Cesare Lombroso and his assistant S. Ottolenghi communicate the results
of their investigations of the senses of born criminals in a similar
way as the former of the two had done in his “Studies in Criminal
Anthropology,” _The Monist_, Vol. i, No. 2, p. 177 et sqq. Our authors
say: “Since the days of the famous Greek sage who said that nothing came
into the intellect save through the gateway of the senses, it could be
foreseen that a study of the senses would become the gateway to ethics.”
And, it is a fact recognised for some time but not as yet proved by exact
methods that a lack of moral sense is often accompanied with an obtusity
of the sense-organs. Dr. Azam’s famous Felida showed an entire absence of
the moral sense when she was in a state of analgesia; Romanes has pointed
out that the sensitiveness to pain is greater in tame animals than in
wild beasts, this is especially noticeable in the dog. It is noteworthy
also that savage peoples are almost insensible to pain while civilisation
often increases sensibility till it becomes hyperæsthesia.
Obtusity of the sense-organs in criminals should not be confounded
however with the anæsthesia of criminals, because the rarity of
laterality, the absence of isolated insensible places, the lack of motory
anomalies, etc., exclude the supposition of hysteria.
Our authors found among 15 criminal boys between 10 and 14 years no less
than ten cases of absolute analgesia, which proves that this symptom
cannot be the effect of alcoholism, syphilis, marasmus, or overwork of a
special trade.
Several anecdotes are told about the insensibility to pain. An old thief
had his leg amputated with the greatest apathy: the operation done, he
took the limb into his hand and joked about it. An inveterate murderer,
his penal servitude being ended, was dismissed out of the bagnio of the
island S. He asked the warden to be retained, because he did not know how
to get food and shelter. His demand being refused, he opened his bowels
with the handle of a spoon, went to bed as usual, and died without even a
sigh. Mandrin, a criminal, shortly before his execution allowed himself
to be cut in eight places without giving a sign of pain; criminal R.
flayed the skin of his face with a piece of glass. In the penitentiary at
Chatham during the years 1871 and 1872, 841 voluntary wounds and injuries
were made. Among them 27 convicts had mutilated some limb, and in 17
cases the limb had to be amputated.
This obtusity of the sensory organs in criminals is supposed to be of
a cortical origin and being similar to the phenomena of savage life is
interpreted as atavism. Criminals show deficiencies in the senses of
touch, smell, taste, and hearing, but not of sight. And this is analogous
to the savage in whom the sense of sight is naturally very strong, and
no criminal could execute numerous thefts or escape the arm of justice
without a high development of the sense of sight.
In the second article on comparisons of tone-distances Gustav Engel,
Professor at the Royal High-school of Music in Berlin, takes occasion
to explain his views of the subject with reference to the severe
criticism of C. Stumpf on Carl Lorenz’s theory. Wilhelm Wundt had taken
part in the discussion in favor of Lorenz. The subject of the article
lies in the border-land between the physiology of hearing and music;
and Professor Engel comes to the conclusion that affinity of tones, i.
e. the interval-sense in a melodious succession does not lead to the
same accuracy and reliability of hearing as their concord. He objects
to the idea of an arithmetical difference as proposed by Lorenz and
Wundt, and proves it through the fact that the Pythagorean tierce in
the unaccompanied scale makes a less noticeable disturbance than in a
concord, while the approximately pure tierce (which is too low only
by a small fracture of a comma) is excellent in the concord while it
causes a slight disturbance in the melody. Musical intervals are not
identical with the geometrical intervals, yet they are based upon them as
a selection made among innumerable possibilities for certain purposes.
Their acceptance is established only in harmonic music, but this fact too
adds some difficulties to the investigations made in this field, for if
two tones sound together, we can no longer distinguish them separately,
as would be required for the investigation; and if we let the one succeed
the other their geometrical relation is no longer discerned with the same
precision. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
κρς.
VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XV. Nos. 3
and 4.
CONTENTS of No. 3:
PSYCHISCHE UND PHYSISCHE ACTIVITÄT. By _H. Höffding_.
UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.
(Achter Artikel.) By _A. Marty_.
ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER MATHEMATIK. By _Chr. v. Ehrenfels_.
DER FOLGERUNGSCALCUL UND DIE INHALTSLOGIK. By _E. G. Husserl_.
CONTENTS of No. 4:
DIE GESETZMÄSSIGKEIT DER PHYSISCHEN ACTIVITÄT. By _H. Höffding_.
ETHNOLOGIE UND ÆSTHETIK. By _E. Grosse_.
UEBER DIE FORTSCHREITENDE ENTWICKLUNG DES MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS.
(Erster Artikel.) By _F. Rosenberger_.
UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.
(Neunter Artikel). By _A. Marty_.
UEBER FERNWIRKUNG UND ANORMALE. WAHRNEHMUNGSFÄKHIGKEIT.
Methodologische Randglossen. By _M. Offner_.
Prof. H. Höffding’s article on psychical and physical activity is an
answer to a criticism by Professor Kroman. Professor Höffding had
proposed, concerning the relation of the psychical to the physical, a
theory which he called the “identity hypothesis,” according to which
the physical and psychical activities are not different in their nature
but only in their phenomenal appearance. K. Kroman, a countryman and
colleague of H. Höffding—both are professors at the University of
Copenhagen—rejected in his recent work “Logic and Psychology” the
identity hypothesis and characterised it as “Duplicism,” a name against
which Höffding protests. Kroman’s objections are as follows: _a_) Natural
science knows of no reason to conceive of the relation of the psychical
to the material in the way expressed by the identity-hypothesis. _b_)
On the basis of the identity-hypothesis it remains unexplained how we
can know anything about the external world. _c_) It is inexplicable how
an identity can obtain of two so different things as are the bodily
multiplicity and the psychical unity. Professor Höffding investigates
these three objections separately and comes to the conclusion that
his identity-hypothesis shows the relation between the psychical and
material nature in a clear and simple light. It excludes on the one hand
materialism and on the other hand spiritualism. The question whether
either phenomenon, spirit or matter, represents the absolute nature of
existence, cannot, according to Höffding, be answered. It appears to
us that Professor Höffding’s position is sound in all main points and
may be considered as that view which is most prevalent among modern
psychologists. However, concerning the question whether spirit or matter
represents the absolute nature of existence, we refer the reader to the
editorial article “Are there Things in Themselves?” section XII, “The
Oneness of Subjectivity and Objectivity.” In our opinion the question
itself is illegitimate. Neither the subjectivity of spirit, nor the
objectivity of matter represents the absolute nature of existence;
both together form the nature of existence; and we omit here the word
“absolute” purposely. The question as to which abstract, matter or
spirit, represents the absolute nature of existence seems to us similar
to the question which of the two terms _A_ and _B_ represents in the
relation _A:B_ the absolute nature of the relation. The obvious answer is
neither.
The eighth article of A. Marty of Prague on Language-reflex is mainly of
a controversial nature directed against L. Tobler’s article on the origin
of language in the _Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie_. By Nativism,
Marty understands the theory that certain involuntary articulate sounds
are associated with certain ideas, while the so-called empirical theory
attempts to explain the origin of the first words without such innate
mechanical relations between sounds and concepts. Marty represents the
empirical solution of the problem and objects to the extreme nativism,
but he grants that Tobler’s modified nativism approaches very much to his
own position.
The longest article of the present number (63 pp.) is an essay full of
valuable hints by Chr. v. Ehrenfels on the Philosophy of Mathematics.
The epistemological basis of mathematics demands a psychological
investigation of its contents. Accordingly the author proposes to present
a psychological characterisation of the number-conceptions, from
which he derives some conclusions concerning the theory of cognition.
He investigates the origin of the unity conception which is generally
defined as “positing a unit” or as “conceiving as a unit.” We usually
believe that we abstract numbers directly from the objects, when we
look for instance at one house with two doors and five windows. But
this process of abstraction is not quite so direct as it seems. The
number-conception is not taken from external observation, but carried
into the same; yet this is done involuntarily and inadvertently so that
it appears as if they were _eo ipso_ contained in it.
What is the origin of the concepts “unity” and “multiplicity”? Two
methods present themselves: 1) The concentration of attention and (2)
the act of bringing into relation. The former produces a unity and,
when successively directed to several objects, a series of units. The
latter appears to be required by the consideration that the conception
of a number is conditioned by acts of distinguishing. The number
“two” requires two acts of distinguishing, “three” requires three,
“four” requires six and the number _n_ requires _n_/2(_n_-1) acts
of distinguishing. This explains why we can have clear and direct
conceptions only of very low figures. The idea that a combination of both
methods will explain the facts is by no means excluded. But there is a
third source which may be used to explain the unity conception, viz.
inner experience. “The unity of consciousness,” Ehrenfels says, “has been
misused in philosophy to demonstrate the substantiality, simplicity,
and indestructibility of the soul.” Nevertheless there is some truth in
the unity idea, for the present psychical phenomena present themselves
in a peculiar amalgamation, which admits of a comparison between two
elements while it erects a barrier between the _ego_ and the _tu_. Our
psychical contents will always appear to us as a unit; and on this basis
we might declare that the unity conception is derived from this source.
[Here Ehrenfels does not see that the concentration of attention is
practically the same as the unity of consciousness, for attention means
consciousness, and concentration produces unity.]
Number-conceptions originate by counting. We disjoin things; for
instance, we throw a number of apples into a basket, or we let the finger
slide over the division lines of a measuring stick naming each unit while
proceeding in the act. From such processes the function of counting
can be abstracted while the details are neglected as unimportant. Most
of the higher numbers are never directly but only indirectly realised.
So for instance twenty is to many that number which will be reached by
counting up to twenty, yet the single units of the number are lost sight
of entirely. Such number-conceptions belong to the class of “indirect
concepts” which represent objects not through marks belonging to the
object itself, but originating through its relation to other objects.
The basis of such indirect concepts had been called by Ehrenfels
_Gestaltsqualitäten_, i. e. figure qualities, and by Meinong _fundierte
Inhalte_ or founded contents. Thus indirect conceptions are parts
contingent upon some such basis.
Number-conceptions are not always clearly thought out and there are some
helps to represent higher or more complex numbers. Thus we can think of
ten as represented by the outside and inside corners of a pentagram,
twelve as the edges of a cube, etc., and common among all nations is the
usage of the fingers to represent numbers up to ten. Such helps are quite
different from indirect number-conceptions and may be called figurative
number-conceptions.
That there are mathematical conceptions of magnitudes which have no
objective analogon is quite natural, for there is even in an indirect
conception no warrant for its objective reality; and we ought to
consider how many word- and idea-combinations are possible without
their possessing some analogous reality. Yet the so-called irrational
cannot properly be called a number, it is the demand of a number which
in fractions can sufficiently for certain purposes but never fully be
realised.
Negative numbers always presuppose a contrast and such conditions arise
naturally wherever the fundamental ideas imply two opposite directions,
for instance past and future in time, credit and debit in business, etc.
It is a matter of course that there are in reality as little either
positive or negative numbers, as there are positive or negative colors or
sounds.
Concerning the necessity idea, Ehrenfels says: “Nobody will consider
it as possible that five plus seven will in some cases make any other
number than twelve. We are confident that the same addition will under
all circumstances yield the same sum.” Ehrenfels grants the psychical
certitude of this but not the mathematical, and thinks that on this
point there is a difference of opinion allowable. Here we disagree from
Ehrenfels and refer the reader to former articles on kindred subjects in
_The Monist_, especially the article on “The Origin of Thought-forms,”
Vol. II, p. 111. We must bear in mind that in mathematics we are moving
in a realm of pure forms and the statement 7 + 5 = 12 is, as the Germans
express it, _eindeutig bestimmt_, i. e. it is determined exhaustively in
one and the only one possible way. The numbers 7 and 5 being rigid, their
sum and their product will also be rigid.
This difference of opinion may be contingent upon a difference of the
conception of the _a priori_. Ehrenfels defines as “a priori” such
judgments which having come into our possession, are readily accepted
without proof. We follow Grassmann in rejecting the acceptance of
anything without proof, including the idea of mathematical axioms. The
_a priori_ in our terminology becomes identical with that which pertains
to formal thought: and it would make no difference whether the instance
presented is as simple as 1 + 1 = 2 or extremely complex as are the
differential calculus and logarithms. Accordingly we disagree also from
Ehrenfels when he finds even in such additions as for instance 825 +
217 = 1042 vestiges of an _a posteriori_ character. The employment of
the logarithms accordingly appears to Ehrenfels also _aposterioristic_
because the fruits of other peoples’ labors are utilised!
Concerning John Stuart Mill’s view of the subject, Ehrenfels says that
“it is still deeply entangled in the errors of that conception which it
so bitterly opposes, viz. in the formalism of the old purely _a priori_
conception. For only he who adheres to the view that all mathematics
are deduced from a few axioms can think of attributing to those axioms
the highest degree of plausibility which is assumed for them on the
ground of comprehensive deduction.” We agree with Ehrenfels’s objection
to Mill, but we cannot agree with his view that mathematics derives any
elements from _a posteriori_ elements, although we grant that quite new
departments are created simply by a different employment of certain
functions. Accordingly mathematics cannot be derived from a few axioms
only but is the products of certain functions.
Ehrenfels calls attention to the fact that the mathematician operating
with symbols often forgets entirely what he has to think of in connection
with these symbols. “This is not strange,” he adds, “for thoughtless
word-combinations present analogous instances, yet it is strange that
the result almost without exception comes out right; _es stimmt!_” We
object here; operations with mathematical symbols are not thoughtless
combinations, at least, they are not meaningless. They are operations
not with things, but with symbols representing certain relations among
things. When gamblers play with chips representing real money, they need
not think during the game of the value represented by a chip, and yet
when the account is made, the result attained with the assistance of the
chips will come out right. There is no reason to wonder at it. Chips like
mathematical symbols might in a certain sense be called thoughtless, for
certainly they do not think; but they are not thoughtless in the sense
that they are meaningless, that nothing is thought by them.
Ehrenfels apparently sees a problem where there is none and this is
closely connected with another point. He looks upon the mathematician’s
inability of thinking out in every respect the objective meaning of
mathematical symbols as a shortcoming of man’s intellect. While it
appears that we cannot think anything by many mathematical symbols (for
instance by _a⁰ = 1_) except the symbol itself, the enormous success
of mathematical thought is evidence that they must have some definite
meaning although it is to be excogitated only by those beings who will
transgress the average intelligence of to-day, the first germs of whose
existence are the mathematical geniuses of the present generation. It
appears to us that undoubtedly every mathematical symbol has a definite
meaning, representing the result of some function. That the result will
sometimes be unattainable or unrealisable, that especially all operations
with zero make the whole calculation indefinite (which naturally arises
from the nature of zero) does not alter the truth of this proposition in
the least.
We have to make one additional remark. The peculiarity of mathematics
that we do not throughout our operations think out the meaning of the
symbols is not a shortcoming of our intelligence, but the strength of
mathematical science. The advantage of all the formal sciences and
especially of mathematics consists in this that we _need not_ think out
every detail, but that we can, through the assistance of mathematical
symbols, perform the most intricate operations with machine-like
exactness. The economy of thought produced in this way is not a
deficiency of man’s mind, but a virtue.
Prof. H. Höffding (in No. 4) insists upon the causal law as being
indispensable in psychology. There are some people and among others his
colleague Professor Kroman who regard moral motives as an exception.
“Yet,” says Professor Höffding, “should the decisive moment of a decision
not be determined by the causal law, the will could never be determined
through a reflection on the possible effects of the action and thus every
reason would be missing to attribute to man any responsibility.”
E. Grosse expatiates on the proposition to apply the comparative method
of ethnology to æsthetics. Ferd. Rosenberger proposes the following
programme: “Knowledge is power; activity based upon such power is the
cause of happiness. Therefore with the increase of knowledge, there is
an increase of happiness, successful activity however is impossible
without virtue. Therefore we conclude that an increase of happiness will
be accompanied with an increase of virtue.” A. Marty in this his ninth
article blames Steinthal for having misrepresented the eighteenth century
theories of the origin of language.
M. Offner reviews Dr. Charles Richet’s reports of his telepathic
experiments, but the reviewer cannot assent to Richet’s opinion “that
these facts possess a strange coincidence and that they are, probably,
the result of a relation and not of pure chance.” (Leipsic: O. R.
Reisland.)
κρς.
PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 1 and 2.