brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was
hurtful to the Liberties of that Republic_
The fact of those ten citizens who were chosen by the Roman people to
make laws for Rome, in time becoming her tyrants and depriving her of
her freedom, may seem contrary to what I have said above, namely that
it is the authority which is violently usurped, and not that conferred
by the free suffrages of the people which is injurious to a republic.
Here, however, we have to take into account both the mode in which, and
the term for which authority is given. Where authority is unrestricted
and is conferred for a long term, meaning by that for a year or more,
it is always attended with danger, and its results will be good or bad
according as the men are good or bad to whom it is committed. Now when
we compare the authority of the Ten with that possessed by the
dictator, we see that the power placed in the hands of the former was
out of all proportion greater than that entrusted to the latter. For
when a dictator was appointed there still remained the tribunes, the
consuls, and the senate, all of them invested with authority of which
the dictator could not deprive them. For even if he could have taken
his consulship from one man, or his status as a senator from another,
he could not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws. So that the
senate, the consuls, and the tribunes continuing to exist with
undiminished authority were a check upon him and kept him in the right
road. But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all this took
place. For on their appointment, consuls and tribunes were swept away,
and express powers were given to the new magistrates to make laws and
do whatever else they thought fit, with the entire authority of the
whole Roman people. So that finding themselves alone without consuls or
tribunes to control them, and with no appeal against them to the
people, and thus there being none to keep a watch upon them, and
further being stimulated by the ambition of Appius, in the second year
of their office they began to wax insolent.
Let it be noted, therefore, that when it is said that authority given
by the public vote is never hurtful to any commonwealth, it is assumed
that the people will never be led to confer that authority without due
limitations, or for other than a reasonable term. Should they, however
either from being deceived or otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow
authority imprudently, as the Romans bestowed it on the Ten, it will
always fare with them as with the Romans. And this may readily be
understood on reflecting what causes operated to keep the dictator
good, what to make the Ten bad, and by observing how those republics
which have been accounted well governed, have acted when conferring
authority for an extended period, as the Spartans on their kings and
the Venetians on their doges; for it will be seen that in both these
instances the authority was controlled by checks which made it
impossible for it to be abused. But where an uncontrolled authority is
given, no security is afforded by the circumstance that the body of the
people is not corrupted; for in the briefest possible time absolute
authority will make a people corrupt, and obtain for itself friends and
partisans. Nor will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority
is vested, that he is poor and without connections, for wealth and
every other advantage will quickly follow, as shall be shown more fully
when we discuss the appointment of the Ten.