POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. By _B.
Tchitcherin_.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN THEOCRACY IN THE FIFTH CENTURY. The
Cosmic Views of St. Augustine in his Genesis. By _Prince E.
Trubetzkoi_.
ETHICS OF LIFE AND OF THE FREE IDEAL (conclusion). By _K. N.
Ventzel_.
OPINIONS CONCERNING L. N. TOLSTOÏ. By _N. Strachoff_.
FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. By _Vladimir Solovieff_.
SPECIAL PART: (1) Fundamental Moments in the Evolution of
the New Philosophy. Metaphysical Philosophy: Descartes and
Occasionalists. By _N. Grote_. (2) Measurableness of the
Simplest Mental Acts. By _E. Tchelpanoff_.
CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Review of Philosophical
Periodicals. Book Reviews.
APPENDIX: 1) Recent Publications. 2) Transactions of the Moscow
Psychological Society.
_Positive Philosophy and the Unity of Science._ This article is made up
of extracts from a lengthy competitory dissertation presented by the
author to the Moscow Psychological Society. The writer points out the
fallacy of the “fundamental law” of the Comtist philosophy—the supposed
gradual evolution of human thought through three successive phases,—the
theological, metaphysical, and positive stage of development. The
writer contends, that the so-called “positive stage,” as conceived by
Comte, is really neither positive, nor even scientific, if we examine
its main foundations. As all the world knows, Comte was not satisfied
with the results of the particular sciences, but wished to effect their
comprehensive unity. The writer lays stress on the fact that Comte failed
to perceive the inward contradiction of his whole system. His followers,
in order to overcome this difficulty, were compelled to advance still
another step. Despite the teaching of Comte, they recognised in
mathematics the whole of a science that derived its principles from
experience. This is shown by Littré in his criticism of the system of
Comte (_Aug. Comte et la Philosophie positive_, page 567), where Littré
refers himself to the analysis of Stuart Mill in his Logic. The author,
in order to reach a definite and satisfactory solution of this important
problem, in his next, concluding article, will investigate the nature and
alleged solidity of the mathematical principle.
_The Philosophy of the Christian Clergy in the Fifth Century._ In
analysing the whole literary activity of St. Augustine, we observe, in
the evolution of his doctrine, three stages, that closely correspond
to his own personal struggle against the three heresies of his
time—Manicheism, Donatism, and Pelagianism. Yet all of these three
stages are characterised by one and the same principle—the ideal unity
of the Christian churches. This ideal aspiration reveals itself as a
kind of constructive principle of the universe; as the supreme principle
of a social organisation of humanity, as the substance and contents of
subjective, human freedom. The Bishop of Hippona,—after thus having
developed the several aspects of his doctrine against the heresies,—sums
up, and concentrates his teaching, in its widest bearings, against
the heathen. Here this Christian ideal attains its fullest and final
expression, and is formulated as a _Civitas Dei_, as the unity of a
universal, divine Sovereignty.
_Ethics of Life and of the Free Ideal._ In concluding his exhaustive
reflections on the subject of Guyau’s system of ethics, in which the
writer frequently has occasion to cite the critical parallel views of
A. Fouillé and of other English and Russian philosophers, Mr. Ventzel
remarks, that his aim has been, not only to introduce M. Guyau’s
system of ethics to his Russian readers, but also and mainly to show
the relations of this system of ethics to moral obligation. The writer
wishes to say in conclusion a few words about Guyau’s relation to ethical
sanction. Guyau rejected any moral sanction, in the strict sense of
the word, that was distinguished or detached from social sanctions, as
such. In this sense he conceives moral sanction and moral obligation in
his Ethics of Life, in his _Equisse d’une Morale_. If life, of itself,
creates an obligation to work, simply, on the strength of our capacity to
work, in such case life also will create its own ethical sanction. Even
when generously giving itself away, life will without fail, again and
again, find itself. No matter how it be cut short, life will preserve a
vivid consciousness of its fulness and significance and will reappear in
some other place and under other conditions; for, truly, nothing in this
world lives and works in vain.
_Opinions Concerning Leon N. Tolstoï._ Mr. Strachoff’s psychological
study would doubtless possess an additional interest to western readers
if the writer had really given an exclusively Russian estimate of
Tolstoï’s character and intellectual activity. In this respect, however,
we must not expect to find any very marked deviation from the well-known
current views of the reading public of other nations. “The main cause,”
Mr. Strachoff observes, “why people are incensed against Tolstoï, is to
be found in the fact, that, of all men, Tolstoï has most widely deviated
from universally received ethical notions, and that he antagonises his
century, even in certain delicate problems, that will always be the
dearest to mankind. You cannot help feeling this, when you listen to the
clamour, reproach, and vituperation, that have been raised against him
throughout the civilised world. For the rest, it seems rather odd, that,
at the close of the nineteenth century, there should have risen such a
number of deadly foes against an inoffensive writer and thinker like
Tolstoï; and yet, long ago, we had been accustomed to the intemperate
utterances of a host of enraged freethinkers, whom we have endured with
patience and meekness. Why, accordingly, have we all of a sudden lost
our patient tolerance, and why are we almost ready to start a systematic
persecution against the thoughts and words of a book like the _Vasnaya
Polyana_ (Clear Field)?... It must be admitted, that there is a certain
originality in his writings. Every line possesses a freshness and novelty
that are entirely his own; and yet his language is tame, and the subjects
even more common than in other writers. He frequently describes the
birth and death of very plain people. He tells us how these same people
amuse themselves, eat, drink, and dance on feast-days, cut the hay, go to
church, to confession, and so forth. Occasionally he tells how a jealous
husband kills his wife,—a fact, that has been told in so many other
literatures. But in anything he relates, he has the art of throwing a
strong, clear light upon his subject, so that it seems to us, as if those
time-worn scenes were seen and heard for the first time. In this consists
the real originality of Tolstoï’s art. And he is the same in his ethical
teachings. They strike us by their directness, vigor, sincerity; and for
this very reason they powerfully arouse our love and our yearning for
those deep, spiritual cravings that invite man to lead a higher life—“to
live a god-like life.” Here also, at times, it appears to us, that we
hear about those lofty aspirations for the first time; but when you pay
close attention, you will find that his doctrine is really based on the
ethics of the past, and you meet with traits of that self-same Christian
doctrine with which you have been familiar from early childhood.”
_From the Philosophy of History._ Mr. Solovieff, this time also, has
chosen a title that scarcely conveys a definite idea of the aim and
contents of his article, which describes the specific relations of the
Christian idea to the historical evolution and political ideal of the
nations of antiquity. (Moscow, 1891)
γνλν.
MIND. October, 1891. No. LXIV.