The value of the first article on the sensitiveness of the green-blind
and the normal eye in perceiving color-variations in the spectrum
consists mainly in the three diagrams that exhibit the results obtained
in the author’s experiments.
Professor H. v. Helmholtz published in a former number his attempt at
propounding “a formula which should play the same part in the province
of color-sensations as the formula of the length of the linear element
plays in geometry.”... As geometry begins with the concept of a shortest
line between two points, so our fundamental formula in this subject shall
enable us to find that series of transitions between two given colors
for which the sum of the perceptible differences is a minimum. Helmholtz
proposes to call them “shortest color-lines” and comes to the conclusion
that the whole domain of these apparently irregular phenomena are easily
subsumed under a generalised formulation of Fechner’s law.
Professor Th. Lipps criticises Wundt with regard to the latter’s
theory of measuring the visual field by ocular motion. Wundt’s theory,
he declares, is in need of several auxiliary hypotheses, such as the
assumption that certain ocular motions are supposed to be more difficult
than others: the visual field is said to possess the form of a spherical
surface, etc. The author maintains that ocular motions do contribute to
the construction of our space-conception, but in a different way than
Wundt assumes. The most interesting part of the article appears to be the
discussion of the genesis of the third dimension which is not given in
the data of sensation but added to them as a judgment concerning these
data. It is an interpretation of the data. There are still psychologists
who regard the third dimension as immediately given. Professor Lipps
refers as an instance to Prof. William James’s article “The Perception
of Space” in (_Mind_, Vol. XII), where the latter declares that “no
arguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually exists, to be
impossible.” While Wundt says that to the resting eye the form of the
visual field is spherical because the sky appears to us as spherical;
Lipps declares that we might just as well say that the visual field of
the resting eye is a plane, because the earth appears to us as a level
surface. We attribute to the visual field the form which certain reasons
prompt us to. Certain convergences of the eyes induce us to place certain
points at certain distances. We read, as it were, the distances out of
the convergences of the ocular axes. Accordingly, when we cease to feel
any difference in our feeling of convergency we cannot help attributing
the same “depth” throughout to all the things with respect to which such
feeling is wanting, and we place all objects beyond a certain range upon
a spherical surface. Thus Lipps interprets the spherical form of the
firmament as the result of our using both eyes, which use from habit has
become the form of monocular vision also, and not as Wundt does from the
spherical form of each visual field, which by habit has been transferred
to binocular vision. There is a strange fact that distances on the left
side are overestimated in comparison with those on the right side; and
this fact is also claimed by Professor Lipps to be incompatible with
Professor Wundt’s theory, but in favor of his own views.
Th. Wertheim has made an observation which tends to prove that positive
as well as negative fluctuations of light-intensity, cause the
disappearance of objects indirectly seen.
G. Sergi publishes the results of his investigations concerning the
sense of touch made in the Institute for Anthropology and Experimental
Psychology at the University of Rome.
Karl L. Schaefer’s results of experiments with invertebrate animals
upon the rotatory table show that in the beginning a counter-rotation
takes place, but not in all animals. It does not take place in some
caterpillars; it does take place in black beetles, ants, flies, earwigs,
provided they are at the time in actual motion. There is no after-affect
from the rotation and thus they are not subject to vertigo as are the
vertebrates. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
κρς.
VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 2.
BEITRÄGE ZUR LOGIK. (Zweiter Artikel. Schluss.) By _A. Riehl_.
ERNST PLATNER’S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN
ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. (Zweiter Artikel.
Schluss.) By _B. Seligkowitz_.
UEBER BEGRIFF UND GEGENSTAND. By _G. Frege_.
BEMERKUNGEN ZU RICHARD AVENARIUS’S “KRITIK DER REINEN
ERFAHRUNG.” By _R. Willy_.
A. Riehl discusses in the second instalment of his “Contributions to
Logic” the forms of judgment and the different kinds of conclusion. B.
Seligkowitz concludes his article on Ernst Platner’s relation to Kant,
setting forth the former’s criticism of the latter’s views of synthetic
judgments _a priori_, his moral theology, his psychological ideas, and
moral philosophy. G. Frege explains his view of “concept and object” with
reference to the idea of Benno Kerry, who does not recognise between the
two any absolute difference. (Leipsic: Reisland.)
κρς.
PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 3 and 4.
CONTENTS: April, 1892. No. 3.
DIE WIRKLICHKEIT ALS PHÄNOMEN DES GEISTES. By _A. Rosinski_.