_To the Editor of The Monist_:
SIR—I am glad to hear that Prof. Max Müller intends to answer our
double-barrelled criticism of his article on the above subject.
Meanwhile, however, I should like to say a few words with regard to the
point which he selects for immediate response (see _The Monist_, Jan.
1892, p. 286). And my object in saying these few words is to remove from
his mind the idea that with regard to the point in question I had the
smallest intention of bringing against him “a serious charge of want of
accuracy, unpardonable in a scholar.” On the contrary, as regards this
point I was simply defending myself from _his_ charge against _me_—to
wit, the charge of arrogance.
In his article on “Thought and Language” he observed, “Professor Romanes
has no right to speak of men like Noiré, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say
nothing of Hobbes, with an air of superiority.” In answer to this charge
I stated the bare facts of the case,—viz. that in my book I had alluded
to Noiré merely for the sake of stating his theory as to the origin
of speech, and of expressing my large measure of agreement therewith;
that I had quoted Huxley only in places where my argument needed
authoritative opinions on matters of comparative anatomy; that I had
only once mentioned Hobbes, and then in order to back by his authority a
philosophical doctrine for which I was contending; and, lastly, that I
had never mentioned Herbert Spencer at all. Now, if my critic feels that
a mere statement of these facts amounts to a serious charge against him
as a scholar, I can only express my regret that he should have imposed on
me the necessity of stating them.
But what now is his reply to this simple statement of facts? Briefly,
he drops his own “serious charge” as regards Noiré, Huxley, and Hobbes,
and takes his stand upon the case of Herbert Spencer. “It is true,” he
says, “Mr. Spencer’s name does not occur in the index. But on p. 230 we
read: ‘So here again we meet with additional proof, were any required,
of the folly of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a
proposition.’ Now it is well known that it is Herbert Spencer who regards
the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.” As if it were
one man alone who takes this view, and that man Herbert Spencer! Or as
if Herbert Spencer’s name were so specially identified with it, that
in calling it a philosophically foolish view I expected my readers to
understand a disrespectful allusion to him! Surely my critic knows as
well as I do that this question touching the function of the copula
is one which has been debated for centuries; and therefore that with
much more show of reason he might accuse me of making an attack on the
President of the United States, on the ground that I had expressed a
decided opinion in favor of free trade.
But more than this. So far is it from being “well known that it is
Herbert Spencer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a
proposition,” that I am under the necessity of asking Prof. Max Müller
for references in proof of such a statement. Chapters X and XI of the
“Principles of Psychology” (Vol. II) are those which, as far as I am
aware, most nearly approach the subject. Yet the word “copula” does not
once occur in them. Moreover, with all that Mr. Spencer has there said
upon the nature and structure of propositions I am, and always have been,
in full agreement.
Yours faithfully,