[10] Compare the article _The Origin of Thought-Forms_ in the present
number, under the caption “Diverse Topics.”
[11] I should prefer to speak of the oneness or inseparableness of
thought and language, but since Prof. Max Müller has sufficiently
explained himself, I use here his term “identity” in the sense of
inseparableness as it is used by Prof. Max Müller.
[12] _The Logos Theory_, by Ludwig Noiré. Translated from the German.
_The Open Court_, iii. p. 2196. English translations of Noiré’s most
important articles concerning the origin of language, have appeared in
Nos. 33, 137, 139, 141, 142 of _The Open Court_.
[13] That ants communicate with each other through their antennæ is an
undeniable fact. But Landois believes that they communicate also through
sounds. Some ants possess in their stridulation-organ a kind of a rattle
the sound of which, however, is perceptible to the human ear only in the
Ponera ants.
[14] See _Three Lectures on the Science of Language_, p. 47. The Open
Court Publishing Co., Chicago.
[15] Prof. Lloyd Morgan introduces several new terms, which seem well
coined. The mental product which is called the object of sense he calls
“construct”; the most prominent feature in a composite sense-image, he
calls the “predominant”; and if the predominant is named and isolated by
abstraction he calls it an “isolate.”
[16] An impartial criticism of Professor Romanes’s position has been made
by Prof. Lloyd Morgan in his recent work _Animal Life and Intelligence_.
[17] This quotation is requoted from Prof. Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and
Intelligence_, p. 325.
[18] _The origin of Mind_, in _The Monist_, Vol. I. No. I.
[19] L. c., p. 281. “So much about the subject or the monon. What now
about the objects or the mona?”
[20] Prof. Max Müller is a great admirer of Kant and so am I. But it
appears to me that we differ greatly in what we accept as the essential
teachings of the master; and I grant willingly that Prof. Max Müller has
preserved the doctrines of Kant more faithfully than I. I have attempted
to modernise Kant. If I am called a Kantian (and I do not object to the
name, on the contrary I am proud of it) it is because I proceed from
Kant and I attempt to preserve the spirit of Kant’s philosophy rather
than his doctrines. For the sake of the spirit of Kantian philosophy I
have seen myself urged to surrender the idea of the thing-in-itself as
something unknowable. Prof. Max Müller has preserved in his philosophy
(for such is the _Science of Thought_) the Ding-an-sich theory. Believing
in things-in-themselves he must consistently believe in a self or monon,
for this monon is nothing but the thing-in-itself of the soul.
I have limited myself in the present article to the principle of
continuity in evolution as a point of divergence between Prof. Max Müller
and the views defended by _The Monist_. If I attempted at present to
enter into the philosophical problem of things-in-themselves, I should be
obliged to tax too much the patience of my readers. But as I am convinced
that the reason of our difference with Prof. Max Müller concerning the
continuity of evolution lies deeper still, I intend to treat the subject
of things-in-themselves in a future number.