In spite of the fundamental difference that obtains between Mr. Peirce’s
and our own world-conception, we must state that there are many
most important points of agreement. Mr. Peirce says in his article
“Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” (ibid. p. 3 and 7):
“The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration
of what we already know, something else which we do not know....
“The settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry.”
There are according to Peirce several methods of settling opinion, which
swayed humanity in an historic succession: (1) The method of tenacity.
Doubt being an uneasy and dissatisfied state, we cling tenaciously not
merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe. (2) The
method of authority, which is that of the Roman Church and of all great
political and religious institutions of the past. (3) The _a priori_
method, by which Mr. Peirce understands the fixing of belief agreeably to
reason, i. e. to the subjective conviction of the individual thinker. All
these methods have their merits, says Mr. Peirce (ibid. p. 13):
“The _a priori_ method is distinguished for its comfortable
conclusions. It is the nature of the process to adopt whatever
belief we are inclined to, and there are certain flatteries
to the vanity of man which we all believe by nature, until we
are awakened from our pleasing dream by some rough facts. The
method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind....
But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its
strength, simplicity, and directness.”
It is apparent that the merit of the _a priori_ method so called
is really a vice. The _a priori_ method so called is the basis of
agnosticism. If according to my reason this, and according to your reason
that, may be the truth, where does truth remain? If truth is purely
subjective, truth becomes impossible. The method of settling belief
agreeably to our individual tempers is the death of objective truth, of
science and philosophy.
Mr. Peirce fully recognises the practical importance of thought. He says:
“The production of belief is the sole function of thought”
(ibid. p. 289).
“Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions” (ibid. p.
5).
“What is belief? First, it is something that we are aware of;
second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it
involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action,
or, say for short, a _habit_” (ibid. p. 291).
“Thus, we come down to what is tangible and practical, as
the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how
subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so
fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of
practice” (ibid. p. 293).
Mr. Peirce is very far from considering philosophy as a mere matter of
speculation or theory without practical importance. He says:
“What sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe,
how to think of the _ensemble_ of things, is a fundamental
problem in the theory of reasoning.”
The _a priori_ method, so called by Mr. Peirce, translated into practical
life is not only the death of truth but also of morality. The objective
criterion of truth is gone, and with it goes the objective standard of
right and wrong. If that is true which seems so to my individual reason,
then that is right which pleases me best. What is right to me might be
wrong to you. Thus this method leads either to moral indifference, or to
basing ethics upon the greatest amount of pleasure attainable, (Hedonism,
as represented by Mr. H. Spencer, Prof. Harald Höffding, Professor
Gizycki, and others,) or to relying upon the individual conscience as an
absolute and ultimate authority.[75]
The method of settling opinion agreeably to individual reason is at
present the most fashionable and widely spread conception, and it shows
its influence in the almost universal acceptation of agnosticism to-day.
Is that the final decision with which we have to rest satisfied? If it
were, we would better return to the method of authority or tenacity.
No, it is not the sum of all wisdom. The _a priori_ method so called
represents a period of transition, which, if persistently pursued, will
lead to the bankruptcy of thought, the desperate appearance of which is
well disguised in the big sounding and modesty-parading term agnosticism.
And here we return to the exposition of Mr. Peirce’s views. Mr. Peirce
does not accept the _a priori_ method, he believes in “the logic of
science.” Mr. Peirce says:
“To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a
method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by
nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something
upon which our thinking has no effect.... The method must be
such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the
same. Such is the method of science” (ibid. p. 11.)
“That whose characters are independent of how you or I think is
an external reality” (ibid. p. 298).
“All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the
processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will
give one certain solution to every question to which they can
be applied.... They may at first obtain different results, but,
as each perfects his method and his processes, the results
will move steadily together toward a destined centre.... The
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real” (ibid. pp. 299-300).
The word “fated” must be understood as Mr. Peirce understands it. He adds
in a foot-note:
“Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and cannot
be avoided.”