THE CLERGY’S DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE TO DOGMA AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
WORLD-CONCEPTIONS.
A late number of the _Gegenwart_ of Berlin (Vol. xl, No. 30) contained
an article by Mr. Eugene Schiffer, a German justice, on the subject
“World-Conception and the Office of Judge,” in which attention was called
to the fact that the performance of duties, not only in the pulpit
but in all the professions, and preëminently in the dispensation of
justice through the courts, depends upon and stands in a more or less
close connection with some definite world-conception; thus showing that
religion of some kind forms and must form the background of the practical
life of society. He says:
“The Church demands of its disciples as an indispensable
condition of serving her the confession of a certain
world-conception; she requires that every one who intends to
take upon himself her rights and duties, should in his inmost
heart agree with her concerning the contents of her faith,
especially concerning the dogmas on eschatology, on God and
world, body and soul, the origin and end of things; and this
is but a matter of course, for the essential part and also the
foundation of her activity lie in these very doctrines and in
their propagation. It is a hard and a severe demand. Although
on the one hand the morally free fulfilment of her requests
contains the germ of an harmonious development of life and
promises an extraordinary concentration and elevation of all
faculties, it leads on the other hand to serious conflicts, of
which the pages of history not less than the experiences of our
daily life exhibit innumerable and sad instances. We recollect
the terrible spiritual struggles in the souls of those who
commenced to doubt, and the outcome is generally a pitiful
catastrophe, either submission and hypocrisy with the weak,
or tribulation, renunciation, and ruin with those who thought
higher of truth than of their worldly emoluments.
“Most of the other professions and trades know nothing of the
indispensability of a certain world-conception. The merchant,
the mechanic, the lawyer, the soldier, the teacher, the
laborer, can upon the whole think concerning these highest
problems of life as they please. An inner and ideal conflict
between their views and their calling seems definitely
excluded. Outer and practical conditions—such as administrative
injunctions of a certain kind, the aspiration of progress, the
ambition to be better off, etc.—may sometimes produce conflicts.
“Yet this character of indifference concerning a general
world-conception which is found in the secular professions and
trades does not bear the stamp of permanence. For ultimately
the entire doing and achieving of every thinking man, so far
as it rises above the mere vegetative functions, is intimately
connected with that common world-conception which everywhere
influences and guides him. This is unnoticeable so long as the
harmony of the connection remains undisturbed, but it manifests
itself in consciousness as soon as its harmony is threatened
through some important change of any of its parts. Even to-day
a deep-going change is preparing itself; even now the struggle
about the world-conception is fought more severely and more
bitterly than ever and a new doctrine goes far enough to
uncover the ultimate roots of our civilisation, of our position
in life, of our calling; it attacks and shakes the present
world-conception.
“This implies the possibility of a conflict between the old
and the new faith even outside the pale of the church, and
this conflict may influence the choice of a calling. This
possibility has become an imminent probability concerning the
office of judge, especially the judge of a criminal court.
“The dispensation of justice rests to a great extent upon the
presupposition of guilt and the criminal law of to-day is
almost throughout built upon this idea of guilt. It is true
that this view has not always been taken. The Greek law and
the old Germanic law interfered even in the gravest cases
exclusively on account of the objective state of things without
taking into consideration the criminal intent of the defendant.
But this view was superseded in the former case by the Roman,
in the latter by the canonical law, both requiring the
conception of a moral and a subjective guilt, and at present
the criminal law of every civilised nation (with the sole
exception of the Chinese who threaten with capital punishment
him who accidentally kills no less than the intentional
murderer) rests upon the foundation of a belief in guilt.
“But there is no room for guilt in the materialistic
world-conception. Everything that happens, the activity of the
human soul included is to be explained according to mechanical
principles and thus the view that man’s will is not free is
proposed as one of its fundamental doctrines. While in this
way there is no possibility left that a man might have acted
differently than he actually did, this view takes away his
responsibility. And this movement which either cancels or
weakens the momentum of guilt, has taken hold of the minds of
men far beyond the circle of decided materialists.
“The foundation of our criminal law stands or falls with the
idea of guilt. With it stands and falls also the office of
the judge, whose duty is the dispensation and utilisation of
justice. He who does not believe in the possibility of guilt
cannot without inconsistency pronounce any one guilty. He who
as a matter of principle or at least within certain not well
defined limits denies the freedom of the human will can no
longer serve as a judge, certainly not as a criminal judge.”
Justice Eugene Schiffer is a conservative man. He demands that for the
protection of the old world-conception the office of judge should be
carefully guarded against such intruders as are not in sympathy with the
present world-conception. He says:
“Exactly as the church, in order to preserve herself and
to guard against her theology being diluted into a watery
philosophy of religion, is bound not to separate the conditions
of her life from a definite world-conception, so also justice,
in order to deserve its name, should oblige its servants to
take a definite position toward the ultimate world-problems....
He who does not accept in his conviction the moral foundations
of a certain calling, must not choose it, or if he has chosen
it, he must renounce it—or he must in his profession act
against his conviction—unless he risks being discharged from
his office on account of a neglect of duties.”
We agree with Justice Schiffer in one most important point, viz.,
the intimate connection of religion with practical life and of our
world-conception with all our doing and achieving. But we differ from him
in another no less important point, viz., in the proposition to prevent
the present world-conception from undergoing a further growth and higher
evolution. His proposition is nothing less than to make humanity and all
its institutions stationary.
Everything that exists has a natural right to defend its existence, and
so has the present world-conception. But that which grows and develops
out of the conditions of the present existence has also a natural
right to attain existence. The ideal world of the “is to be” is not a
non-existence, as it might appear to the unknowing, but a germ existence,
and if there is no room for both the actual existence of the present
state and the germ existence of a new state, a struggle will ensue. There
are at present and always have been many spurious world-conceptions
which if they overcame the present world-conception would lead humanity
backward to the beginning of civilisation. Indeed most propositions of
reform are reversals which would undo the results of evolution and reduce
mankind to primitive conditions. The fermenting minds of those who still
hope to cure all the ills and woes of society by one stroke, have not
yet outgrown the idea of the perfection, nobility, and happiness of the
so-called original state of nature,
“When wild in woods the noble savage ran.”
Yet among all the plans of reform there is one which is correct,
answering the wants of the time; and among all the world-conceptions
which struggle to exist there is also one which is the legitimate outcome
of the present world-conception. It is the present world-conception
enlarged through additional experience and purified of certain errors.
And it is an often repeated occurrence in history that the old and the
new, father and son, have to fight with each other. The heir apparent
either does not know that he is the child of his antagonist, or the
latter the defendant of the present state does not know that he fights
with his own son. This often repeated fact has found a mythological
expression in the old Teutonic song of Hildebrand meeting in combat his
son Hadubrand, a legend which in similar versions appears again in other
Aryan sagas, the best known of which is the tale of Rustem’s struggle
with Sohrab in Firdus’s great Iranian epic.
Can the struggle between the old and the new world-conception be avoided?
No, it cannot and should not, for the new has to prove its legitimacy
by showing its intrinsic strength; it must show that it has the power
to exist. The struggle cannot be avoided, but the bitterness, the
severity, the barbarity of the struggle can be avoided. Let Hildebrand
and Hadubrand measure swords in a spiritual encounter, let the vanquished
ideas yield to the stronger ideas, and they will prepare the gradual
change of an evolution instead of the sudden rupture of a revolution.
Freedom of thought is always the best soil for a peaceful evolution
but any system that binds the consciences of men and ties their ideas
down to the average level of a certain age will be as dangerous as a
boiler without a valve. There are periods of instability in history
when the strengthening of the conservative spirit by imposing fetters
upon the consciences of men appears useful and almost a condition for
the development of some kind of a civilisation. This found expression
in the historic legends of Lycurgus and Solon, binding their countrymen
by oath not to alter the laws of the state. But these periods are after
all ephemeral, and we ought to know by this time that we cannot bid
the sun stand still or check the spirit of progress and the growth of
mankind. There are nations which develop slowly because they rush into
innovations, but there are other nations which have gone to the wall
because of over-conservatism through which they were induced to suppress
the freedom of thought and to deny the right of doubting the absolute
validity of the prevailing world-conception.
The proposition of Justice Schiffer to bind the conscience of the judge
by an oath of allegiance to that world-conception which is at present
recognised as orthodox, is actually a law in the constitution of the
church, and conflicts in the consciences of clergymen are of a common
occurrence. The opinion that a clergyman who has ceased to believe in
certain dogmas of his church has to resign this position is very common
among freethinkers as well as orthodox believers. At first sight this
seems to be the only choice left to a man of honesty and a lover of
truth. I held this opinion myself for a long time. There is nevertheless
another view of the subject which caused me to change my opinion
entirely, and I am glad to perceive that such a man as Mr. Moncure
D. Conway who held himself a position in the church and having grown
more and more liberal has retired from active service, declares most
emphatically that a clergyman who has grown liberal should not resign
but stay in the church and wait till the church forces him to leave his
position. This is an honest course, a clergyman has a right to pursue it
and he will thereby open the eyes of his fellow-men; he will further the
interests of mankind, and people will thus be enabled to judge better
whether or not it is just to impose these burdens upon the pastors of the
church.
Let us consider the case more closely. First, the oath which a young
clergyman gives at his ordination is a promissory oath, and like all
promissory oaths it holds good on the supposition that all the main
conditions remain the same. If a man promises and binds himself by
an oath to start to-morrow morning on a journey he does so on the
supposition that it will be possible. So far as he can foresee it
is possible, but incidents may happen which will make it impossible
to-morrow. A promissory oath will be a weight on the conscience if it has
to be broken, but it has no legal force. Thus soldiers swear an oath of
allegiance to their king, and under ordinary circumstances there will be
no cause for doubt as to the propriety of remaining faithful to the oath.
But many cases of great perplexity will appear when a civil war splits a
nation in twain so that brother stands against brother and faithfulness
to the king may be the most degrading felony toward one’s highest and
holiest ideals, perhaps also toward one’s bodily parents and nearest
kin. Who does not recollect the sad end of Ludwig II, king of Bavaria.
When the mind of the unfortunate monarch was too much deranged to leave
him in possession of his royal power, a commission of several authorised
men went to the castle where he resided to place him under the care of
a physician. The king refused to receive the commission and ordered his
faithful guards by whom he was surrounded to seize the commission, gouge
out their eyes and treat them otherwise in the most outrageous way. The
commission not being protected were for a moment in great danger, but
happily the guards perceiving the seriousness of the situation did not
execute the king’s orders and we might say,—broke their oath.
Did they really break their oath? No, they did not, for when they were
sworn to obey their sovereign master and lord, it was supposed that the
king was and would remain in his right mind. He became insane and this
changed the situation entirely.
The oath of allegiance which the ministers of a church swear at their
ordination is made in the bona fide conviction on both sides,—the church
on the one side and the man that takes orders on the other side,—that
the dogmas to which he pledges his troth are the truth. The oath holds
good so long as a minister believes that the dogmas of the church are the
truth; it still holds good so long as he considers it possible that they
may be true. But the oath to believe them ceases to bind in the sense in
which it was demanded as soon as a minister sees clearly that they are
not true and that their truth is an actual impossibility. It ranks in the
same category as the oath of allegiance to a sovereign who has become
insane.
But the case is more complex still. If promissory oaths have no legal
force because in certain cases a man would have to act against the letter
of the oath, have these oaths no binding power whatever, as soon as a
minister recognises the incongruity of the church belief with truth? I
should say that they have a binding power, yet this binding power must be
sought not in the letter but in the spirit of the oath.
One of the most prominent of juridical authorities, Prof. Rudolf von
Jhering, has written a book entitled “Der Zweck im Recht.” He finds that
all laws, all wills, all decrees have a purpose, and this purpose is
their spirit. There are laws worded so badly that obedience to the letter
of the law would under certain and unforeseen circumstances enforce
exactly the contrary of that which the law was made for. Instances of
this kind are of not an uncommon occurrence especially with regard to
wills; testators and their legal advisors being often unable to formulate
their intentions in a logical shape. Jhering maintains that a judge in
construing a will, a decree, or a law has to find out the intention and
purpose of the testator, the magistrate that gave the decree, or the
legislator, and it is this intention or purpose with which his decisions
have to agree. Supposing however that this purpose of a will or a law
is wrong in itself or nonsensical, a judge has to construe it so that
it will have sense. If the purpose is criminal the whole transaction is
illegal, if it is irrational or illogical, it has to be interpreted so as
to make it rational and logical. If it has reference to antiquated views,
customs or institutions it has to be adapted to the corresponding modern
views and to existing conditions.
An instance from practical life will explain the last point. There are
many institutions in Northern Germany which were founded as cloisters or
monasteries. The nuns and monks have been engaged partly in teaching,
partly in attending to the sick, and in other useful purposes. The funds
of these institutions exist still, and serve now those purposes directly
which they have served formerly indirectly through the service of nuns
and monks. Most of them are employed for the maintenance of schools,
some of them as hospitals, others as homes for unmarried daughters
of government officials or for homeless aristocratic ladies without
means, etc. These changes have been wrought by history as the natural
consequence of new conditions. Many of them were made in actual violation
of the letter of the testators’ will; yet they were made bona fide with
the intention to remain faithful to its spirit? The question is not what
a testator intended his will to be half a millennium ago, but what he
would intend it to be in the living present, knowing all the changes
which the progress of the times have wrought and having progressed with
the times.
Before we answer the question, What is the purpose of the minister’s
oath? we should first see clearly, what is the purpose of the church. Is
the purpose of the church really to be sought in the propaganda of some
absurd dogmas? Or does not rather the preaching of these dogmas itself
serve a purpose?
The dogmas of Christianity were some time ago supposed to be the
indispensable instruments of ethical instruction. All the churches are
educational institutions to inculcate the moral ought on the basis of
a popular world-conception. The church of England for instance is a
national institute and it is not true that one church party has the
right to impose its religious conception upon the rest of the nation.
When the church was founded some crude notions were taken to be absolute
truths and no man can at the present time be required to believe these
crudities. All institutions are conservative but most conservative are
the courts of justice and the church. The conservatism of jurisprudence
is characterised in the saying which appears to be its leading principle
_fiat justicia et pereat mundus_. Jurisprudence too often forgets that
the dispensation of justice serves the purpose of sustaining life,
of promoting the general welfare and enhancing the prosperity of the
community; it overlooks the spirit and clings to the letter.
Our justices are inclined to believe that if a new world-conception
arises, (which by the bye will as we believe not be materialistic nor
will it destroy the idea of moral responsibility, although it may
change our views about guilt,) their whole system of jurisprudence
will break down. They are afraid of a _pereat justicia et vivat
mundus_. Justice Schiffer is not at all anxious to prove the truth of
the old world-conception, he is satisfied with proving that the new
world-conception is incompatible with the old view of justice. Criminal
law means punishment and punishment presupposes the idea of guilt. He
argues:
“The question remains whether the conflict between the new and the old
world-conception could be avoided by adapting our views of justice to the
new world-conception; yet this question is to be denied, for the notions
of guilt and punishment belong to each other according to logical,
ethical, and moral principles. To punish without assuming guilt is as
nonsensical as it is immoral.”
It would lead us too far here to show that moral responsibility still
subsists on the supposition of a strict determinism and that the
criminal law with its punishments will not be abolished in the future.
Yet there is no doubt that our views of punishment will have to be
changed; indeed they have changed and how much they have changed, can
be learned by a comparison of an execution of to-day with one of a few
hundred years ago. The idea of punishment in the sense of inflicting
pain as a retribution has gone and it has gone forever. There is no more
burning of the criminal with hot irons, or twitching with hot tongs,
or tearing out his tongue, or stretching on the wheel. The criminal is
executed with as little pain to him as possible. Why this change? Because
a new world-conception has entirely altered our views of punishment
and it is going to alter them still more. Penology is not to be based
upon sentimentality as some so-called philanthropists intend to do;
nevertheless it is to and it will become humane because we have abandoned
the old conception of guilt which as Justice Schiffer correctly states
was a fundamental idea in the old jurisprudence, and this antiquated
conception of guilt has partly but not as yet entirely been overcome.
The church is in a position similar to that of the criminal law courts.
A change of our world-conception has set in and the church is not as
yet adapted to the change. The church having found it necessary for its
purpose of preaching ethics to insist on the belief in a world-conception
which demonstrates a moral world order, now attempts to perpetuate
certain errors of our ancestors’ conception of this moral world-order.
The oath of a clergyman having been asked and given bona fide on the
supposition that the dogmas of the church were the truth, holds good
still, but it must be construed as in similar cases a judge would have
to construe a faulty will or an ill-worded law. It has to be construed in
the spirit and not in the letter.
Clergymen who have grown liberal should not leave the church. It is their
duty to stay in the church and to make their influence felt to broaden
the spirit of the church. If the church removes them from their position,
they yield to the authority at present in power, but they should not
yield without a struggle, to be conducted on their part modestly but
firmly, with reverence toward their authorities, with tact and decency,
but fearlessly and bravely, for they are fighting not only for their
personal interests but for the progress of mankind, they are fighting for
the holiest treasures of the church—for truth.
The abolition of these burdens on the consciences of the clergy would
be a natural consequence of repeated struggles. Let a pastor be bound
to respect his church authorities, to obey them in all matters of
administration, let him be bound to revere the ecclesiastical traditions
of which he should never speak lightly, but do not prescribe to him a
belief of any kind. Pledge him to serve the truth, to speak the truth and
to live the truth; and that simple pledge will have more weight than the
requirement to believe dogmas which, his superiors know but too well can
no longer be believed literally but must be taken _cum grano salis_.
Christ says concerning the observances insisted upon by the Scribes
and Pharisees: “They bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne: and
lay them upon men’s shoulders.” This passage is applicable also to the
present system of ordination. Christ’s saying is read in the churches and
it is, as most of his words are, as new to-day as it was at his time,
but who thinks of its application to our present system of burdening the
consciences of men?