Productions of a literary-historical character are under certain
circumstances also entitled to mention in a philosophical magazine,
especially if they present to us the intellectual development and
physiognomy of an individual or of a community in a scientific manner, as
is done in the _Essays_ of KARL WEIGAND which have just been published by
Merhoff, of Munich. Of the larger essays contained in this book we will
especially mention those on Voltaire, Rousseau, Baudelaire, and Taine, to
which in psychological respects a high value is to be accorded, and which
although not exactly easy are nevertheless pleasant reading.
Viewed from this standpoint the _History of North American Literature_ by
KARL KNORTZ (Berlin, 1891, Lustenöder) hardly admits of consideration;
not even Edgar Allen Poe, who in the psychological point of view is of
unexceptionally great importance, is in any respect profoundly treated.
The work is made up of a series of well written articles which first no
doubt were published in newspapers and magazines for the public at large.
We deem it proper, however, to mention the work in this place, because it
contains a chapter on the philosophical literature of North America, in
which, we must admit, philosophy does not appear to the best advantage.
The representatives of philosophy in North America, the author says,
are in the main doctors of divinity and securely installed university
professors, and this department of study has therefore no dangerous
connections; the gentlemen calmly wend their way along the ancient and
well-trodden path of the aprioristic philosophers and proscribe without
any ado all modern innovations, Darwinism in particular.
As they have not as yet consigned the belief in God and immortality and
the freedom of the will to the lumber-room of traditional opinions, and
as they are as a rule only superficially acquainted with the results of
the exact sciences, despite the fact that many assure us of the contrary,
they accordingly fancy that they are easily able to solve the imagined
chief problem of philosophy, the reconciliation of religion and science.
This judgment may contain much that is true, but from the little that
we personally know of things in North America, is to be decidedly
restricted. Moreover, we by no means share the low opinion which the
author entertains of all attempts to reconcile religion and science.
Religion is a phenomenon of too great antiquity and its influence
in the life of nations is too thoroughly established to entitle us,
on the ground of science with which it is still involved in violent
conflict, summarily to disregard it; and consequently every attempt at
reconciliation is worthy of the best efforts of the noblest. It is of
course a question whether we shall ever arrive at the point where we
will completely understand _all_ religious things, but we certainly
must with time arrive at a point where religion shall no longer contain
inconsistencies, contain nothing, that is, of which the absurdities are
patent.
There was indeed, in Germany also, a time when the belief was very
widely spread that religion as compared with science might be ignored
completely; it was the time when Ludwig Büchner and Karl Vogt were so
much read, when the magazine _Gartenlaube_ counted its greatest number
of readers. But this time is long since past, and just as since that
time employment with philosophy, especially with ethics, has become
more comprehensive, so also the interest in religio-philosophical
questions, which aim at a reconcilement of the two hostile powers, has
been considerably augmented. Aside from the German productions which have
been written in a conciliatory tone, like the book, to give an example,
of Moriz Carrière on Christianity and the Modern World Conception,
foreign works of this same class have also been much read, particularly
Drummond’s _Natural Law in the Spiritual World_, to which indeed in
our judgment no particular value is attributable, as it does not help
us to any real knowledge but contents itself with analogies which
scientifically are absolutely worthless.
Recently the little treatise _Ernste Gedanken_ of the Saxon officer VON
EGIDY (Leipsic, 1891, Wilh. Wigand) has been much talked about. The
reformatory effect of this brochure has, indeed, hitherto been very
slight and will hardly become more extensive in the future, but the
response that it has met with in the widest circles of the German public,
proves that many ardent friends of religion anxiously desire that the
dogmatic shackles and integuments shall be stripped from the body of the
Christian beliefs, and that it shall appear, in the clearest and purest
light, that which it is, the religion of love.
Theological criticism has not taken an exactly favorable attitude towards
the little book of Lieut. Egidy, and even the liberals, who pay the
fullest credit to the good intentions of the author call attention to the
fact that the greater part of what Egidy advances has been said before
and said better, and that there is an almost absolute lack of positive
proposals to be adopted. The Egidy movement will thus probably have, they
conclude, no lasting effects.
We cannot indeed absolutely say that these critics are wrong, if we
are at all conversant with the development of protestant theology.
A very instructive and opportune work in this respect is a book
of the well-known Berlin professor OTTO PFLEIDERER, who, as his
religio-philosophical treatises evidence, himself belongs to the
reconcilers of Christianity and the modern world-conceptions. In the
year 1889, at the instigation of the editor of the Library of Philosophy
issued by Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. of London, he published in the
English language a work on _The Development of Protestant Theology
since Kant and in Great Britain since 1825_, and this same work has now
just appeared in German (published by Mohr of Freiburg) in a somewhat
more extended form. As its title proclaims, and as its belonging to the
Library of Philosophy would signify, the work is chiefly concerned with
the influence which philosophy has exercised on theological thought.
To make this influence plain, the author presents at the start, in the
form of an introduction, a concise but extremely lucid exposition of the
philosophical doctrines that especially demand consideration in this
direction. Of German philosophers, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel,
and of English, Herbert Spencer are treated of at length.
In view of the great respect which Hegel still enjoys in America, it will
perhaps interest many of the readers of _The Monist_ if I give here an
utterance of Pfleiderer, which in the point of view of the history of
religion is also deserving of consideration, at least on the part of
those who are recognised adherents of evolutionism.
“No other branch of inquiry,” says Pfleiderer, “owes so much to Hegel as
History; the arbitrary construction of details from the philosophical
concept which had crept in by Hegel and his immediate followers, has
of course been discarded by exact historical inquirers, but there has
remained that profounder conception of historical life generally as a
development of the common mind of all ages and nations, conformable
to law, dominated by ideas, and aiming at necessary general purposes;
there has remained that profounder insight into the intricate play of
phenomena, into the kernel of things and men, into the dominating ideas
that lie as guiding impulses at the foundation of even the apparent
disharmony of individual passions; there has remained that unprepossessed
understanding for the necessity of even the contrarieties and struggles,
for the errors and passions of men, for conflict is the father of all
things, as Hegel says with Heraclitus, and as it is only through the
struggle of partial rights and one-sided truths that the whole truth of
the idea can force its way into existence; there has remained finally
that intelligent respect for the heroic figures of history in which the
genius of a people and of an age have been incarnated, which as the
instruments of a higher power have awakened the thought that slumbered
in all souls, given it clear expression, and infused in it life by their
mighty deeds. Neither a Leopold Ranke, nor a Thomas Carlyle, nor a
Ferdinand Christian Bauer would be conceivable without Hegel’s philosophy
of history.”
Pfleiderer expresses himself here very cautiously concerning Hegel, and
in other passages his caution is extended further still. Nevertheless, it
will seem to many as if that philosopher has been too highly estimated by
Pfleiderer. Especially will the followers of Herbart be dissatisfied, who
was involved in violent combat with Schelling and Hegel. It is not the
place here to enter minutely into this subject; but it is to be mentioned
that the name of Herbart does not occur once in this large book. Perhaps
Pfleiderer is of Edward Zeller’s opinion who says in his “History of
Modern Philosophy,” that the philosophy of Herbart has proved itself
unfruitful. It must be confessed, indeed, that the philosophy of Hegel
has proved itself for religious doctrine very fruitful; but whether we
should be satisfied with its results is quite a different question. Be
that however as it may; still, after Schoel has presented Herbart’s ideas
concerning religion in a special work, since men like Drobisch, Thilo,
and Strumpell have further elaborated these ideas; since particularly
Ziller in his Ethics has also profoundly treated religious problems in
the sense of Herbart, it is no longer allowable to omit the name of
Herbart when we treat of the modern philosophy of religion.
In other respects also we are not always in full accord with the author.
So, for example, in Hausrath’s _Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte_, a work
to which we ourselves are very much indebted, the perfection of the form
of the presentment is justly praised, as is also the merit of having
inserted into the greater setting of universal history the development
of early Christianity; but it is not mentioned that Hausrath has often
allowed himself to be misguided into combinations whose flimsiness cannot
escape the notice even of the lay student.
But these are only slight deficiencies of a work that is otherwise
excellent and full of matter, closing with the words: “This much is
certain, that the labors of the best and wisest of all the theologians of
our century, who have here been passed in review before the eyes of the
reader, however different the paths may be which individually they have
entered upon, have yet been all directed to the one end that Christianity
shall strip itself of its dogmatic coverings and fetters and evince its
world-conquering power in the ethical idealism of a love that unites us
with God and joins together the hands of humanity into the federation of
brotherhood.”
If this aim were universal, that is if it were also recognised by the
theologians, a not inconsiderable portion of the dispute between religion
and science would be done away with, and the sole question would then
turn on the contrariety of theological and philosophical ethics. But even
respecting this point a settlement would be much sooner brought about,
if those concerned would evince the same spirit of reconciliation as
HANS GALLWITZ, city pastor of Sigmaringen, has recently done in his book
_Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart_ (Göttingen, 1891, Vandenhoeck
and Ruprecht). The author, it is true, deals critically not only with
the philosophical ethics of a Paulsen and a Wundt, but also with the
theological ethics of a Hermann and a Kaftan; still the settlement of
things with the philosophers forms the bulk of this rather extensive
work, the contents of which we cannot of course give here. Gallwitz also
speaks in considerable detail of Kant, whom he opposes in respect of the
psychological questions here involved, wholly rejecting anything like
a transcendental will. If we must agree with him in this respect, we
can nevertheless not follow him in his assumption of a special ethical
constitution of the soul.
In conclusion let me note the titles of two works to which I shall revert
in a subsequent letter. On _The Psychology in Kant’s Ethics_ Dr. ALFRED
HEGLER of Tübingen presents a meritorious and compendious treatise of 300
pages (Freiburg, 1891, Mohr), and Professor HOSTINSKY of Prague publishes
an exposition and interpretation, based on the sources, of _Herbart’s
Æsthetics_, in which, as is well known, ethics and æsthetics in the
restricted sense are wholly severed from psychology.