INDIVIDUALITY OF IDEAS.

We are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced, as passed from mind to

mind, as similar or dissimilar to one another, and, in short, as if they

were substantial things; nor can any reasonable objection be raised to

such expressions. But taking the word “idea” in the sense of an event in

an individual consciousness, it is clear that an idea once past is gone

forever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea. These two

ideas are not present in the same state of consciousness, and therefore

cannot possibly be compared. To say, therefore, that they are similar

can only mean that an occult power from the depths of the soul forces

us to connect them in our thoughts after they are both no more. We may

note, here, in passing that of the two generally recognised principles of

association, contiguity and similarity, the former is a connection due to

a power without, the latter a connection due to a power within.

But what can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at

all, any longer? They are utterly unknowable. What distinct meaning can

attach to saying that an idea in the past in any way affects an idea in

the future, from which it is completely detached? A phrase between the

assertion and the denial of which there can in no case be any sensible

difference is mere gibberish.

I will not dwell further upon this point, because it is a commonplace of

philosophy.

The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 · 第 304 / 390 题