BELIEF IN GOD. Its Origin, Nature, and Basis. Being the Winkley Lectures
of the Andover Theological Seminary for the Year 1890. By _Jacob Gould
Schurmann_. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1890.
The learned Sage Professor of Philosophy in Cornell University, after
tracing the historical origin and development of the belief in God,
expresses his conviction that the problem of the modern theist consists
in the union of the Aryan and Semitic modes of interpreting existence. We
shall then have “a synthesis of the Father of all spirits with the ground
of all nature.” This is the hypothesis developed in the course of the
lectures delivered by Professor Schurmann last year before the Andover
Theological Seminary on the Winkley foundation, that form the contents of
the present volume. The theism embodied in that hypothesis is called by
the author _anthropocosmic_, because, while it is based on the facts of
the universe and those of human nature, the universe must be interpreted
in the terms of man, and not man in the terms of the universe. The key
to the universe is the self-conscious spirituality which makes us selves
and persons. Hence anthropocosmic theism is the doctrine of a Supreme
Being “who is ground both of nature and of man, but whose essence is not
natural but spiritual.”
Before considering the evidence for this hypothesis, let us see what
the author has to say with reference to the logical character of the
belief in God. He shows that _agnosticism_—of which he treats under
its three significations as referring to the method of knowledge, the
object of knowledge, and the subject of knowledge—is not consistent
with the insight into nature and the constitution of knowledge gained
by the Newtonian method of hypotheses and verifications. Science, as
opposed to pure phenomenalism, assumes that what has not originated
in the percipient subject is objectively real, and it postulates the
universality of law in nature, a postulate which is the expression of a
conviction of “the unity and universal inner connection of all reality.”
The objective world cannot be understood without reference to our own
conscious experience, and as the only reality we know from the inside
is a spiritual _ego_, self-conscious spirit must be ascribed to the one
ultimate reality whose existence science assumes, as that which will
alone satisfy the requirement of unity in the midst of change.
It might be objected here, that the existence in man of a spiritual
_ego_ requires proof before that of a universal spirit or world-soul can
be inferred from it. The author takes the existence of the _ego_ for
granted, a course which is quite allowable from the theistic standpoint,
although, in the face of what is now known as to the dissolution of the
ego under abnormal conditions of the organism, not scientific. Having
made that assumption and inferred the existence of God from that of the
human spirit, the author explains the nature of the one by reference to
that of the other. He tells us, that the finite spirit is identical,
within the limits of its range, with the infinite spirit, because it is
an _ego_, and that in the _ego_ we have, not merely a mode of the divine
activity, but a part of the divine essence. Such being the case, the
author has no difficulty in inferring the attributes of God from the
phenomena exhibited by man. Thus God is a God of righteousness because
the moral capacity in the human spirit must have its ground in the
infinite Spirit. Again universal benevolence or love is the ideal of
which human morality is the realisation; hence we must conceive of the
Spirit of the universe as a God of love.
We do not think the author’s final conclusion, that “the phenomena
both of the universe and of human life require the thinking mind to
postulate a Supreme Ground of things which we are entitled to describe as
self-conscious Spirit and loving Father,” is warranted by his premises.
But we can accept the statement that our knowledge of God must continue
to grow with our knowledge of man and nature. Through these alone can we
know Him, but the difficulty is to interpret the revelation. Let it be
admitted also that the end of nature is the production of man, and that
what is referred to by the author as the human spirit is “the organ of
that communication of God which is the end of the universe.” This does
not in reality throw any light on the nature of God. The utmost that can
be said is that, as man is an organism possessing certain functions, the
universe, viewed as God, must have an organic existence with functions
_corresponding_ to those exhibited by the human organism.
The author’s reasoning in support of the belief in God as cause or ground
of the world, and as realising purpose in the world is very ingenious.
He affirms that the creational form of the argument from causality is
insufficient. It satisfies the devotional needs of a certain class
of worshipers, but what the religious, as well as the scientific,
consciousness demands is a God “here in the world, not there outside of
it or making it.” It has not yet been shown that the universe has had a
beginning in time, and the argument in favor of the eternity of matter
ends with an assurance of the eternity of spirit alone. Spirit is the
eternal reality, and nature its eternal manifestation, the latter being
no more separable from the former “than the spoken word from the thought
it symbolises.” The causal relation is, however, absolutely necessary
for our apprehension of the facts of the universe, and as it cannot
be interpreted without contradiction as an action between independent
beings, it must be explained as the eternal dependence of the world upon
God. This implies that God must be volitional as well as self-conscious;
“for without will there could be no activity, no efficient causation,
no material universe.” The universe is thus the eternal expression of
the divine will. But what is the purpose realised in creation? The
activity of the divine will precludes the notion of a blindly working
nature. As creation is the eternal self-revelation of God, the supreme
and preconceived end of all things must be the glory of God. But man is
indispensable for the attainment of God’s glory, and therefore the end
of nature as a realised scheme of divine ideas is the production of man.
The volitional and teleological arguments as thus stated by the author
are consistent with the theory of evolution developed by Darwin, but
they may be combatted on other grounds connected with the conditions of
the existence of God as one with Nature. With this observation, we must
leave Professor Schurmann’s very thoughtful book which, although for the
reasons we have stated, not conclusive, presents the theistic argument
with great clearness and in its strongest form.
Ω.
JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY. A Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old
Testament to New Testament. By _Crawford Howell Toy_. Boston: Little,
Brown & Co. 1890.
This work is another contribution to that genuine history which is alone
competent to impart any true instruction. In it the author undertakes to
give an account of the genesis of Christianity as a child of Judaism.
It seems to be the thesis of the author that those conceptions and
beliefs that characterise any form of religion are rather determined by
the social evolution than that the social progress and its features are
determined by the evolution of ideas among which the religious ideas
are specially influential. In his introduction the author sketches out
his view of the general laws of social progress as the same are related
to religious thought. He notices in history the tendency of ethnic
religions to give way to or to develop into universal religions, and
argues that Christianity is destined to overcome all its rivals and
prevail universally. This kind of a conclusion is a natural one to follow
from the theory that the character of thought is determined by social
circumstances and progress. But if it be true that the special course
of the evolution of thought and its characteristic form at any epoch is
determined by causes that are uncontrolled by social conditions, that as
between thought and society thought is the masterful factor, then quite
another conclusion may ensue. But the dubitable nature of the main thesis
of the work does not much detract from the great excellence of the work
in general. As a history of the evolution of Jewish religious conceptions
and beliefs from the very first until the establishment of Christianity,
it is in the highest degree interesting and instructive.
After a discussion of the literature of the Jews and the formation of the
canon, the author proceeds to describe in full detail the nature genesis
and mutations of the cardinal religious doctrines as they revealed
themselves to the Israelite, Jewish, and early Christian insight. The
entire body of the data are interpreted in consonance with the modern
scientific idea of the organic nature of society. Jesus is regarded as
the master spirit that created the Christian Church, and Paul whom many
would install as the real author of the same is accordingly given only a
second place. Altogether it may be said that Professor Toy has given us
a most valuable contribution to religious history and to the scientific
interpretation of the same.
ρσλ.
PRONAOS TO HOLY WRIT. Establishing, on Documentary Evidence, the
Authorship, Date, Form, and Contents of each of its Books, and the
Authenticity of the Pentateuch. By _Isaac M. Wise_. Cincinnati: Robert
Clarke & Co. 1891.
Rabbi Isaac Wise, the president of the Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati
and the Nestor of Orthodox Judaism in America, presents in the “Pronaos
to Holy Writ” a review of the Biblical books with comments as to their
authenticity and the times in which they were written. Having read these
“books and every word thereof in the original for a term of sixty-six
years, i. e. from boyhood up to his seventy-second birthday,” and having
“acquainted himself with all the ancient versions and commentaries
and a large portion of the modern translations and commentaries of
the Bible,” the author is entitled to be heard. Rabbi Wise is a stern
monotheist and he declares: “God only did create light out of darkness;
man cannot produce truth out of fiction, unless in his self-delusion
problematic truth satisfies him. All so-called gems of truth buried under
the quicksand of fiction and deception are problematic at best, if not
supported by authoritative corroborants.” This is true. All truth depends
upon verification. We cannot make truth, but must find it, we must be
able to corroborate it, and the corroborants of truth are its authority.
Dr. Wise’s idea of a corroborant is different from ours, he says: “No
one can speak conscientiously of Bible truth before he knows that the
Bible is true, and especially in its historical data.” This seems to
indicate that we must have a belief in the truth of the Bible before
we investigate it and that moral truths, the ethics, the philosophy of
the Bible depend upon its historical data. We cannot go so far with the
author of the Pronaos. Dr. Wise says: “The science commonly called Modern
Biblical Criticism, actually Negative Criticism which maintains on the
strength of unscientific methods that the Pentateuch is not composed of
original Mosaic material, no Psalms are Davidian, no Proverbs Solomonic,
the historical books are unhistorical, the prophecies were written
post festum, there was no revelation, inspiration, or prophecy, must
also maintain that the Bible is a compendium of pious or even impious
frauds, wilful deceptions, unscrupulous misrepresentations.” Dr. Wise
thought it necessary to meet Negative Criticism with the documentary
evidence and for this purpose he wrote his Pronaos, which is to be an
entrance-hall to the Temple of Biblical Truth. We do not side with the
negativism of certain biblical critics, for we believe that historical
investigations have proved large portions of the Pentateuch to be Mosaic,
several psalms to be Davidian, and the historical books to contain as
much history as many old historical books contain. We believe that they
have to be judged and searched and commented just as much and in the
same spirit of scientific inquiry as our philologists treat Herodotus
or Livy. But the value of the Bible, in our opinion, does not depend
upon the acceptance or rejection of these or those historical data; nor
is it necessary to consider the Hebrew prophets as special revelations
of God, in contradistinction to the divine revelation in nature and the
history of mankind in general. It may be true enough that the orthodox
God-idea of Monotheism depends upon the belief in special revelation
and prophecies, and it is also true that most of the Biblical criticism
has been destructive and negative. But there is a way possible between
both standpoints which may be called positive criticism. This positive
criticism attempts to understand the very life and meaning of the old
religion, it attempts to comprehend the belief of the orthodox and
construe it in the terms of science—i. e. of rational and clear thought.
Religion is certainly not a mere fraud or a vain illusion, it is an
ideal which developed naturally out of certain needs of man and the
conditions of society. That religious ideas, especially the idea of God
as the cosmic power which represents the moral authority, are no mere
fictions, is proved by their survival, and those who believe in evolution
should not be blind to the fact that there is something good, something
true, something well adapted to surroundings in religion. To find these
elements of truth and goodness which constitute the life of religion
is not mere negative criticism, but positive criticism, and it is not
at all necessary for those who aspire in this direction, to believe in
any historical data, or in special revelations, or in prophecies, or in
the personality of God, but simply to trust in truth. Truth is the only
way of salvation even though it may shatter the most sacred idols of a
venerable orthodoxy.
The contents of the book show that the standpoint of the author does not
blind him to the finer traits of the natural development of his religion.
So, for instance, Solomon’s rationalism is excellently contrasted with
the spirit which manifested itself in the Judges as well as the Prophets.
The author of the Judges was an outspoken theocratic democrat. “He
literally pours out his abhorrence of the monarchical anti-theocratic
institution in narrating the story of the first usurper Abimelech, the
son of Gideon.... Entirely different are the language and tendency of
the two appendices, evidently written by another author, who evinces his
animosity to the democratic form of government by saying four times:
‘In those days there was no king in Israel,’ to which he adds twice
‘every man did what seemed right in his sight’” (p. 46). “The Solomonic
ethics is a commentary on the Mosaic ethics, as by reason understood....
Man’s knowledge of ethical doctrine is identical with his knowledge
of God’s moral attributes, and all moral obligation has its root in
the Mosaic God-idea....” According to Solomon “wisdom based upon and
rooted in the fear of Jehovah with the revealed material before them was
all-sufficient, without any further special oracles of any prophets. This
peculiar rationalism brought upon him the ire of prophets and rabbis” (p.
111).
Some reviewers of Dr. Wise’s book will probably find fault with him that
he has taken little if any account of the results of modern biblical
investigations. And this is a grievous fault in our times where it seems
to be essential for a scholar and author to have read the very latest
things published on a subject while an acquaintance with the views of
the classical old authorities is considered unnecessary. It appears that
Dr. Wise did not intend to present his views or criticisms of and his
answers to the latest biblical investigations. It may even be that he is
not familiar with many of them. Granting this to be a fault of his book
it is, nevertheless, refreshing to us to find an author who has actually
read and is excellently familiar with all the old sources of the subject
he is writing upon.
κρς.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. By _Edward T. Dixon_. Cambridge (Eng.):
Deighton, Bell & Co. 1891.
This work is divided into three parts, the first containing such
doctrines of psychology and logic as the author deems sound and useful
for his purposes, the second exhibiting the author’s “subjective theory
of geometry deduced from the two fundamental concepts _position_ and
_direction_,” and the third “on the applicability of the foregoing
subjective geometry to the geometry of material space.”
In his preface the author expresses his desire that those who criticise
his work shall “consider categorically” certain questions relating to his
theory of definition, to the definitions and axioms prescribed by him,
to his proofs of propositions and to the “objective applications” of his
three axioms.
Geometry may be studied for two distinct purposes, neither of which
necessarily involves the other. Unless the aim is mainly the discipline
of the logical faculty, it is plainly a poor method of study to pore
over the definitions, axioms, postulates, theorems, problems, and
demonstrations of Euclid or any similar text-book. Practical resources
and geometrical information can be acquired much better and more rapidly
by a course of mechanical drawing with here and there a more or less
loose explanation of the grounds and reasons that warrant the geometrical
doctrines, than by means of the Euclidian course. Under such a method of
instruction the student would rarely feel any real doubt as to the truth
of his geometrical knowledge.
But where the paramount aim is the training of the reason the Euclidian
rigor is all important. Hence the perfection of that method by the
discovery and certification of the ultimate grounds on which, and the
principles by which, it may be unfolded systematically and in necessary
and sufficient sequence without presumption or fallacy, is an object of
the most momentous concern to science, to philosophy, and to culture in
general. For it is well known that however good an account elementary
geometry may give of its superstructure the reports given of its
foundations are all very far from satisfactory.
Repeated and strenuous efforts have been made, and by the most competent
of our race, to discover and certify the true state of the case in
respect to the geometrical foundations, in order that the whole edifice
of that science shall display throughout the same thorough-going
necessity and sufficiency that distinguishes it in general.
The author of the work under review is persuaded that he is now able to
perform this so desirable service. He avers his belief that the system
of geometry he “has set forth in this book is _logically sound_ and that
consequently the more it is discussed and criticised, the more firmly
will it become established.” He takes his stand upon two fundamental
concepts, _position_ and _direction_, which he defines not explicitly but
“implicitly.” This leads us to consider his first question and his theory
of definition.
The embarrassments that involve the foundations of elementary geometry
are mainly, if not wholly, those which involve the general problems of
definition. Now a definition is the certification of the purport of a
name by means of a statement or a conspiracy of statements necessary and
sufficient to that end. But names are constituents absolutely necessary
for the formation of any statement, so that the above definition of a
definition may be restated thus: A definition is the certification of the
purport of one name by means of other names, necessary and sufficient
to certify the purport of the one defined. Evidently then, definition
can only lead us from name to name in unending process, or to some
undefinable name, or to some name that we choose to leave undefined; and
the question arises, on what sort of names shall we take our stand as
ultimate grounds?
Our author answers this question as follows: “The propounder of a
scientific theory is not of course expected to teach his readers to
speak, it is only necessary for him to define the terms peculiar to his
science, or those to which he wishes to attach peculiar meanings. He may
therefore assume that the meanings of all other words are known to his
readers.”
He then propounds that “all that is logically required for a definition
is one or more assertions with regard to the word to be defined or, its
attributes,” provided “they are not demonstrably incompatible with each
other.”
Although our author conceives that logical competence requires no more
than this for a good definition, he yet goes on to remark, that “if the
definition is to form the basis of a deductive science it is further
advisable that the assertions should be independent,” and that “where
it is required to define a term whose denotation is already known, it
is further necessary not only that the assertions should be commonly
accepted as true with respect to it, but that they should restrict the
meaning of the term exactly to its accepted denotation, neither more nor
less, and should do so in the simplest manner that can be devised.”
It is upon this theory of definition that our author requests of his
critics a “categorical” answer to his first question, “Do you accept the
requirements I have laid down for a logical definition? (If not please
state which of them you object to, why you object to it, and what you
would propose to substitute for it.)”
Since it is a “categorical” answer that is requested and since also it is
the matter of definition that is put in issue, we wish that our author
had been more definite and had made his propositions better issuable, for
we must protest that we regard ourselves obliged to answer to what we
can best conceive to be the author’s true meanings rather than to what he
has explicitly said.
We do not conceive that he regards it as _necessary_ to a definition that
the defining assertions should be expressed “in the simplest manner that
can be devised.” We have also to take his use of the word “restrict”
as importing completion as well as limitation, and his use of the word
“requirements” as intending conditions that together are sufficient as
well as necessary.
If we are right in our understanding of the meanings of our author he
contemplates four cases, first, the definition of a name that has no
denotation already known and that is not to form the basis of a deductive
science, second, the definition of a name that has no denotation already
known but which is to form the basis of a deductive science, third, the
definition of a name that has a denotation already known but which is not
to form the basis of a deductive science, and fourth the definition of a
name that has a denotation already known and is to form the basis of a
deductive science.
In this fourth case our author deems it requisite for a logical
definition that there shall be made one or more assertions about the
subject of definition that are not demonstrably incompatible with one
another, that are independent of one another, that are commonly accepted
as true in respect to the subject defined and that “restrict” the meaning
of the name under definition exactly to its accepted denotation.
It seems to us that this last requirement dispenses with the necessity
of all the rest. If we have provided an assertion or a set of assertions
that do in fact complete and limit the meaning of the subject of
definition exactly to its proper denotation that is a definition in full.
It implies that the defining assertions are all consistent with one
another, and in case any assertion is dependent upon one or more of the
rest that is a circumstance wholly immaterial. _Utile per inutile non
nocetur._
Again, what is it to be commonly accepted as true? Does logical
competence depend on the altering states of our knowledge or on the
fluctuations of opinion? Was a whale logically defined as a fish before
we learned that it was a mammal?
The third case allows of the application of the same comment as that
made upon the fourth. But in the first and second cases the doctrines
of the author as well as his suppositions are very notable. He supposes
the anomaly of names without any known denotation, by which he may mean
those which have no application whatever. In respect to such he propounds
that they may be given a logical definition by making one or various
consistent assertions as applicable to them or to their attributes.
“The proof of the pudding will be found in the eating,” as our author
says. So let us say that a troft may be perceived whenever our attention
is excited, and that trofts are of multitudinous variety. Do these
assertions constitute a logical definition? It is a prime requisite for
a definition that the defining assertion or assertions shall have a
meaning, which is the same as to say that names must be employed that
are already significant. These significant names must be so used that the
intellectual sensibility shall be excited to perceive in a determinate
way that which is intended to be defined. In other words, sense and not
nonsense must be produced in the mind that considers the definition.
Perhaps, however, our author intends such words as electricity, or
spirit, or energy.
Because of the considerations above indicated and others we cannot accept
the author’s requirements for a logical definition as a whole. Some of
them are in some of his cases unnecessary, while taken together they
supply no new means whereby to solve the several problems of definition.
The author’s subjective theory of geometry is plainly the outgrowth of
his confidence in the solvent power of the concept of direction as a
prime datum of geometry.
Everything of consequence in his essay depends upon the worth of this
concept as a geometrical foundation. Considering the disparagement
that has been visited upon that concept by numerous writers of good
geometrical rank we naturally look for considerations tending to remove
the discredit that has befallen that notion. Instead however of this we
find the most palpable set of circular definitions. Direction is defined
by direction in the most distracting way, thus:
“(_a_) A direction may be conceived to be indicated by naming two points
as the direction from one to the other.”
The inaptitude of the term direction for use in geometry is rooted in
its ambiguous purport. As commonly used it means at least three distinct
but closely associated notions which become confused in thought and
expression unless the most solicitous care is taken to distinguish
them. When we speak of the direction of one point from another or of
the direction from one point to another we mean the straight off-ness
or from-ness or to-ness which one bears to the other; in other words
a relation of separation and straight mediation. When again we speak
of the direction of a motion we intend the indefinite straight sense
of its procession, which is not a relation but an attribute of the
motion. When still again we speak of the direction of a line we mean its
straight _lay_ as compared or as comparable with other actual or possible
correlates which is again a relation but not necessarily the same
relation as that that obtains between two points.
In all these meanings the notion of straightness is involved, and could
we say in lieu of straightness first directness and then direction and
holding fast in thought this sense of the word, make a noun of it, so
that a direction would intend the same as a straightness and no more, it
might obtain a useful geometric term and notion.
To define it we might first define a line thus: A line is a space
boundary that is indefinitely long but not otherwise of any extent.
Then, a direction is a line such that between the points that bound any
assigned parcel of it no copy of said parcel is possible.
But direction purports to our author the second of the meanings above
set forth, namely, the indefinite straight sense of the procession of a
motion. Definite parcels of a direction thus understood are identical
with vectors.
Now the notion of straightness is after the notions of point and line
the most fundamental one of geometry and the one which is altogether the
most prominent and useful. It is the necessary means for any definition
of a vector or of the notion which our author deems so important. As
straightness is attributable only to lines and long things which a line
may represent it makes no difference whether we define straightness
or a straight line, but a masterful performance of this definition is
absolutely necessary before the foundations of geometry can be abidingly
certified.
Our author defines a straight line thus: “A straight line is a continuous
series of points extending from each of them in the same two directions.”
What kind of a thing a continuous series of points may be we are not told
but as a point is defined to be “a portion of matter so small that for
the purpose in hand variations of positions within it may be neglected”
we take it that a straight line is a continuous series of particles of
matter. The “purpose in hand” in this case must of course be the purpose
of geometry.
In defining an angle our author first lays down that “The difference
between two directions is called their _inclination_ to one another” and
then “The measure of an inclination is called an _angle_.”
Considering that it is the doctrine of the author that every straight
line has two contrary directions the measure of whose inclination is an
angle of one hundred and eighty degrees, we imagine a northeast southwest
line cutting an east west line and wonder if the right hand upper angle
is really two angles according to whether or not the directions both pass
to the left or both pass to the right or pass one to the left and the
other to the right.
Were this an ordinary work we might regard it as due to the author to
notice the many excellencies which characterise it, in spite of the
defects which we notice. But as our author evidently realises, the
eminent dignity of the topic challenges and its singular importance
demands unsparing criticism. He who offers to instruct the world on the
foundations of geometry draws his sword and throws away the scabbard, and
like a doughty champion he will scorn to accept any favor, prizing only
such success as he shall take at the point of an efficacy of treatment
that conquers all competent and candid criticism.
Stringent as are such terms of contest an author who is a worthy
competitor in the field of geometric research can be well content with
them in the perception that the very same conditions apply in full force
to the comments of his critics.
The author is undoubtedly an able man and a close thinker. He has
concentrated his mind upon a work that is worth the energy of a lifetime.
But we must confess our judgment to be that in spite of his capacity and
evident devotion he has come short of the high result to which he has
aspired.
ρσλ.
LES FÊTES DE MONTPELLIER. PROMENADE A TRAVERS LES CHOSES, LES HOMMES ET
LES IDEES. By _J. Delbœuf_. Paris: Félix Alcan.
We have here a charming narrative by the well-known Professor at the
University of Liège of his visit to the fêtes of Montpellier, undertaken
in great measure to make the personal acquaintance of M. Dauriac, the
critic in the _Revue Philosophique_ of the author’s work “La matière
brute et la matière vivante.” The description given of the fêtes,
which marked the sixth centenary of the University of Montpellier, is
very entertaining, as is the account of the journey through the South
of France; but as M. Delbœuf says that he was more curious to become
acquainted with men than with places, what he tells us about the former
will be the more interesting.
The author, with the companions of his tour, could not pass Nancy
without stopping to see “the masters in the science of hypnotism” there.
An account of what he saw and heard gives the author the opportunity
of repeating “That he does not regard forgetfulness on awaking as
characteristic of profound hypnosis, and that experience is against
the efficacity of criminal suggestion unless the subject is criminally
inclined.” The fêtes at Montpellier commenced with a religious service
in the Cathedral, during which the Bishop, M. de Cabrières, preached a
sermon so liberal in tone, that M. Delbœuf thinks the time is arriving
when the church will demonstrate that Moses was the precursor of Darwin.
At the University reception which followed, M. Delbœuf sought out among
the professors for his friend M. Dauriac, whom he had figured when first
he heard from him as small, thin and dark, but now found, in accordance
with the usual rule in such cases, that he was tall, robust and fair.
In the course of their subsequent conversations the two Professors
made mutual confidences, M. Dauriac confessing that his true vocation
was music, and that he was preparing a work on the psychology of the
musician; while M. Delbœuf informed his friend that he was about to reply
to his criticism of “La matière brute et la matière vivante,” and that he
would throw the greatest light on the origin, which was still obscure, of
life and death. If the genial Liège Professor can do this, he may be the
first to reap the benefit referred to in his own words: “The discovery of
the cause of death could not fail to assure the immortality of its author
and its inspirer, and sooner or later that of humanity at large.” For,
according to a medical adage, if the cause of a disease is known it is
already conquered.
Montpellier was honored during the fêtes with the presence of Helmholtz,
to whom but for national jealousy would have been confided the part of
speaking in the name of the foreign universities. Nevertheless he was
the true hero of the occasion, and when at the official reception, on
the President of the Republic shaking his hand and saying a few gracious
words someone feebly hissed, Helmholtz received in response a perfect
ovation of applause. M. Delbœuf met with a congenial spirit in the
Professor of Zoology, M. Sabatier, who has a laboratory at Cette. Their
views on free-will were in sympathy. They agreed in allowing freedom not
only to the superior animals, and to inferior animals and plants, but
even to so called inorganic matter. M. Sabatier is a Christian and at
the same time a convinced transformist; having arrived at his views from
religious considerations. He cited M. Dauriac as saying, “The reign of
determinism is not in the objective world; its empire extends itself over
nature only after having been exercised over thought. There is no other
necessity than that of logic or mathematics.” M. Delbœuf is evidently
an “indeterminist” by nature. He heartily sympathised with the students
in all their demonstrations of freedom, although one of them assumed
a somewhat serious character. Dining in the open air with M. Milhaud
the author of an article in the _Revue Philosophique_ on non-Euclidian
geometry, he was prepared to talk mathematics. The surroundings were
too much for him, however, and in recalling the scene he cries, “To the
devil with philosophy and mathematics! I cannot recall what we said; in
my remembrances, I see only blooming faces, I hear only the indistinct
bursts of gaity.” M. Delbœuf’s sympathetic nature is shown in the fact,
which he records, that wild animals in confinement soon become familiar
with him.
One of the principal objects of the author’s journey was to see M.
Gabriel Tarde, “one of the most prolific and original publicists in
France, if not in Europe,” who resides at Sarlat. After quoting passages
from an article of M. Tarde on Social Darwinism, which appeared in the
_Revue Philosophique_, M. Delbœuf remarks that nothing is more attractive
and at the same time more fatiguing than the reading of his works. M.
Tarde is “the locomotive that carries you to the end of your journey
across countries by turns wild, agricultural, industrial, picturesque;
but without giving you time to regard and admire.” Referring to M.
Tarde’s acute criticisms of Lombroso and his theories, the author says,
“It is not that he strikes the pseudo-thinker with formidable blows, but
he makes him drop gently to the ground.” The French publicist sees in
_imitation_ the source of social life, and he has been long engaged in
developing the idea, to the great importance of which M. Delbœuf bears
witness; although he objects to the use which M. Tarde makes of terms
taken from mathematics, physics, and biology, to express his sociological
views. On the question of free-will there was no agreement. Although the
latter is a determinist, he believes in penal responsibility, on the
ground of personal identity; the diseased person or the madman is no
longer himself, in which they differ from the criminal.
We can say nothing of M. Delbœuf’s visit to the canons of the Tarn. Here
was captured a lizard which displayed, when compared with a Spanish
lizard in captivity with it, as much difference in character as could be
found between two men chosen at hazard. The author concludes an amusing
description of the habits of the two captives by recommending their
history to the politicians and the historians of France and Spain, as
likely to throw light on that of the peoples themselves. We leave M.
Delbœuf, whose book of seventy-five pages may be said to be as full of
interesting matter as an egg is of meat, with quoting his postscript:
“On the day that these lines appear (March 1891) the Spanish lizard has
finally cast off his savage character and follows in the footsteps of the
French. Effect of imitation.”
Ω.
DER POSITIVISMUS VOM TODE AUGUST COMTE’S BIS AUF UNSERE TAGE (1857-1891).
By _Hermann Gruber_, S. J. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder’sche
Verlagshandlung. 1891.
This pamphlet of 194 pages is the continuation of another pamphlet on
August Comte, the founder of Positivism, which was reviewed in _The Open
Court_, No. 134. The author is a Jesuit and it is a matter of course that
all the facts he relates, all the doctrines he explains are represented
from the standpoint of Roman Catholicism. The booklet is of great
importance in so far as we learn through it what an erudite Catholic mind
thinks of that recent movement of philosophy which has been called by
the collective name Positivism. The method pursued by Hermann Gruber is
most recommendable. He states facts and quotes abundantly so as to let
the various philosophers speak for themselves. He is economical with the
salt of his own opinion, yet he uses it with such a discretion that Roman
Catholics can become thoroughly acquainted with infidel views without
suffering in their faith.
The book consists of two parts: (I) The Positivism of the schools in
connection with Comte and of the Positivistic movement outside of these
schools. The first part begins with a discussion of Littré. Littré, “the
voice, the spirit and the soul of Positivism,” as Bourdon calls him,
is characterised as a philological genius. Although he had chosen the
medical profession, which however he abandoned early, and although he
regarded the propaganda of the positive philosophy as his life-work,
all his talents lay in the direction of special investigation in the
literary, historical, and linguistic fields, and the editing of the
French dictionary remains his main achievement.
Comte had not nominated a successor who should in his place be the
_Directeur du positivisme_. Littré had forfeited this honor on account
of his quarrels with Comte in which he strongly sided with Madame Comte
against her husband. After Comte’s death P. Lafitte was elected as a
temporary director and he has kept this office ever since, which he
conducts with remarkable devotion and unselfishness. Although without
property himself he proposed not to use the positivistic funds until he
had shown himself through his work worthy of using them. He ekes out a
scanty living for himself by giving lessons in mathematics, and devotes
all the rest of his time to the management of and the propaganda for
the Positive Church. His co-workers are Audiffrent, Antoine, Robinet,
and others—all of them as the reviewer thinks strange people, visionary
enthusiasts, and, to use an expressive Americanism, regular cranks.
Lack of space prevents us from recapitulating their ceremonies, their
sacraments, festivals, pilgrimages, memorials, and other forms of
service. Their whole behavior proves that they are and will remain
infidel Roman Catholics and it would have been wiser if they had not
left the church at all. The positivistic orthodoxy culminates in the
positivistic mystery of Comte’s idea of a “Virgin-Mother” (_Vierge-Mère_)
which according to Lafitte is destined to elevate the intercourse
between the sexes, while Audiffrent, Lagarrigue, and the Brasilian Lemos
stick closely to Comte’s view “to represent positivism as directly
conceived under the Utopia of a virgin-mother.”[22] General Lemos goes
so far as to say “We prefer to be looked upon with St. Paul for the
sake of our faithfulness toward Comte as fools than to be praised by
the contemporary frivolity as sages.” And Audiffrent defends against
Lafitte the diplomatic action of Comte’s with the General of the Jesuits
concerning an alliance between Positivism and Catholicism. Positivism,
he says, invites all who have ceased to believe in God to become
positivists, but it induces all those who still believe in God to turn
Catholics, thus making an alliance possible of the disciplined against
the non-disciplined.
If the Jesuit General ever has seriously considered the offer, he would
perhaps have accepted it, for there is no doubt that he would have made
the better bargain as all the discipline we should say is on his side.
The English group of Comtean Positivists consists mainly of Fr. Harrison,
Richard Congreve, George Eliot and James Cotter Morison. The second part
of the book which treats of the positivistic movement outside of the
positivistic schools in England, France, Germany and other countries will
be less interesting to English and American readers partly because the
subject is better known to them partly because our author is apparently
more familiar with his French than with his English sources. The second
part begins with John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. It mentions Bain,
Lewes, Clifford, Maudsley, Darwin, Sully, Romanes, Huxley, Tyndall.
Clifford’s view is sketched in sixteen lines but in such a way that
it appears grotesque. As French positivists outside the schools are
mentioned Taine, Ribot, Fouillée, Guyau, Charles Richet, J. Luys, Cl.
Bernard, and Roberty. It is correctly said of Ribot that his doctrine
of personality is most characteristic of his views. The unity of a
personality in the ego does not grow from above downwards but from below
upwards, but Gruber is mistaken in saying of Charles Richet, the editor
of the _Revue Scientifique_, that he represents about the same views as
Th. Ribot. Richet’s publication on telepathic experiments in which he
confidently believes, would never be countenanced by Ribot.
As the first German positivist is mentioned Eugen Dühring. Riehl, Laas,
Lange, Vaihinger and Avenarius are disposed of together in the next
following chapter. Several pages are devoted to Wundt.
The little chapter headed _Nord-America_ (p. 171) consisting of two and
a half pages begins with the words: “According to the testimony of G.
Stanley Hall philosophy in the new world is in its swaddling-clothes
still (_in den Kinderschuhen_). Philosophers over there are as rare
as snakes in Ireland (_Schlangen in Norwegen_).[23] For scientific
instruction in the United States are used as guiding stars Spencer,
Lewes, Darwin, Huxley, and Haeckel.” As a representative Atheist is
named Ludeking, a man unknown to fame, while Colonel Ingersoll is not
mentioned at all. It is maintained that J. D. Bell, a professor in
New York had proclaimed the same confession of faith as Comte in _The
Modern Thinker_—a journal which we have never seen nor ever heard of.
The societies for ethical culture are characterised as avowing “a purely
natural religion” while in fact natural religion, the religion of science
and philosophy, as a basis of ethics is as rigorously rejected by
Professor Adler as any dogmatic religion, and more than half of the two
and a half pages is filled with a masonic proclamation of the Sovereign
Grand Commander, Albert Pike, of Washington, which preaches the belief in
an unknowable God and denounces Atheism.
The booklet closes with the following sentences: “The full and true
positivism is embodied in the Catholic Church. The divine revelation
which she represents is that which is truly real ... truly sure ... truly
precise ... truly organic ... truly useful. The deepest root, however,
and the most essential nature of all true positivism (this is vouched for
by reason as well as by revelation) is not the relative but the absolute.”
Here we conclude our review of the book. We have however to add a few
words which concern _The Monist_ as well as all the publications of The
Open Court Publishing Co. Hermann Gruber mentions in his book _The Open
Court_ and its editor together with the societies for ethical culture.
We have, ourselves, characterised our views as positivism and as monism,
but we stated at the same time that our positivism had nothing to do
with Comte or with any one of Comte’s disciples.[24] They have (with the
sole exception of Ribot and I should hesitate to call him a Comtean)
contributed little if anything to the formation of our views. The name
Positivism is a good and expressive word and we have adopted it because
taken in its proper meaning it represents the true principle of modern
philosophy. However we cannot agree with any of the fundamental tenets
either of Comte or of his most positivistic and most scientific disciple
Littré.[25] Comte as well as Littré are radical agnostics they repeat
again and again that “We can know nothing about first and final causes.
Positive philosophy denies nothing and maintains nothing.” According
to our view of the subject this attitude is rather negativism than
positivism. But it is not even negativism; it is worse, it is mere
scepticism leading to indifferentism. It sounds very philosophical to
speak of the inscrutability of first and final causes but the very
terms “first causes” and “final causes” are most nonsensical and
self-contradictory concepts. (See “Fundamental Problems,” pp. 88-90, and
101.) Comte and Littré imagine to have conquered metaphysics, but in fact
they are the worst kind of metaphysicians. They believe in the ghosts of
metaphysics as strongly as some mediæval minds believe in devils but are
afraid to wrestle with them, because, as they maintain these metaphysical
ghosts cannot be conquered.
Comtean Positivism, especially as it is represented by Littré, consists
mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to “let metaphysics alone”
(which latter includes the object of religious worship) and limits
science to positive issues. Thus the oneness of the sciences, a unitary
world-conception is lost, for the hierarchy of the sciences which are
to serve as a substitute for philosophy is rather a summing up of the
stock of knowledge than a system of the sciences exhibiting their organic
growth. It is an inventory rather than a plan to guide science in its
further evolution. It is an anatomy rather than a physiology, for the
very life and spirit of the sciences is missing. And outside the pale of
the hierarchy of the sciences there is looming around an awful something
quite different in its nature, like an infinite ocean surrounding a
forlorn island, the unknowable first and final causes! That which is
called by former philosophers “metaphysics,” which is at the same time
the essence of religion, is by no means either unknowable or indifferent.
It is not something beyond, something extramundane, it is the very life
of the world and our religious and philosophical opinions are not only
of a theoretical interest. They are the main factors of our lives which
in the long run will determine the direction of our development. That
this is so, has not been sufficiently recognised, and we would suggest in
this connection that a history of the United States should be written to
point out that the political liberty of the country and its republicanism
are nothing but the application of its religious principles and of the
Puritan conviction of religious independence. The historic growth of the
colonies remained faithful to this maxim. The religion of a man and of
a nation is the most important thing. In the same way the structure of
a seed predetermines the whole plant, and the angle of crystallisation
together with the shape of the crystal-nucleus from which the process of
crystallisation starts, will determine the formation of the whole crystal.
His sceptical attitude led Littré to what he and his friends call
“tolerance.” Littré’s wife was a devout Catholic and his daughter was
educated in her mother’s faith. He had intended to explain to her his
views of the subject when she had reached maturity, and leave the choice
to her. But when the moment came, he declared that “the experiment was
not worth the tears which it would cause.” Our view of “tolerance” is
radically different. Whatever the truth may be it should be struggled
for, cost it ever so many tears or pains.
We cannot sympathise with Littré’s method of constructing ethics upon the
nutritive and sexual instincts, the former producing egotism, the latter
altruism. Emotions are, says Littré, as much as ideas, the result of
brain-processes in consequence of external impressions and “the struggle
between both kinds of emotion make up the moral life.” Littré rejects
the evolution theory and its attempts to explain ethics. (See Gruber’s
book p. 20.) Having explained our views of ethics on other occasions,
it is sufficient here to state that we consider Littré’s attempt as a
failure. We cannot even adopt the so-called “positive method,” of which
Littré says: “Whoever adopts this method is a positivist and whether
he acknowledges the fact or not, also a disciple of Comte. Whoever
employs another method is a metaphysician. It is the surest mark by
which a careful mind will discriminate what belongs to the positive
philosophy and what is foreign to it.” What is this method? Says Littré:
“It is an acknowledged principle of positive science that nothing real
can be stated through reasoning (_raisonnement_). The world cannot be
guessed.” Littré is opposed to so-called _a priori_ arguments. Hermann
Gruber says in the preface: “This positive method is embraced by all
the representatives of the lines of thought here discussed. All of them
intend to build up their systems with the exclusion of scholastic,
respectively of Kantian, Hegelian, or any _a priori_ speculations
after purely ‘scientific’ methods upon the foundation of the facts of
experience.” We certainly intend to build our world conception “upon the
facts of experience” but the most important facts among them are their
formal relations and these formal relations when represented in thought
are exactly that element which Kant called _a priori_. The sense-element
affords us the building stones, but the _a priori_ element represents
the mortar without which we could not build. So much do we oppose
this one-sided philosophy which takes its stand upon what is wrongly
called the purely scientific method, that our views have been called
the Philosophy of Form, and justly, for Form is that feature of the
world which makes of it a cosmos and formal thought is the organ of our
comprehension.
κρς.
UEBER DEN ASSOCIATIVEN VERLAUF DER VORSTELLUNGEN. Inaugural-Dissertation.
By _E. W. Scripture_, M. A., Fellow of Clark University. Leipzig: Wilhelm
Engelmann. 1891.
This essay of 102 pages characterises most excellently some of the
proceedings and methods of Professor Wundt’s psychological laboratory.
The author, a disciple of Wundt, is a native American who studied in
Berlin, Zürich, and Leipzig, and took his degree of Doctor on the ground
of this dissertation. The object of the treatise is not so much to solve
as to formulate the problem of the associative course of concepts, and
the author hopes that in a future treatise he will be able to propound
his theory based upon the facts here related.
The experiments were made with the assistance of seven friends, among
them German students, a doctor of philosophy, a doctor of medicine,
and a teacher. They were of different nationality, three Germans, one
Belgian, one Japanese, one Englishman from the Cape, and two Americans,
the author included. The apparatus used was so arranged that the person
operated upon sat in the dark, before him was a plate of ground glass
intercepting from a camera an image which was exposed for four seconds.
Pictures of all kinds, colors, and plainly printed words were used. For
other sense-impressions the observer was also seated in the dark. Several
instruments for producing sounds were ready on a table. Tastes were
effected by liquids which the person operated upon had to drink, and the
sense of touch was investigated through handing him cards to which some
small objects had been attached. The author was partly operator, partly
observer, i. e. the person operated upon. The ideas evoked through the
sense-impressions produced in this way, are enumerated in tabular form in
the order in which they arose.
Among the experiments made in this way we find one kind which is of
special interest. Sir William Hamilton made the remark in his Lectures
on Metaphysics that unconscious ideas may serve as connecting links
between two ideas otherwise unassociated. He represented his view in the
following way: Let _A_, _B_, _C_, be three ideas, _A_ does not suggest
_C_, but both are associated with _B_. It happens that _A_ is directly
followed by _C_ in consciousness. In such a case _A_ may recall _B_
and _B_ may recall _C_, but _B_ being a _minimum visibile_ or _minimum
audibile_ does not enter consciousness. Thus the idea of the mount Ben
Lomond called into Hamilton’s mind the system of Prussian education.
Subsequent reflection taught him that he had met on Ben Lomond a German.
The recollection of the place was associated with the ideas—a German,
Germany, Prussia. These ideas were too weak to enter consciousness yet
they reawakened another idea which did enter consciousness, the system of
Prussian education.
This is a mere suggestion of Hamilton’s but Dr. Scripture proved its
truth by actual experiment. He took cards containing some simple
words, such as MENSCH, GEHEN, KOMMEN, BLUME, etc., and also Japanese
words in Roman characters HANA, HITO, IUKU, KURU. To every word was
attached another Japanese word in Japanese characters so that the same
character appeared on HANA and BLUME; HITO and MENSCH; JUKU and GEHEN;
KURU and KOMMEN. The words were shown twice so as to give a stronger
impression. The Japanese gentleman was excluded from these experiments,
and indeed, the unknown Japanese characters which were only dimly or
not at all remembered, evoked the corresponding words: HITO—MENSCH;
KURU—KOMMEN; BLUME—HANA, etc. Dr. Scripture adds: “These associations
were involuntary, the observer imagined them to be wrong, and could find
no reason for the involuntary appearance of the words. He had not thought
at all of the connecting links.”
It appears that the links in a chain of concepts need not be all
conscious and the result of his experiments in this line is formulated by
Dr. Scripture as follows: A concept apperceived can bring another concept
into the focus of consciousness although it was never associated with it,
if there are other psychic elements of lower degrees or even outside of
consciousness which are connected with both—provided that there are no
other elements stronger than these. The effect of the unconscious link
however is much weaker than that which was conscious.
Pages 71-101 are devoted to the investigations of the after-effect of
concepts. The phenomena of ideation being extremely complex, we cannot
assume that the process of a so-called reproduced concept is analogous
to the original idea. A sensation changes during its presence with
reference to the degree of consciousness of its parts and even the
concepts as a whole may be altered. The process is different according
to circumstances. The renewed concepts differ from their originals,
(1) in the degree of the consciousness of the whole idea, (2) in the
degree of the consciousness of its parts among themselves, (3) in
form, color, relations, etc., (4) in duration. In order to avoid the
metaphysical influence of hypothetical theories we ought to avoid all
kinds of terms suggestive of a theory and stick closely to a simple
description of facts. Therefore Dr. Scripture proposes to discard such
words as “retention, reproduction, revival,” etc., and suggests the term
“after-effect.” Yet he adds, quoting from Wundt, “these after-effects
themselves are as little ideas as the effects produced upon nerves and
muscles by exercise can be called actions of will.”
Dr. Scripture avoids explaining what he conceives these after-effects to
be. We see no reason for disagreement and should say that the result of
the after-effects is what generally goes by the name of “disposition.”
And a certain disposition is produced according to the law of the
conservation of form in living structures. (See “The Soul of Man,” pp.
418-424.)
Dr. Scripture is led by a consideration of his observations to the
following statement: “Each concept is conditioned through the effects of
the elements of the present state of consciousness and the after-effects
of many (if not of all) previous elements of consciousness.”
This result is not compatible with the theory of reproduction now almost
universally accepted by the association-psychology. Wundt says: “If only
certain single concepts were renewed, we might perhaps explain why in the
memory-picture certain elements of a former reproduction are missing:
but we could not explain why the elements of a concept change so often
qualitatively as is indeed the case. This, it appears, is possible only
because a memory-picture and others of a kindred nature affect each other
mutually.”
This will find explanation in the following experiment. The observer
sees a dog, and thinks of a circus, which he saw a year ago. There is
no direct association between the picture of the dog and the special
reminiscence of that circus visited a year ago. The association was
formed at the moment. Former sensations of dogs had their after-effects
and this special reminiscence was localised.
Dr. Scripture maintains that Höffding’s association theory contains too
many hypothetical elements; it presupposes faculties of the soul to join
like with like and to combine simultaneous or consecutive events.
κρς.