Prof. Ernst Haeckel’s Anthropogeny, the fourth edition of which appeared
of late,[65] brings again into prominence that conception of monism which
identifies the monistic view with mechanicalism.
A review of this book has appeared already in _The Open Court_, No.
231, in which we called attention to the great merits of a work which
has become a household book, not only for the scientist, but for every
educated reader who is interested in man and the origin of man. Our
knowledge in Anthropogeny, certainly, will influence not only our general
world-conception, but through our general world-conception it will extend
its influence not only over every branch of science but also into the
broader fields of man’s daily life and his practical morality.
Professor Haeckel is the most popular naturalist of to-day and there
is no one, perhaps, who has made a more effective propaganda for the
monistic world-conception than he. So it is almost a matter of course
that his definition of monism is generally accepted as the standard.
We have formulated our view of monism in a way which in principle and
general outlines concurs with the commonly accepted usage of the term,
yet it deviates from it in some important points which are perhaps not
merely matters of detail. It will be difficult to say how far we agree
and how far we disagree with Professor Haeckel’s monism because those
subjects in which we disagree, have never been elaborated by him, and we
are inclined to believe that he would modify some of his expressions, if
he devoted a quiet hour’s thought to the objections we have to make to
his definitions.
Professor Haeckel’s monism being mechanicalism savors strongly of
materialism. He says in the latest edition of his “Anthropogenie” which
is now before us, Vol. II, p. 851:
“There can be no doubt that a thorough consideration and unprejudiced
deliberation of these facts will lead to a decisive victory of that
philosophical conception which with one word we call monistic or
mechanical in opposition to the dualistic and teleological. Upon the
latter are based most of the philosophical systems of antiquity, of
the mediæval times, and also of the present time. The mechanical or
monistic philosophy declares that certain and immutable laws obtain
everywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally,
that a necessary causal connexus obtains everywhere in phenomena and,
accordingly, that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole, a
monon. Monism moreover maintains that all phenomena are produced alone
through mechanical causes (_causæ efficientes_) not through premeditated
purposive causes (_causæ finales_).”
And in the first lecture “The History of Evolution and Philosophy,” (p.
15) he says:
“We shall clearly recognise in the following investigations how
the most wonderful enigmas of human and animal organisations,
heretofore considered as inaccessible, have become accessible
to a natural solution through Darwin’s reform in the doctrine
of evolution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless
efficient causes.”
In agreement with these views, Professor Haeckel regards the terms
necessity and mechanicalism as equivalent terms. He rejects any kind of
teleology, any kind of final causes, and also the freedom of the will.
He opposes the so-called moral world-order as contradictory to the idea
that the world is regulated by mechanical law and he adopts the latter to
the exclusion of the former. All these points come out very strongly and
clearly in Professor Haeckel’s letter to the editor of _The Open Court_,
where his view of monism is graphically presented in a concise tabular
form.
We here reproduce this table from No. 212 of _The Open Court_, for the
convenience of our readers:
=======================+=======================+========================
MONISM. | FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS. | DUALISM.
-----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
Inseparable. | Matter and force. | As a matter of
| God and world. | principle distinct
| Soul and body. | entities.
-----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
Mechanicalism. | Life. | Vitalism.
Necessary evolution. | | Teleological creation.
-----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
Universal (conservation| Immortality. | Individual.
of energy). | Freedom of will. | A person’s will being
Determinism. | | absolutely free.
-----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
Causæ efficientes. | Causation. | Causæ finales.
(Efficient causes.) | | (Final causes.)
-----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
Regulated by mechanical| World-order. | So-called “Moral.”
law. | |
-----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
Inseparable and subject| Inorganic and organic | As a matter of
to the same laws. | nature. | principle distinct
| | and subject to
| | different laws.
-----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
Now we agree with Professor Haeckel in one main point, viz. “that certain
and immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as
much as in nature generally, and that the knowable world forms throughout
a unitary whole, a monon.” But we cannot agree to his proposition that
“the wonderful enigmas of organised life are accessible to a natural
solution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless efficient causes.”
We grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve for all
motions that take place in the world; even the motions of the brain
take place in strict obedience to the laws of molar and molecular
mechanics. But a mechanical explanation is not applicable to that which
is not motion. If it were applicable it would not be desirable, for
it would be of no avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to
mechanical phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon,
and an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a feeling, or
rather and more accurately expressed, being the special meaning of a
very complex feeling, is not a mechanical phenomenon either. It is true
that when a feeling takes place and when an idea is thought in the
brain of an organised being, that a certain nervous action takes place.
The nervous action is a motion and this motion represents a definite
amount of energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are
almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring the definite
amount of potential energy that is changed into kinetic energy when a
man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechanical
explanation of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of
what the nature of the idea is, why ideas originate and how they act.
We know that Professor Haeckel when he so vigorously insists on
mechanicalism, opposes those philosophers who believe that there are
motions which cannot be explained by mechanical laws. We side with
Professor Haeckel against any one who maintains that some motions are
mechanical (molar or molecular) and others are exceptions to the laws of
mechanics, representing a kind of hypermechanics. But we cannot admit the
explanation by mechanical laws of non-mechanical phenomena.
Professor Haeckel speaks of purposeless efficient causes—_zwecklos
thätige Ursachen_. He speaks of efficient causes, as excluding final
causes. He is right in his objection to final causes as the term is
commonly used. But while there are causes that are _zwecklos_, there
are no causes that are _ziellos_. Every process of causation takes a
definite course, it has a certain and definable direction. The end of
this direction need not be a conscious aim, but it is an aim whatever it
be, it is a _Ziel_. In this sense every efficient cause is at the same
time a final cause. The gravitating stone has no purpose, yet it has an
aim. So the evolution of organised life is a natural process having a
very definite aim. And this aim of the evolution of organised life is
determined by factors of a very complex nature. One of these factors is
almost imperceptible at the beginning, but it is of a constantly and
rapidly growing importance; and this factor is the psychical element
that appears with organised life. This factor is nothing supra-natural,
nothing extra-natural, and yet it is not something material or
mechanical. It is this factor which in its highest efflorescence changes
aims into purposes, and with this change it creates again a new factor of
evolution which is the purposive aspiration to conform to the world-order
and thus to advance the further progress of mankind. This aspiration is
in one word called morality.
When we speak of a moral world-order we mean that such moral behests
as were formulated in prescripts by Confucius, by Buddha, by Moses,
by Jesus, and other moral teachers of mankind have an objective and
immutable foundation in the nature of things. The mechanical law in the
province of motions, the logical law in the realm of thought, geometrical
proportions in mathematics, the regularity of natural laws, etc., form in
our world-conception a part of this moral world-order. The laws of social
life are not opposed to them but correlative.
The purpose of a man’s action reveals his character, and the character
of the man is his innermost nature. In an analogous way the aim of
evolution and especially the aim of the evolution of organised beings
reveals the character, the innermost nature of the universe. Psychic life
is absent so far as we can see in the primordial world substance as it
appears in the form of a nebula; it is absent still in the primordial
state of planets. It appears with the subjective states of awareness that
rise into existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised
matter is, in comparison with man’s subjectivity, to be considered as
a blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of awareness, which we have
reasons to doubt, it is apparently without meaning; it does not symbolise
external objects; it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim
of evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that the
subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature.
And the aim of psychical life being the development of moral ideals, we
are very well justified in speaking of the world-order as moral. When
speaking of the world-order as moral we mean that the moral prescripts of
the great ethical teachers of mankind are founded in and derived from the
world-order of nature.
There is one objection to calling the world-order moral, and we therefore
dislike to use the phrase. It is this: Morality means conformity to
a certain standard. The standard is not moral, but those who do or
do not conform to it are moral or immoral. Therefore if there is any
truth in the idea of God it is this that there is a standard for human
conduct to conform to, there is an authority which has to be obeyed
and this authority is God. To speak of God as moral or immoral is
anthropomorphism. If “God” means anything, it means that power of the
world-order obedience to which is called morality. If we say God is
moral, God ceases to be God, the moral authority above him to which he
has to conform would be the really true God. Thus logically the personal
conception of God leads to a superpersonal conception of God.
These are in brief our objections to Professor Haeckel’s definition
of monism as being identical with mechanicalism and perhaps also with
materialism. My opinion that Professor Haeckel may after all accede to
our view of monism is based upon an interesting and friendly conversation
which I enjoyed with him several years ago in Jena. Professor Haeckel
is not the one-sided naturalist that he is often represented to be by
orthodox clergymen. He does not see the workings of the natural laws
only, he sees also the moral aspect to which a consideration of the
natural laws leads. That his books emphasise the former without entering
into the problems of the latter is natural for a scientist, but he
personally is certainly even broader than are his books, and I should say
that his very opposition to certain errors which have been foisted by an
antiquated dogmatism upon our religious institutions, show the deeply
religious spirit of his character.