Under “Belief” Mr. Stout includes every mode and degree of assent or
dissent. To disbelieve a proposition is to believe its contradictory.
Doubt is belief in a disjunctive judgment. In a former article he
dealt with the “Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality.” He now
treats of the various kinds of real existence; as follows. _The Real in
Sensation._ The real as immediately apprehended in sensation must not be
confounded with the percipient mind. Sensation as such is real in so far
as it limits and controls the movement of attention, by restricting the
range of subjective selection. _The Real in Judgments of Comparison._
In and through the peculiar movement of attention in endeavoring to
keep it fixed on _A_ in the very act of fixing it on _B_, the points of
agreement and difference between _A_ and _B_ gradually emerge into clear
consciousness. _Objective Attributes of Presentation._ Dr. Pikler’s
theory of the psychology of Objective Existence fails to distinguish
between the phenomena which are merely observed by voluntary attention
and those which are actually produced by it. The act of introspection
modifies more or less the mental processes which it examines. Their
pre-existing strength and mode of operation can be ascertained only by
elimination of the peculiar reinforcement or enfeeblement which they
acquire by emergence into distinct consciousness. _The Objectivity of
Space and Spatial Relations._ Although we can produce change of place
by moving our bodies, according to our will, this freedom of selective
selection has rigid limits imposed on it by the very nature of space.
This control imposed on our freedom by the nature of the object
constitutes its objectivity. The constant possibility of transition
from one position to another is apprehended as inherent in the very
nature of space independently of our will. Whenever I distinctly attend
to the nature of a spatial limit, I must of necessity admit that space
is boundless. What has been said about the objectivity of space in
general applies _mutatis mutandis_ to the objectivity of space-relations
as treated by the geometrician. The psychological conditions of my
subjective certitude lie ultimately in the impassable barriers,
arising from the very nature of space, which confine the freedom of
my constructive movement. _Reality in the Association of Ideas._
Association is a cause of belief. If certain contents of consciousness
have once been copresented in a certain relation to each other, the
reproduction of the one tends to bring about the reproduction of the
other in the same relation in which they were originally copresented.
A comparatively feeble association may command belief merely from the
absence of counter-associations. This is the basis of Bain’s doctrine
of primitive credulity. _Subconscious Conditions of Belief._ The
presentations which successively emerge into the forms of consciousness
are only fragmentary portions of the total mental system. Many, if not
most, of our beliefs depend on the operation of subconscious elements
which, in massive combination, co-operate to support a certain connection
of ideas which appears in consciousness as an object of attention. But
such massive support may arise from the connexion of the belief with
practical interests or æsthetic enjoyments, or with some powerful organic
sensation. _Apperception and Belief._ Ideal combinations may be separable
or inseparable according as this or that apperceptive system happens to
be predominant. This is best seen in its pathological exaggeration in
the case of suggestible patients. Under normal conditions the necessary
alternation of different apperceptive masses produces a corresponding
variation in the conditions of belief. _The Real in the Products of
Constructive Imagination._ The work of imagination either imposes an
illusion on the mind, or it does not. In both cases there is a certain
reference to reality. Illusion is a temporary and often more or less
imperfect belief in the product of constructive imagination; a belief
which can be indirectly produced or dissipated at will. _The Real as
Physical Resistance._ In the experience of the irregular interruption
of otherwise continuous series of muscular sensation, which, apart from
this restriction, are producible at will, we apprehend real existence.
The reality, however together with that of sensation as such, being
communicated to the interpretations which we are constrained to put both
upon sensations and their order, gives rise by a very complex process to
the presentation of a physical world. _Conclusion._ The law of conflict
is the psychological counterpart of the logical law of contradiction.
In the present paper Mr. Marshall examines in detail his thesis that
Pleasure and Pain are determined by the relations between the amount of
activity in, and the nutritive conditions of the organ which determines
the conscious content (_Mind_ No. 63). He states the psychological
conditions for Pleasure to be: “A content which appears normally at
regular intervals will tend to be indifferent. If it appear with
hypernormal intensity or frequency suddenly in the course of the normal
regularity, it will for a relatively short time appear as pleasurable,
but this pleasurableness will soon fall away into indifference.” The
psychological condition of Pain is said to be: “If a content which has
already often appeared in consciousness appear with unusual frequency
or exceptional intensity, it will ordinarily be accompanied at first by
pleasure, which usually will wane until the content appears indifferent.
If the hypernormal stimulus continue (except as after described) the
content will become painful, and this pain will increase in amount, and
having reached a maximum will decrease gradually until it disappears, but
in general with it will also gradually disappear the content itself, not
to reappear in consciousness for a considerable time, if ever. In some
cases, however, if the content be not over intense, we may look for a
gradual decrease of the pain felt at the beginning until a condition of
indifference is reached.” Time is an essential factor in the process of
organic repair. For each organ there will be a certain time after action
has ceased at which recurrent activity will be most effective. Here we
have the physical basis of the gratifications obtained through rhythms.
There is also a relation of rhythm to pain. The throbbing of acute pain,
so far as it is not directly traceable to _pressures_ of blood-supply,
is probably indirectly traceable to the _rhythm_ of blood-supply.
Turning to Psychology proper, the laws of Pleasure-Pain may be stated
in terms of Attention. Pleasure, as involving the use of stored force,
implies a continuance of activity in the organ of pleasurable content,
and therefore a tendency to continuance of Attention upon that content.
Pain, on the other hand, implies a tendency to cessation of activity
in the organ of the painful content, and therefore the disappearance
of the content. The notion that pleasure is mere absence of pain is
denied by this theory, which accounts for the connexion, in a broad way,
between Pleasure and Pain and activities respectively advantageous and
disadvantageous. In relation to Ethics this theory teaches that the _act_
of will, _per se_, is pleasurable as the outcome of the conditions of
opposition which are anterior to the will-act. Further, action in the
direction of the greatest desire is the most pleasant action. But this
does not show that the effect of habit may not be such as to lead to
action against the strongest desire and away from the greatest pleasure.
Further, the object of desire, whilst it may be, is not necessarily the
attainment of pleasure.
A scrutiny of the psychological aspect of musical pleasure, says Mr.
Donovan, will lead to the conviction that its origin required simpler
psychological machinery than the origin of speech, which was possible
only through the aid of that machinery. The ear is superior to the eye
in respect of their relative contributions toward making up our mental
life and activity. The superiority of the ear rests on its functional
passivity. This allowed auditory impressions to force themselves into
consciousness in season and out of season. The facts of history and
ethnology which may be given a new aspect when regarded in the light of
the analysis of music cover a very wide field, beginning with the first
and rudest vestiges of communal sympathy and tribal glorification, and
extending up to the national song or epic. It is peculiar to man to
give expression to communal interest in a way which has nothing to do
with life-caring instincts. That interest finds its first and rudest
expression in bodily play-excitement: (1) bodily play-movements in
imitation of actions, (2) rhythmic beating, (3) some approach to song,
and (4) some degree of communal interest, display themselves as the
most constant elements of all festal celebrations. If we start from the
generally-accepted explanations of play-movements in animals, and grasp
the ultimate reason why play-excitement became infused with the communal
spirit, there will be no difficulty in tracing evidence of this spirit
even where they are most hidden by accompanying habits. Success in a
common enterprise tends to preserve it. The natural modes of expression
of the communal elation follow, i. e. the bodily play-movements in
imitation of the successful actions and the rhythmic beating. These
movements give to consciousness preservative elements of sensation. Every
step of tonal development was made in order to prove the effectiveness
of the elements of sensation which could preserve the content of
consciousness springing out of play-excitement and communal elation. The
attention-drawing power a musical tone possessed was enhanced by the
conditions of its production which ensured repetition in a persistent
temporal succession. Animals’ excited cries were both before and after
the stimulating rhythmic beating—produced tones. The same excitement
which impelled to these cries also impelled to rhythmic beating, and thus
produced a persistent auditory model for the cries. The philologist says
that roots are elements of words which analysis can reduce no further.
The psychologist can trace them back to the musical tones which became
reproductive agents of the vague presentative elements of actions as they
had been repeatedly held together in consciousness by the psychological
machinery of nascent musical pleasure.
In a previous article (_Mind_, No. 62) Mr. Hobhouse aimed at proving
that all reasoning involved generalisation from observed facts, and
that all such generalisation could be shown to proceed on a definite
principle. There are two main ways in which Induction and Deduction may
be distinguished. First we may distinguish the assertion of a universal
from its application. The application of a universal to a particular case
is represented by the syllogism in which the major is a general judgment
and the minor a particular judgment of perception. When two judgments are
compared they are found to be (1) Tautologous—the same assertion of the
same fact. (2) Different statements of the same fact. (3) Assertions of
different facts. A judgment expresses a relation between two terms, and
hence two judgments may be said to assert the same fact when they assert
the same relation between the same terms. But if either of the terms or
the relation differs, then they assert different facts. Generalisation
involves a universal principle connecting different facts. Syllogism does
not. Syllogism appears as simply the opposite side of generalisation.
In the latter we assert a universal for the first time, in the former
we apply a universal already asserted. But in both we are dealing with
the same relation of universal and particular. Whether we assert or
apply our universal, the same ultimate logical fact, expressed in the
axiom of Induction, is at the bottom of the process. But a different
distinction may be drawn between Induction and Deduction. The whole
process of bringing particular facts under universals by observation
of similar particulars may be called Induction, while the combination
of several universals in a chain of reasoning is called Deduction. In
the first, Generalisation, we assert a universal on the ground of a
particular, or a particular on the ground of a similar particular. In
the second, Construction, we assert a relation between two universals
on the ground of the relation of each to one or more intermediate
relations. Construction involves generalisation at every step, and is a
true reasoning process. The nature of the generalisation may be shown by
the typical Deductive axiom. If, where two terms are in any way related
to a third, a relation between the two is observed, then when any other
two terms are similarly related to any third, the relation between these
two will be similar to that observed between the first two. The simplest
construction on which others rest is that of two relations to the same
type, and this axiom applies to relations so understood. The axioms
postulated by Reasoning lay down the conditions under which facts not
presented may be known to exist, and they are thus distinguished from
those principles called the “Laws of Thought.”
Mr. Titchener severely criticises Dr. Münsterberg’s experimental
psychology, pointing out various errors, and concludes that “whether the
theories of the _Beiträge_ stand or fall, their experimental foundation
has very little positive worth.”
In reply to the criticisms in _Mind_, No. 63, Mr. H. Spencer points
out that Dr. Wallaschek has overlooked a passage in which the former
recognises rhythm as an essential component of music. He does not
coincide with Dr. Wallaschek’s view, however, since it regards music as
acquiring its essential character by a trait which it has in common with
other things, instead of by a trait which it has apart from other thing.
It is from the emotional element of speech that music is evolved—not from
its intellectual element.
After referring to the fact that harmony, as ordinarily understood and as
spoken of by him, is concerned with the fundamental tones and ignores the
overtones, Mr. Spencer states that he cannot accept Prof. Cattell’s view
that harmony has been developed from melody. To establish the evolution
of the one from the other, there must be found some identifiable
transitions between the combinations of tones constituting _timbre_,
which do not constitute harmony to our perception, and those combinations
of tones which do constitute harmony to our perception.
In his Valedictory on retiring from the Editorship of _Mind_, Professor
Robertson refers to the establishment of the _Review_ in 1876, on the
initiative of Professor Bain, by whom it has since been sustained, and he
mentions that most of the experimental research has been contributed by
the American hands “that have been or are now organising psychological
laboratories over all the breadth of their own land.” (London: Williams
and Norgate.)
Ω.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1891. Vol. II. No. I.