EPILOGUE
On 23 May 1968, several members of the 26th Marines who had fought
at Khe Sanh had a reunion of sorts in Washington, D. C. and the
surroundings were a far cry from the dirt and grime of the combat
base. The "CP" belonged to the President of the United States, Lyndon
B. Johnson. In the Cabinet Room of the White House, the Commander in
Chief paused to honor the men of the 26th Marines and awarded the
Presidential Unit Citation to the regiment. Colonel Lownds, whose
large handle-bar mustache had been shaved off at the direction of
"the highest possible authority"--his wife, and Sergeant Major Agrippa
W. Smith, senior enlisted man at the KSCB, were on hand to receive
the award. While it was fitting that the 26th Marines be cited as a
unit, the President also praised the South Vietnamese, U. S. Army, U.
S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, and Marine aviation and support units which
contributed so gallantly to the defense of the installation.(223)
In some quarters, however, there were still grumblings over the Khe
Sanh issue. During the siege, there had been a virtual storm of protest
from critics who opposed the Administration's decision to hold the
base. These doomsday prophets suffered from what some military experts
referred to as the "Dien Bien Phu Syndrome." Many noted intellectuals
were in the van of this group and throughout the battle they could not
be convinced that air and artillery support would provide the margin of
difference; they warned that the tiny base would suffer the same fate
which had been meted out to the French garrison 14 years earlier.(224)
[Illustration: During the presentation of the Presidential Unit
Citation to the 26th Marines, President Lyndon B. Johnson (C)
congratulates Sergeant Major Agrippa W. Smith (L) while Colonel David
E. Lownds (R) looks on.]
There are several reasons why Khe Sanh did not become another Dien Bien
Phu. The first and most obvious being that the Americans possessed the
overwhelming supporting arms which were not available to the French.
Contrary to the predictions of many critics, air and artillery were
decisive and more than made up for the numerical superiority of the
enemy. Over 100,000 tons of bombs and 150,000 artillery rounds were
delivered--and delivered intelligently--by the Americans during the
siege. Much of the credit goes to the regimental commander and his
staff who knew how to coordinate their different sources of firepower
to achieve maximum results. The NVA learned this during the five major
attacks against the base and hill outposts.
The ability to keep Khe Sanh resupplied was another major factor.
The NVA encirclement did not coincide with the monsoon season by
accident. With Route 9 interdicted, the fate of the garrison hinged
on the success or failure of the airlift and apparently the North
Vietnamese anticipated that it would fail. The fact that the airlift
was successful in the face of heavy enemy fire and the foulest weather
imaginable is indeed a tribute to the aircrews and recovery personnel
but the resupply effort went much deeper than just delivering the
goods. The Force Logistics Command at Da Nang augmented by U. S. Army
sources at Cam Ranh Bay was responsible for the mountain of supplies
and material which sustained the 26th Marines. An excerpt from the
works of Winston Churchill which was selected as the motto of the
Force Logistics Command best describes the vital role these logistics
agencies played: "Victory is the beautiful colored flower. Supply is
the stem without which it could never have blossomed."(225)
Another important facet of the defense was the close supervision and
leadership provided by the senior commanders, namely CG, 3d MarDiv,
CG, III MAF, and ComUSMACV. Since much of the supporting arms and all
of the logistical support was handled by agencies external to the 26th
Marines, constant coordination among these three headquarters was
imperative. General Tompkins was the pivotal figure of the triumvirate.
During his daily trips to the base, the general learned first hand
what the regimental commander needed; he not only saw that Colonel
Lownds received adequate support but he insured that the defenders made
the most of their resources. In so doing he exposed himself to heavy
enemy antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar fire as did General Cushman
during his periodic visits to Khe Sanh. Commenting on the strong role
played by the 3d Marine Division commander, General Cushman later said,
"General Tompkins made or approved every major decision during the
battle."(226)
The real hero of Khe Sanh, however, was on the opposite end of the rank
scale--the individual fighting man. For 77 days the defenders waited
in the trenchlines while the bulk of the credit and publicity went to
the artillery, fighter/bombers, and B-52s. On several occasions the
supporting arms could not prevent major enemy assaults from reaching
the wire; at this point, it was the Marines or ARVN Rangers, armed with
rifles, grenades, and bayonets, who stopped the North Vietnamese--often
in bitter hand-to-hand combat. Without exception, the battalion
commanders were lavish in their praise of the young Americans and South
Vietnamese who held the perimeter and denied the enemy a much-needed
victory. In spite of the inherent hardships which accompanied the siege
and the incessant shelling, the defenders were always itching for a
fight. The most overused expression during the battle was, "I wish they
(North Vietnamese) would hurry up and come so we can get this thing
over with." When asked by a reporter if the NVA troops could take Khe
Sanh, one officer answered, "Hell no, those 19-year-old Marines won't
let them."[75](227)
Finally, much of the credit for the American success at Khe Sanh
belongs to the NVA. The North Vietnamese obliged the 26th Marines
by standing toe to toe in a slugging contest during which they were
outgunned and outfought; in effect, the enemy destroyed himself. If
there was one salient feature which resulted in the enemy's defeat it
might well be his rigid adherence to a siege strategy in the face of
certain failure. Even when it became obvious that the Americans were
aware of their master plan, the North Vietnamese doggedly pursued
their siege tactics without alteration. The extremely lucrative target
presented by the massed NVA forces which ringed the base was one of the
main reasons the garrison was maintained. Thus, the question may be
legitimately asked, "Who besieged whom?"(228)
To a lesser degree, there was a controversy over who or what had won
the battle. Proponents of air power and strategic bombing were the most
vocal; they felt that the B-52 had been the most decisive instrument
of defense. While the Stratofortress was a valuable asset and, without
doubt played a major role, any attempt to single out one supporting
arm as the ultimate weapon in the battle would be futile. The B-52 was
but one part of an intricate defensive fire plan. The bombers struck
targets beyond 1,100 meters of the base; tactical air and artillery
took up the slack to within about 250 meters and the organic weaponry
of the defenders provided close-in fires. The system was balanced
and effective but, if any part were eliminated, the defenders would
have paid a much higher price in casualties. Both General Tompkins
and Colonel Lownds were unstinting in their praise of all supporting
arms, as well as the logistical effort; they stressed, and stressed
heavily, that the defense of Khe Sanh was a joint endeavor. The highly
successful results were achieved through the contributions of all U. S.
Services and the South Vietnamese. While the Marines had been unable to
find an infantryman who could carry a 27-ton payload, neither had the
U. S. Air Force come up with a B-52 which could man a foxhole. Both, in
their own way, were essential.(229)
The Khe Sanh story again became news in late June 1968 and the old
controversy over strategy was rekindled. Prior to leaving his post as
ComUSMACV on 11 June, General Westmoreland visited PCV Headquarters in
I Corps and approved the recommendations of Generals Cushman and Rosson
to raze the KSCB and withdraw all Allied forces to the Ca Lu area.
While General Westmoreland made the decision prior to his departure,
he did not close the base at that time, because mopping-up operations
were being conducted around Khe Sanh. In addition, large amounts of
supplies had been stockpiled there and the general deemed it more
economical to maintain the base while these stocks were consumed in
support of the operations rather than backhaul them to Ca Lu. For these
reasons, he left the choice concerning the optimum time to dismantle
the installation up to his successor, General Abrams. When bulldozers
finally began to level the bunkers and structures which had housed the
26th Marines throughout the siege, the American people wondered why
the base had been so tenaciously defended if it was to be eventually
abandoned. Had American blood been shed in vain? Critics of the
hold-out policy argued that, in the final analysis, they had been right
and those who decided to defend the base had been wrong. Such rationale
pinpointed the inability of many Americans to break away from the
techniques employed in past wars and recognize the peculiarities of the
conflict in Vietnam.
There were several reasons for the deactivation of the KSCB since,
for all practical purposes, the base had outlived its usefulness.
The rationale endorsed by General Cushman and General Rosson was
threefold. First, the enemy had reduced his forces and changed his
=modus operandi= in the Khe Sanh area. Secondly, the NVA artillery in
Laos had accurately targeted the base and access road which compounded
the casualty and resupply problems. Finally and most important, General
Cushman had sufficient assets in June to pursue the mobile offensive
strategy which he had advocated strongly for such a long time. Two U.
S. Army divisions (i.e. 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne) with their
inherent helicopter resources had been shifted to III MAF and, during
March and April, the tremendous logistics burden associated with
the introduction of these 50,000 men into northern I Corps had been
alleviated. Since he had sufficient maneuver elements to go on the
offense in western Quang Tri Province, General Cushman no longer needed
five battalions buttoned up in Khe Sanh.(230)
An additional consideration for the abandonment of the base was
President Johnson's announcement on 31 March that the U. S. would end
air strikes in North Vietnam.[76] While the decision was a major step
toward peace, it also enabled thousands of NVA support personnel who
were responsible for road repair in North Vietnam to move further
south. These workers constructed a network of infiltration arteries
which bypassed the combat base and the continued policy of positioning
static Allied defense installations in the path of these routes would
have been inefficient and undesirable. In this regard, the best defense
was a highly mobile offense and while a forward operating base for such
operations was essential, the LZ Stud/Ca Lu area was much better suited
than Khe Sanh.(231)
By the time PEGASUS was over, LZ Stud was in full operation. The
airstrip was extended to accommodate C-123s, a Force Logistics Area was
established, and local defenses were strengthened. The base was outside
the range of the North Vietnamese 130mm and 152mm guns in Laos and the
stretch of Route 9 from Ca Lu to the Rockpile and eventually Dong Ha
was easier to keep open. Thus, two factors--enemy shelling and resupply
problems--which had negated the effectiveness of Khe Sanh as a base of
operations were absent at LZ Stud.
While not physically located on the Khe Sanh Plateau, the forces at
LZ Stud controlled it. Two forward fire bases were established in
the vicinity of the old combat base from which extensive patrolling
was conducted. Ground patrols were supplemented by air surveillance.
Whenever contact with the enemy was made, lighting-fast helicopter
assaults were launched from LZ Stud and were supported by the artillery
of the forward fire bases, tactical aircraft, and Huey gunships.
The enemy was attacked by these mobile forces whenever and wherever
he appeared. When a major NVA unit was encountered, sufficient
reinforcements were also injected by helicopter. So, the only thing
that changed on the Khe Sanh Plateau, besides the face of the combat
base, was the style and tempo of operations.(232)
The new strategy by no means diminished the accomplishments of the
men who had held Khe Sanh; it was simply a continuation of the
battle in another form. When the leaders in Hanoi finally accepted
President Johnson's peace overtures and consented to meet with U. S.
representatives in Paris, there was one thing that the North Vietnamese
negotiators did not possess--the battle standard of the 26th Marines.
An editorial in the =Washington Star= provided an appropriate tribute
to the men of Khe Sanh:
To be sure, Khe Sanh will be a subject of controversy for a long
time, but this much about it is indisputable: It has won a large
place in the history of the Vietnam war as an inspiring example of
American and Allied valor. One day, in fact, the victory over the
siege may be judged a decisive turning point that finally convinced
the enemy he could not win.(233)
FOOTNOTES:
[75] Many of these young men exhibited a maturity beyond their years.
One message, scrawled on the back of a C-ration carton by an anonymous
Marine, was found after the siege. It read: "Life has a special flavor
to those who fight for it that the sheltered never know."
[76] The attacks were halted except in the area north of the
demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly
threatened Allied forward positions and where the movements of their
troops and supplies clearly related to that threat.
APPENDIX A
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND FOOTNOTES
=Explanatory Note=: Unless otherwise noted the material in this
monograph is derived from Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, and General
William C. Westmoreland, USA, =Report On The War In Vietnam=, hereafter
Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report On The War=; Maj John J. Cahill, USMC,
and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in
Vietnam, Jan-Jun65"; FMFPac, Operations of U. S. Marine Forces Vietnam,
Mar67-Apr68, hereafter =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=; FMFPac, U. S.
Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary, Volume
I: Narrative, hereafter =FMFPac HistSum=; III MAF Command Chronologies
Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =III MAF CmdChron=; 3d Marine Division Command
Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =3d MarDiv CmdChron=; 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =1st MAW
CmdChron=; 26th Marines Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter
=26th Marines CmdChron=; 1/26 Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68,
hereafter =1/26 CmdChron=; 2/26 Command Chronologies, Jan68-Apr68,
hereafter =2/26 CmdChron=; 3/26 Command Chronologies, Jun67-Apr68,
hereafter =3/26 CmdChron=; 3d Marines Khe Sanh Operations After Action
Report, 9Jun67, hereafter =3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR=; VMGR-152 Command
Chronologies Jan68-Apr68, hereafter =VMGR-152 CmdChron=; Marine Corps
Command Center, Status of Forces, Apr68, hereafter =MCCC Status of
Forces=; Defense Intelligence Bulletins Dec67-Apr68, hereafter =DIA
IntBul=; Six Month Evaluation Report, prepared by HQ, MACV 31May68;
Presentation of LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968 General
Officers Symposium Book, HQMC, dtd 15Jul68; CG, FMFPac msg to CMC
dtd 200327Z Mar68; Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
PEGASUS (C), hereafter =PEGASUS AAR=; Gen William C. Westmoreland ltr
to CMC dtd 14Dec68, Subj: Review of the draft manuscript "The Battle
of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Westmoreland Comments=; LtGen
Lewis W. Walt Interviews with HistBr dtd 17Dec67 and 14Jan69; LtGen
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, HQMC, dtd 26Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68,"
hereafter =Cushman Comments=; LtGen Herman Nickerson, USMC, memo to
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Review of draft
manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Nickerson
Comments=; LtGen William B. Rosson, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 18Dec68, Subj:
"The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Rosson Comments=;
LtGen John J. Tolson, III, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 21Jan69, Subj: "The
Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Tolson Comments=; MajGen Norman J.
Anderson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj:
Khe Sanh Historical Monograph, hereafter =Anderson Comments=; MajGen
Louis Metzger, USMC, memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC,
dtd 23Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter
=Metzger Comments=; MajGen John R. Chaisson comments on draft
manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Chaisson
Comments=; Interview with MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, USMC, dtd
26Aug68 No. 3088 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter
=Tompkins Interview=; Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) comments on draft
manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," dtd 9Dec68, hereafter =DCS/Air
Comments=; BGen Robert P. Keller, USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 17Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe
Sanh," hereafter =Keller Comments=; BGen Harry C. Olson, USMC, ltr
to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 13Jan69, Subj. "The Battle of Khe
Sanh," hereafter =Olson Comments=; BGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, ltr to
CMC (Code AO3D) dtd 22Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter
=Hoffman Comments=; Chief, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office ltr
to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Review of Historical
Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, Historical Studies Branch, USAF
Historical Division ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 22Jan69,
Subj: Review of Historical Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief,
Project CORONA HARVEST ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 15Jan69,
Subj: Review of Draft Manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter
=Air Force Historical Comments=; Interview with Col David E. Lownds,
USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 801 674/4 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC),
hereafter =Lownds Jul Interview=; Col David E. Lownds, USMC, Interview
with HistBr dtd 13Sep68, hereafter =Lownds Sep Interview=; Col Frank
E. Wilson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 6Jan69, Subj:
Review of "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Wilson Comments=; Col
Bruce F. Meyers, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 16Dec68,
Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Meyers Comments=; Interview
with Col Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd 24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Col Johnnie C. Vance, Jr.,
USMC, dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC);
Col Robert D. Brown, USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: "The
Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Brown Comments=; Col Robert E. Brofft,
USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: Monograph, "The Battle of
Khe Sanh," hereafter =Brofft Comments=; LtCol John F. Mitchell, USMC,
ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 31Jan69, Subj: Comments on "The
Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Mitchell Comments=; LtCol Harry L.
Alderman, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, Subj: "The Battle
of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Alderman Comments=; LtCol James B. Wilkinson,
USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Response
to HQMC ltr AO3D-rem S807 373 of 6Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh,"
hereafter =Wilkinson Comments=; LtCol John A. Hennelly, USMC, comments
on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh" of 15Feb69, hereafter
=Hennelly Comments=; Interview with LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna, USMC,
dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol
Francis J. Heath, Jr., USMC, comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle
of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Heath Comments=; LtCol Frederick
J. McEwan, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 30Dec68, Subj:
Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =McEwan
Comments=; LtCol Johnny O. Gregerson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC
dtd 3Jan69, Subj: Review of a draft copy of the historical monograph:
"The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Gregerson Comments=;
LtCol John C. Studt, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd 24Dec68, Subj:
"The Battle of Khe Sanh" manuscript, hereafter =Studt Comments=;
Interview with LtCol Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol William J. White, USMC,
comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68"
n.d., hereafter =White Comments=; Interview with Maj William J.
Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC); Maj John A. Shepherd, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC,
dtd 2Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter
Shepherd Comments; Taped comments of Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC,
on the draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" dtd
2Jan69, hereafter =Caulfield Comments=; Interview with Maj Matthew
P. Caulfield, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC); Maj Wayne M. Wills, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC,
dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Historical Monograph, "The Battle of Khe Sanh,
Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Wills Comments=; Maj Harper L. Bohr, USMC,
ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Comments concerning "The
Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Bohr Comments=; Maj Jerry E. Hudson,
USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Review of Historical
Monograph of Khe Sanh, hereafter =Hudson Comments=; Maj Mirza M.
Baig, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC dtd 23Dec68, Subj:
Comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68"
hereafter =Baig Comments=; Maj William H. Dabney, USMC, comments on
draft manuscript n.d., "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter
=Dabney Comments=; Maj William H. Dabney, USMC, Interview with HistBr
dtd 10Jan69; Maj Earl G. Breeding, USMC, comments on draft manuscript
dtd 22Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter
=Breeding Comments=; Interview with Capt Earl G. Breeding, dtd Jul68,
No. 2121 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj Kenneth W.
Pipes, USMC ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., Subj: Khe Sanh
Manuscript, hereafter =Pipes Comments=; Interview with Capt Kenneth
W. Pipes, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC); 1stLt James M. Alexander, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,
HQMC, n.d., Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter
=Alexander Comments=; Interview with 1stLt James M. Alexander, USMC,
dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC);
Interview with 1stLt William L. Everhart, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Sgt Timothy
B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC); Interview with HM3 Frank V. Calzia, USN, dtd Mar68, No. 2621
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LCpl Michael A. Barry, USMC,
Interview with HistBr dtd 17Feb69; Cornelius D. Sullivan, =et al.=,
=The Vietnam War: Its Conduct and Higher Direction= (Washington, D.
C.: The Center For Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1968)
(U), hereafter Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=; Bernard B. Fall,
=The Two Viet-Nams= (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965 ed.) (U);
Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, =Soldiers of the Sea= (Annapolis:
United States Naval Institute 1962 ed.) (U); Capt Ken Kashiwahara,
USAF, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh," =The Airman=, v. XII, no. 7 (Jul68) (U),
hereafter Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; =Washington Star=,
25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U); =Washington Star=, 9Jun68, p. 1-E
(Early Bird); =Baltimore Sun=, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U). All
documentary material cited is located in the HistBr, G-3 Division,
HQMC and, unless otherwise noted, carries an overall classification of
Secret.
FOOTNOTES:
(1) Major John J. Cahill, USMC and Jack Shulimson, "History of U.
S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65," pp. 67, 68,
126 (S).
(2) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jun67, pp. 5-12 (S).
(3) =Ibid.=
(4) =3d MarDiv CmdChron=, Oct68, p. 11 (S).
(5) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Mar67, p. 15 (S).
(6) =3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR=, p. 7 (S); Bernard B. Fall, =The Two
Viet-Nams= (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1965 ed.), p. 3.
(7) =Westmoreland Comments.=
(8) =3d Marines=, =Khe Sanh AAR=, p. 12 (S).
(9) Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt Interview with Historical
Branch dtd 17Dec68 and 14Jan69 (S).
(10) =3d Marines, Khe Sanh AAR=, pp, 7-30 (S).
(11) =Ibid.=
(12) =Ibid.=, pp. 32-33 (S).
(13) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, May67, p. 11 (S).
(14) =Ibid.=, pp. 7-10, 19 (S).
(15) =FMFPac HistSum=, pp. 7-17 (S).
(16) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jul67, pp. 9-13 (S).
(17) =Ibid.=
(18) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Sep67, pp. 52-73 (S); =3d
MarDiv ComdChron=, Sep67, p. 25 (S); Chaisson Comments; Personal
observations of the author.
(19) =Westmoreland Comments=; =Metzger Comments=.
(20) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Oct67, pp. 24-36 (S).
(21) =Metzger Comments.=
(22) =26th Marines CmdChron=, May67, p. 4 (S).
(23) =Ibid.=
(24) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jun67, p. 4 (S).
(25) =Ibid.=, Jul67, p. 4 (S).
(26) Col Lownds tape No. 801 674/4 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=,
Aug67, p. 4 (S); =Metzger Comments=.
(27) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(28) Col Lownds Tape No. 801 674/4 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=,
Aug67, p. 4 (S), =Brown Comments=.
(29) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Nov67, p. 4 (S).
(30) =Cushman Comments=; =Hoffman Comments=.
(31) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Dec67, p. 4 (S).
(32) =Alderman Comments.=
(33) =Bohr Comments.=
(34) =Hudson Comments.=
(35) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jan 68, pp. 8, 9; =III MAF
CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68,
p. 60 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(36) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 10 (S);
=Caulfield Comments=.
(37) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p.
4 (S).
(38) =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 3 (S).
(39) =2/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 2 (S).
(40) =Ibid.=; =Breeding Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(41) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =Lownds Sep
Interview= (S).
(42) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jan68, p. 10 (S).
(43) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =3/26 CmdChron=,
Jan68, p. 3 (S); =Alderman Comments=; =Dabney Comments=;
=Caulfield Comments=.
(44) =Ibid.=
(45) =Dabney Comments.=
(46) =Ibid.=; =26th CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =3/26
CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 3 (S); =Alderman Comments=; =Dabney
Comments=.
(47) =Ibid.=
(48) =Cushman Comments=; =Tompkins Interview= (S); =Lownds Sep
Interview= (S); =Wilkinson Comments=; =Pipes Comments=; =26th
Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 5 (S).
(49) =Caulfield Comments.=
(50) =Alderman Comments.=
(51) =Caulfield Comments.=
(52) =Ibid.=
(53) =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan 68, p. 3 (S); =Caulfield Comments=.
(54) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with Major Matthew P.
Caulfield, USMC dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Caulfield Comments=.
(55) =Dabney Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(56) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Lownds Sep
Interview=; =White Comments=.
(57) =Pipes Comments.=
(58) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(59) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Hudson Comments=.
(60) Interview with First Lieutenant William L. Everhart, dtd
10Feb68 No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S);
=Hennelly Comments=.
(61) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 9 (S); =FMFPac Marine Opns
in Vietnam=, Jan68, p. 11 (S); =Tompkins Interview= (S); =Hudson
Comments=.
(62) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(63) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 9 (S).
(64) =Cushman Comments.=
(65) =Ibid.=; =Westmoreland Comments=.
(66) =Westmoreland Comments.=
(67) =Ibid.=; Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 163.
(68) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 4, 11 (S); =Lownds Sep
Interview= (S).
(69) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =Baig Comments=.
(70) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(71) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Lownds Sep
Interview=; =Wilkinson Comments=.
(72) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =III MAF
CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3-10 (S).
(73) Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 158.
(74) Presentation of Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.,
USMC, in 1968 General Officers Symposium Book, dtd 15Jul68 (S).
(75) Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=, pp. 101-104.
(76) =Ibid.=, Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 235.
(77) =Ibid.=
(78) Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=, p. 99.
(79) =Ibid.=
(80) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(81) =Ibid.=
(82) =Ibid.=; CG FMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S).
(83) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(84) =Dabney Comments.=
(85) =Ibid.=
(86) =Ibid.=
(87) =Ibid.=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(88) =Dabney Comments.=
(89) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(90) =Mitchell Comments.=
(91) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S); =Tompkins Interview= (S).
(92) =Ibid.=; =Mitchell Comments=.
(93) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 8 (S); Interview with
Captain Earl G. Breeding, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 2121 (Oral
History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S): =Breeding Comments=.
(94) =Ibid.=
(95) =Ibid.=
(96) =Ibid.=; =Dabney Comments=.
(97) =Ibid.=
(98) =White Comments.=
(99) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8-10 (S); =Tompkins
Interview= (S).
(100) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul Interview= (S); =Hennelly Comments=.
(101) =Hennelly Comments.=
(102) =Hudson Comments.=
(103) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(104) =Lownds Sep Interview=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(105) =Anderson Comments.=
(106) =Westmoreland Comments=; =White Comments=; =26th Marines
CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 4-8 (S).
(107) =DIA IntBul.=
(108) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8, 48 (S); =Mitchell
Comments=.
(109) =Ibid.=
(110) Lance Corporal Michael A. Barry Interview with HistBr, dtd
17Feb69.
(111) =Ibid.=
(112) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8, 48, 49 (S); Mitchell
Comments.
(113) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 49 (S).
(114) =Ibid.=, p. 51 (S).
(115) =Air Force Historical Comments=; =1st MAW CmdChron=, Feb68,
p. 8 (S).
(116) =Wilkinson Comments=; =White Comments=.
(117) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 51 (S); Kashiwahara,
"Lifeline to Khe Sanh".
(118) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(119) =VMGR-152 CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 4 (S); =Gregerson Comments=.
(120) Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; =Meyers Comments=;
=Brown Comments=; =Air Force Historical Comments=.
(121) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(122) =Ibid.=
(123) Information provided by the Marine Corps Command Center on
19Feb68.
(124) =Ibid.=
(125) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); =Wilson Comments=.
(126) =Ibid.=
(127) =Dabney Comments.=
(128) =Ibid.=
(129) =Wilson Comments.=
(130) =DCS/Air Comments.=
(131) =Breeding Comments.=
(132) See =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to
CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S).
(133) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(134) CG FMFPac Msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S); =Lownds Jul
Interview= (S).
(135) See =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S).
(136) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(137) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S); =Lownds
Sep Interview=; Interview with Major William J. Sullivan,
USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC) (S); =Hennelly Comments=; =Gregerson Comments=; =Air
Force Historical Comments=.
(138) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S).
(139) =Ibid.=, Debrief Sheets (S).
(140) =Dabney Comments.=
(141) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Feb 68, p. 2-2 (S); =Pipes Comments.=
(142) Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd
2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (C).
(143) Information supplied by U. S. Air Force Public Information
Office, 16Oct68 (U); =Chaisson Comments=; =Air Force
Historical Comments=; =Brofft Comments=.
(144) =Tompkins Interview= (S).
(145) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Kashiwahara, "Lifeline
to Khe Sanh."
(146) =Air Force Historical Comments=; =26th Marines CmdChron=,
Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S); =Tompkins Interview=; =Baig Comments=.
(147) =Gregerson Comments.=
(148) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S); Interview with Major William J.
Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Gregerson Comments=.
(149) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with First Lieutenant
James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Hennelly Comments=.
(150) Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68,
No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview
with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No.
2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =26th Marines
CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar 68 (S); =Gregerson Comments=.
(151) =Ibid.=
(152) =Ibid.=
(153) =Lownds Interview=; =Hennelly Comments=.
(154) =Hennelly Comments.=
(155) =Baig Comments.=
(156) =Hennelly Comments.=
(157) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S);
=Baig Comments=.
(158) =Ibid.=
(159) =Baig Comments.=
(160) =Ibid.=
(161) =Ibid.=
(162) =Ibid.=; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. A.
Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC) (S); Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC,
=Soldiers of the Sea= (Annapolis: United States Naval
Institute 1962 ed.) p. 563.
(163) =Baig Comments.=
(164) Six Month Evaluation Report, HQ USMACV, 31May68 (S);
Interview with Colonel Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd 24Jun68,
No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(165) =1/26 CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to CMC dtd
200327Z Mar68 (S); Information provided by Research,
Development, and Study Division, HQMC, 8Nov68 (U); =Lownds
Jul Interview= (S).
(166) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); =Lownds Jul and
Sep Interviews= (S).
(167) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S).
(168) =Dabney Comments.=
(169) =Ibid.=
(170) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with Sergeant Timothy
B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(171) =Baltimore Sun=, 25 May, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U).
(172) Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC,
dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC) (S); Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC,
dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC)
(S); Interview with Colonel Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC,
dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC)
(S); Interview with Major John A. Shepherd, USMC, dtd 26Apr68,
No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(173) =Shepherd Comments.=
(174) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(175) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(176) =Ibid.=; =Tompkins Interview= (S).
(177) =Keller Comments.=
(178) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(179) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, Encl 1 (S).
(180) =Ibid.=
(181) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with HM3 Class Frank V.
Calzia, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC) (S).
(182) =Ibid.=; Interview with Captain Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC, dtd
Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(183) =Ibid.=
(184) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, Encl 1 (S).
(185) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(186) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, p. 4 (S); =Baig
Comments=.
(187) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =Wilkinson
Comments=.
(188) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview=.
(189) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, p. 8 (S).
(190) =Ibid.=, pp. 11, 12.
(191) =Ibid.=, p. 7.
(192) =Ibid.=, pp. 7, 8.
(193) =Ibid.=, p. 6.
(194) =Ibid.=, p. 10 (S).
(195) =Ibid.=; =White Comments=.
(196) =Ibid.=; =McEwan Comments=; =Pipes Comments=.
(197) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, pp. 9, 10, and Encl 1.
(198) =Ibid.=; =Baig Comments=.
(199) MCCC, Status of Forces, Apr 68 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview=
(S); =PEGASUS AAR=, pp. 1-4.
(200) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C); =Westmoreland Comments=; =Cushman
Comments=.
(201) =Ibid.=
(202) =Tolson Comments.=
(203) =Ibid.=
(204) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C); =Rosson Comments=.
(205) =Ibid.=
(206) =Ibid.=
(207) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(208) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C).
(209) =Ibid.=
(210) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S); =Tolson
Comments=.
(211) =PEGASUS AAR=, pp. 13, 14 (C).
(212) =Ibid.=, Encl 1.
(213) =Ibid.=
(214) =3/26 CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Studt Comments=; =Meyers
Comments=.
(215) =Ibid.=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(216) =Ibid.=; =Dabney Comments=.
(217) =Caulfield Comments.=
(218) =Meyers Comments.=
(219) =3/26 CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Meyers Comments=; =Studt
Comments=.
(220) =Caulfield Comments.=
(221) =PEGASUS AAR.=
(222) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Caulfield
Comments=.
(223) =Baltimore Sun=, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U); =Washington
Star=, 25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U).
(224) =Ibid.=
(225) =Olson Comments.=
(226) =Cushman Comments.=
(227) =Alderman Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(228) =Baig Comments.=
(229) =Tompkins Interview=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(230) =Westmoreland Comments=; =Cushman Comments=; =Rosson
Comments=.
(231) =Ibid.=
(232) =Ibid.=`
(233) =Washington Star=, 9Jun68, p. 1-E (Early Bird) (U).
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY
AAR After Action Report
ABCCC Airborne Command and Control Center
A-4 Skyhawk A single-seat, lightweight, jet attack
bomber in service with Navy and Marine
Corps squadrons. Built by Douglas.
AN/PRC-25 U. S.-built, short-range, portable,
frequency-modulated radio set used to
provide two-way communication in the
30 megacycle to 75.95 megacycle band.
AN/TPQ-10 U. S.-built, ground-based radar system
used to guide aircraft on bombing missions.
A-1 Skyraider U. S.-built, prop-driven, attack aircraft
built by Douglas.
Arc Light Operational name for B-52 strikes in South
Vietnam.
ARVN Army of The Republic of Vietnam.
A-6A Intruder U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine,
low-altitude, jet attack bomber
specifically designed to deliver ordnance
on targets completely obscured by weather
or darkness. Carries a heavier and more
varied load than any other U. S. naval
attack aircraft. Built by Grumman.
ASRT Air Support Radar Team
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
Bde Brigade
B-52 Stratofortress USAF eight-engine, swept-wing heavy jet
bomber. Built by Boeing.
BLT Battalion Landing Team
CAC Combined Action Company
CACO Combined Action Company Oscar
CavSqd (e.g. 1/9) 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry
C-4 Plastic explosives
CG, 1st MarDiv Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
CG, FMFPac Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific
CG, 3d MarDiv Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
CG, III MAF Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious
Force
ChiCom Chinese Communist
CH-53A Sea Stallion U. S.-built, single-rotor,
heavy assault transport helicopter powered
by two shaft-turbine engines with an
average payload of 12,800 pounds.
Full-sized rear opening with built-in
ramp permits loading of 105mm howitzer and
carriage. External sling will accommodate
a 155mm howitzer (towed). Carries crew of
3 plus 38 combat troops or 24 litters.
Built by Sikorsky.
CH-46D Sea Knight U. S.-built, medium transport,
twin-turbine, tandem rotor helicopter
with an average payload of 4,800 pounds.
Has rear loading ramp and external sling
mount. Carries crew of 3 plus 25 combat
troops or 15 litters and 2 attendants.
Built by Boeing.
CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
Claymore U. S.-built, directional antipersonnel
land mine employed above ground and
normally in an upright position.
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CmdChron Command Chronology
CO Commanding Officer
ComUSMACV Commander, U. S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam
CP Command Post
CS Designation for tear gas
DASC Direct Air Support Center
D-Day Day scheduled for the commencement of an
operation.
DIA IntBul Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence
Bulletin
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
EC-121 Super USAF and USN four-engine, prop-driven,
Constellation long-range, heavy transport modified with
special equipment for radar early warning
patrols and electronic warfare duty.
Built by Lockheed.
FADAC Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer
FDC Fire Direction Center
F-8 Crusader U. S. Navy and Marine Corps supersonic,
single-seat, single-engine, jet fighter
with afterburner. Primarily used in South
Vietnam in an attack role. Carries
air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance.
Built by LTV Vought Aeronautics.
F-4B Phantom II U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine,
two-seat, supersonic fighter/attack jet
with afterburners; has dual role of
interceptor and bomber. Of all U. S. naval
attack aircraft, F-4B carries second
largest payload. Built by McDonnell.
F-4C U. S. Air Force model of the Phantom II.
1st ACD 1st Air Cavalry Division
1st MarDiv 1st Marine Division
1st MAW 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
FOB-3 Forward Operating Base 3
F-100 Super Sabre Single-engine, jet (with afterburner)
sweptwing, supersonic fighter-bomber; in
production since 1953, the F-100 was the
first supersonic operational fighter
developed for the U. S. Air Force.
Carries air-to-air and air-to-ground
ordnance. Built by North American.
F-105 Thunderchief U. S. Air Force supersonic, single-seat,
single-engine, jet fighter/bomber with
afterburner. Built by Republic.
FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FO Forward Observer
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center
GCA Ground Controlled Approach
GPES Ground Proximity Extraction System
Grenade Launcher, U. S.-built, single-shot, break-open,
M-79 breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires
40mm projectiles and weighs approximately
6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained
rate of aimed fire of 5-7 rounds
per minute and an effective range of 375
meters.
Gun, 100mm M1944 Soviet-built, dual purpose field and
antitank gun introduced toward the close
of World War II; it weighs 7,628 pounds,
is 30.9 feet in length and has a muzzle
velocity of 900 meters per second. Maximum
range is 21,000 meters and maximum rate
of fire is 8-10 rounds per minute. Is
recognizable by long tube, double-barrel
muzzle brake, dual wheels, and sloping
shield.
Gun, 130mm Soviet-built fieldpiece which utilizes
either a limber for transport or is
self-propelled. Towed weapon weighs 19,000
pounds, is 38 feet in length, and has a
muzzle velocity of 930 meters per second.
Maximum range is 27,000 meters and maximum
rate of fire is 6-7 rounds per minute.
Tube has a multi-perforated muzzle brake.
Gun, 175mm U. S.-built, self-propelled gun which
weighs 62,100 pounds and fires a 147-pound
projectile to a maximum range of 32,800
meters. Maximum rate of fire is 1/2 round
per minute.
Hand Grenade, U. S.-manufactured, hand-thrown bomb,
Fragmentation which weighs approximately one pound,
M-26 and contains an explosive charge in a
body that shatters into small fragments;
it has an effective range of 40 meters.
H&I Harassment and Interdiction
H&S Co Headquarters and Service Company
HistBr Historical Branch
HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
Howitzer, 105mm U. S.-built, towed, general purpose light
M2A1 artillery piece; the weapon is mounted
on a carriage equipped with split box
trails and pneumatic tires. On-carriage
sighting and fire control equipment are
used both for direct and indirect fire.
The piece weighs 4,980 pounds, is 19.75
feet in length, has a muzzle velocity of
470 meters per second, and a maximum range
of 11,155 meters. Maximum rate of fire
is 4 rounds per minute.
Howitzer, 155mm U. S.-built, towed, medium artillery piece
M1 mounted on a two-wheel, split-trail
carriage with detachable spades. The
howitzer is fired from a three-point
suspension, with the trails spread and
the carriage resting upon an integral
firing jack, the wheels being clear of the
ground. The piece weighs 12,700 pounds,
is 24 feet long, has a muzzle velocity of
560 meters per second and a maximum range
of 15,080 meters. Maximum rate of fire
is 3 rounds per minute.
Howitzer, 8-inch U. S.-built, self-propelled heavy artillery
M-110 piece; 37 feet long tracked carriage is
identical to that of 175mm gun. M-110 has
a maximum range of 16,930 meters and a
rate of fire of 1/2 round per minute.
HQMC Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
KBA Killed By Air
KIA Killed In Action
KSCB Khe Sanh Combat Base
LAPES Low Altitude Proximity Extraction System
LSA Logistics Support Area
LZ Landing Zone
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAG Marine Aircraft Group
Machine Gun, U. S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated,
.50 Caliber air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs
approximately 80 pounds without mount or
ammunition; it has a sustained rate of
fire of 100 rounds per minute and an
effective range of 1,450 meters.
Machine Gun, M-60 U. S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated,
air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which
weighs approximately 23 pounds without
mount or ammunition; it has a sustained
rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and
an effective range of 1,100 meters.
____ Marines Designation of Marine regiment
MATCU Marine Air Traffic Control Unit
Medevac Medical evacuation
Mortar, 60mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,
single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon,
which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled
and fires an assortment of high explosive
and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum
rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and
sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per
minute; the effective range is 2,000
meters.
Mortar, 81mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,
single-shot, high angle of fire weapon,
which weighs approximately 115 pounds
when assembled and fires an assortment of
high explosive and pyrotechnic rounds;
it has a sustained rate of fire of 2 rounds
per minute and an effective range of
2,200-3,650 meters, depending upon the
ammunition used.
Mortar, 82mm Soviet-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,
single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon
which weighs approximately 123 pounds
when assembled and fires high explosive
and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum
rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and
a maximum range of 3,040 meters.
Mortar, 120mm Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built,
smooth-bore, drop or trigger fired,
single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon,
which weighs approximately 606 pounds when
assembled and fires high explosive and
pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum rate
of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a
maximum range of 5,700 meters.
Mortar, 4.2 inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded,
M2 drop-fired weapon consisting of tube,
baseplate and standard; weapon weighs 330
pounds, is 4 feet in length, and has a
maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of
fire is 20 rounds per minute and utilizes
both high explosive and pyrotechnic
ammunition. (Five M2s were employed at
KSCB)
Mortar, 4.2-inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded,
M98 Howtar mortar; a towed weapon, the Howtar is
mounted on a carriage with two pneumatic
tires. Tube and carriage weigh 1,289
pounds; maximum range is 5,500 meters.
(Two Howtars were employed at KSCB)
M-16 U. S.-built, magazine-fed, 5.62mm
gas-operated, air-cooled shoulder weapon
designed for either semiautomatic or full
automatic fire; fully loaded weighs 7.6
pounds, fires a maximum rate of 150-200
rounds per minute, and has a maximum
effective range of 460 meters.
9th MAB 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
9th MEB 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade
NVA North Vietnamese Army
O1-E U. S.-built, single engine, two-seat,
prop-driven light observation aircraft
built by Cessna.
Ontos U. S.-built, lightly-armored tracked
vehicle armed with six coaxially mounted
106mm recoilless rifles. Originally
designed as a tank killer, the Ontos is
primarily used in Vietnam to support the
infantry.
PCV Provisional Corps, Vietnam
PF Popular Forces
PMDL Provisional Military Demarcation Line
RC-292 U. S.-built, elevated, wide-band, modified
ground-plane antenna designed to operate
with and increase the distance range of
various radio sets.
Recoilless Rifle, U. S.-built, single-shot, recoilless,
106mm, M40A1 breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438
pounds when assembled and mounted for
firing; it has a sustained rate of fire
of 6 rounds per minute and an effective
range of 1,365 meters. The weapon can
be singly or Ontos mounted.
RF Regional Forces
RLT Regimental Landing Team
Rocket, 122mm A Soviet-built, four-piece, fin-stabilized,
9-foot long rocket weighing 125 pounds;
maximum range is approximately 17,000
meters. Launcher tube and mount weigh
121 pounds and are 8.1 feet in length.
RPG-2 A Soviet-and Chinese Communist-built
antitank grenade launcher; a smooth-bore,
muzzle-loaded, shoulder-fired, recoilless
weapon which fires a 40mm spin-stabilized
round. The weapon weighs 6.3 pounds, is
3.2 feet in length, has a muzzle velocity
of 84 meters per second, and an effective
range of 100 meters. Maximum rate of fire
is 4-6 rounds per minute utilizing High
Explosive Antitank ammunition.
SLF Special Landing Force
S-2 Intelligence section or officer
TA-4 Two-seat trainer model of the A-4 Skyhawk
TAC(A) Tactical Air Controller (Airborne)
TAFDS Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System
Tank, PT-76 Soviet-built, 15.4-ton, amphibious tank
with a crew of 3; primary armament is
turret mounted 76mm gun and maximum
thickness of armor is 0.6 inches.
Tank, M-48 U. S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew
of 4; primary armament is turret-mounted
90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one
.50 caliber machine gun. Can be configured
with water fording equipment.
Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour
and an average range of 195 miles.
TAOR Tactical Area Of Responsibility
TET Vietnamese Lunar New Year
3d MarDiv 3d Marine Division
III MAF III Marine Amphibious Force
TIO Target Intelligence/Information Officer
TOT Time On Target
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UH-1E A single-engine, Marine, light
Huey Gunship attack/transport helicopter noted for its
maneuverability and firepower; carries a
crew of three with seven combat troops or
three litters, two sitting casualties and
a medical attendant, or 3,000 pounds of
cargo. It is armed with air to ground
rocket packs and fuselage mounted,
electrically fired machine guns.
UH-34D A single-engine, Marine, medium transport
Sea Horse helicopter with a crew of three; carries
16-18 combat troops or 8 litters or a
normal 5,000 pound payload.
USAF United States Air Force
USA United States Army
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
VC Viet Cong
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VHF Very High Frequency
Viet Minh The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam,
Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led
coalition of nationalist groups which
actively opposed the Japanese in World
War II and the French in the early years
of the Indo-China War.
VMA Marine Attack Squadron
VMFA Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron
VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler Transport
Squadron
VMO Marine Observation Squadron
VNAF Vietnamese Air Force
VT Variable Timed fuze for artillery shell
which causes airburst over target area.
APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY
1962
Aug U. S. Army Special Forces establish CIDG camp at
Khe Sanh.
1966
Apr 1/1 sweeps Khe Sanh plateau during Operation
VIRGINIA.
Oct 1/3 occupies KSCB; CIDG displaces to Lang Vei.
1967
Feb 1/3 replaced by single company, E/2/9.
15 Mar Company B, 1/9, replaces E/2/9 as resident defense
company.
20 Apr Combat assets at KSCB pass to operational control
of Col Lanigan's 3d Marines which commences Operation
PRAIRIE IV.
24 Apr B/1/9 patrol engages large enemy force north of
Hill 861 and prematurely triggers attack on Khe
Sanh; "Hill Fights" begin.
25 Apr 2/3 and 3/3 airlifted to KSCB to counter enemy drive.
28 Apr After heavy prep fires, LtCol DeLong's 2/3 assaults
and seizes first objective--Hill 861.
2 May LtCol Wilder's 3/3 seizes Hill 881S after four days
of heavy fighting.
3 May 2/3 repulses strong enemy counterattack south of
881N.
5 May 2/3 secures final objective--Hill 881N.
11-13 "Hill Fights" terminate with 940 NVA and 155 Marine
May KIA. 3d Marines shuttled to Dong Ha as 26th Marines
(FWD) and 1/26 move into Khe Sanh.
13 May Col Padley, CO 26th Marines (FWD), relieves Col
Lanigan as Senior Officer Present at Khe Sanh.
Elements of 1/26 occupy combat base, Hills 881S,
861, and 950. Operation CROCKETT commences.
13 Jun Due to increasing enemy contacts, LtCol Hoch's
3/26 airlifted to KSCB.
16 Jul Operation CROCKETT terminates with 204 NVA and 52
Marines KIA.
17 Jul Operation ARDMORE begins.
12 Aug Col Lownds relieves Col Padley as CO, 26th Marines.
13 Aug Due to lack of significant contact around Khe Sanh,
Company K and L, 3/26, transferred to 9th Marines
and Operation KINGFISHER.
17 Aug Khe Sanh airfield closed to normal traffic for
repair of runway.
3 Sep Remainder of 3/26 withdrawn to eastern Quang Tri
Province.
27 Oct Air strip reopened to C-123 aircraft.
31 Oct Operation ARDMORE terminated with 113 NVA and 10
Marines KIA.
1 Nov Operation SCOTLAND I begins.
28 Nov MajGen Tompkins assumes command of 3d MarDiv.
13 Dec LtCol Alderman's 3/26 returns to Khe Sanh because
of increased enemy activity in Khe Sanh TAOR.
21 Dec 3/26 conducts five-day sweep west of base and uncovers
evidence of enemy buildup around KSCB.
1968
2 Jan Five NVA officers killed near western edge of main
perimeter.
Intelligence reports indicate influx of two NVA
divisions, and possibly a third, into Khe Sanh TAOR.
16-17 LtCol Heath's 2/26 transferred to operational control
Jan of 26th Marines and arrive KSCB; 2/26 occupies Hill
558 north of base.
ASRT-B of MASS-3 displaces from Chu Lai to Khe Sanh
to handle ground controlled radar bombing missions.
17 Jan Team from Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion
ambushed near Hill 881N.
19 Jan While searching ambush site, patrol from I/3/26 comes
under fire from estimated 25 NVA troops and withdraws
under cover of supporting arms. Two platoons
from M/3/26 helilifted to Hill 881S as reinforcements
for I/3/26 which prepares for sweep toward
881N the next day.
20 Jan Capt Dabney's I/3/26 attacks and, with the aid of
air and artillery, badly mauls NVA battalion entrenched
on southern slopes of 881N; 7 Marines and
103 North Vietnamese KIA.
On strength of testimony of captured NVA lieutenant
that enemy attack is imminent, I/3/26 is withdrawn
to 881S and base placed on Red Alert.
DASC of MASS-3 displaces to Khe Sanh.
20-21 Estimated NVA battalion attacks K/3/26 on Hill 861.
Jan After penetrating southwestern portion of Marines'
perimeter, the enemy is repulsed leaving 47 dead; NVA
reserves are hit by heavy air strikes and artillery
fire.
21 Jan KSCB comes under heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket
attack which destroys main ammunition dump. NVA
battalion attacks and partially overruns Khe Sanh
village before CAC and RF companies drive off enemy.
After second attack, Col Lownds withdraws defenders
to confines of combat base.
22 Jan ComUSMACV initiates Operation NIAGARA to provide
massive air support for Khe Sanh.
LtCol Mitchell's 1/9 arrives KSCB and takes up positions
which encompass rock quarry southwest of
combat base.
E/2/26 is relocated from Hill 558 to prominent ridgeline
northeast of 861 as covering force for flank of
2/26; E/2/26 passes to operational control of 3d
Battalion. New position is called 861A.
23-28 Large number of tribesmen and families are evacuated
Jan from Khe Sanh area to avoid hostile fire.
27 Jan 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion arrives KSCB and takes up
positions in eastern sector of combat base.
30 Jan Communists launch nation-wide TET Offensive.
5 Feb NVA battalion attacks E/2/26 on Hill 861A in concert
with heavy shelling of KSCB. Enemy gains foothold
in northern sector of Company E perimeter but is
driven out by savage counterattack; 109 NVA and 7
Marines KIA.
7 Feb Special Forces camp at Lang Vei overrun by enemy
battalion supported by PT-76 Soviet-built tanks;
first use of NVA tanks in South Vietnam.
8 Feb Some 3,000 indigenous personnel, both military and
civilian, from Lang Vei move overland to Khe Sanh.
After being searched and processed, several hundred
refugees are air evacuated.
8 Feb A/1/9 combat outpost 500 meters west of 1/9 perimeter
hit and partially overrun by reinforced NVA battalion.
During three-hour battle, reinforcements drive NVA
from Marine position and with aid of supporting arms
kill 150 North Vietnamese; Col Lownds decides to
abandon outpost and units withdraw to 1/9 perimeter.
10 Feb Marine C-130 of VMGR-152, hit by enemy fire during
approach, crashes after landing at Khe Sanh and six
are killed.
Feb-Apr Paradrops, low-altitude extraction systems, and
helicopters are primary means of resupplying 26th
Marines due to bad weather and heavy enemy fire.
21 Feb After heavy mortar and artillery barrage, NVA company
probes 37th ARVN Ranger lines but withdraws after
distant fire fight. It is estimated that 25-30 NVA
were killed.
23 Feb KSCB receives record number of incoming rounds for
a single day--1,307.
First appearance of enemy trench system around KSCB.
25 Feb B/1/26 patrol ambushed south of KSCB; 23 Marines KIA.
29 Feb-1 Estimated NVA regiment maneuvers to attack 37th ARVN
Mar Ranger positions but fail to reach defensive wire.
6 Mar USAF C-123 shot down east of runway; 43 USMC, 4 USAF,
and 1 USN personnel killed.
7 Mar Large groups of refugees begin to filter into
the combat base and are evacuated.
8 Mar ARVN patrols attack enemy trenchline east of runway
and kill 26 North Vietnamese.
15 Mar American intelligence notes withdrawal of major NVA
units from Khe Sanh area.
23 Mar KSCB receives heaviest saturation of enemy rounds for
the month of March--1,109.
24 Mar A/1/9 patrol kills 31 NVA west of 1/9 perimeter.
25 Mar 1/9 CavSqd, 1st ACD begins reconnaissance in force
operations east of Khe Sanh in preparation for
Operation PEGASUS.
30 Mar B/1/26 attacks enemy fortified position south of combat
base and kills 115 North Vietnamese; 9 Marines are KIA.
Operation SCOTLAND I terminates with 1,602 confirmed
NVA and 205 Marines KIA; estimates place probable
enemy dead between 10,000 and 15,000.
Task Force KILO launches diversionary attack along
Gio Linh coastal plain to divert attention away from
Ca Lu where 1st ACD, and 1st Marines are staging for
Operation PEGASUS.
1 Apr Operation PEGASUS begins; 2/1 and 2/3 (1st Marines)
attack west from Ca Lu along Route 9. Elements of
3d Bde, 1st ACD conduct helo assaults into LZ Mike
and Cates. Joint engineer task force begins repair
of Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh.
3 Apr 2d Bde, 1st ACD assaults LZs Tom and Wharton.
4 Apr 1/5 CavSqd moves northwest from LZ Wharton and attacks
enemy units near old French fort; 1st Battalion, 9th
Marines moves southeast from rock quarry and assaults
Hill 471.
5 Apr 1/9 repulses enemy counterattack on Hill 471 and
kills 122 North Vietnamese.
1st Bde, 1st ACD departs Ca Lu and assaults LZ Snapper.
6 Apr One company of 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force airlifted
to KSCB for the initial link up with defenders.
Elements of 2d Bde, 1st ACD relieve 1st Battalion, 9th
Marines on Hill 471; 1/9 commences sweep to northwest
toward Hill 689.
6 Apr 1st Bde, 1st ACD helilifted north of KSCB. 2/26 and
3/26 push north of combat base; Company G, 2/26 engages
enemy force and kills 48 NVA.
8 Apr 2/7 CavSqd links up with 26th Marines and conducts
official relief of combat base. 1/26 attacks to
the west.
3d ARVN Airborne Task Force air assaults into LZ Snake
west of Khe Sanh and kills 78 North Vietnamese.
10 Apr LtGen Rosson arrives Khe Sanh and directs LtGen Tolson
to disengage and prepare for Operation DELAWARE in
A Shau Valley.
11 Apr Engineers complete renovation of Route 9 and road is
officially opened.
Elements of 1st ACD begin withdrawal to Quang Tri City
in preparation for Operation DELAWARE; 37th ARVN
Ranger Battalion airlifted to Da Nang.
12 Apr Col Meyers relieves Col Lownds as CO, 26th Marines.
14 Apr 3/26 attacks Hill 881N and kills 106 NVA; 6 Marines
are KIA.
15 Apr Operation PEGASUS terminated; Operation SCOTLAND II
begins.
18 Apr 26th Marines withdrawn to Dong Ha and Camp Carroll.
23 May President Johnson presents the Presidential Unit
Citation to 26th Marines and supporting units during
White House ceremony.
23 Jun Although forward fire support bases are maintained in
Khe Sanh area, the KSCB is dismantled and abandoned.
LZ Stud at Ca Lu is selected as base for air mobile
operations in western DMZ area.
APPENDIX D
=TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 24 APRIL-13 MAY 1967=
=A. 3D MARINES (-) (REIN)= 24APR-13MAY67
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 24APR-13MAY67
2D BATTALION (REIN) 26APR-13MAY67
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY(-)(REIN)
DET, HQBN, 3D MARDIV
DET, HQCO, 3D MAR
DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1ST BN, 12TH MAR
DET, 15TH DENTAL CO
2D CLEARING PLT (REIN), CO B, 3D MED BN
1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN
1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D MT BN
1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN
DET, LSU, FLC
COMPANY E (REIN)
1ST SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT
FAC TEAM
DET, MED PLT
DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC
DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12
1ST SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN
DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN
COMPANY F (REIN)
DET, H&S CO
2D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT
FAC TEAM
DET, MED PLT
DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC
DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12
2D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN
DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN
COMPANY G (REIN)
DET, H&S CO
3D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT
DET, MED PLT
DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC
DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12
COMPANY H (REIN)
DET, H&S CO
4TH SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT
FAC TEAM
DET, MED PLT
DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC
DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12
3D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN
DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN
COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67
COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67
COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 13 MAY 67
COMPANY D, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67
COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 12-13MAY67
3D PLT (REIN), CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN
2D PLT (REIN), CO A, AT BN
3D PLT, CO B, 3D RECON BN
2D PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D TANK BN
106MM RR PLT
3D BATTALION (-) (REIN)
COMMAND GROUP "A"
COMPANY K 25-27APR67
FO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12
DET, H&S CO
FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT
FAC TEAM (-)
DET, MED PLT
COMPANY M 27APR-1MAY67
FO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12
FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT
SCOUT/DOG TEAM
SCOUT TEAM, 3/3
COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 25-27APR67
COMPANY K, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 25APR-13MAY67
COMPANY M, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 29APR-13MAY67
COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES 1MAY-3MAY67
COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 5-13MAY67
COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 12-13MAY67
BASE DEFENSE/RESERVE
COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 24-27APR67
COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES 27APR-1MAY67
COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 1-12MAY67
COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 4-5MAY67
1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 12-13MAY67
SUPPORTING UNITS
DIRECT SUPPORT
BATTERY F (REIN), 2/12 24APR-13MAY67
BATTERY B, 1/12 27APR-11MAY67
BATTERY A, 1/12 13MAY
TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 20 JANUARY-1 APRIL 1968
=A. 26TH MARINES=
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 20JAN-31MAR68
1ST BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
2D BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
3D BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
=B. ATTACHED AND SUPPORTING UNITS=
=(1) U. S. MARINE CORPS=
1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES (LESS CO "C") 22JAN-31MAR68
CO "C", 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 23JAN-31MAR68
1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES 20JAN-31MAR68
1ST PROV, 155MM HOWITZER BTRY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 1ST SEARCHLIGHT BTRY 12TH MARINES 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 3D ENGINEER BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "B", 3D RECON BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
3D PLATOON, COMPANY "D", 3D RECON
BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
1ST PLATOON, COMPANY "A", 5TH RECON
BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "A" (-) 3D ANTITANK
BATTALION (REDESIGNATED ANTITANK
COMPANY (-), 3D TANK BATTALION) 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "A", 3D SHORE PARTY BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68
DET, H&S COMPANY, 3D SHORE PARTY
BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68
2D CLEARING PLATOON, COMPANY "C"
3D MED BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68
OTTER PLATOON, H&S COMPANY
3D MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, COMPANY "B", 9TH MOTOR
TRANSPORT BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, COMPANY "A", 9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT
BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, SU#1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 3D DENTAL COMPANY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEADQUARTERS
BATTALION, 3D MARINE
DIVISION (POSTAL, PHOTO, EXCHANGE,
ISO, AO'S, STAFF AUGMENT) 20JAN-31MAR68
COMBINED ACTION COMPANY "O"
3D COMBINED ACTION GROUP, III MAF 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, COMM CO, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION,
3D MARINE DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 5TH COMM BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 7TH COMM BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND 20JAN-31MAR68
SUB-TEAM #1, 17TH INTERROGATOR-TRANSLATOR
TEAM 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "B", 3D TANK BATTALION, 3D
MARINE DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET "01", HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE
SQUADRON, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 20JAN-31MAR68
DET "01", MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON,
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 15MAR-31MAR68
DET "2" MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON
3, MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP-18 16JAN-31MAR68
DET, HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE
SQUADRON-36, MARINE AIRCRAFT
GROUP-36 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT-62,
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-36 20JAN-31MAR68
=(2) U. S. NAVY=
DET "B", CONSTRUCTION BATTALION,
MOBILE UNIT-301 20JAN-11FEB68
DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-10 20JAN-19FEB68
DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-53 20JAN-13FEB68
DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-5 20JAN-24JAN68
=(3) U. S, ARMY=
DET. A-101, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 44TH ARTILLERY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 65TH ARTILLERY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 238TH COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR
UNIT, 108TH FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP 22JAN-31MAR68
DET, 1ST PLATOON (SMOKE), 25TH
CHEMICAL COMPANY 9FEB-31MAR68
544TH SIGNAL DET, 37TH SIGNAL
BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
=(4) U. S. AIR FORCE=
DET, (OPERATING LOCATION AJ), 15TH
AERIAL PORT SQUADRON 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 366TH TRANSPORT SQUADRON, 366TH
COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 903D AERO MED EVAC SQDN 20JAN-31MAR68
DET "A", 834TH AIR DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68
=ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM=
37TH ARVN RANGER BATTALION 27JAN-1APR68
APPENDIX E
=COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 3D MARINES, 24 APR-13 MAY 1967=
(Period covered during "The Hill Fights")
=3D MARINES=
Commanding Officer Col John P. Lanigan
(24Apr67-13May67)
Executive Officer LtCol Jack Westerman
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-1 WO Charles M. Christensen
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-2 Capt Adolfo Sgambelluri
(24Apr67-7May67)
Capt James D. McGowan
(8May67-13May67)
S-3 Maj Floyd A. Karker
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-4 Maj Howard L. Long
(24Apr67-13May67)
Communications Officer Capt Curtis G. Arnold
(24Apr67-1May67)
Capt George W. Brooks
(2May67-13May67)
=2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Earl R. DeLong
(24Apr67-13May67)
Executive Officer Maj Wendell O. Beard
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-1 2dLt Billy L. Heaton
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-2 Capt Robert N. Bogard
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-3 Capt Douglas W. Lemon
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-4 Capt Robert R. Green
(24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Headquarters and Service Company Capt Stuart R. Vaughan
(24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "E" Capt Alfred E. Lyon
(24Apr67-3May67)
1stLt John F. Adinolfi
(4May67-12May67)
Capt Alfred E. Lyon
(13May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "F" Capt Martin Sorensen
(24Apr67-9May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "G" Capt James P. Sheehan
(24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "H" Capt Raymond C. Madonna
(24Apr67-13May67)
=3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Gary Wilder
(24Apr67-13May67)
Executive Officer Maj Rudolph S. Sutter
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-1 2dLt John C. Ralph
(24Apr67-11May67)
S-2 2dLt Evander R. McIver III
(24Apr67-11 May67)
2dLt Michael T. Montgomery
(12May67-13May67)
S-3 Capt Thomas A. Stumpf
(24Apr67-13May67)
S-4 SSgt William T. Pope
(24Apr67-30Apr67)
1stLt John H. Admire
(1May67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Headquarters and Service Company Capt Robert W. Poolaw
(24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "I" Capt Christian L. Harkness
(24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "K" Capt Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr.
(24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "L" Capt John W. Ripley
(24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer
Company "M" Capt William R. Griggs
(24Apr67-13May67)
APPENDIX F
=COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 26TH MARINES, 20 JAN-1 APR 1968=
(Period covered in Presidential Unit Citation)
=26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer Col David E. Lownds
(12Aug67-1Apr68)
Executive Officer LtCol Louis A. Rann
(28Sep67-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Robert J. Mariz
(29Jan68-29Jan68)(KIA)
Capt Arnold R. Nelson
(30Jan68-8Feb68)
Capt Anthony V. Latorre, Jr.
(9Feb68-1Apr68)
S-2 Capt Harper L. Bohr, Jr.
(1Aug67-7Feb68)
Maj Jerry E. Hudson
(8Feb68-17Mar68)
Capt Thorvald P. E. Holm
(18Mar68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Wayne M. Wills
(1Aug67-22Jan68)
LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna
(23Jan68-1Apr68)
S-4 Maj Aubrey L. Lumpkin
(17Mar68-1Apr68)
Communications Officer Maj John A. Shepherd
(16Nov67-1Apr68)
=1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol James B. Wilkinson
(5Jul67-29Feb68)
LtCol Frederick J. McEwan
(1Mar68-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Charles E. Davis III
(23Dec67-31Jan68)
Maj Howard J. McCarty
(1Feb68-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Stephen A. Fitzgerald
(13Dec67-31Jan68)
1stLt William J. Ferral
(1Feb68-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Anthony E. Sibley
(6Dec67-13Feb68)
1stLt Ernest E. Spencer
(14Feb68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Bruce A. Greene
(23Dec67-29Jan68)
Maj Charles E. Davis III
(30Jan68-1Apr68)
S-4 Capt Robert C. Onslow
(6Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Headquarters and Service Company 1stLt Robert A. Brown
(20Dec67-16Feb68)
1stLt Paul G. Lojkovic
(17 Feb68-20Mar68)
Capt Lajon R. Hutton
(21Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "A" Capt Ray G. Snyder
(15Dec67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "B" Capt Kenneth W. Pipes
(20Dec67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "C" Capt David L. Ernst
(15Jan68-15Feb68
2dLt Paul W. Bush
(16Feb68-2Mar68)
Capt Walter J. Egger
(3Mar68-22Mar68)
Capt Lawrence E. Seaman, Jr.
(23Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "D" 1stLt Ernest E. Spencer
(1Aug67-13Feb68)
Capt Edward J. Hughes, Jr.
(14Feb68-1Apr68)
=2D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr.
(Jan68-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Royce L. Bond
(Jan68-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Richard J. Gustafson
(16Jan-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Edwin R. Matthews
(Jan68-11Feb68)
SSgt Horace E. Roland
(12Feb68-9Mar68)
1stLt John C. Wainio
(10Mar68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Gerald F. Kurth
(Jan68-1Apr68)
S-4 Capt Erwin J. Martikke, Jr.
(Jan68-18Mar68)
Capt Earle G. Breeding, Jr.
(19Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Headquarters and Service Company Capt Stanley M. Hartman
(Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "E" Capt Earle G. Breeding Jr.
(Jan68-8Mar68)
1stLt Joseph R. Meeks
(9Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "F" Capt Charles F. Divelbiss
(Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "G" Capt Lee R. Overstreet
(Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "H" Capt Charles O. Broughton
(Jan68-1Apr68)
=3D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Harry L. Alderman
(21Aug67-14Mar68)
LtCol John C. Studt
(15Mar68-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Joseph M. Loughran, Jr.
(9Sep67-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Edward J. Paurazas Jr.
(21Dec67-1Apr68)
S-2 2dLt Jay G. Marks, Jr.
(14Jan68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Matthew P. Caulfield
(24Nov67-1Apr68)
S-4 1stLt Jack A. Brage
(16Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Headquarters and Service Company Capt Alfred Lardizabal, Jr.
(29Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "I" Capt William H. Dabney
(24Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "K" Capt Norman J. Jasper, Jr.
(23Nov67-22Jan68)
1stLt Jerry Saulsbury
(23Jan68-27Jan68)
Capt Paul L. Snead
(28Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "L" Capt Richard D. Camp, Jr.
(30Jun67-29Jan68)
Capt William F. Hurley
(30Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "M" Capt John J. Gilece, Jr.
(29Nov67-31Jan68)
1stLt John T. Esslinger
(1Feb68-23Mar68)
Capt Walter R. Jenkins
(24Mar68-1Apr68)
=1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol John F. Mitchell
(1Jan68-31Mar68)
LtCol John J. H. Cahill
(1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Joseph A. Donnelly
(1Jan68-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Peter A. Woog
(1Jan68-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Robert J. Arboleda
(1Jan68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Edward M. Ringley
(1Jan68-16Feb68)
Capt Charles B. Hartzell
(17Feb68-10Mar68)
Maj Ted R. Henderson
(11Mar68-1Apr68)
S-4 1stLt John M. Georgi
(1Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Headquarters and Service Company 1stLt Michael J. Walker
(9Jan68-13Feb68)
Capt John W. Cargile
(14Feb68-31Mar68)
Capt Edward R. Miller, Jr.
(1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "A" Capt Henry J. M. Radcliffe
(1Jan68-31Mar68)
Capt. Henry D. Banks
(1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "B" Capt Robert T. Bruner
(1Jan68-26Jan68)
1stLt Arthur N. Mangham, Jr.
(27Jan68-2Feb68)
Capt John R. Williams, Jr.
(3Feb68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "C" Capt John W. Cargile
(9Jan68-13Feb68)
Capt Ralph H. Flagler
(14Feb68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "D" Capt Don F. Schafer
(1Jan68-31Mar68)
Capt John W. Cargile
(1Apr68)
=1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol John A. Hennelly
(10Dec67-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Ronald W. Campbell
(13Jul67-1Apr68)
S-1 2dLt Daniel W. Kelly
(19Nov67-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Walter K. Jones
(21Dec67-4Mar68)
1stLt Leslie M. Palm
(5Mar68-1Apr68)
S-3 Capt Lawrence R. Salmon
(13Jul67-8Mar68)
Maj Gerald R. Houchin
(9Mar68-1Apr68)
S-4 1stLt Harold P. Klunk
(1Dec67-20Feb68)
Capt Tommy J. Hicks
(21Feb68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Headquarters Battery 1stLt Ralph W. Dunn, Jr.
(2Aug67-20Feb68)
1stLt Walter K. Jones
(21Feb68-15Mar68)
Capt Jerome P. Rogers
(16Mar68-21Mar68)
1stLt Jacob W. Hughes, Jr.
(22Mar68-lApr68)
Commanding Officer
Battery "A" Capt Dennis L. Pardee
(Aug67-29Feb68)
Capt Victor B. Snider
(1Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Battery "B" 1stLt George G. Wood
(21Jan68-29Feb68)
Capt James C. Uecker
(1Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Battery "C" Capt William J. O'Connor
(28Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Mortar Battery Capt Michael T. Pierson
(5Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
1st Provisional 155
Howitzer Battery, 3/12 Capt Joseph Taylor
(5Jan68-29Feb68)
Capt Stephen J. Hayes
(1Mar68-1Apr68)
=ATTACHED UNITS=
Commanding Officer
Company "A", 3d AT Battalion Capt James O. Lea
(20Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "B", 3d Tank Battalion Capt Daniel W. Kent
( -24Jan68)
Capt Claude W. Reinke
(25Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer
Company "A", 3d Shore Party
Battalion 1stLt Robert L. Singleton
(28Jan68-4Mar68)
Maj Howard W. Wahlfeld
(5Mar68-1Apr68)
[Illustration: APPENDIX G]
The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia
in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown
here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed
to five points, this device has continued on Marine buttons to the
present day.
[Illustration]
End of Project Gutenberg's The Battle for Khe Sanh, by Moyers S. Shore