaumont taking possession on whatever terms.
This was seen afterwards by experience in the year 1502, when, on the
revolt of Arezzo, M. Imbalt was sent by the King of France with French
troops to assist the Florentines. For when he got near Arezzo, and
began to negotiate with the Aretines, who, like the Pisans, were
willing to surrender their town on terms, the acceptance of these terms
was strongly disapproved in Florence; which Imbalt learning, and
thinking that the Florentines were acting with little sense, he took
the entire settlement of conditions into his own hands, and, without
consulting the Florentine commissioners, concluded an arrangement to
his own satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo with his
army. And he let the Florentines know that he thought them fools and
ignorant of the ways of the world; since if they desired to have
Arezzo, they could signify their wishes to the King, who would be much
better able to give it them when he had his soldiers inside, than when
he had them outside the town. Nevertheless, in Florence they never
ceased to blame and abuse M. Imbalt, until at last they came to see
that if Beaumont had acted in the same way, they would have got
possession Of Pisa as well as of Arezzo.
Applying what has been said to the matter in hand, we find that
irresolute republics, unless upon compulsion, never follow wise
courses; for wherever there is room for doubt, their weakness will not
suffer them to come to any resolve; so that unless their doubts be
overcome by some superior force which impels them forward, they remain
always in suspense.