Professor William James’s supposition of “an hallucinatory candle” seen
by a “new born mind entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin”
is an impossible and self-contradictory figment. We might as well speak
of the dry Niagara falls employed in the manufacture of some material
goods out of nothing. For, first, a mind entirely blank is no mind
and, secondly, a blank mind if it could exist at all, would have no
hallucinations. An hallucinatory candle can be produced only out of the
memories or the combination of memories of former candle-sensations. A
blind man sees in his dream no colors, and a deaf man hears no symphonies.
A new-born babe is already in possession of many inherited memories. Thus
the first sense-impressions after the babe’s birth find the organism,
especially its skin, nerves and muscles predisposed for their reception.
The babe’s organism accordingly presents an instance of a relative but
not of an absolute blank; an absolute blank of a something that is to
develop into mind can mean only a lump of sentient matter at the moment
of formation. As soon as it is formed it is exposed in every second
of its existence to innumerable impressions which fill the blank with
contents and these contents are the mind that is developing.
Sentient substance is not at rest, but like a flame it is possessed of
an incessant activity. The form of this activity is both extraordinarily
plastic and stable. It is plastic, for every impression together with the
reaction of the impression modifies it and leaves a trace: it is stable
for the traces of all the impressions and reactions are preserved.
The first sense-impression of a lump of sentient substance produces an
irritation which objectively considered is a commotion of the sentient
substance and subjectively considered a feeling, the substance being
sentient _ex hypothesi_. This first and primitive feeling is meaningless,
for it has not, and cannot have, any reference to any other feeling,
memory or mind, and meaning is created through the interaction of
feelings with memories of feelings.
Some later sense-impression of the same kind will not only produce
the same irritation but also serve as an irritation to awaken the
memory-trace left by the former sense-impression. The new feeling will
melt into one with the reawakened memory of the former feeling. In the
long run many traces of the same kind which are, as it were, deposited
in the same place will constitute an organ predisposed to receive the
correspondent impressions; and now a sense-impression received by such an
organ may be called a sensation. A sensation is not merely a feeling, it
is a feeling of a special kind and it is felt to be of a special kind. In
other words, a sensation is a feeling that has acquired meaning; and this
meaning is the product of the interaction and coöperation of feelings
and memories. Sensations have become symbols representing the cause of
the sense-impression which produced the sensation, and ideas are symbols
of a higher order representing either whole classes of a certain kind
of causes of sense-impressions or certain features thereof, or certain
relations among them.
Thus every mind is a system of sentient symbols. These symbols being as
it were pictures intended somehow to represent or allegorically speaking
to portray things are called “ideas,” while the things symbolised are in
their totality called objective existence or “reality.”
Considering the nature of mind, it is obvious that there cannot be
an entirely blank mind. We might as well speak of an entirely blank
picture. But an entirely blank picture is a canvas and no picture at
all. That a mind which is not as yet a mind can have neither sensations
nor hallucinations is almost self-evident. Similarly there is no sense
in saying that a picture that consists of an utter blank and thus is
properly speaking no picture at all but an empty canvas, either does or
does not correctly represent a certain object.
The word “real” is used in two senses (1) as a name for everything that
exists and (2) to signify that kind of existence which is the object of
our sensory and mental experience, i. e. the objective world so-called.
The former of these two definitions is more comprehensive; for it
includes the realm of mentality, the ideal world of subjectivity. The
latter is used in contrast to the subjective world of mental life and
thus expressly excludes the ideal realm of the mind and of mental symbols.
The questions as to What is reality? and Is there anything real at all?
must not be formulated as they are by Professor James, in terms of belief
but in a statement of facts and by defining certain facts as real.
An hallucination is real in the first sense of the word; it is an actual
existence; it is a feeling taking place in the mind of some organism.
It is also real in the second sense of the word in so far as it is a
vibration of a brain structure. However an hallucination is not real
in the second sense of the word in so far as its meaning has not its
correspondent analogue.
Let the meaning of a certain mental symbol be a candle, under which
name we comprise a certain group of experiences, and let the cerebral
structure of this mental symbol be awakened by another stimulus than
that which is generally called a candle. Those experiences which as a
group are called a candle are of a certain kind. If a piece of paper
approaches the lighted candle, it will burn. An hallucinatory candle will
leave the paper intact, although the person who has the hallucination may
see the paper burn. Thus the ideas or images of objects are built up of
experiences which have taught us that under certain conditions certain
events happen; in consequence of certain actions there are constantly
certain reactions taking place. Reality consists of such facts; it is the
sum total of all reactions; reality is the nature of objects which react
somehow.
Those who jump at the conclusion that our subjective sensations, such as
colors, tastes, sounds, etc., must be regarded as objective properties
of things, are grossly mistaken. Our sensations are not qualities of
things but subjective phenomena: they do not inform us about the nature
of things, but reveal to us how things affect our senses. Those however
who deny or doubt objective existence are no less mistaken. The world
is not a subjective phenomenon of sensations, but an objective existence
symbolised in sensations.
The question is not “Does reality exist?” but “What is Reality?” or
“What is the meaning of ‘real’?” When we say “Objects are real,” we
mean that they resist, they react, their presence produces somehow some
effect. When we say, We ourselves are real, we mean that we react upon
the objects with which we come in contact, we mean, that in our bodily
existence we are objects in an objective world.
Actions and reactions are taking place. This is a fact. He who denies
it is like the man who declares that he is not at home; he contradicts
himself: for the denial of a question is a reaction upon an action. The
term reality is the symbol of the nature of actions and reactions in
their efficacy, it denotes the essence of facts and thus the question
“Does reality exist?” has no sense. We denote that which exists, that
which acts and reacts, that which is a fact, or howsoever we may
express it, by the word “reality.” We might deny that the reactions of
the objective world are constant, or that a certain idea of a certain
reaction is erroneous, viz. that the reaction if put to the test would
prove to be different from what it was expected—but all these denials and
doubts which are of daily occurrence in the domain of science presuppose
that there are reactions taking place and reality or objective existence
is only a collective name for these reactions and their nature. The name
object still preserves the idea of reaction, for object is that which
reacts upon touch, which resists, which is objected.
We shall lose ourselves in inextricable confusion by making a matter of
doubt and belief what is really a statement of facts. To speak of a doubt
or belief in the reality of things in general is tantamount to speaking
of a belief in our experiences which, whatever their particular nature
may be, are facts. And to doubt our experiences, not the correctness
of a particular experience, but experience in general, i. e. the very
existence of experience is tantamount to doubting our own being.
A consideration of what we mean by an hallucination can best make clear
what we mean, and rationally can only mean, by reality. A real candle is
a mental symbol of something which will under certain conditions react
in a certain way. An hallucinatory candle is also a mental symbol, but
the thing which it purports to mean, does not exist; i. e. there is
nothing that will react. The symbol is there, but not that something the
existence of which the symbol of the idea “candle” would indicate.
This method of dealing with the problem of the old naïve realism and the
pseudo-critical idealism of former times is not based upon the assumption
of the reality of things (which means, of the reality of reality); it
is simply a careful formulation of the problem to prevent our being
entangled all about with contradictions; it is the method of rendering
clear the basic principle of positivism, that all knowledge is a
description of facts, which description of facts is made for the purpose
of, dealing with facts.