AFFECTIONS OF IDEAS.

But we are met by the question what is meant by saying that one idea

affects another. The unravelment of this problem requires us to trace out

phenomena a little further.

Three elements go to make up an idea. The first is its intrinsic quality

as a feeling. The second is the energy with which it affects other

ideas, an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of immediate

sensation, finite and relative in the recency of the past. The third

element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it.

As an idea spreads, its power of affecting other ideas gets rapidly

reduced; but its intrinsic quality remains nearly unchanged. It is long

years now since I last saw a cardinal in his robes; and my memory of

their color has become much dimmed. The color itself, however, is not

remembered as dim. I have no inclination to call it a dull red. Thus, the

intrinsic quality remains little changed; yet more accurate observation

will show a slight reduction of it. The third element, on the other

hand, has increased. As well as I can recollect, it seems to me the

cardinals I used to see wore robes more scarlet than vermilion is, and

highly luminous. Still, I know the color commonly called cardinal is on

the crimson side of vermilion and of quite moderate luminosity, and the

original idea calls up so many other hues with it, and asserts itself so

feebly, that I am unable any longer to isolate it.

A finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable series

of feelings; and when these become welded together in association,

the result is a general idea. For we have just seen how by continuous

spreading an idea becomes generalised.

The first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living

feeling. A continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but

still embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal,

entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of

boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt.

Second, in the presence of this continuity of feeling, nominalistic

maxims appear futile. There is no doubt about one idea affecting another,

when we can directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping

itself into the other. Nor can there any longer be any difficulty about

one idea resembling another, when we can pass along the continuous field

of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we had

marked.

Third, consider the insistency of an idea. The insistency of a past idea

with reference to the present is a quantity which is less the further

back that past idea is, and rises to infinity as the past idea is brought

up into coincidence with the present. Here we must make one of those

inductive applications of the law of continuity which have produced such

great results in all the positive sciences. We must extend the law of

insistency into the future. Plainly, the insistency of a future idea with

reference to the present is a quantity affected by the minus sign; for it

is the present that affects the future, if there be any effect, not the

future that affects the present. Accordingly, the curve of insistency is

a sort of equilateral hyperbola. [See the figure.] Such a conception is

none the less mathematical, that its quantification cannot now be exactly

specified.

[Illustration]

Now consider the induction which we have here been led into. This curve

says that feeling which has not yet emerged into immediate consciousness

is already affectible and already affected. In fact, this is habit, by

virtue of which an idea is brought up into present consciousness by a

bond that had already been established between it, and another idea while

it was still _in futuro_.

We can now see what the affection of one idea by another consists in.

It is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the

affecting idea as subject. So when a feeling emerges into immediate

consciousness, it always appears as a modification of a more or less

general object already in the mind. The word suggestion is well adapted

to expressing this relation. The future is suggested by, or rather is

influenced by the suggestions of, the past.

The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 · 第 312 / 390 题