LES ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET CÉRÉBRALE. I.
Le Kantisme. By _A. Fouillée_.
DU RÔLE DE LA VOLONTÉ DANS LA CROYANCE. By _J. J. Gourd_.
In discussing the part of the will played in belief, M. J. J. Gourd
considers our belief in an ultra-phenomenal reality which he calls
“metaphysical belief.” “All thought,” he says, “involves a relation,
viz. a relation between subject and object. Every relation presupposes a
comparison of its terms and this comparison is not established if the
subject and object belong to different worlds. The subject is undoubtedly
found in consciousness, the object must be there also. All the ingenious
arguments to escape this conclusion are vain. Accordingly, one may well
believe in the truth of the metaphysical belief, but this belief is not
true.”
M. G. Tarde, the great criminologist and an opponent of Professor
Lombroso’s school reviews the penological and criminological literature
of recent times in France, Italy, and Belgium.
Alfred Fouillée revises in the article on “the origin of our intellectual
and cerebral structure” several solutions of the problem of the nature
of thought-forms, especially Kant’s view of the _a priori_. Strongly
influenced by Schopenhauer, he makes of the great pessimist’s will-theory
quite an original and peculiar application and finds that the question of
“_idées-forces_” is also at the bottom of the question of the origin of
ideas. In comparing the origin of ideas to the origin of solar systems,
he says: “Ideas are the condensation of that which exists everywhere in
a nebulous state into luminous centres and conscious focuses. Sensation
is desire.” And he sums up his view in the sentence: “Nihil est in
intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu et voluntate.” (Paris: Félix
Alcan.)
κρς.
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II.
No. 5.