Consistently with the doctrine laid down in the beginning of this paper,
I am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in
continuous connection with it. By anything but an idea, it cannot be
affected at all. This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds,
that what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind
hide-bound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification;
and in that diversification there is life. When an idea is conveyed
from one mind to another, it is by forms of combination of the diverse
elements of nature, say by some curious symmetry, or by some union of a
tender color with a refined odor. To such forms the law of mechanical
energy has no application. If they are eternal, it is in the spirit
they embody; and their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical
necessity. They are embodied ideas; and so only can they convey ideas.
Precisely how primary sensations, as colors and tones, are excited, we
cannot tell, in the present state of psychology. But in our ignorance, I
think that we are at liberty to suppose that they arise in essentially
the same manner as the other feelings, called secondary. As far as
sight and hearing are in question, we know that they are only excited
by vibrations of inconceivable complexity; and the chemical senses
are probably not more simple. Even the least psychical of peripheral
sensations, that of pressure, has in its excitation conditions which,
though apparently simple, are seen to be complicated enough when we
consider the molecules and their attractions. The principle with which
I set out requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated
to the nerves by continuity, so that there must be something like them
in the excitants themselves. If this seems extravagant, it is to be
remembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation
of sensation, which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact
absolutely inexplicable and ultimate. Now absolute inexplicability is a
hypothesis which sound logic refuses under any circumstances to justify.
I may be asked whether my theory would be favorable or otherwise to
telepathy. I have no decided answer to give to this. At first sight, it
seems unfavorable. Yet there may be other modes of continuous connection
between minds other than those of time and space.
The recognition by one person of another’s personality takes place by
means to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious
of his own personality. The idea of the second personality, which is as
much as to say that second personality itself, enters within the field of
direct consciousness of the first person, and is as immediately perceived
as his ego, though less strongly. At the same time, the opposition
between the two persons is perceived, so that the externality of the
second is recognised.
The psychological phenomena of intercommunication between two minds have
been unfortunately little studied. So that it is impossible to say, for
certain, whether they are favorable to this theory or not. But the very
extraordinary insight which some persons are able to gain of others from
indications so slight that it is difficult to ascertain what they are, is
certainly rendered more comprehensible by the view here taken.
A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In
considering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine
of a personal God; but in considering communication, it cannot but admit
that if there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that
person and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be
the case, the question arises how it is possible that the existence of
this being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer
that I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and
eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones
most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial.