THE TURNING POINT
While the supporting arms continued to whittle away at the enemy's
strength, the defensive posture of the 26th Marines grew more
formidable with each passing day. By the end of February, the
Americans and South Vietnamese had erected some 510 bunkers, dug
miles of trenchline, and laid hundreds of minefields and trip flares.
Each sector was guarded by a maze of double-apron, tanglefoot, and
concertina barbed wire obstacles.[60] The Marines also had sophisticated
anti-infiltration equipment such as the Night Observation Device, the
PPS-6 ground-surveillance radar, and the Starlight Scope; all of which
could detect infiltrators along the wire during night-time and other
periods of reduced visibility.(165) Wherever these apparatus were
employed, the number of enemy killed along the perimeters increased and
the number of probes decreased.
In addition to the standard issue, the men improvised many of their
own jerry-rigged gadgets. Drawing from his childhood experiences on
the farm, Colonel Lownds devised a type of electric fence which was
employed along some of the company fronts in the main perimeter. The
plan was simple; the Marines figured out which strands of barbed wire
the enemy would more than likely cut to penetrate those obstacles and
they attached trip wire in a circuit. Flashlight batteries were the
power source and the network of wires tied into a central switchboard
located in each company CP. When a North Vietnamese soldier clipped
the barbed wire, he short-circuited the system and one of the warning
lights on at the switchboard went out. A few grenades in the right
place or a broadside from a Claymore mine and the snooper usually
became another grim statistic.
On the hill outposts, the =fougasse= was used extensively. The Marines
dug holes along the slopes which faced the enemy and embedded barrels
or cans of mixed gasoline and diesel fuel. The detonator for this
volatile concoction was usually a grenade, a blasting cap, or a pound
of C-4 plastic explosive taped to the container. The triggering device
was a wire leading back up the hill to the Marine positions. When
attacked, the defender simply jerked the wire and detonated the lethal
munitions.(166)
The Scout Sniper Platoon attached to the 26th Marines provided
another kind of deterrent. At least one team of these hand-picked,
specially-trained sharpshooters was assigned to each company. Using
commercial, bolt-action rifles with high-powered scopes, the snipers
preyed on individual NVA soldiers who carelessly exposed themselves
around the fringes of the perimeter. Patience was a must in this
business and the marksmen often waited for days until their quarry
appeared. When the snipers finally got a chance to practice their
deadly art, the results were almost unbelievable. As though they
were firing for record on a rifle range, they calculated the wind,
adjusted their slings, took steady positions, and slowly squeezed
off their shots. Many North Vietnamese who felt safe beyond 1,000
meters of the Marine positions never received a chance to ponder their
mistake. The psychological impact was also a factor. One can imagine
the eerie feeling experienced by an NVA soldier who had just seen a
comrade "zapped" and never heard the report of the rifle that did the
trick.(167)
[Illustration: Sniper attached to Company E, 2/26 on Hill 861A waits
for a target. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)]
[Illustration: Men of 1/26 lay wire along Blue Sector. Dong Tri
Mountain is in the background. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)]
By no stretch of the imagination did the 26th Marines have a monopoly
on good snipers. The NVA marksmen, armed with rifles and scopes which
were comparable to those of their American counterparts, lurked
around the edges of the perimeters--especially the hill outposts--and
waited for a target. Although none of this deadly business could be
categorized as humorous, there was one sniper incident on Hill 881S
which could not help but evoke a chuckle. The men of Company I had
been cursed with the presence of a particularly accurate sniper who
was located in the brush to the south of their perimeter. The rifleman
scored frequently and had wounded 10 Marines in the period of about a
week, all of whom were medevaced. In addition to being a hazard, the
sniper was also a general nuisance. A man moving from one place to
another within the perimeter was always hurried on his way by slugs
which kicked up dirt at his heels or buzzed past his head like angry
hornets. Thus, the Marines were constantly waiting for the culprit to
expose himself and one day a glint off the telescopic sight proved
to be his undoing. The Marines marked his position and, on Captain
Dabney's order, lugged a 106mm recoilless rifle from the northern
side of the hill, sighted in, and blew the sniper away--tree and all.
The victory was short lived because his successor proved equally as
effective. More Marines were hit. The second rifleman lasted about as
long as the first before he suffered the same fate at the hands of the
106mm gunners.
His replacement, however, was a complete wash-out. Expending between 20
and 30 rounds a day, the misfit flailed away for over a week without
hitting anyone. In the process, he too gave himself away. After the
Marines had manhandled the 106 into position for the third time, and
were sighting in, one private, after deep thought, approached the
company commander with a proposition: "Skipper, if we get him, they'll
just replace him with someone who might be able to shoot. He hasn't hit
anyone so why not leave him there until he does." It was so ordered.
The sniper's ineptitude had saved his life and he blasted away for the
rest of the battle and never touched a soul.[61](168)
The incident with the snipers pointed out the advantage of having 106mm
recoilless rifles on the hills. Unlike the artillery pieces at Khe
Sanh, the 106mms were used in a direct fire role and because of their
extremely flat trajectory, they could be employed when attack aircraft
were in the target area. Another feature which endeared these weapons
to the Marines was their extraordinary accuracy. The recoilless rifles
were used with great finesse, especially against the well-camouflaged
enemy gun positions which ringed the outposts. In most cases, it
required minute adjustments to put a round squarely on target and knock
out these emplacements. This was evident in one instance when a 106mm
on 881S was used to silence an NVA 12.7mm machine gun which had been
spraying Marine helicopters.
The automatic weapon was situated inside the mouth of a small tunnel
which had been cut deep into the side of a hill located north of the
Company I, 3/26, perimeter. The tiny aperture, which faced south,
restricted the gunner's fields of fire but that was no drawback because
he only concentrated on the resupply choppers as they hovered over
the Marine positions. On the other hand, the small opening prevented
the gun from being knocked out by anything except a direct hit from
the front. Once the men on 881S had pinpointed the heavily camouflaged
site, they went to work with their 106mm. Out of necessity, their
firing routine was erratic; the gunners cranked off a round, dived for
cover when enemy mortars responded, jumped up, adjusted the weapon, and
fired again. While spotters guided them with such unorthodox jargon as
"Right a tad," or "Up a hair," the gunners repeated the process and
slowly closed in on the enemy position. Finally, one glowing round
disappeared completely into the side of the hill and a split second
later there was a muffled explosion from deep within. Smoke belched
out the mouth of the tunnel and the NVA machine gun was no more. This
performance was repeated several times during the battle with the same
results.(169)
The three 105mm howitzers on 881S were also used extensively in
the direct fire role and were especially useful against targets of
opportunity. The ever-present fog around the hill reduced the number
of such targets but on one occasion a momentary break in the weather
yielded an extremely lucrative prize. When the fog suddenly lifted,
an alert Company I machine gunner spotted a 20-man column of North
Vietnamese slowly climbing Hill 758 which was due south of 881S. They
were carrying what appeared to be several mortar tubes. The Marine
immediately opened fire and even though the range was 1,200 meters he
managed to hit several of the enemy soldiers. Instead of scattering,
the remaining NVA troopers clustered around their fallen comrades and
this proved to be a fatal error. The C/1/13 gunners attached to Company
I sprang to the 105mm howitzer on the south side of the hill, quickly
knocked aside the parapet, and depressed the tube for a downhill shot.
Using a combination of point detonating and VT fuzes which were set to
explode 50 feet above the ground, the gunners slammed a dozen rounds
of direct fire into the midst of the tightly packed enemy soldiers.
By the time the fog closed in again, there was no sign of life on the
opposite slope. The action was so brief, that the first report received
at the 3/26 CP was a laconic message from Captain Dabney that 20 North
Vietnamese had been sighted, engaged, and killed.
There were also innovations inside the compound. Ever since 21 January,
the NVA gunners had concentrated their fire on the base ammunition
dumps. Originally there were two large caches but the main one was
totally destroyed on the opening day of the battle. After that,
Colonel Lownds decentralized his stores in several widely-scattered
berms which were large, 12-foot-deep trenches, gouged out of the
ground by bulldozers. One end of the berm was sloping so that 2-1/2
ton trucks could be driven down a corridor between two flanking stacks
of ammunition which lined the sides of the trench. This arrangement
greatly facilitated loading because the Marines could stand on top of
the stacks and pass rounds onto the bed of the truck which was at their
level. The driver then backed out of the berm and took the ammunition
to the distribution points of the various units. The ammunition was not
only dispersed, it was also segregated according to type. This way,
if a berm of artillery high-explosive shells was hit, fire fighters
were not hampered by tear gas or white phosphorous fumes. On three
occasions, ammunition stores were hit but the resulting devastation
never reached the proportion of that on the 21st.(170)
Although the berms were prime targets, the ASRT, MATCU, FDC, 26th
Marines communications center, and other units which depended on
sophisticated and delicate equipment suffered from the heavy shelling.
Consequently, they all had one common problem--maintenance. The normal
difficulties associated with keeping the various radars, radios,
antennae, generators, and cooling components in an "up" status were
complicated by the constant incoming, the dust, and the limited supply
of replacement items. The vans and bunkers were heavily sandbagged
but antennae and some communication lines were exposed and frequently
knocked out by enemy rounds.[62](171) The speed with which the vital
installations were returned to operation served as a tribute to the
technicians who maintained the equipment under the most adverse
conditions imaginable. In one instance, a 122mm rocket exploded a scant
seven meters from the ASRT-B van and sheared off most of the radio
antennae. Thanks to several trouble shooters who braved the intense
barrage and repaired the damage, the station was back on the air within
20 minutes.[63] Such performances were routine. The ASRT normally
operated 23 hours a day and shut down one hour for maintenance.
The MATCU, which was essential for ground-controlled approaches and
paradrops, was kept operable 95 percent of the time.(172)
Major John A. Shepherd, Communications Officer of the 26th Marines, was
responsible for the vast network which enabled the ground commanders to
keep abreast of the situation and in touch with their units. The major
praised the accomplishments of his men, stating that they "provided
support in winning every battle, firing every round of artillery,
controlling every air strike, and providing the means to receive every
bean and bullet." There were six radio relay teams which kept open 52
channels between Khe Sanh and the outside world. In addition, there
were five external teletype nets in operation 24-hours a day. Radio
relay provided voice and teletype links to agencies at Dong Ha and Da
Nang. For classified information, there were two secure voice circuits
operating full time. One net linked the Combat Operations Center of the
26th Marines to that of the 3d Marine Division at Dong Ha. The other,
the Regimental Tactical Net, enabled Colonel Lownds to disseminate hot
information to his battalion commanders.
To protect it against the artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks,
all communication equipment was either underground or heavily
sandbagged. Major Shepherd moved his communications center into a
shelter which was made from 4 conex boxes, 16 feet underground.[64]
This nerve center housed the teletype equipment and switchboards
which provided service for 65 on-base subscribers and 40 external
radio relay voice circuits. In spite of the protective measures, the
antenna and internal wire system sustained damage on a daily basis.
Following every barrage, wiremen tracked down cuts and spliced them
and repaired damaged antennae so that the various nets were back in
operation within minutes. The maintenance and repair of the electronic
devices used for perimeter security placed an additional burden on the
communicators.(173)
While trucks and forklifts were not exactly delicate equipment, the
base motor transport personnel had their share of problems. These
vehicles were used constantly. During the summer and fall of 1967,
they were used to haul rock for the repair of the runway. Throughout
the siege, the drivers carried ammunition from the berms to the
distribution points and supplies from the drop zone to the combat
base. Many of the trucks were in bad shape and mechanics worked around
the clock to keep them rolling. The biggest headache was caused by
flat tires, of which the constant shelling produced an abundance; the
drivers became paste and patch experts of the highest order. More often
than not, these men were caught out in the open when the enemy decided
to pound the base. Since their cargo usually contained high explosives,
the drivers had good reason to be apprehensive. Some simply bailed out
of the cabs during the attacks and dived for cover; others, performing
a wild imitation of the Grand Prix, raced for revetments. Needless
to say, the base speed limit of five miles per hour was frequently
violated.(174)
When there wasn't any work to do, many Marines created some and the
threat of enemy tunnels provided a powerful motivation. When the word
spread that the enemy might try to dig under the base, the tunnel
ferrets went to work. Many of the defenders became fascinated with the
prospects of uncovering a "mole" and their antics were near comical. It
was not uncommon to see a man crawling around in front of his position,
patting the ground with the flat side of a shovel, and listening for
hollow spots. Others drove metal stakes into the ground and listened
with stethoscopes by the hour for tell-tale signs of digging. If they
heard something, the next step was to dig a large hole in front of the
enemy so that he would tunnel himself into a trap. Some self-appointed
water witches walked around with divining rods and waited for the
downward tug which meant that they had discovered a subterranean
intruder. When the news media got into the act and publicized the
possibility of tunnels, the regimental commander began receiving scores
of letters from around the world with "If I were you" themes. One
American planter who lived in Sao Paulo, Brazil, wrote and suggested
that the Marines purchase commercial sensors like the ones he used to
detect bugs which fed on the roots of his trees. Another suggested that
the defenders strap hand grenades onto rats and turn them loose in the
tunnels.(175)
Unknown to the Marines at the time, the enemy never tried to tunnel
under the base. The KSCB sat atop a plateau, and the slopes were
wrinkled with deep ravines. Colonel Lownds later surmised that the
enemy would have had to go so deep to keep from breaking the surface
that such excavations were impractical. The men of Company K, 3/26 did,
however, discover one tunnel leading toward Hill 861 and called in air
strikes against it; at the base itself, the North Vietnamese limited
their digging to trenches.(176)
Unlike the phantom tunnels, the trenches were very real and served as
a constant reminder of the enemy's intentions. These networks were
quite understandably a source of concern to the defenders who watched
with fascination and no small apprehension as the trenchlines drew
closer and closer each day. Working at night or under the cover of
fog, the North Vietnamese often moved their lines forward as much as
200-300 meters at a time. There were several methods used to counter
the trenches with artillery and tactical air strikes being the most
prevalent. Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's batteries provided constant
fires during the night especially to the east and southeast where the
heaviest enemy siegeworks were concentrated. The VT-fuzed ammunition
with its deadly airbursts no doubt hampered the enemy efforts
considerably. During the day, attack aircraft hit the trenches with
every type of aerial ordnance from 20mm cannon fire to 2,000-pound
bombs. At night, TPQs were run to within about 250 meters of the
wire while Mini and Micro Arc Lights were targeted from 500 to 1,500
meters.(177)
In addition, the Marines along the perimeters concocted their own
schemes which added to the displeasure of the enemy. During the day,
Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's men registered on the close-in trenches
with their M-79 grenade launchers; these shotgun-like weapons fired a
40mm projectile to a maximum range of about 375 meters and produced a
frag pattern approximately 5 to 10 meters in diameter. At night when
the North Vietnamese were digging, the Marines periodically lobbed
these rounds into the trenches and disrupted the sappers.(178)
In spite of the harassment, the NVA launched several attacks against
the base from the trenchlines during the last 10 days in February.
At 1245, 21 February, the North Vietnamese fired 350 mortar, rocket,
recoilless rifle, and artillery rounds into the eastern sector and
followed up with a company-sized probe against the 37th ARVN Ranger
Battalion. The enemy troops, however, did not attempt to close with the
South Vietnamese and, after a distant fire fight, withdrew at about
1500. Although no body count was ascertained, the Rangers estimated
that 1/13 artillery and their own defensive fires had claimed from 20
to 25 of the enemy. Six Marines from 1/26 and 18 Rangers were wounded
during the encounter.(179)
On 23 February, the base received the worse shellacking of the
siege. In one eight-hour period, the installation was rocked by 1,307
rounds--a total which surpassed the daily high received at Con Thien in
1967. Many of the rounds came from the 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces
in Laos. The runway took several hits but the Seabee and Marine working
parties filled the craters and quickly replaced the damaged strips
of runway matting. At 1600, the barrage touched off a fire at one of
the supply points and 1,620 rounds of 90mm and 106mm ammunition were
destroyed. Cumulative friendly casualties for the day were 10 killed,
21 medevaced, and 30 wounded but returned to duty.(180)
Two days later the Marines suffered one of their most serious setbacks.
On the morning of the 25th, the 1st and 3d Squads, 3d Platoon, B/1/26
departed Grey Sector on a patrol to the south of the base; the patrol
leader was a second lieutenant. The two squads were reinforced by an
81mm mortar FO, an S-2 representative, a Kit Carson Scout, one rocket
team, and a machine gun section (two guns).[65] Each man carried 500
rounds of ammunition and six grenades; each machine gun team had 1,800
rounds. Their mission was to sweep to the south along a well-defined
route and attempt to locate an enemy mortar which had been harassing
the Marines. The patrol leader was assigned three checkpoints from
which he was to radio his position and progress to the company
commander, Captain Pipes. The lieutenant was under strict orders to
follow the planned route and keep within sight of the base as much as
possible.(181)
Around 0900, the two squads reached their first checkpoint; the
lieutenant made the required radio report and the Marines started on
the second leg of their trek. Unknown to Captain Pipes, the patrol had
deviated from course and was actually about 600 meters south of its
scheduled route. Shortly after his first transmission, the lieutenant
spotted three NVA soldiers walking along a road which branched off
Route 9 and ran northwest into the FOB-3 compound. The North Vietnamese
were apparently trying to suck the Americans into a trap--a trick as
old as war itself. In spite of warnings from the Kit Carson Scout,
the young patrol leader took the bait and pursued the three men; the
decision was to cost him his life.(182)
The Marines moved south across the road, chased the North Vietnamese
and ran head-on into an ambush. A heavily reinforced NVA company
was entrenched just south of the road in a crescent-shaped bunker
complex, the tips of which curved to the north. When the trap was
sprung, the patrol was caught squarely in the center and, in essence,
was double-enveloped by stationary positions. At first the Marines
opened up and gained the advantage but the enemy fire gradually built
to an overwhelming crescendo and the patrol became pinned down. When
the lieutenant realized the full implications of his predicament, he
dispatched the 1st Squad to flank the NVA emplacements from the west.
The maneuver might have worked but the squad leader did not hook out
far enough to the west before turning back in on the enemy positions.
Instead of hitting the tender flank, the 1st Squad walked into more
blistering, frontal fire. When the lieutenant was unable to raise
the squad leader on the radio, he sent one of his few unwounded men,
Hospitalman 3d Class Frank V. Calzia, a U. S. Navy corpsman, to find
out what had happened. The corpsman returned later and reported that
every man in the 1st Squad, except one, was dead.(183)
Captain Pipes immediately realized that his men were in trouble
and, upon direction of higher authority, sent the 2d Platoon to the
aid of the patrol. The cunning North Vietnamese anticipated such a
move, however, and positioned a blocking force in the path of the
relief column. The two separated Marine units were engaged in heavy
fighting for about four hours before the remnants of the patrol could
break contact and withdraw through the positions of the 2d Platoon.
Marine tanks rumbled into the southern portion of the compound but
supporting fires were restricted by ground fog and the proximity of
the combatants. As he pulled back, the patrol leader was hit in both
femoral arteries and bled to death before reaching the perimeter.
His radioman, Corporal Rolland R. Ball, a full-blooded Sioux Indian,
carried the lieutenant's body back to the base. Friendly casualties
during the day were 1 killed, 25 missing and presumed dead, 13
medevacs, and 8 wounded but returned to duty; the bodies of the missing
men were all recovered. Enemy losses were undetermined. The action on
the 25th sobered the men of Company B and there was one predominant
thought in their minds. Captain Pipes probably understated the feelings
of his men when he said: "We are anxious to repay the loss." Before the
siege ended, Company B did just that.(184)
The flurry of activity to the east and south of the base led General
Tompkins and Colonel Lownds to believe that the major enemy thrust was
imminent. Recalling the accuracy of the North Vietnamese lieutenant's
previous predictions, they felt sure that the attack would come from
the east. From various other reports, they knew that large NVA units
were massing around a deserted plantation to the south and an old
French fort near the junction of Route 9 and the two roads which tied
in with the KSCB. Although the North Vietnamese had not secured the
hill outposts according to the first phase of their plan, time was
running out. Each day, the skies over Khe Sanh cleared a little more
as one of the enemy's greatest allies, the monsoons, slowly abandoned
him. If American airpower, unhindered by the weather, were ever fully
brought into play, the enemy's task would have been next to impossible.
The NVA launched a heavy attack against the base on 29 February;
whether it was in fact the main prong of the Communist offensive,
historians may never know for sure.(185)
Largely because of the quick response by the FSCC and the overwhelming
firepower at its disposal, the enemy attack never got up a full head
of steam. Early in the evening of 29 February, current intelligence
showed that the enemy was on the move. Each succeeding report indicated
that the North Vietnamese were heading toward the eastern perimeter.
The FSCC sprang into action and called on all assets to saturate the
enemy's route of march. Massed artillery, TPQs, as well as Mini and
Micro Arc Lights were targeted in blocks to the east, southeast, and
south. Flights of B-52s, diverted from other targets, arrived overhead
in two and a half hours and added to the carnage before the enemy
troops had moved completely through the killing zone.(186)
At 2130, a battalion from the =304th NVA Division= launched the first
attack against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. The South Vietnamese
responded with their final protective fires; 1/13 contributed
thousands of conventional and special artillery rounds while strike
aircraft streaked in and raked the attacking force. The enemy pulled
back without even breaching the outer defenses. The first assault
was followed by one at 2330 and another at 0315 (1 March); both were
similarly stifled short of the wire. The North Vietnamese finally
called it quits and withdrew with those bodies which they could
retrieve. When the Rangers investigated the next morning, they found 78
dead NVA soldiers huddled in three successive assault trenches a few
hundred meters from the perimeter. Some were in a kneeling position
as if they had been killed just before going over the top. Many had
been peppered by the artillery airbursts and were covered with small
holes. Crude devices made from bamboo strips and laced with blocks of
TNT lay beside many of the bodies. These were obviously to be used as
bangalore torpedoes but the sappers never had the chance. The slaughter
along the perimeter, however, was nothing compared to the losses
sustained by the NVA reserves.(187)
While the S-2 personnel could never ascertain the exact number of
enemy killed, they felt reasonably certain that an entire NVA regiment
had been virtually wiped out. The eastern approach was saturated with
tons of high explosives; the road junction, the plantation, the old
French Fort, and all bottlenecks along the enemy's route were heavily
hit. Montagnard tribesmen, who inhabit the surrounding hills, later
reported finding from 200 to 500 North Vietnamese bodies at a time
stacked in rows along the trails and roads leading to the base. It was
obvious that they had been caught while on the march and mangled by
air raids and piston-like artillery concentrations. While many of the
defenders at the KSCB never fired a shot, what was believed to be the
long-awaited enemy onslaught came and passed with a whimper instead of
a roar.(188)
Even though the North Vietnamese continued to probe throughout March,
it was obvious that they had shot their bolt on the night of 29
February/1 March. The NVA never mustered another large ground attack
against the base; the battle had reached a turning point. Having had
their fingers burned too often, the North Vietnamese settled into a
wait-and-see strategy. They continued to pound the base with artillery
but exerted no major ground effort; instead they lurked in the hills
and waited for patrols which ventured too far from the perimeter.(189)
The waiting game proved to be just as disastrous for the enemy as had
his previous strategy. The month of March was marked by clear skies
over Khe Sanh and there were only five days during which weather
hampered flight operations. While the overcast had never interfered
with Arc Light strikes or TPQs, the retreat of the monsoons was a
blessing for the attack pilots and fighter/bombers swarmed into the
valley like locusts. The number of close air support sorties in March
almost doubled the amount flown the previous month. Any enemy movement
within the TAOR during the day invariably drew a flight of sleek jets,
prop-driven A-1 Skyraiders, or helicopter gunships within minutes. The
trenches and bunker complexes inside the B-52 line were also worked
over daily to insure that the NVA stayed at arm's length. What's more,
the unrestricted visibility enabled the TAC(A)s and airborne observers
to ferret out and call in artillery on the enemy gun positions which
had been hammering the base. For the most part, 1/13 had been limited
to intelligence-generated concentrations during February, but the
good weather in March provided Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's men with
something they could sink their teeth into--observed targets. Enemy
gunners no longer enjoyed a reprieve and each round they fired was an
invitation to instant retaliation. With Birddogs or Hueys overhead, the
enemy seldom even fired and this was no small consolation to the men at
the base. The clear skies and accurate supporting fires were a potent
combination and the number of confirmed enemy dead recorded in March
increased approximately 80 percent over February.(190)
The enemy's plight at Khe Sanh was echoed, albeit in veiled terms by
his propaganda broadcasts. The Radio Hanoi, English-speaking announcer,
Hanoi Hanna--the Communist's anemic version of Tokyo Rose--gradually
shifted her theme from, "We will crush Khe Sanh" to "Ho Chi Minh would
be unhappy if we wasted our time on only 6,000 Marines." The Communists
also attempted to sell the line that 20,000 North Vietnamese had "tied
down" the 26th Marines. Such rationale smacked of sour grapes. This
illogical reasoning would be similar to a defeated football coach
saying that he didn't really want to win the game, only keep the other
team "tied down" for an hour or so. At the KSCB itself, there were a
few feeble attempts to sway the defenders. On 10 March, an incoming
mortar round released about 200 propaganda leaflets. The following
day, an NVA loudspeaker blared a message to the 37th ARVN Ranger
Battalion which invited the South Vietnamese to "join their brothers
from the North in driving out the Americans." There were no takers. The
psychological effort was just one more indication that the enemy was
hurting.(191)
About mid-March, the 26th Marines S-2 began noting an exodus of major
NVA units from the Khe Sanh TAOR. Most of these reports came from
mountain tribesmen who provided valuable information on enemy troop
dispositions throughout the siege. The =325C NVA Division Headquarters=
was one of the first to pull out toward Laos, followed by elements of
the =95C= and =101D Regiments= which also relocated to the west. About
the same time, the =304th NVA Division= withdrew several thousand
meters to the southwest. The enemy still retained enough troops
around the base to maintain pressure and thus the shelling and probes
continued.(192)
Closely correlated with the enemy's retrograde movement was another
large influx of refugees into the KSCB. Most were Montagnards who had
inhabited the smaller villages surrounding the base and unfortunately
had become the pawns of war. When the fighting first broke out, the
Allies advised them to evacuate their homes and move overland to Cam
Lo or else they would be exposed to fire from both sides. During
the period 23-28 January, 1,050 Vietnamese and tribesmen with their
families were air evacuated to Da Nang and then on to Quang Tri City.
About the same time, some 1,800 tribesmen completed an overland trek
from Khe Sanh to Cam Lo by way of the the Ba Long Valley. Later an
additional 3,000 or more attempted to reach Cam Lo, but during the
journey, the North Vietnamese intercepted this group and directed them
back into the Khe Sanh area. Presumably, the NVA used the Montagnards
to screen troop movements and confuse American intelligence. The next
surge of refugees into the combat base occurred in early February
following the attack on Lang Vei. On 7 March, the tribesmen again
started to filter into the base. They were screened, interrogated, and
processed for evacuation in the FOB-3 compound. As many as 661 were
airlifted to eastern Quang Tri Province in a single day and the total
for March was 1,432.(193)
Although the enemy had scaled down his forces, the heavy incoming
continued to plague the Marines. On the average, the base received
about 150 rounds a day during March. During the course of a normal
day, the preponderance of fire was from the 82mm mortars but on peak
days the greatest number of rounds was from the heavier artillery.
On 23 March, the KSCB received its heaviest daily saturation of the
month--1,109 rounds. Of these, over 30 percent were from the enemy's
big guns in Laos. In addition to the indirect fire, the Marines took a
sprinkling of recoilless rifle shells; but these weapons were easy to
spot because of their large back blast and thus were vulnerable to air
attack and counterbattery fire.(194)
During March, the defenders, on order of General Cushman, began to push
out from the perimeter. On 8 March, the ARVN Rangers conducted a series
of sweeps east of the runway. The first patrol made no contact but the
next two became heavily engaged with an NVA force of unknown size. The
Rangers attacked and poured into the enemy trenches, got eye-ball to
eye-ball with "their brothers from the North" and killed 26. On the
24th, a patrol from Company A, 1/9, made contact with two NVA platoons
which were dug in approximately 1,500 meters northwest of Lieutenant
Colonel Mitchell's main perimeter. The Marines attacked the enemy
emplacements and in a four-hour battle killed 31 North Vietnamese.
During the fighting, a UH-1E helicopter of VMO-6 was shot down while
supporting the Marines but the crewmen were rescued.[66] Friendly
casualties were five killed, four medevaced, and two with minor wounds.
The largest encounter, however, came on 30 March when Company B, 1/26,
received a chance to settle an old score. The target area was the same
complex, approximately 850 meters south of the perimeter, where the
B/1/26 patrol had been ambushed on 25 February.(195)
The attack had been planned by the battalion commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Frederick J. McEwan (who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson
on 1 March) and his operations officer, Major Charles E. Davis III,
with careful attention to every detail. In fact, the 1/26 staff had
been working on this attack for a month. The sweep was also closely
coordinated with the FSCC to ensure that the maximum supporting arms
were available. To support Company B, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's
staff worked out a variation of the defensive fire plan with nine
batteries participating. Marine artillery (1/13) formed the primary
box and rolling barrage while the Army 175mms and TPQ-10 controlled
aircraft were responsible for the sides of the secondary box. The
latter fell on the high ground adjacent to the objective which might
influence the battle. The plan called for Captain Pipes to move his
unit into the primary box and follow approximately 75 meters in trace
of the rolling barrage. As the company advanced, the entire cylinder
also advanced. Outside the primary box, the sides of the secondary
would open and close over the terrain like a giant accordion. One
extremely important factor was that the artillery fire would not
necessarily alert the enemy of the impending attack because the same
technique had been used so frequently in that area. The element of
surprise still belonged to the Marines.
At 0800, Captain Pipes' men swept out of a draw and, under the cover of
heavy fog, crossed the access road which ran from the Route 9 junction
to the FOB-3 compound. This jumping off point had been secured by one
platoon during the night. To their front and flanks, waves of exploding
artillery shells churned up the terrain. At the same time, four 106mm
recoilless rifles and six .50 caliber and M-60 machine guns provided
overhead fire; a type of support "which would have warmed the heart of
'Manila John' Basilone."[67] The crescent-shaped defenses, manned by
an NVA battalion, were roughly 100 meters southeast of the road and
extended along a 700 meter front. The enemy troops occupied heavily
fortified bunkers, trenches, and fighting holes. Although the objective
was indeed formidable, Company B was not to be denied that day.(196)
After about 10 minutes of continuous supporting fire, Company B moved
swiftly into final assault positions and Captain Pipes directed the
FSCC to collapse the two artillery boxes. The fire was shifted to
cut off any enemy reinforcements from reaching the battle area and
to suppress NVA artillery and mortars. As if on cue, the dense fog
suddenly lifted; the last thing that many enemy soldiers saw that
morning was two Marine assault platoons with fixed bayonets only a few
yards in front of their positions. The surprise was complete. Pipes'
men poured into the trenches and swarmed over the startled defenders
before they could react. While one element laid down a base of fire
with small arms and machine guns, Marines armed with flame-throwers,
grenades, and satchel charges rushed through the trenches to sear and
blast enemy emplacements. The men of Company B carried out their grisly
work for over three hours and, by noon, the trenchworks had become a
smoking tomb for 115 North Vietnamese.
The only effective resistance during the battle was enemy mortar fire.
Eventually, the NVA placed about 100 rounds on the attacking force. One
of these scored a direct hit on the company CP and killed the radio
man, the artillery FO, and the 81mm mortar FO. The company commander
was also hit. A mortar fragment passed through Captain Pipes' arm and
lodged in the side of his chest about two inches from his heart. Pipes
not only survived, he continued to direct the attack.
With the loss of his two forward observers, the captain had to
handle the coordination of supporting arms by himself. Fortunately,
Lieutenant Colonel McEwan and Major Davis had made allowances for such
a possibility. During the planning phase, they plotted general fire
zones in the objective area and assigned each one a call sign (e.g.
Apples, Oranges, Grapes, etc.) Captain Pipes knew where these zones
were located and whenever he wanted to hit a target he simply told the
FSCC, "Fire Apples" or "Fire Oranges." In short order, the designated
zone was saturated with mortar and artillery rounds. Pipes utilized
this technique throughout the rest of the battle.(197)
Once the Marines had consolidated the objective, they collected their
casualties which included nine dead and returned to the perimeter.
As Company B retired, the primary and secondary boxes closed back
in around the Marines and walked them home. During the battle, the
raiding force was shielded by some 2,600 artillery shells and 1,000
mortar rounds. On the return trip, NVA artillery tracked the column;
ironically, one casualty during the withdrawal was an NVA prisoner who
was killed by his own fire. Lieutenant Colonel McEwan later described
the operation as a "classic raid." He attributed the success to the
detailed planning, the coordination with the FSCC, and Captain Pipes'
precise execution which "adhered to the tactical fundamentals and
principles of war."[68] For his part, the captain was later awarded
the Silver Star and the entire company received a warm congratulatory
message from General Westmoreland. The debt had been paid in full.(198)
This purge to the south of the base marked the last significant
encounter of SCOTLAND and, at 0800 on 31 March, the operation was
officially terminated. The operational control of the 26th Marines was
passed to the U. S. Army 1st Air Cavalry Division (1st ACD), commanded
by Major General John J. Tolson, III, and Operation PEGASUS commenced.
The Army division, along with the 1st Marines and the 3d ARVN Airborne
Task Force started the push from Ca Lu to reopen Route 9, relieve the
pressure on the KSCB, and destroy remnants of the NVA units in the
Khe Sanh TAOR. In effect, the siege was over. Cumulative friendly
casualties for SCOTLAND, which began on 1 November 1967 were 205
friendly KIA, 852 medevaced, and 816 minor wounded. The extent of NVA
losses was never determined and more than likely never will be. The
Marines counted 1,602 enemy bodies along the perimeters but the total
number of North Vietnamese dead was probably between 10,000 and 15,000.
The enemy always carried off his dead when possible and many others
undoubtedly died in the surrounding hills and were not found by anyone.
There was little doubt that the heart of two crack NVA divisions had
been ripped out at Khe Sanh. The full impact of the suffering endured
by the enemy, however, did not become evident until the Marine, Army,
and ARVN troops began mopping up operations around the base.[69](199)
FOOTNOTES:
[48] Marine control of air support within the Khe Sanh TAOR resulted
from negotiations between CG, III MAF and the Seventh Air Force.
General Cushman was delegated authority for Colonel Lownds to
control, through his FSCC, all supporting fire, including air strikes
within a circle which encompassed the range of the regiment's 155mm
howitzers. During the period 22 January-13 February, operational
difficulties caused ComUSMACV to give Commander, Seventh Air Force full
responsibility for the overall NIAGARA air effort through the ABCCC.
[49] Close air support in Vietnam includes all air attacks that are
coordinated with the supported force. Radar-controlled bombing and B-52
strikes, in this context, can be called close air support but, for
the purposes of this study, the three above mentioned categories will
be considered separately. Although the delivery method is technically
not a criteria, close air support in this text will refer to those
missions where fixed-wing pilots, under the direction of an airborne or
ground controller, visually acquire and attack a target in proximity to
friendly forces.
[50] High and dry meant that all ordnance had been expended. Another
frequently used term was "ammo minus."
[51] Both crews suffered sore backs from the ejection but no other
injury. Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman became the third CO in a row from
VMFA-323 to leave an F-4B via the ejection route. Captain Brandon
returned to action and eventually compiled 400 combat missions--a first
for Marine Radar Intercept Officers.
[52] To catch stunned survivors above ground, the 1/13 batteries
frequently put massed artillery fire into the target area 10 to 15
minutes after the bombers departed.
[53] General Westmoreland gave his constant personal attention to the
targeting of these strikes and while most of the targets were generated
by the 26th Marines Headquarters, General Westmoreland personally
approved the requests. Based on intelligence he also directed or
diverted B-52 raids from Saigon. To keep right on top of this aspect of
the battle, the general slept at night in his Combat Operations Center
during the siege.
[54] The 26th Marines Command Chronology does not list sorties but
strikes which were made up of several aircraft and 430 strikes were
recorded.
[55] The van, as well as crew living quarters, was emplaced underground
and was heavily sandbagged. The sturdiness of the bunker was an
important factor because of the heavy shelling. One enemy round scored
a direct hit on top of the bunker with no damage to the fragile
equipment. The computer van remained operational throughout the siege.
[56] The term "pickled" is slang used by pilots which means to drop
their ordnance.
[57] When a TPQ-10 broke lock, the radar beam strayed from the aircraft
and inputs to the computer were interrupted. The operator also lost
visual contact on the radar screen.
[58] One 105mm howitzer on 881S was also destroyed.
[59] Not every artillery round that left Khe Sanh was high explosive.
During March, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalion had accumulated
more ammunition than it could safely store. Since the ammo would not
fit in the berms and presented a hazard above ground, the decision was
made to fire it all. This excess included some 90-odd rounds of green
smoke. On 17 March--St. Patrick's Day--the Marines fired all the green
smoke rounds on known enemy positions to honor the patron saint of the
Fighting Irish.
[60] Tanglefoot, as the name implies, is a barbed wire entanglement
that is stretched low to the ground and is usually used between larger
barriers. Concertina comes in rolls which are laid side by side or on
top of each other. Double-apron obstacles are simply barbed wire fences
in depth.
[61] To rub salt into the wound, the Marines devised a red
flag--Maggie's Drawers--like the ones used on rifle ranges to signal
that the shooter had missed the entire target, and waved it every time
the sniper fired.
[62] To keep the North Vietnamese from zeroing in on his communication
bunkers, Colonel Lownds ordered that fake antennae be placed on every
structure at Khe Sanh--including the four-holers.
[63] The ASRT-B radar antennae sustained over 200 hits from shell
fragments but continued to function near maximum efficiency throughout
the siege.
[64] A conex box is a large metal container primarily used to sea-lift
cargo.
[65] Kit Carson Scouts were enemy ralliers who scouted for the Allies.
[66] The pilot was badly burned in the crash and died that night.
[67] Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone was a Medal of Honor winner in
World War II. During an action at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal,
Basilone's machine gun section fired over 26,000 rounds in one night
and helped break up a fanatical Japanese attack. Manila John was later
killed on Iwo Jima.
[68] Another interesting point was that the attack was largely carried
out by inexperienced troops. During the siege, Company B suffered
considerable casualties and most of the replacements were fresh from
the States. Major Davis later commented that the conduct of these
Marines during the operation spoke highly of the type of training that
they received before arriving in Vietnam. This ability to adapt quickly
plus the high quality of small unit leadership was, in Davis' opinion,
a key factor in the Marine victory.
[69] The breakdown of fixed-wing tactical sorties under Operation
NIAGARA follows: Marine-7,078, Seventh Air Force-9,684, and U.
S. Navy-5,167. These figures were derived from 1st MAW Command
Chronologies and Project CHECO, Southeast Asia Report. The two sources
do not agree on Marine sorties (Project CHECO credits USMC aircraft
with 6,385); 1st MAW records in this case have been cited. Statistics
for B-52 strikes and Marine helicopter operations have been previously
incorporated in the text.