Mr. Herbert Spencer published in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July 1888
and in the _Popular Science Monthly_ for August of the same year an
article on “The Ethics of Kant” in which he so strangely misrepresents
Kant’s position that Kant to any uninitiated reader must appear not only
as superficial and shallow, but even as palpably nonsensical.
Mr. Spencer’s article on “The Ethics of Kant” is a severe criticism
mainly of the nonsensical idea, erroneously imputed to Kant, of a will
that has no end. At the same time Mr. Spencer reproaches Kant with
assuming the simplicity of conscience and believing in a non-evolutionary
origin of the minds of living beings.
In reply to Mr. Spencer an editorial article appeared in _The Open
Court_ under the caption “Herbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant” (Nos.
51 and 52), which was supplemented by another article entitled “Kant on
Evolution” (No. 158), the latter being elicited by a renewed attack of
Mr. Spencer upon Kant’s views (which appeared in _Mind_, No. LIX, p. 313).
Mr. Spencer has republished his article “The Ethics of Kant” together
with many other older articles in a work of three volumes entitled
“Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative,” 1891, in which he
repeats the following sentence:
“Thus the basis of the argument by which Kant attempts to
justify his assumption that there exists a good will apart from
a good end, disappears utterly; and leaves his dogma in all its
naked unthinkableness.”
To this sentence he adds the following foot-note as a reply to my
criticisms:
“I find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant
less than justice and more than justice—less, in assuming
that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of
our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not
contradicted himself. My knowledge of Kant’s writings is
extremely limited. In 1844 a translation of his ‘Critique of
Pure Reason’ (then I think lately published) fell into my
hands, and I read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine
of Time and Space: my peremptory rejection of which caused
me to lay the book down. Twice since then the same thing has
happened; for, being an impatient reader, when I disagree with
the cardinal propositions of a work I can go no further. One
other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made aware
that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies have
been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond
this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my
supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped
short with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets, was due
to the fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of
thought anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin
inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis. Dr. Paul
Carus, who, shortly after the publication of this article
in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July, 1888, undertook to
defend the Kantian ethics in the American journal which he
edits, _The Open Court_, has now (Sept. 4, 1890), in another
defensive article, translated sundry passages from Kant’s
‘Critique of Judgment,’ his ‘Presumable Origin of Humanity,’
and his work ‘Upon the different Races of Mankind,’ showing
that Kant was, if not fully, yet partially, an evolutionist in
his speculations about living beings. There is, perhaps, some
reason for doubting the correctness of Dr. Carus’s rendering
of these passages into English. When, as in the first of
the articles just named, he failed to distinguish between
consciousness and conscientiousness, and when, as in this
last article, he blames the English for mistranslating Kant,
since they have said ‘Kant maintained that Space and Time are
intuitions,’ which is quite untrue, for they have everywhere
described him as maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_
of intuition, one may be excused for thinking that possibly
Dr. Carus has read into some of Kant’s expressions, meanings
which they do not rightly bear. Still, the general drift of
the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that Kant must
have believed in the operation of natural causes as largely,
though not entirely, instrumental in producing organic forms:
extending this belief (which he says ‘can be named a daring
venture of reason’) in some measure to the origin of Man
himself. He does not, however extend the theory of natural
genesis to the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.
When he speaks of an organic habit ‘which in the wisdom of
nature appears to be thus arranged in order that the species
shall be preserved’; and when, further, he says ‘we see,
moreover, that a germ of reason is placed in him, whereby,
after the development of the same, he is destined for social
intercourse,’ he implies divine intervention. And this shows
that I was justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space
and Time, as forms of thought, are supernatural endowments. Had
he conceived of organic evolution in a consistent manner, he
would necessarily have regarded Space and Time as subjective
forms generated by converse with objective realities.
“Beyond showing that Kant had a partial, if not a complete,
belief in organic evolution (though with no idea of its
causes), the passages translated by Dr. Carus show that he
entertained an implied belief which it here specially concerns
me to notice as bearing on his theory of ‘a good will.’ He
quotes approvingly Dr. Moscati’s lecture showing ‘that the
upright walk of man is constrained and unnatural,’ and showing
the imperfect visceral arrangements and consequent diseases
which result: not only adopting, but further illustrating,
Dr. Moscati’s argument. If here, then, there is a distinct
admission, or rather assertion, that various human organs are
imperfectly adjusted to their functions, what becomes of the
postulate above quoted ‘that no organ for any purpose will be
found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for
that purpose’? And what becomes of the argument which sets out
with this postulate? Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for
enabling me to prove that Kant’s defence of his theory of ‘a
good will’ is, by his own showing, baseless.”
Mr. Spencer’s reply to my criticisms is surprising in more than one
respect.
First, without even mentioning the objections I make he discredits my
arguments by throwing doubt upon the correctness of the translations of
the quoted passages.
Secondly, he alleges, with a view of justifying his doubt, that in the
first of my articles I “failed to distinguish between consciousness and
conscientiousness.”[69]
Thirdly, Mr. Spencer declares that I had “read into some of Kant’s
expressions, meanings which they do not rightly bear.”
Fourthly, Mr. Spencer bases this opinion upon a double mistake: he blames
me for not distinguishing between the Kantian phrases that “Space and
Time are intuitions” and that they are “forms of intuition.”
Fifthly, acknowledging after all that Kant had at least “a partial belief
in organic evolution,” Mr. Spencer accuses him of inconsistency.
Sixthly, several statements concerning Kant’s views are made not because
Kant held them but because Mr. Spencer assumes for trivial reasons that
he is “justified in ascribing them to him.”
Seventhly, these statements so vigorously set forth are accompanied by
Mr. Spencer’s remarkably frank confession of unfamiliarity with the
subject under discussion.
It may be added that Mr. Spencer calls my criticisms “defensive
articles.” He says that “I undertook to defend the Kantian ethics”;
while, in fact, my articles are aggressive. Kant needs no defense for
being misunderstood, and it would not be my business to defend him, for
I am not a Kantian in the sense that I adopt any of the main doctrines
of Kant. On the contrary I dissent from him on almost all fundamental
questions. In ethics I object to Kant’s views in so far as they can be
considered as pure formalism.[70] I am a Kantian only in the sense that
I respect Kant as one of the most eminent philosophers, that I revere
him as that teacher of mine whose influence upon me was greatest, and
I consider the study of Kant’s works as an indispensable requisite for
understanding the problems of the philosophy of our time. Far from
defending Kant’s position, I only undertook to inform Mr. Spencer of what
Kant had really maintained, so that instead of denouncing absurdities
which Kant had never thought of, he might criticise the real Kant.
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