That which we call natural law is not the description of a certain
special and concrete form of existence which is now or then and here
or there, but of some general quality of facts which is everywhere and
always. The former, i. e. every special and concrete form of existence,
can be explained by evolution, the latter, i. e. natural law, cannot. The
former has to be accounted for by the law of causation, the latter by the
principle of sufficient reason. And it is this distinction between cause
and reason which Mr. Peirce does not seem to have regarded.
Every special form of existence must, at least theoretically, be
traceable as the effect of some cause and every law of nature must be
explainable by showing its connection with other natural laws. The only
thing in the world of which we cannot and need not give account is the
existence of facts itself, or being in general, which is the stubborn
presence of reality in us ourselves and also outside of us, objected
to our own being as an independent power to which we have to adapt our
conduct. We need not prove its existence, for it exists. If anything
is ultimate, facts are ultimate; and cognition is nothing but the
reconstruction of facts for the purpose of orientation among them, it is
a methodical description of reality in the symbols of the feelings that
exist in sentient beings.
A scientist having observed a special process of nature, describes it,
if possible, in such a way that it is recognised as a transformation. A
description of this kind is called an explanation. It renders the process
intelligible to us; it is complete and exhaustive. In order to make such
a description available for comprehending other cases of the same or
similar kind, we have to introduce another principle, which is that of
economy. We must single out those features which are common to a certain
class and remove all diversity and specificalness. All specificalness
and diversity are transient features due to special conditions; they
disappear with these special conditions. Thus the notion of natural law
involves as an essential characteristic and fundamental quality the
absence of the incidental and the temporal.
Natural laws describe the facts of nature _sub specie aeternitatis_. They
cease to be natural laws in the proper sense of the word as soon as they
are conceived, like legal laws, as products of evolutions, which have
appeared in time and may disappear again. Eternity is the characteristic
feature of a natural law, it is its backbone, the essence of its being,
its _conditio sine qua non_.
Thus in considering a natural phenomenon we are led to distinguish
between its cause and its reason: Its cause is something special, it is
an individual event, happening in time, and accordingly being transient;
it is an occurrence of some kind, it is a single and definite fact.
However its reason is not anything special, it is something general;
it is not a single and definite fact, but it is a law of universal
application; it is not transient, but a conception of things in which the
incidental and temporal are eliminated. A reason is applicable to all
cases of the same kind and also to all cases of any time. A cause, i. e.
a fact, if it truly exists, is real (not true); a law, i. e. a reason,
if it really obtains in nature, is true (not real), and any attempt at
explaining natural laws as a product of evolution, being based upon the
view that regards them as causes not as reasons, as real not as true, as
a description of temporal existences, not as viewing facts _sub specie
aeternitatis_, must from the outset be a failure.[77]
Mr. Peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they were single and
concrete facts. Where we have to look for reasons he evidently employs
the method of searching for causes. He treats that which in its very
nature is eternal, as if it were temporal. He regards the everlasting,
the imperishable, the immutable as if it had originated, as if it were
transient, as if it were the product of a development.