DARWIN AND AFTER DARWIN. I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. By _George John
Romanes_, M. A., LL. D., F. R. S. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Chicago:
The Open Court Publishing Co. 1892.
In the present work by Professor Romanes, who may be regarded as the
special exponent of Darwin’s theory of organic evolution, we have a
complete and systematic presentation of “Darwinism according to Darwin.”
It is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by the author in 1889
before the Royal Institution, London, and forms only part of a much more
extensive treatise on the Darwinian theory, embracing the early history
of biology, and a discussion of the further developments of the theory
subsequent to the death of the great naturalist who gave it birth. The
present part is limited to what is distinctly Darwinian, dealing with it
and with the main objections raised against the general theory of organic
evolution it enforces.
The subject naturally divides into two parts, and Professor Romanes
accordingly deals with it in two sections, in the first of which he
considers organic evolution as a fact, stating the main evidences in
support of the doctrine, while in the second section he furnishes “the
evidences which thus far have been brought to light touching the causes
of organic evolution considered as a process.” The author points out
in his introductory remarks, that in order to establish a theory of a
continuous transmutation of species, which is what is meant by organic
evolution, it is not necessary to furnish proof of _all_ the natural
causes which have been at work. The issue is between the theory of a
supernatural cause, as operating immediately in numberless acts of
special creation, and the theory of “natural causes as a whole whether
these happen, or do not happen, to have been hitherto discovered.”
Moreover, the discussion is concerned only with the origin of species,
and not with that of life, as to which the author says with truth,
“although in the opinion of most biologists it is a question which we may
well hope will some day fall within the range of science to answer, at
present, it must be confessed, science is not in a position to furnish so
much as any suggestion upon the subject; and therefore our wisdom as men
of science is frankly to acknowledge that such is the case.”
The idea of evolution implies continuity, and the author refers to
the fact that the uniformity of nature’s method in the production of
phenomena to which continuity is due, recognised in other fields of
science, strongly recommended the theory of organic evolution for
acceptance on merely antecedent grounds. There is another important fact,
from the antecedent point of view, to which Professor Romanes draws
attention. He states it in the words of Mr. Wallace, who lays down as a
general law that “every species has come into existence coincident both
in space and time with a pre-existing and closely allied species.” This
is a necessary consequence of natural evolution, but no reason can be
assigned for it on the theory of special creation, and the existence of
such a correlation may be regarded as a test-question between the two
theories.
The direct evidence in favor of organic evolution brought together in
the first section of the present work is considered under the several
heads of classification, Morphology, Embryology, Palæontology, and
Geographical Distribution. As to the first of these subjects, the object
of classification has been the arranging of organisms in accordance
with their natural affinities. Organisms have been compared for the
purpose of ascertaining which of the constituent organs are of the most
invariable occurrence, and therefore of the most typical significance,
and the author shows that “all the general principles and particular
facts appertaining to the natural classification of plants and animals,
are precisely what they ought to be according to the theory of genetic
descent; while no one of them is such as might be—and indeed, used, to
be—expected upon the theory of special creation.” In connection with
the important subject of Morphology, the author, after showing that the
theory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully explains
all the known cases of divergence from the typical structure which an
organism presents, devotes himself especially to the argument from
rudimentary structures. These are of such general occurrence that they
are found in every species, and such obsolescent or vestigial structures,
as the author terms them, are of great value as evidence for the theory
of evolution, particularly those found in adult man. To human vestigial
structures the author pays particular attention, his observations being
accompanied by excellent illustrations from nature. It is noteworthy that
he abandons the flattening of the tibia in man, and the disposition of
valves in human veins, as arguments in support of man’s natural origin,
which is abundantly supported, however, by reference to other rudimentary
organs.
The science of Embryology is of special importance, on account of the
history it affords of the _process_ of evolution, and thus supplying
evidence of the fact, although the author remarks, “the foreshortening of
developmental history which takes place in the individual lifetime may
be expected often to take place, not only in the way of condensation,
but also in the way of excision.” To understand the argument from
embryology it is necessary to trace the first beginning of individual
life in the ovum, and for this purpose to consider the phenomena
of reproduction in their most simple form. In connection with this
subject, Professor Romanes, after examining the features in which
the cell-division of protozoa differs from that of metazoa, and after
considering the grounds on which it may be concluded that there is a
physiological continuity between growth and sexual reproduction, points
out that the constructive argument in favor of evolution derived from
embryology commences with the fertilisation of the metazoal ovum. As
this first stage has not been adequately treated by any other writer,
the author deals with it at considerable length. The later stages of
individual development, including that of the vertebrata, on the lines
of Haeckel’s ideal primitive vertebrate, are more concisely treated.
The science of embryology, covers the whole field of animal life, and
it is not surprising therefore that it is considered by the author and
other evolutionists as furnishing the strongest support to the theory of
evolution.
As to the palæontological evidence, Professor Romanes does not ascribe
to it the paramount importance which it has in popular judgment.
Nevertheless he asserts that, not only is no positive proof against the
theory of descent to be drawn from a study of palæontology, but it proves
two very important general facts in favor of it. These are that from the
earliest to the latest times there has been a constant and progressive
increase in the diversity of types both of animals and plants, and that
“through all these branching lines of ever-multiplying types, from the
first appearance of each of them to their latest known conditions, there
is overwhelming evidence of one great law of organic nature—the law of
gradual advance from the general to the special, from the low to the
high, from the simple to the complex.” These general facts are supported
by detailed consideration of fossil horns, bones, teeth and shells, which
supply four special lines of evidence. The evolution of mammalian limbs
with particular reference to the hoofed animals is treated with a fulness
its importance requires.
As the geological argument is concerned with the distribution of species
in time, so that based on the present geographical distribution of
animal and plant species is concerned with their distribution in space.
This, although not regarded by the author as a crucial test between the
rival theories of creation and evolution, is declared to be one of the
strongest lines of evidence in favor of the latter. The general facts
relied on are, the discontinuity of distribution of certain species, the
absence of any _constant_ correlation between habitats and animals or
plants suited to live upon them, and the presence in every biological
region of species related to other species in genera, and usually also
genera related to other genera in families; this correlation between a
geographically restricted habitat and the affinities of its fauna and
flora being repeated over and over again throughout the earth’s surface.
But further, the correlation between habitats and their animals and
plants is not limited to the now existing species, that is, the dead
and living species are allied, showing that the latter are modified
descendants of the former. Moreover, where the areas of distribution are
not restricted, through species wandering away from their native homes,
the course of their wanderings is marked by the origination _en route_ of
new species. Another important consideration is that a double correlation
exists in the geographical distribution of organic types. That between
the geographical restriction and natural affinity among inhabitants of
the same areas has already been mentioned. The second is the correlation
between _degrees_ of geographical restriction and _degrees_ of natural
affinity. This is consonant with the theory of descent with modification,
as “the more distant the affinity, and therefore, _ex hypothesi_, the
larger and the older the original group of organisms, the greater must
be the chance of dispersal.” These general considerations are supported
by detailed illustrations drawn from the distribution of aquatic and
terrestrial organisms. The author shows that an examination of the
faunas and floras of oceanic islands establishes the general law “that
_wherever_ there is evidence of land-areas having been for a long time
separated from other land-areas, there we meet with a more or less
extraordinary profusion of unique species, often running up into unique
genera.” There is, moreover, a constant correlation between the _degree_
of this peculiarity, and the time during which the fauna and flora have
been isolated. The author concludes this part of his argument by the
forcible observation that “if the doctrine of special creation is taken
to be true, then it must be further taken that the one and only principle
which has been consistently followed in the geographical disposition of
species, is that of so depositing them as to make it everywhere appear
that they were not thus deposited at all, but came into existence where
they now occur by way of genetic descent with perpetual migration and
correlative modification.”
The second part of this work, that which treats of selection, under the
two heads of Natural Selection and Sexual Selection, although in some
respects the most important, does not need to be noticed so fully as that
which deals with the facts of natural evolution. After stating the theory
of natural selection, the author notices various fallacies connected
with it which are largely prevalent among the adherents of Darwinianism,
although nowhere fallen into by Darwin himself, and the still greater
fallacies found in the writings of his opponents. In the two following
chapters Professor Romanes, after stating the main arguments in favor
of the theory of natural selection, reviews the main objections which
have been urged against it. The first argument is that, as a matter of
observation, “the struggle for existence in nature does lead to the
extermination of forms less fitted for the struggle, and thus makes room
for forms more fitted.” The second argument, which the author considers
of overwhelming significance, is that there is not a single instance, in
either the vegetable or the animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinct
which is developed for the exclusive benefit of another species. Its
importance may be judged by the fact that Darwin considered that a single
instance to the contrary would invalidate the whole theory of natural
selection. The third argument is based on the facts connected with the
variation of animals and plants under domestication. Ocular evidence
of the value of this argument is furnished by a series of drawings
prepared for the present work representing varieties of pigeons, and of
eight other animals. As special illustrations of natural selection the
author considers the subjects of protective colouring, warning colours,
and mimicry. In referring to his treatment of the criticisms of the
natural selection theory, in the course of which he deals with the main
objections, we cannot do more than mention that based on the possession
by the skate of an electric organ, which, owing to the weakness of
its discharges, cannot apparently be of any use to the animal. This
difficulty seems to be unexplainable according to the principles of
natural selection, and Professor Romanes, in admitting the fact, remarks
that it is of a magnitude and importance “altogether unequalled by that
of any other single case—or any series of cases—which has hitherto been
encountered by the theory.”
The last chapter of the work is devoted to the consideration of the
theory of Sexual Selection, which was suggested by Mr. Darwin to furnish
a scientific explanation of the wide generality of beauty in organic
structures. It is an observed fact that sexual selection does take place
among the higher animals, and it is inferred that, the selection has
reference to an æsthetic taste on the part of the animals themselves;
and that this cause is adequate to explain the phenomena of beauty
presented by such animals. After stating the evidence in favor of these
conclusions, the author considers at length Mr. Wallace’s views on the
subject. These constitute the objections urged against the theory of
sexual selection, of the truth of which, however, Darwin shortly before
his death expressed himself as remaining firmly convinced.
Professor Romanes concludes his present volume with a few general remarks
on the philosophical relations of Darwinism to the facts of adaptation
on the one hand and to those of beauty on the other. In none of these,
says the author, do we meet with any independent evidence of supernatural
design, although there is abundant evidence throughout organic nature of
natural causation. And yet natural causation furnishes no disproof of the
existence of a Supreme Being. The whole of organic and inorganic nature
is made subject to one rule of government, but “the ulterior and ultimate
question touching the nature of this government as mental or non-mental,
personal or impersonal, remains exactly where it was.” Moreover, if
there be an intelligent First Cause, of whose Will all secondary causes
are the expression, their operation must be uniform, so far as the Will
is consistent, and therefore it must appear as what we call mechanical.
Thus according to the pure logic of the matter, “the proof of organic
evolution amounts to nothing more than the proof of a natural process.”
In an appendix to Chapter V, Professor Romanes offers suggestions as to
the imperfection of the geological record, and meets various objections
against the theory of organic evolution on that ground. But we must now
leave this excellent work, which will undoubtedly answer the expectation
with which it was prepared, of being “a compendium, or handbook, adapted
to the requirements of a general reader or biological student, as
distinguished from those of a professed naturalist.”
It is enriched by a very good portrait of Darwin, in whose footsteps
the author has sought to tread by “avoiding dogmatism on the one hand,
and undue timidity as regards general reasoning on the other.” In
his introductory observations he dwells on the remarkable influence
exercised by Darwin over the method of investigation of organic nature,
by treating the discovery or accumulation of facts, not as an end, but
as a means for generalisation, thus bringing natural history into a line
with other inductive sciences.
The value of the work is materially increased by the addition of numerous
well executed original illustrations, besides various plates derived from
Haeckel’s works and other sources, some of them American. It has also a
good Index which will add much to its usefulness.
Ω.
GRUNDRISS DER NATURLEHRE FÜR DIE OBEREN CLASSEN DER MITTELSCHULEN. Von
Dr. _E. Mach_. Ausgabe für Gymnasien. Mit 358 Abbildungen. 315 pp. Vienna
and Prague: F. Tempsky. Leipsic: G. Freytag.
The principles that have guided Professor Mach in the preparation of
these outlines of Physics, are in the main as follows:
The concepts and notions of physical science should not be set forth
dogmatically, but should be presented as much as possible under the
influence of the actual natural facts that lead to them. Hypotheses
and theories should be employed only when actually necessary. Long
mathematical developments and pages of formulæ only impede the scholar’s
total view of his subject and afford of themselves no insight. _Logical_
finish should not be sought after in elementary presentations; the method
of the inculcation of truths should, so to speak, be _psychological_: the
method of their acquisition.
From the brief statement of these guiding principles, the reader will
observe that Professor Mach’s conception of the proper form of an
elementary text-book, differs greatly from that usually entertained.
The method of presentation is not the dogmatic, the “logical,” which
sets forth a science as a ready-made and perfected, mystically created,
product; but the genetic, the historical, the natural. We are constantly
made aware, in the study of this book, of what knowledge really means
and what it does not. We are not treated, in its introductory chapter,
as we are in most of the text-books of Physics, to disquisitions on the
insolubility of the questions What is Matter, What is Energy, What is
Force, and to like professions of metaphysical ignorance, which make us
wonder how people can request us to read hundreds of pages about things
it is impossible to have knowledge of; but we are presented throughout
with a simple statement and description, in terms of facts, of what
our fundamental, as well as our derived, notions _are_, and what their
import. It is unnecessary to say that the need of such a book is very
great. And it is pleasant, constantly to discover how well its idea
has been executed. Concise, unburdened by unnecessary and self-evident
developments, it is in our judgment a model of elementary exposition.
With characteristic modesty, Professor Mach disclaims all pretension to
having fully realised his conception, and views his performance simply as
an attempt. The book was submitted, before publication, to a number of
competent educators, whose advice in regard to alterations was frequently
acted upon.
μκρκ.
NOUVELLES RECHERCHES DE PSYCHIATRIE ET D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _C.
Lombroso_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892.
Prof. C. Lombroso’s activity reaches a climax that is almost superhuman.
He contributed to the Italian Archives of Psychiatry two articles,
one of which proves that, at least in Italy, the sense of touch is
weaker in women than in men; it is still weaker and more irregular in
criminal women than in normal women. (Archiv. di. Psichiatr. Sc. pen.
ed. Antrop. Vol. XII, 1891, p. 1-6). The other article (l. c. p. 58-108)
is an inquiry concerning thought-transmission, which contains besides a
critical review of the usual rubbish of so-called telepathic phenomena
two strange observations. The first is the case of a low-bred hysterical
lad who does not possess the faculty claimed by him to understand
telepathically the intentions of whosoever employs him, but strange
enough, if sufficiently charged with whiskey, is able to read any writing
through the envelope with closed eyes. The other case is a somnambulistic
compositor, who sets type correctly in the state of somnambulism.
Blindfolded he draws the figures drawn behind his back upon a slate, and
hypnotised he guesses the numbers which the experimenter thinks. Lombroso
is one of our greatest psychologists, but these experiments perhaps with
the same subjects should be repeated by other psychologists so as to make
sure of their correctness. Lombroso concludes that there seems to be some
foundation in thought-transmission.
The present little volume of new researches applies Lombroso’s theories
concerning morphological abnormalities of the criminal type in the
anthropological field. It appears natural that the criminal type should
show abnormal features, but sometimes Lombroso’s eagerness to discover
abnormal features, even in political criminals such as Charlotte Corday,
is exaggerated. At least we must confess that many abnormalities appear
very frequently among peaceful and law-abiding citizens. The Corday
skull, although a trifle platycephalic, is beautifully rounded and
normal. M. Topinard finds no abnormal features but Lombroso maintains
that its platycephaly is doubly abnormal and he adds: “The capacity of
the skull is 1.360 cubic centimeters while those of Parisian women is
1.337. Must we not conclude that its capacity exceeds the average?” We
read on p. 124 and sq.: “The more our women will be forced to enter
the economical struggle for existence, the more will they become
criminals.... The result (of letting them enter public life) will be to
lower the nature of women.”
The booklet is very instructive even to those who disagree with the
professor, for it is full of facts and valuable observations.
κρς.
VORLESUNGEN ÜBER DIE ALGEBRA DER LOGIK. (Exakte Logik.) By Dr. _Ernst
Schröder_. Erster Band mit viel Figuren im Texte. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner.
1890.
Professor Mach says, “The essence of science is economy of thought.”
If that is so, there is no discipline more imbued with the spirit of
science than algebra. When operating with algebraic symbols we cease
to think out the whole calculation at every stage, and we are enabled
to keep track of the different factors, and of their mutual relations
during the operation from the beginning to the end. In common arithmetic
these factors are lost like rivers in an ocean of homogeneous numbers
which increase and decrease without betraying the way by which they were
reached. Algebraic symbols generalise calculation, and thus we have
the advantage of calculating from the resultant formula any particular
example with machine-like exactness and without the trouble of going
over the whole operation again. The ease with which we can operate
with symbols brings it about that we sometimes out-run our thought and
the correct result may be obtained by an operator who only partially
understands the operation, just as an engineer is able to run a machine
the mechanism of which he but partially understands.
Mathematics having gained so great advantages through the introduction of
algebraic symbols, the question suggests itself whether the same method
might not with some advantage be introduced into the other provinces of
formal science, especially in the domain of logic. The first logicians
who borrowed signs from algebra and introduced them into logic by
generalising their meanings, were two Germans, Gottfried Ploucquet and
Johann Heinrich Lambert. Ploucquet wrote “Principia de substantiis et
phaenomenis, accedit methodus calculandi in logicis ab ipso inventa, cui
praemittitur commentatio de arte characteristica universali,” Frankfort
and Leipsic, 1753, ed. II. 1764.[84] Lambert’s investigations on the
subject are found in his “Logische Abhandlungen.” Prof. Venn, in his
“Symbolic Logic,” p. xxxii, says of Lambert, “He fully recognised that
the four algebraic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication,
and division, have each an analogue in Logic; that they may here be
respectively termed aggregation, separation, determination, abstraction,
and be symbolised by +, -, ×, :. He also perceived the _inverse_ nature
of the second and fourth as compared with the first and third; and no one
could state more clearly that we must not confound the mathematical with
the logical signification.”
The algebra of logic which through the work of these ingenious men,
had received so favorable a start, was very soon neglected; yet it was
revived after some time in England by Boole, DeMorgan, and Jevons. It
remained for quite a while the almost exclusive property of the English
where at the present time Prof. Venn may be considered as the greatest
English authority on the subject. Venn’s works were rivalled by an
American scholar, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the same who has contributed
several articles to _The Monist_. The algebra of logic which had been
so long neglected in Germany, is now reviving in the country of its
first birth. The author of the work, the first volume of which lies now
before us for review, is Professor of Mathematics at the Polytechnicum of
Karlsruhe in Baden. The second volume is not yet worked out in detail,
but its publication may be expected in one or two years. The whole work,
when completed, will be the most comprehensive treatise on the algebra
of logic that has as yet appeared. The plan and treatment of Professor
Schröder’s “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik” exhibit that uncommon
thoroughness and exhaustiveness, for which German scholars are justly
famous. The book, in one word, will be the standard work on the algebra
of logic for a long time to come.
It would lead us here too far to review or to sketch the main contents
of Professor Schröder’s work, which, it seems to us, is difficult to
explain without entering into the details and thus going beyond the scope
of mere review. But we shall briefly set forth the chief foundations
upon which Schröder builds his algebra of logic. Professor Schröder has
inscribed two mottos on the title page of his book, but we confess that
we suspect at least one of them is intended to be ironical; it certainly
seems to have been selected when the author was in a mood of humor. Being
conscious of the great value of theoretical speculation, he quotes from
Goethe the following Mephistophelian sentiment:
“I say to thee, a speculative wight
Is like a beast on moorlands lean,
Led circling there by some malicious sprite
While all around lie pastures fair and green.”
There are two kinds of speculation: first, that which attempts to find
out by pure thought a substantial extension of knowledge; and secondly,
that which investigates the methods of inquiry. The former is futile, the
latter is fruitful. The former is that which Goethe censures. To censure
the latter would be a grave mistake. The man who would try to forge bread
out of iron must meet with disappointment, but the smith who invented and
shaped the plow did more for the production of bread than many thousand
farmers taken together, although it may be he did not raise a blade of
wheat. Speculation that attempts to find out things by mere brooding
is _prima facie_ wrong; but speculation that constructs the methods of
investigation is the basis of all progress in science.
The other motto of Schröder’s book is Goethe’s saying: “Man is not born
to solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the point where the
problem begins and then to keep within the limits of the comprehensible.”
It would be well to compare this saying of Goethe’s with another one by
the same author which is “Man should hold fast to the belief that that
which seems incomprehensible, is comprehensible. Otherwise, he would
not investigate.” Schröder follows rather the spirit of the second than
that of the first quotation. He says on p. 105 of the recent volume,
with reference to some critical remarks made by the late Professor
Lotze of Göttingen, who was more brilliant and ingenious than exact
in his philosophical views and who showed an undisguised dislike for
any severe method that has recourse to numbers, figures, schedules, or
classifications, as does the algebra of logic: “If Lotze concludes his
logic with the wish that German philosophy should rise to the attempt at
comprehending the course of the world instead of merely calculating it,
we should answer, Could we first calculate it, then we should certainly
comprehend it so far as comprehension on earth is possible.” But how
is it possible? Simply by properly limiting and defining the field of
investigation; and here we can see that the first saying of Goethe’s
should not be construed in such a way as to appear contradictory to the
second.
Every thinker starts with certain limits of comprehension, but he extends
them so that the stock of knowledge increases in every generation,
and there is no probability that we shall ever reach the limits of an
absolutely incomprehensible. There is no solid progress to be made by
making wild raids in the domain of the unknown, a method which is pursued
only by dreamers and metaphysicians. We must start from the boundary
of the present stock of knowledge, and let our progress be confined
to single well defined and limited problems. How a solution of the
world-problem is possible in this sense, is explained by Schröder on p.
103: “The answer is given in the old parable of the bundle of arrows,
which resists all attempts at breaking it. As a whole it withstood, but
it yielded to him who untied the bundle and broke the arrows singly. The
difficulties which present themselves to the progress of knowledge can
also only be overcome singly, and in their one-sidedness. In the division
of labor thus produced, lies exactly the advantage and the strength of
the diverse disciplines,—_qui trop embrasse, mal étreint_.”
Professor Schröder advertises his book with the following words:
“From the title the reader will observe that here the deductive or formal
logic alone is treated. The calculative treatment of the deductive
logic, through which this discipline is redeemed from the fetters by
which through the power of habit, word-language has bound the human
mind, should deserve, more than anything else the name ‘Exact Logic’!
This method alone can give to the laws of valid inference, their most
pregnant, concise, and clear expression, and is thus enabled to reveal
numerous and important gaps,—why not mistakes,—in the older presentations
of the subject.”
“Since the appearance of the author’s ‘Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls,’
this method of treatment has made progress of highest importance,
especially through the works of the Americans, Mr. Charles S. Peirce and
his school. To Mr. Peirce, more than to anybody else, is due the merit
of having built a bridge from the older and purely verbal treatment
of our discipline to the new calculative method; a bridge which the
professional philosophers rightly found lacking and to which lack is well
to be ascribed the fact that the new method received only a partial and
bewildered attention. Through Mr. Peirce’s works, upon which also the
author has had some influence, the theory is now so far developed and
perfected that for the first and main part of its whole system, a final
presentation and arrangement may be obtained.”
“Endeavoring to offer so far as possible such a final and comprehensive
presentation, the author desires to offer at the same time and in
a systematic way a handbook of the most valuable materials of the
literature of the subject which especially in the English language, is
quite considerable.”
The book addresses two kinds of readers which are of a greatly different
turn of mind, and it will go far in reconciling the methods of both, the
mathematicians and the philosophers.
In the preface Schröder says, “In consideration of the formulæ which
appear in the book, it may be wise to state, that no mathematical
training or any specific knowledge is presupposed to be known by the
reader. We might repeat the words of Dedekind, prefixed to one of his
books: ‘Everybody can understand this work who is in possession of what
is generally called, common-sense.’ But we may add another saying from
another author: ‘The beaux esprits certainly, who are not accustomed to
the severe demands of thought, will very soon turn away from it.’”
The introduction is comparatively long, comprising no less than 125
pages. But, considering that it is more than an introduction, that it
explains the foundation on which the whole work rests, it is not too
long, for it forms an essential and indeed the most important part of
the book. Schröder discusses in it the character and the limitation of
his problem. He explains induction, deduction, contradiction and valid
inference. He considers the nature of signs and names. He says, on p.
38: “Humanity, it appears, does not rise above the absolute zero of
civilisation and the level of animal life, until it develops the activity
of denotation and symbolising. And there is indeed nothing to which the
human mind owes so much for its progress as to the signs of things.
“The sign which speaks in attitude and gesture to emotion, speaks in word
and sentence to the intellect. And it possesses, in accordance with the
laws of the association of ideas, the power of producing in the person
addressed certain ideas.
“While the sign coalesces with the idea, it reacts upon thought itself.
Through signs the ideas which otherwise would remain confused and vague,
are analysed and they become as separate elements, a permanent possession
over which the thinking mind has forthwith free control. Through the sign
we distinguish, we fix differences and make them ready for new peculiar
combinations. The sign, is as it were, the handle by which we take hold
of the objects of thought. Through the sign only, the idea is liberated
from the elements of sense, which are attached to it, and is enabled to
rise into the sphere of generalisation. Thus thinking is on the one hand
liberated, on the other determined by the sign.
“Further, through the sign alone which makes it possible that the same
idea the same purpose can live in many, there is _one_ will, _one_ soul,
and a community of human aspirations exists upon which is based the life
of mankind as a life of individuals in society. And this again is the
basis of our morality and civilisation.
“The efficacy of the sign spoken is considerably increased by the
invention of writing.”
Professor Schröder discusses those two methods of logic which are known
by the names: the Logic of Intension and the Logic of Extension. (_Logik
des Inhaltes_, and _Logik des Umfangs_.) This leads to a discussion of
definition, the categories, and conceptual writing which would find
its ideal in a system of pasigraphy, or universal language, for the
perfection of which an algebra of logic would be indispensable.
The symbols employed by Schröder are borrowed to a great extent from
Peirce, but they are considerably improved and it is probable that
Schröder’s innovations will be universally accepted.
We purposely refrain here from discussing the particulars of Schröder’s
work, stating only in a general way that his proposition of a new symbol
for subsumption, (he proposes to replace the old symbol [symbol] by
[symbol] to signify “equal to or subsumed under”), his treatment of the
symbols 0 and 1, the former representing an absence of certain marks,
or as it has been called their “incompossibility,” as being excluded by
the presence of other marks; the other the universe of the whole subject
under discussion, and all the other problems which he separately treats
in his lectures are admirably presented and command almost throughout
the reader’s consent. We now conclude our review with the quotation of
the last paragraph of Schröder’s introduction on p. 125. Having declared
that “logical inquiry should not be judged from the short-sighted or
narrow-minded, not to say _borné_, utilitarian standpoint,” he points out
the great practical importance of his science, saying:
“Similarly, as with other sciences, so logic also may be expected to
realise and produce undreamed of results, which may incidentally bring
about, in a most surprising way, incalculable advantages. Let me only
point out one thing. Since the impulse which this science has of late
received, there have been already constructed three logical machines
which although we grant, scarcely deserve their name, because their
efficacy remains still very rudimentary, may be compared to Papin’s pot
that in a more advanced state became the steam-engine. Indeed, nobody can
presage whether after all a thinking machine might not be constructed,
which would be analogous to, but more perfect than the calculating
machines. The latter have relieved man of a considerable portion of much
fatiguing thought-work, just as the steam-engine has been successful in
relieving him from physical labor.
“To be sure we must not expect to reap while we are still sowing, and
least so in such a case as this where the harvest is to be expected from
trees.”
κρς.
THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. By _Karl Pearson_, M. A. With 25 figures in
the text. London: Walter Scott, 24 Warwick Lane. Imported by Charles
Scribner’s Sons, New York.
We are greatly in sympathy with the methods and principles of Professor
Karl Pearson’s “Grammar of Science.” The work is a comparatively popular
and also brief exposition of the modern ideal of scientific inquiry.
“The goal of science is clear—it is nothing short of the complete
interpretation of the universe. But that goal,” adds the author, “is an
ideal one—it marks the _direction_ in which we move and strive.”
The best part of the book is in our opinion the introductory chapter
which sets forth “the scope and method of science” and shows the need of
a “Grammar of Science.” Says the author in the summary of this chapter:
“The scope of science is to ascertain truth in every possible branch
of knowledge. There is no sphere of inquiry which lies outside the
legitimate field of science. To draw a distinction between the scientific
and philosophical methods is obscurantism.”
The present generation is in a state of fermentation. While one man
finds a restlessness, a distrust of all authority, a questioning of the
basis of all social institutions and long established methods, another
pictures for us a golden age in the near future. One teacher propounds
what is flatly contradicted by a second. We require some guide in the
determination of our actions, and not for our own private but also our
public duties. “Every citizen is thrust into an appalling maze of social
and educational problems; and if his tribal conscience has any stuff
in it, he feels that these problems ought not to be settled, so far as
he has the power of settling them, by his own personal interests, by
his individual prospects of profit or loss. He is called upon to form a
judgment apart from his own feelings and emotions if it possibly may be—a
judgment in what he conceives to be the interests of society at large.
“How is such a judgment to be formed?” The answer is by science. Such
a judgment can only be based on a clear knowledge of facts, on an
appreciation of their sequence and relative significance. The judgment
based upon them ought to be independent of the individual mind which
examines them, and this frame of mind which is that of the scientist is
an essential of good citizenship. Not as if the scientist were _eo ipso_
a good citizen, but society has an interest in the propagation of the
methods of modern science. Sound citizenship will be promoted by training
the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts.
How much a grammar of science is needed can be learned from the confusion
that prevails concerning the fundamental concepts of science. Says
Pearson:
“Anything more hopelessly _illogical_ than the statements with regard
to force and matter current in elementary text-books of science, it is
difficult to imagine; and the author, as a result of some ten years’
teaching and examining, has been forced to the conclusion that these
works possess little, if any, _educational_ value; they do not encourage
the growth of _logical_ clearness or form any exercise in scientific
method.
“The views expressed in this _Grammar_ on the fundamental concepts of
science, especially on those of force and matter, have formed part of
the author’s teaching since he was first called upon to think how the
elements of dynamical science could be presented free from _metaphysics_
to young students.”
Professor Pearson calls attention to the danger that arises from two
modes of thought, viz. that of the metaphysician and that of the
agnostic. He says:
“The poet is a valued member of the community, for he is known to be a
poet; his value will increase as he grows to recognise the deeper insight
into nature with which modern science provides him. The metaphysician is
a poet, often a very great one, but fortunately he is not known to be a
poet, because he clothes his poetry in the language of apparent reason,
and hence it follows that he is liable to be a dangerous member of the
community. The danger at the present time that metaphysical dogmas may
check scientific research is, perhaps, not very great.”
Fortunately the danger that arises from metaphysicism is past. “For,”
adds Pearson, “The day has gone by when the Hegelian philosophy
threatened to strangle infant science in Germany;—that it begins to
languish at Oxford is a proof that it is practically dead in the country
of its birth. The day has gone by when philosophical or theological
dogmas of any kind can throw back, even for generations, the progress of
scientific investigation.”
The scientist will, it is true, often have to confess: “There I am
ignorant.” But it would be absurd to restrict science to the limited
field of thought which it occupies to-day. Professor Pearson continues:
“It is true that this view is not held by several leading
scientists, both in this country and Germany. They are not
content with saying, ‘We _are_ ignorant,’ but they add, with
regard to certain classes of facts, ‘Mankind must _always_ be
ignorant.’ Thus in England Professor Huxley has invented the
term _Agnostic_, not so much for those who are ignorant as for
those who limit the possibility of knowledge in certain fields.
In Germany Professor E. du Bois-Reymond has raised the cry:
‘_Ignorabimus_’—‘We shall be ignorant,’ and both his brother
and he have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that
with regard to certain problems human knowledge is impossible.
We must, however, note that in these cases we are not concerned
with the limitation of the scientific method, but with the
denial of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to
knowledge. Now I venture to think that there is great danger in
this cry: ‘We _shall_ be ignorant.’ To cry ‘We are ignorant,’
is safe and healthy, but the attempt to demonstrate an endless
futurity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches
despair. Conscious of the past great achievements and the
present restless activity of science, may we not do better
to accept as our watchword that of Galilei: ‘Who is willing
to set limits to the human intellect?’—interpreting it by
what evolution has taught us of the continual growth of man’s
intellectual powers.”
The introductory chapter presents the general plan of Professor Pearson’s
book. The following chapters contain the detailed work of the plan.
The headings of these chapters are: II, The Facts of Science; III, The
Scientific Law; IV, Cause and Effect—Probability; V, Space and Time; VI,
The Geometry of Motion; VII, Matter; VIII, The Laws of Motion; IX, Life;
X, The Classification of the Sciences.
Professor Pearson follows Professor Ernst Mach in his expositions
(especially in Chap. II) very closely, and especially refers to the
latter’s contributions to _The Monist_. Pearson emphasises with Mach
the distinction between the conceptual and perceptual, between ideas
or noumena and sensations. He rejects, as does Professor Mach, the
assumption of unknowables beyond our groups of sense-impressions, saying:
“It is idle to postulate shadowy unknowables behind that real world of
sense-impression in which we live” (p. 88), and yet he says in another
passage on p. 134: “There is mystery enough in the chaos of sensations
and in its capacity for containing those little corners of consciousness
which project their own products, of order and law and reason, _into an
unknown and unknowable world_.”
It appears to us that the deeper reason of this apparent inconsistency
can be traced to the author’s conception of the import of knowledge. He
follows Kirchhoff in the acceptance of the theory that scientific law is
a brief description of facts in mental shorthand. But at the same time he
follows Clifford and Mach too closely; the former in the respect that we
can know the “how” only and not the “why,” and the latter in overlooking
the fact that concepts are symbols which stand for something and have a
meaning. Pearson says on p. 145, “Science describes how they [motions]
take place, but the _why_ remains a mystery.” But should we not, we ask,
rather supplant the old and metaphysical conception of the “why” (the
sense of it as here implied) by a better and more correct conception? The
metaphysical “why” is not so much a mystery as it is the incorporation of
an illegitimate problem. The “why” of positive science demands as answer
an exhaustive description of those conditions which as the outcome of a
definite transformation inevitably produce a certain phenomenon.
But here we must criticise Professor Pearson’s view of “description,”
as well also as his view of causation. Cause and effect are to him, as
they were to Mill, mere sequences; necessity belongs exclusively to
the conceptual realm, and is “illogically transferred to the world of
perceptions.”
An exhaustive description will trace the process of causation, and
whenever we succeed in this we have answered the question “why” in the
only sensible meaning it possesses. Sense-impressions do _not_, as
Professor Pearson expresses it, “shut us in,” so that the beyond remains
a mystery to us. Sense-impressions represent the beyond of reality and
they represent it in such a way as to enable us to deal with it properly.
This representation is knowledge and thus the world is _not_ unknowable.
The world is full of mystery, but knowledge itself is not mysterious.
Having sense-impressions and interpreting them in our conceptual
inferences we know something of the world.
We are not prepared to accept Professor Pearson’s views that “change is
perceptual, motion conceptual,” and also that “we are not compelled to
postulate a space outside of self for phenomena” (p. 196). We should
say that our concepts, the concepts motion and space included, represent
certain features of reality. We might give a special name to those
features of reality which are represented by the terms motion and space,
but we could not deny their objective reality without at the same time
denying the validity of the concepts.
Says Professor Pearson, “All things move—but only in conception” (p.
385). “What moves in conception is a geometrical ideal, and it moves
because we conceive it to move.” These propositions have no meaning if
pronounced from our standpoint. Observe also that Professor Pearson
inculcates the conceptuality of motion by unnecessarily repeating the
word in the formula on page 341 which begins as follows: “Every corpuscle
in the _conceptual_ model of the universe must be _conceived_ as
moving....” When we conceive something as moving we mean that not only in
the conceptual model, but also in reality there is an action taking place
which we represent by the concept motion. To say that we have knowledge
only of changes but that we do not know whether those changes which we
describe as mechanical are really motions, appears to us idle subtlety.
The point is whether this method of describing those events enables us to
deal with them properly. If it does it answers the purpose.
In spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with
the author of “The Grammar of Science,” for we agree with respect to the
principles of science and we certainly can leave the settlement of our
differences to a common test on the basis of these principles. Moreover,
the attitude of the author seems to us very much like that which we take
ourselves. We quote from a former publication of his, the following
passage[85]:
“I set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought
is no longer to batter down old faiths; that has been long
ago effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am ready to put
a railing round the ruins, that they may be preserved from
desecration and serve as a landmark. Indeed I confess to have
yawned over a recent vigorous inditement of Christianity, and
I promptly disposed of my copy to a young gentleman who was
anxious that I should read a work entitled: _Natural Law in the
Spiritual World_, which he told me had given quite a new width
to the faith of his childhood.”
κρς.
PHILOSOPHIE DER ARITHMETIK. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen.
By Dr. _E. G. Husserl_. Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.
The present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the
philosophy of arithmetic, but it attempts to prepare, in a series of
psychological and logical investigations, the scientific foundation
for a future construction of this discipline, which would be of equal
value to the mathematician and philosopher. The first volume which is
now before us analyses in its first part the ideas plurality, unity, and
number, so far as they are directly given us and not in their indirect
symbolisation. The second part considers the symbolical representations
of plurality and number, and the author attempts to show that the fact
of our being almost throughout limited to symbolical ideas of number
determines the meaning and the purpose of that view which the author
calls “Anzahlenarithmetik.”
The author criticises several theories which in different ways explain
the origin of plurality and unity. There is one theory which explains
the origin of the unit from the unity of consciousness; there is another
one which explains the origin of number from a succession in time. F.
A. Lange bases his theory of number upon space-conception and Bauman
declares there is something mathematical in the external world which
corresponds to the mathematical in us. The theory of difference held
by Jevons, Schuppe, and Sigwart, is declared to be superior to all
others, but even that is rejected by the author. Jevons says, “Number
is but another name for diversity. Exact identity is unity, and with
difference rises plurality.... Abstract number then, is the empty form
of difference.” Dr. Husserl objects: if numbers are all empty forms of
difference, what makes the difference between two, three, four, etc.? The
contents of these numbers are very different. The inability of defining
this difference shows the imperfection of the theory of difference.
Dr. Husserl proposes what he calls “collection” as a special method of
combination by which unities are formed.
Although the book contains many valuable suggestions, it is very hard
reading. The author’s views are not at all clearly set forth. Neither
is the table of contents so systematically arranged as to give us a
clue to the plan of the book, nor is there any index that might give us
assistance in finding out the most characteristic passages. The reader is
supposed to read the book right through, in order to understand detached
chapters or even sentences. And even then we are not sure whether or not
we have understood the author’s propositions the consistency of which is
not as apparent as it might be expected. For, after having criticised
so many attempts at explaining and analysing the ideas, plurality,
unity and number, and after having proposed definitions, explanations,
and analyses of his own, we find on p. 130 a passage where these ideas
are incidentally declared to be incapable of definition. Speaking of
Frege’s theory, Dr. Husserl says, “As soon as we come down to elementary
concepts, all definition has an end. Such concepts as quality, intensity,
place, time, etc., cannot be defined. The same is true of elementary
relations, and of those concepts upon which they are founded. Equality,
similarity, gradation, whole and part, plurality and unity, etc., are
concepts which are utterly incapable of a formal-logical definition.
All we can do in such cases is to produce the concrete phenomena from
which they have been abstracted, and to explain the method of this
process of abstraction. One can, where it is necessary, exactly fence in
(umgrenzen) by diverse circumscriptions, the concepts in question, and
thus prevent confusion with kindred concepts.” We must confess that we do
not understand the author’s idea; what is an act of defining if not an
“umgrenzen,” a fencing in of the concept? The book contains many similar
passages, which, it seems to us, are not properly thought out by the
author. But the subject is a difficult one, and, as the author says in
the preface, “A work of this kind should, with regard to the difficulties
of the problem it treats, be judged with leniency.”
κρς.
CHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY. Both or Neither. By the Rev. _Daniel
Lyons_. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. Chicago: A. C. McClurg &
Co.
This little book of Dr. Lyons’s is got up in a much more substantial
and prepossessing form than the majority of the works that come from
Catholic quarters. It contains 284 pages and is supplied with the _Nihil
obstat_ of a Catholic “censor deputatus” and with the _Imprimatur_ of the
Bishop of Denver. In this book, therefore, the reader may be sure that he
possesses a correct exposition of Catholic doctrine.
The purpose of Dr. Lyons is to establish the thesis,—a thesis always
insisted upon by the Catholic church,—“that Christianity, to maintain
its rightful hold on the reason and conscience of men, needs a living,
infallible Witness to its truths and principles; a living, infallible
Guardian of its purity and integrity, and a living, infallible
Interpreter of its meaning.” By Christianity Dr. Lyons means “that body
of sacred truths which the Almighty revealed through the _ministry_ of
Christ and His Apostles.”
We italicise the word “ministry,” for on this word hinges in our
judgment the main and unmistakable argument of Dr. Lyons’s advocacy.
If the results of modern Biblical criticism are at all true, the
“Church,” so-called, must have existed before the New Testament. And
in establishing the authority of the church, the Catholic theologians
regard and use the Bible merely as an “historical narrative, whose
trustworthiness (at least in the parts quoted) can be proved in the same
way as that of any other history, sacred or profane.” They take their
argument “for the institution, mission, and authority of the Church
from the Bible as a mere human record of the sayings and doings of our
Divine Lord and His Apostles.” What is the mission of the church? “_And
he said unto them. Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to
every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he
that believeth not shall be damned._” These are awful powers, and awful
are the sanctions placed by the same Divine letter-patent in the hands
of the institution that dispenses them. And in the face of the great
complexity and peculiar nature of the Holy writings, in view of their
recognised liability to manifold and multifarious interpretation, does
not such a great and fearful commission of power as this necessarily
and logically imply a concession of Infallibility—of infallibility, let
us add, as _technically_ understood. “Who can suppose that God would
formally commission anybody to teach in his name and command all to hear
and accept His teaching under the severest of penalties, and at the same
time not secure that teacher against the possibility of teaching error
for truth? Suppose the Church thus commissioned by God did actually teach
error, even then would not all (there is no exception made), by reason of
the divine command, be bound to believe? And in that case would not God
Himself be accountable for the erroneous belief? I conclude, therefore,
that the formal commission to teach the Gospel in God’s name, and by His
authority, joined to the express command to believe carries with it a
pledge of the divine assistance of Infallibility as a guarantee to all
men that in yielding the obedience of faith, they are perfectly secure
against all danger of error.” This inference is incorporated in a dogma,
a “Catholic dogma,” of infallibility, which is this: “that the Pope, by
virtue of a special supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit of Truth
promised to him, in and through St. Peter, is exempt from all liability
to err when, in the discharge of his Apostolic Office of Supreme Teacher
of the Universal Church, he defines or declares, in matters of or
appertaining to Christian faith or morals, what is to be believed and
held, or what is to be rejected and condemned by the faithful throughout
the world. This definition substantially embodies the whole Catholic
teaching on the subject of Infallibility.”
Dr. Lyons’s arguments are well put and well reasoned out. He sees
clearly where the vulnerable point of the present condition of the
Christian churches lies,—which the majority of Protestant theologians
do not see. He sees clearly, though he does not say it, that the
rococo superstructure of neo-Christian dogmatism was long and long ago
undermined by science and that it is now toppling in the minds of the
unscientific generally; and he justly advises all who have set their
hearts on the preservation of the subtle and irrelevant externalities
of religion, to forsake their ancient dwelling-place and seek a safe
and easy abode in the grandly simple and grandly spacious, Roman temple
of Papal infallibility. That edifice is safe against the artillery of
science. It has by one simple act placed itself beyond the reach of all
scientific attacks. For science, or rather the _method of science_,
directly owes its origin to the consciousness of our individual
liability to error and the consequent aspiration of man to establish an
_objective_ criterion of truth. If it attempted to demolish doctrines
of infallibility of any kind, it would simply seek to justify its own
foundations, which it has long ago done. In so far as the doctrine of
infallibility is the only logical outcome of a dilemma in which the
Christian church has, discreetly or indiscreetly, implicated itself,
science has no objection to it; or for that matter to any other
conclusion that logically results from premisses it does not grant.
The question really most worthy of the attention of the “thoughtful,”
“truth-seeking,” and “religious” mind, as Dr. Lyons styles it, is not the
doctrine of infallibility, but the questions, What is religion, What is
God, etc., etc.; and such questions the _truth_-seeking mind will find
it impossible to answer arbitrarily: it must, perforce, answer them in
conformity with that objective criterion of truth called science. And
such subjects are as much the object of science as are motion and matter.
μκρκ.
DER SATZ VOM GRUNDE ALS PRINZIP DES SCHLIESSENS. By Dr. _Franz Erhardt_.
Halle a. S.: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.
This little pamphlet of fifty-six pages, written and published to
acquire for the author the _venia legendi_ at the philosophical faculty
of the University of Jena, treats the several figures of the syllogism
from the standpoint that the middle term of the premisses is, logically
considered, the consequence (_Folge_) of the subject and the reason
(_Grund_) of the predicate in the conclusion. A few remarks are added on
induction and analogy, without, however, entering into the problem as
to the rôle which the method of induction plays in the evolution of the
method of deduction.
κρς.
AGNOSTICISME. Essai sur quelques Théories pessimistes de la Connaissance.
By _E. de Roberty_. Paris: Félix Alcan.
By the publication of this little book M. de Roberty redeems a promise
made in his larger work, on the philosophy of the present century,
already reviewed in _The Monist_ (January, 1892). The pessimist
theories of knowledge of which he treats are the three systems, those
of Criticism, Positivism, and Evolutionism, to which he reduces
contemporaneous philosophy. As these systems are regarded as parallel
manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general hypotheses, they
must equally adopt the doctrine of Agnosticism. It is the aim of the
present work to point out the several forms assumed by this doctrine and
to show its falsity by an examination of the principles on which it is
based. The author properly insists on the importance of distinguishing
between the affirmation of the unknown and that of the unknowable. The
recognition of the former is essential to all progress in knowledge,
but the latter is “the direct negation of all possibility whatever of
utilising the deficiencies of knowledge,” and leads infallibly to the
worship of ignorance. The best definition of the mental phenomenon
of agnosticism, says M. de Roberty is the _pessimism_ of the theory
of knowledge, and it is not for nothing therefore that Kant preceded
Schopenhauer in the development of idealism.
Modern agnosticism is based on the old notion of the separation of the
phenomenon from the noumenon, and it was Kant who cleared it from its
early theological and metaphysical conceptions. He affirmed the reality
of the “thing in itself” as a fundamental postulate, and then declared
that we can know nothing of things considered in themselves. Among
the conceptions formed by the human mind through the exercise of its
imaginative faculty are three which exhaust the entire content of the
Unknowable. Thus it may be reduced to the idea of a reality other than
that of which we are sensible; to the idea of a subject which perceives
in a different manner from the real subject; and finally to the idea that
our cerebral organisation reveals the world to us under delusive colors,
all of which M. de Roberty declares to be simple fiction. His own ideas
on the subject will appear later on.
Positivism stands towards materialism in the same relation as criticism
stands towards idealism, whose noumenon becomes the unknowable thing
in itself; as the simple matter of materialism becomes the unknown
existence about which positivism says we can neither affirm nor deny
anything. Modern agnosticism may be regarded thus as representing the
long sought synthesis of the purest materialism and the most transcendent
spiritualism, and it offers a striking demonstration of the fundamental
equivalence of the hypotheses hitherto formulated as to the origin and
essence of things. It proves also, says M. de Roberty, that the great
law of the identity of contraries is applicable directly to all our
very general conceptions. Contradictory as they seem to be, universal
postulates must, by virtue of that law, be fundamentally identical. This
introduces a discussion of the antinomies, developed but not invented
by modern criticism, which found in them ample justification for its
conclusion of the reality of the unknowable.
The double antinomy of time and space is regarded by the author as always
presenting itself under the aspect of a long chain of contradictions
which are manifestly merely verbal. The opposition between finite and
infinite may be resolved into the distinction between concrete and
abstract, between particular and general, if infinity is taken as
synonymous with, or the perfect substitute for, general and abstract
quantity, the universal attribute of things isolated from the things
themselves. As to the problems connected with the ideas of a vacuum,
matter, force and motion, M. de Roberty supposes them to have a purely
psychological solution. Such ideas go beyond the “conceptive” capacity
of mechanics and belong to psychology considered, not as a branch of
philosophy, or as philosophy itself, but as a science of abstract
concepts.
The philosophy of evolution, although monistic in the sense that it
recognises the law of the identity of opposites, shows itself not to
be so in reality by its doctrine of the unknowable. In this monism and
agnosticism contradict each other, as it is contrary to reason “to
affirm at the same time the identity of every phenomenon and their
unknowability. The first marks the supreme term of the second. Identity
in general serves to define knowableness. So that, if we remain on
the elevated summits of pure abstraction too long, we run the danger
anticipated by the law of identity of contraries. We fall directly
into the error of taking the apparent negation of identity or of pure
knowledge, the unknowable, for something really distinct, really
separated from the knowable.” This is the illusion of Spencer and of
all the philosophers who have undertaken the difficult task of applying
monism as a corrective of agnosticism.
M. de Roberty concludes the present work with a discussion of the
relation between idea and reality, the thought and the object thought of,
in which he gives us his opinion on that disputed point. He says that
what philosophy calls “the object” is composed essentially of external
nature, in which is included our own organism. Very complicated systems
of motions are transmitted to the grey nuclei or opto-striated bodies
of the central regions of the brain. Here these motions determine new
motions of which the totality is described in psycho-physics by the term
“unconscious ideation.” But this internal motion, continually tending to
become again an initial or external motion, gives rise to unconscious
reflex activity. The motion passes by the white nerve-fibres to the
cortical periphery of the brain which becomes “the seat of a phenomenon,
an excitation, a motion which prolongs or repeats the immediately
preceding phenomenon, excitation, or motion, while giving it a shorter
and more steady action.” The sensations and the reflex-actions derived
from them traverse the opto-striated nuclei without retardation and
without giving rise to any system of ideas; while consciousness resides
in the systemisation or union of the same sensations and reflex-actions.
The notion of the ego results from the union or memory of certain ideas,
sensations, and actions, which before their union and preservation by
the cerebral cortex were unconscious. But before becoming unconscious
ideas, those “intellectual virtualities” were in every other part of the
organism, and in all the media which surround it, as, “manifestations
of energy or of motion, it may be objective phenomena.” Thus, says M.
de Roberty, if the universe is composed of two parts, the ego and the
non-ego, it can be affirmed that they form an uninterrupted circuit.
He supposes that when the cosmical energy has produced the phenomena
of unconscious mentality in the brain-centres, it is divided into two
currents, one of which returns to its source and becomes directly cosmic
energy again, and this will be the fate of the other current also when
the life of the organism ceases.
This view the author supports by a consideration of the morphological
and functional difference supposed to exist between the facts which
constitute the notion of the “ego” and the primordial facts of
unconsciousness comprised under the generic denomination of the
“non-ego.” He regards conscious ideas as the telegraphic alphabet, the
stenographic writing of the cosmos. Consciousness serves to coördinate
the incoherent crowd of events which at each instant invades the normal
brain. In these we may see effects of the cause called “universe,” and
therefore its representatives and substitutes, which they could not
be unless there was identity between the two. Thus the “ego” could be
defined as the final synthesis of the “symbolic abridgments,” of the
micrographical abbreviations, of the “non-ego.” Thus the ego serves only
for the purpose of concentrating or condensing, so to say the non-ego,
which it represents in a manner more or less durable and efficient.
This monistic theory gets rid of the unknowable and therefore is a great
improvement on that of the materialist or of the idealist. Nevertheless
it requires further elaboration. There is no difficulty in understanding
that cosmic motion may become transformed within the organism into a
feeling. This still, however, leaves unaccounted for the existence of the
organism itself. A true monism will, therefore, require that the organism
must be in some way identifiable with the cosmos. This is the true
problem that has to be solved, and its solution will be greatly aided by
the overthrow of agnosticism, against which M. de Roberty has made so
vigorous and successful an attack in the present volume.
Ω.