conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties._
The Romans found it for their advantage to be generous to the commons
at a season of danger, when Porsenna came to attack Rome and restore
the Tarquins. For the senate, apprehending that the people might choose
rather to take back their kings than to support a war, secured their
adherence by relieving them of the duty on salt and of all their other
burthens; saying that “_the poor did enough for the common welfare in
rearing their offspring._” In return for which indulgence the commons
were content to undergo war, siege, and famine. Let no one however,
relying on this example, delay conciliating the people till danger has
actually come; or, if he do, let him not hope to have the same good
fortune as the Romans. For the mass of the people will consider that
they have to thank not him, but his enemies, and that there is ground
to fear that when the danger has passed away, he will take back what he
gave under compulsion, and, therefore, that to him they lie under no
obligation. And the reason why the course followed by the Romans
succeeded, was that the State was still new and unsettled. Besides
which, the people knew that laws had already been passed in their
favour, as, for instance, the law allowing an appeal to the tribunes,
and could therefore persuade themselves that the benefits granted them
proceeded from the good-will entertained towards them by the senate,
and were not due merely to the approach of an enemy. Moreover, the
memory of their kings, by whom they had in many ways been wronged and
ill-treated, was still fresh in their minds. But since like conditions
seldom recur, it can only rarely happen that like remedies are useful.
Wherefore, all, whether princes or republics, who hold the reins of
government, ought to think beforehand of the adverse times which may
await them, and of what help they may then stand in need; and ought so
to live with their people as they would think right were they suffering
under any calamity. And, whosoever, whether prince or republic, but
prince more especially, behaves otherwise, and believes that after the
event and when danger is upon him he will be able to win men over by
benefits, deceives himself, and will not merely fail to maintain his
place, but will even precipitate his downfall.