GUNBOATS AND GAALIN
No account of the recent campaign could be in any way complete if
it did not include some mention of the valuable assistance rendered
to the Sirdar and the Anglo-Egyptian forces by the gunboats and the
Friendlies. I have thought it better to keep this portion of the
narrative distinct from the rest, and to mould the present chapter
more or less into the form of a diary.
The Sirdar's fleet at the end of the campaign consisted of the
following gunboats:--_Sultan_, _Sheikh_, _Melik_, _Fatteh_, _Nasr_,
_Hafir_, _Tamai_, _Metemmeh_, and _Abu Klea_. In addition to these
were the old unarmed _El Tahra_ and, up to 25th August, the gunboat
_Zaphir_.
The navigation of the Nile was full of difficulty. The river charts
were bad or non-existent, and no _reis_, or native captain, could
really be trusted to keep his boat in the deep channels with any
certainty. Still, it must be remembered that the bed of the Nile is
continually changing its position, and what are deep holes one year
may be turned by next year's flood into shallow pools. On the whole,
it is astonishing that the river service was not frequently overtaken
by disaster. The engines on a boat like the _Tamai_ were always on
the verge of dissolution, the current was terrific, and all the
vessels--gunboats, barges, and _ghyassas_--were loaded down to the
water's edge. The barges, on which the troops were packed together
with barely room to turn themselves, were especially liable to
accident, as they were exceedingly top-heavy and loosely constructed.
I remember seeing a gunboat gently collide with one of these barges
as it lay, fortunately without any crew, off the bank at Wad Hamed.
The whole structure collapsed at once; the top platform fell off, and
in less than two minutes the remains of the barge and all its cargo
that would float were drifting rapidly down the Nile.
One gunboat alone, the _Zaphir_, was overtaken by serious disaster.
It happened as follows: On 23rd August the _Zaphir_ left the
Atbara at 4 p.m. The officers on board consisted of General Rundle,
Prince Christian Victor, Lieutenant Micklem, R.E., Major Dodd,
R.A.M.C., and, in command of the vessel, Commander Keppel, R.N.
In the _ghyassas_, which were lashed to the gunboat, were packed
"details" of various native battalions. All went well for two nights,
although on the 23rd the _Zaphir_ tied up to the bank in the midst
of a violent storm of wind which suddenly swept over the river from
the desert. At 4.45 p.m. on the 25th of August the officers were
sitting on the upper deck taking tea, when Mr. Poole, the engineer,
suddenly asked Commander Keppel to come below at once. Prince
Christian meanwhile walked forward, and noticed that the ship lay
very low in the water, so much so, in fact, that the rapid current
was washing over the bows. As he walked back to General Rundle,
Commander Keppel rushed up from the lower deck and informed the
assembled officers that water had found its way into the hold, and
the gunboat might go down any moment; meanwhile, he had ordered the
engineer to make for the shore at full speed. On the receipt of
this startling information the officers walked to the side of the
vessel, and as they did so, the _Zaphir_, which was floundering in
a clumsy fashion towards the bank, suddenly gave a heavy lurch to
starboard, and seemed on the point of "turning turtle." A general
exodus of natives followed; servants, sailors, and "Gyppy" soldiers
sprang out of the nooks and crannies in which they hide themselves
on board, and, leaping into the stream, swam easily to the shore. At
the same instant General Rundle, Major Dodd, and Lieutenant Micklem
jumped from the deck on to the _ghyassas_ at the side. The _Zaphir_,
however, righted herself again, but as the fires had been put out
by the inrush of water, she drifted slightly and began to settle
down. An attempt to get a rope from the ship to the shore failed.
Prince Christian then jumped upon a _ghyassa_, and lastly, just as
the gunboat sank within thirty yards of the bank, Commander Keppel
followed his example. Most fortunately, someone had the presence of
mind to cut the _ghyassas_ adrift, otherwise they would certainly
have been dragged down with the vessel as she foundered. On the
return journey from Omdurman I noticed that part of the funnel was
still out of the water, and a twelve-pounder gun projected from the
stern battery a couple of feet above the stream. The whole party
bivouacked on shore that night in rather a destitute condition.
Nobody seemed to know how the leak was caused, but from the time the
inrush of water was noticed, at 5.40, only eleven minutes elapsed
before the vessel sank. A few stores had been saved, and off these
the shipwrecked officers made a meal. Everyone by good luck had
managed to land in his helmet, but otherwise the clothing of the
party was rather nondescript. Prince Christian, for example, had
nothing left except a pair of trousers and a canvas shirt. Next
morning the natives dived about the wreck and fished out some odds
and ends of clothing and baggage. At midday on the 26th, Major
Drage, D.S.O., happened to pass up the river in the _El Tahra_, and
conveyed the _Zaphir's_ crew to Rojan Island, where Commander Keppel
transferred his flag to the _Sultan_, accompanied by Prince Christian
and Major Dodd.
On the day before the loss of the _Zaphir_, the "Irregulars" or
"Friendlies" had assembled at Wad Hamed. This motley corps was
composed of detachments from the following tribes:--Gaalin, Ababdeh,
Shukriyeh, Batahin, Bishariyeh, Mersalamieh, Gimiab, and a few
Hassaniyeh. All these tribes have for thirteen years been bitterly
hostile to the English and Egyptians, but, thanks to the impolitic
conduct of the Khalifa and the cruel devastation practised by his
generals, many of his adherents amongst these Arab tribes have been
alienated from the Mahdi's successor, and now look forward to an era
of peace and security under a settled government. By far the most
useful and important section of these Friendlies was furnished by
the Gaalin, a brave and warlike tribe, who fought gallantly against
the British at Abu Klea, Abu Kru, and Gubat in January 1885. In July
1897 Khalifa's army under the brutal Mahmoud--who was captured at the
Atbara, and is now imprisoned at Wady Halfa--suddenly, on their march
northwards, attacked the Gaalin, and butchered a large number of them
at Metemmeh. Ever since this treacherous massacre a deadly feud had
existed between this tribe and the Khalifa's government.
As a fighting force the Irregulars, numbering about two thousand
five hundred, presented a rather quaint appearance. They were
armed with every imaginable weapon. Some had rifles, others were
equipped with old flint and steel muskets, elephant guns, ancient
muzzle-loading pistols, spears, swords, and daggers. Their methods
of locomotion were almost as varied as their accoutrements. Some
were mounted on horses, some marched on foot, others ambled along
on camels, mules, and donkeys. About twelve hundred Remingtons
were supplied at Wad Hamed for distribution amongst the tribes in
proportion to their numbers, and it was a proud day for many of these
picturesque ruffians when they secured one of these rifles. The
possession of guns always seems to exercise a peculiar fascination
over semi-barbarous peoples. A friend and myself once bestowed three
ancient Snider carbines, rubbed bright with Monkey Brand Soap, upon
a small Arabian potentate, who was delighted with the present and
had the rifles carried after him by three almost naked courtiers
wherever he went. We took good care not to give the monarch any
cartridges, but his attendants did not seem to mind the absence of
ammunition. What they liked was to swagger about with the Sniders,
and use them as a sort of glorified walking-stick with the muzzle
stuck into the ground.
For the command of this extraordinary army the Sirdar had selected
Major Stuart-Wortley, whose military ability and almost unique
experience of Sudan campaigns marked him out as the proper man for
the work of impressing some order and discipline upon the rough and
turbulent material of the Friendly Contingents. Lieutenant Wood also
accompanied the force as staff officer.
The Gaalin and the other Friendlies crossed over from Wad Hamed, and
were ordered to proceed along the river parallel to the advance of
the Anglo-Egyptian forces on the opposite bank. The various tribal
contingents marched separately under their own sheikhs, and presented
a most picturesque appearance across the river as their white-clad
columns moved in and out of the green bushes. They first came into
touch with the enemy on 29th August, when the village of Gaali was
found to be occupied by a small detachment of Jehadieh infantry and
Dervish cavalry. These were speedily routed by the Friendlies, who
attacked the small force before them in fine style, and captured ten
prisoners.
On 31st August three gunboats--the _Sultan_, _Melik_, and
_Fatteh_--were ordered to advance up the river from Seg-et-taib and
shell the advance post held by the Dervishes on the Kerreri ridge.
Before midday the gunboats took up a position opposite Kerreri
village, and proceeded to enfilade the Dervish camp on the hill. Some
splendid practice was made, and great confusion was produced by the
twelve-pounder shells as they burst in rapid succession amongst the
enemy, who could be seen rushing about, collecting their property and
striking their tents. The camp was soon rendered untenable by our
fire, and as the Dervishes fled over the plain towards Omdurman, they
were followed by shells from the gunboats, which knocked over about a
dozen cavalry.
On 1st September some excellent work was done by an effective
co-operation between the gunboats and the Friendlies. At 5.30 a.m.
the _Sultan_, _Sheikh_, _Melik_, _Fatteh_, and _Nasr_ steamed up the
right bank of the river and met Major Stuart-Wortley. It was arranged
that the gunboats should steam on ahead and shell the villages and
forts from the river, while the Friendlies advanced along the bank.
At 9.30 the vessels engaged and utterly destroyed a fort to the
south of Halfayah. The villages of Hejra el Sharg and Halfayah were
next shelled, and as a body of Dervish cavalry emerged into the open
ground, some forty or fifty of them were knocked over by shrapnel.
On land, meanwhile, the Irregulars had not been idle. Notwithstanding
the shells of the gunboats, several of the villages south of Halfayah
were found to be held in considerable force by the enemy. Major
Stuart-Wortley drew up his men for the attack, but an unexpected
hitch occurred, as the Mersalamieh and Gimiab contingents posted in
front did not seem at all disposed to advance against the Dervishes,
who were waiting for them behind the shelter of numerous mud-houses.
Instead of rushing to the attack, they suddenly halted and danced
a "fantasia" instead! Major Stuart-Wortley did not waste time over
these faint-hearted warriors, but brought up his trusty Gaalin, who,
supported by the other tribes, gallantly attacked house after house,
and routed the enemy, killing a large number, including Isa Zachnieh,
a cousin of the Khalifa, and losing themselves over sixty killed and
wounded.
The Gaalin made very little use of their rifles in the desperate
fighting which practically cleared the right bank of the Dervishes.
They loaded their guns and fired them into the air, calling upon
Allah to direct the course of the bullets! Then throwing their
Remingtons on one side, they gripped their broad-bladed spears, and
used them so effectively that after the fight the Dervish casualties
stood at three hundred and fifty killed, wounded none! At one moment
Major Stuart-Wortley and Lieutenant Wood were in great danger. A
troop of Baggara horsemen suddenly charged down upon the spot where
they were standing, and the Ababdeh Arabs who were with the two
officers, instead of waiting for the cavalry, simply turned tail and
fled. Immediately after this fighting round Halfayah, two hundred
and fifty Shukriyeh Friendlies were dispatched up the Blue Nile in
pursuit of the Dervishes who had fled.
By 11.30 on the 1st, the fighting on the right bank was to all
intents and purposes over. Five hundred Gaalin and one hundred and
seventy-five British infantry, made up of details from the Guards,
Rifle Brigade, Highlanders, etc., were embarked on the five gunboats.
The original plan had been to land Stuart-Wortley's levies on Tuti
Island, but this was abandoned owing to the close proximity of the
Omdurman forts--a fact not disclosed on the Intelligence maps--and
the presence on the island of a large force of Dervishes.
[Illustration: Plan of
OMDURMAN and KHARTUM
to illustrate
The operations of the gunboats and the Friendlies.
1. Khartum. | 6. Mosque.
2. Omdurman. | 7. Mahdi's Tomb.
3. Gordon's House. | 8. Khalifa's House.
4. Tuti Island. | 9. Khojali.
5. Great Wall. | 10. Hejra el Sharg.
_R. V. Darbishire 1898._]
Meanwhile Major Elmslie's battery of howitzers had taken up a
position on the bank opposite the centre of Omdurman, and at 1.30
opened fire on the Mahdi's tomb, at a range of three thousand one
hundred and fifty yards. The two first shells missed their mark,
but played havoc with the neighbouring buildings; the third
wrecked the apex of the dome, and carried away the gilded ornaments
which surmounted it. Later on three other shells crashed into the
structure, tearing enormous holes in the stonework, and utterly
destroying the whole of the interior. Subsequently the howitzers
abandoned their artillery practice on tombs and their violation of
the dead, and engaged in the more satisfactory demolition of the
Omdurman ramparts. Vast breaches were torn in the big wall which ran
along the river, and many of the principal buildings were utterly
destroyed.
At 2 p.m. the gunboats, with the _Sultan_ leading, advanced farther
up the stream in order to shell the forts of Omdurman. As they
steamed slowly up past the city, the boats were met by a heavy shell
fire, and occasional volleys from Dervish riflemen. The enemy's
shells burst all round the boats, but they only succeeded in scoring
two hits the whole day, one of which splintered some woodwork on a
barge, while the other struck an iron mantlet at an angle and glanced
harmlessly off into the water. At such short range the Dervish
gunners ought most certainly to have made better practice, but the
fact is, that the aim of our quick-firing guns was so marvellously
accurate that it was almost impossible for the enemy to work their
artillery. Thanks very largely to the skill of two Royal Marine
sergeants, our fire silenced one battery after another. In some cases
actually two shells out of three penetrated the embrasures of the
forts, dismounting the guns inside, and doing terrible execution
amongst the Dervish gunners.
While the twelve-pounder guns were demolishing the forts, the
Maxims were turned with deadly effect on the Dervishes who were
running about the banks. As two more forts in Khartum--one at the
juncture of the Blue and White Nile, the other close to Gordon's
palace--continued to fire upon us, the gunboats steamed past the
ruined city, and speedily converted these last defences of the enemy
into mere heaps of rubbish. At 5 p.m. the Friendlies were disembarked
on the right bank, where they remained with the howitzer battery and
the British detachment under Captain Ferguson of the Northumberland
Fusiliers. The five gunboats then returned and took up a position
off El Genuaia opposite to the zeriba.
During the battle on the morning of 2nd September, the gunboats were
posted at both ends of the zeriba, and made themselves extremely
useful. As was mentioned above, the fire of these boats lying off
Kerreri village practically saved the Camel Corps from annihilation.
Throughout the rest of the fight, too, a galling shell fire was kept
up on the Dervish forces advancing from the north-west and, more
especially, from the south, over the sandy ridge between Surgham and
the Nile.
Meanwhile the howitzer battery had again opened fire at daybreak, and
continued its work of destruction amongst the buildings of Omdurman.
The effect of the Lyddite shells was so terrible that the Khalifa
seems to have abandoned his plan of falling back behind the walls
of his capital. This was a most fortunate thing, so far as we were
concerned, for if, after the fearful slaughter of his troops in the
first half of the engagement, the Khalifa had retreated with ten or
fifteen thousand men inside the tortuous streets and crowded houses
of Omdurman, we should have had the utmost difficulty in driving the
enemy out, and could not, in all probability, have occupied Omdurman
on the evening of the 2nd. House-to-house fighting is always a
costly and dangerous business, and had it taken place, the prophetic
estimate popularly attributed to the Sirdar of "one thousand
casualties before Khartum is ours," might well have been realised in
fact. As it was, the Dervishes prepared to take their chance in the
open desert, rather than await our onset under a continual fire of
fifty-pounder shells which burst amid sheets of flame and clouds of
dust, and sent huge fragments for hundreds of yards, wrecking every
obstacle in their path.
When the battle was over, the gunboats steamed up side by side with
the general advance, and were met at Omdurman by a hot rifle fire
from Dervishes concealed in the houses along the margin of the
river. The streets leading to the southern exit of the town were by
this time crowded with a mass of fugitives. In addition to mounted
Baggaras and Dervish infantry, a mob of inhabitants--men, women,
and children, dragging after them camels, horses, and donkeys laden
with goods and chattels--all this confused stream of human beings and
animals was pressing madly forward in panic-stricken flight. Orders
were given to fire upon the fugitives, and as the artillerymen on the
gunboats, from their raised position, could see well over the walls,
a deadly fire was opened upon the crowded thoroughfares. One street
especially, which led down to the river, was swept by a frightful
hail of Maxim bullets, which mowed the poor wretches down in scores.
After taking part in the battle and the subsequent destruction of
fugitives, the gunboats proceeded, on the night of the 2nd, about one
hundred miles farther up the river, and returned to Omdurman on 5th
September with the report that they had seen no more Dervishes.
During the fighting off Omdurman on the 1st, two of the Khalifa's
gunboats were destroyed. There was a pathetic interest attached to
old vessels like the _Bordein_ and _Ismailia_, as they had formed a
part of Gordon's little fleet in the old days of thirteen years ago!
The _Bordein_ had been despatched northwards by Gordon, but, like
the _Abbas_, had been wrecked. She struck on a rock in the Shabluka
Cataract, on 30th January 1885, and foundered, but was subsequently
raised by the Dervishes. When our gunners came within sight of the
vessel, voices were raised to save the old boat for Gordon's sake.
"Don't let us fire on the poor old _Bordein_!" But there is little
room for sentiment or loving-kindness amid the exigencies of warfare,
and under our fire the _Bordein_ was headed for the shore, and sank
as she reached it.
A still worse fate overtook the _Ismailia_. In some way or other
she fouled one of the mines laid down by the Khalifa's engineers in
midstream; the mine exploded, and the _Ismailia_, literally hoist by
its own petard, was blown out of the water. Two other mines had also
been laid in the channel, near the right bank opposite Omdurman. The
ropes connecting these with the shore were afterwards found inside
the ruined forts, but all our attempts to explode them were futile.
The Dervish steamer which was subsequently captured by the Sirdar on
his way to Fashoda was, I believe, the solitary survivor of Gordon's
ill-starred flotilla. The _Talawahiyah_ had been sunk off Rojan
Island, on 29th January 1885, and was never recovered. The _Abbas_,
which set out from Khartum with Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power on
board,--the one last desperate attempt to reopen communications with
the North,--was wrecked at Hebbeh, between Abu Hamed and Kirbekan,
and now lies there, keel uppermost.