The danger of this boating service is thus stated by Dr King:—

“The duty in boats up African rivers involves considerable risk at any

time of the year, but it can never be practised in the rainy season

without endangering the health and lives of all who are employed, and

such were evidently the sad consequences of the boat expeditions of the

‘Eclair.’”

The crew, according to Mr Maconchy, in addition to this dangerous

service, and the dreariness and monotony of the situation, were exposed

to another depressing agency, “from seeing the prizes of other ships

passing frequently to Sierra Leone, whilst they considered themselves

out of the reach of such good fortune.”

Another cause was probably in operation even at this time, namely, the

foul condition of the ship, as will hereafter appear.

Under these circumstances, fever broke out on board the ship, and proved

fatal to ten of the crew; eight of the ten deaths being considered by

the medical officers as directly consequent on the boating expeditions.

Though there were other and severe cases of sickness on board, these

deaths appear to include the whole of the ship’s mortality during her

stay at Sherboro, a period, as has been stated, of above four months.

In the month of July the “Eclair” left this station, returned to Sierra

Leone, and anchored in the harbour, where she appears to have remained

13 days. This happened to be the rainy season. The crew went on shore,

where several of them remained at night unable to reach the ship from

being in a state of helpless intoxication.

The consequences were soon apparent. While the ship remained in the

harbour, fever again broke out on board with great violence, and

continued without intermission during this and the following month. In

this sickly state she again left Sierra Leone, proceeded northward in

company with another ship, the “Albert,” and anchored in the Gambia on

the 10th of August “(one of the most unhealthy months at that place),”

where she remained until the 15th. All this time, the fever steadily

increasing, she arrived on the 21st of August at Boa Vista. She had now

lost, since leaving Sherboro, 13 more of her crew, making in all, from

the first outbreak of the disease at Sherboro, 37 attacks and 23 deaths;

that is, 1 in 6 of the crew had died.

On anchoring in the harbour of Boa Vista, pratique was at once offered

to her commander, Captain Estcourt, but he replied that he could not

think of accepting it until he had communicated the state of his vessel

to the authorities on shore. After some deliberation the

Governor-General consented to the landing of the ship’s company, in the

hope that the formidable disease, by which so many had already perished,

and so many others were still placed in imminent danger, might be

checked. Accordingly the crew, both the healthy and the sick, were sent

to a Fort on an islet a mile distant from the town (Porto Sal Rey), and

the officers were lodged in the town itself. This took place on the 31st

of August.

The hope of benefiting the crew by the change of their quarters from the

ship to the land was not realized. On the contrary, the sickness

continued to increase with so much virulence that, at the end of the

third week after the arrival of the ship at Boa Vista, no fewer than 60

fresh cases were added to the sick list, and some deaths took place

nearly every day.

In this state of things a consultation of the medical officers was held

on the condition of the crew, the result of which was a recommendation

that the ship should immediately proceed to Madeira, and if the fever

received no check, that she should go on to England. In conformity with

this advice, the whole of the crew, the sick as well as the healthy,

were forthwith re-embarked, and the ship sailed from Boa Vista on the

following day, namely, the 13th of September.

The sequel to this sad narrative shows that no improvement took place

during the passage of the “Eclair” to Madeira, where she was refused

pratique. She therefore proceeded next day on her voyage to England, and

anchored off the Isle of Wight, at the Motherbank, on the 28th of

September, having lost, since sailing from Boa Vista, 12 more of her

crew. Thus in the short space of 37 days, that is, from the time when

she anchored at Boa Vista on the 21st of August, till her arrival at the

Motherbank on the 28th of September, there occurred no less than 90

attacks and 45 deaths, including the death of her excellent and devoted

captain.

On her arrival in England the ship was put in quarantine, and remained

under the direction of the Privy Council until the 31st of October.

On the day following her arrival, Dr Richardson proposed that the sick

should be immediately removed to a wing of Haslar Hospital, to be

appropriated exclusively for them; stating, that in his opinion, if the

sick were placed in well-ventilated wards, with fresh bedding, and the

other means of cleanliness afforded by an hospital, there would be no

further risk to the attendants than would occur in wards set apart for

cases of typhus fever.

To this advice, Sir William Pym objected, and instead of allowing the

removal of the sick, he ordered the vessel, with the whole of her crew,

to proceed from the Motherbank to the Foul Bill Quarantine Station at

Standgate Creek, which place she did not reach until the afternoon of

the 2nd of October, that is, four days after her arrival at the

Motherbank, where they remained six days more before their removal into

another vessel. Thus were all on board detained close prisoners in a

pestilential atmosphere on the shores of their native land; their

anticipations that at length they should quit the scene of such terrible

sufferings, and of so many horrors, their hopes of life and health,

totally destroyed. The consequence was, that within these ten days, five

more deaths took place, nor was it until the Lords of the Admiralty

declared their conviction that the only means of preserving the lives of

the survivors of the crew would be the entire removal of every

individual from this ill-fated ship, that they were permitted to quit

it. Their removal took place on the 8th of October, after which event

two more deaths occurred, one of them being that of the pilot who took

the vessel from the Motherbank to Standgate Creek.[32]

Footnote 32:

A striking contrast to this treatment of the crew of the “Eclair” is

exhibited in the case of Her Majesty’s frigate, the “Arethusa,” which

recently (Feb. 14, 1852) arrived at Plymouth from Lisbon, having on

board cases of small-pox. Instead of putting the ship in quarantine,

and confining the healthy in the same poisonous atmosphere with the

sick, wiser counsels on this occasion prevailed, and more humane

measures were adopted. On the advice of Dr Rae, Inspector of the Royal

Naval Hospital, the sick, twelve in number, were immediately removed

to that establishment, and of these two died, without any

communication of the disease.

As already stated, official inquiries were directed to be made into the

causes of this extraordinary mortality, from which it appears:—

That there was nothing peculiar in the disease itself. The medical and

other officers of the ship, as well as the medical and other officers at

Boa Vista, that is, all competent witnesses who actually saw the

disease, concur in stating that it was nothing more than an aggravated

form of the common endemic fever of the African coast; a view which is

decisively confirmed by the original description of the disease in the

medical journal of the ship, and by post-mortem examination.

In opposition to this generally-received opinion, however, Sir William

Pym promulgated a statement that, in addition to the common African

fever, the celebrated _nova pestis_ of Dr Chisholm had been introduced

into the vessel by a passenger taken on board at Sierra Leone; this

disease being, as he represents, a fever _sui generis_, known by the

name of the African, Bulam, Yellow, or Black Vomit Fever, attacking the

human frame but once, and differing from the common remittent fever in

being highly contagious.

That the doctrine on which Sir William Pym’s assertion rests met with

little countenance from medical authorities is apparent from the

statement of Sir William Burnett, who says:—

“The whole of this, as regards the peculiar properties of the disease,

called by Sir William Pym, Bulam, &c., is a gratuitous assumption on his

part, and, in my opinion, has no foundation in fact; and in my view of

this part of the subject I am supported by nineteen-twentieths of the

medical officers of both services, who are of opinion with myself that

the more ardent form of Yellow Fever is a mere modification of the

bilious remittent so extensively known all over the tropical regions.”

He adds: “The fever which prevailed in the ‘Eclair’ was unquestionably a

remittent fever, originating in marsh miasmata, and the exposure of the

men in boats during rainy weather.”

Dr King and Dr Stewart, in official Reports upon this case, state their

concurrence with Sir William Burnett. Dr McWilliam, on the other hand,

is of opinion that the disease, though primarily an endemic remittent of

the African coast, became, from a series of causes, exalted into a

concentrated remittent or Yellow Fever, and in that manner acquired new

and peculiar properties, not primarily and essentially belonging to it.

With reference to this latter opinion, it may be observed that the

Governor-General of the Cape de Verd Islands affirms, that not one of

those who with a view to escape the pestilence emigrated to the

different islands of the Archipelago, had the disease, or communicated

it to others. According to the view of Dr McWilliam, therefore, this

disease must have been of a very singular character, for in its origin

at Shebar, it was not contagious, at Boa Vista it became contagious,

while in the other islands of the Archipelago, wherever the sick or the

uninfected fled, it again laid aside its contagious character, and did

not spread to a single individual.

All the inquirers and reporters agree in stating that among the causes

which concurred in communicating to this disease so extraordinary a

degree of prevalence and mortality, the more important were the

following:—

The employment of the crew uninterruptedly for an unusual length of

time, including the sickly season, in a peculiarly unhealthy situation,

and dangerous local duty.

The exposure of men, whose systems were impregnated with the seeds of

disease imbibed in this unhealthy locality, to the risks of unrestricted

liberty on shore, in the atmosphere of Sierra Leone, during the rainy

season; one consequence of which freedom being their “inordinate

indulgence in ardent spirits of the worst description.”

And subsequently, at Boa Vista, the confinement of the crew, the sick as

well as the uninfected, in a place still more crowded, filthy, and

unventilated than their quarters on board, instead of their dispersion

in a pure atmosphere.

Some conception may be formed of the unfavourable circumstances under

which the crew were placed at the Fort, from the account which, on

personal inspection, Dr King gives of its sanitary condition, who states

that from the absence of all means of cleansing, from the actual

accumulation of filth, and from the impossibility under any

circumstances of obtaining a free circulation of pure air, owing to the

plan of the building, the atmosphere which the sick, the convalescent,

and the healthy were compelled to breathe, day and night, must have been

polluted and deleterious in the extreme; and that into a space incapable

of affording sufficient accommodation for 50 men, upwards of 100,

including the sick, were huddled together under a most oppressive heat,

the thermometer ranging from 81° to 86°. This description is confirmed

by the testimony of Dr Almeida, who states that having been requested by

the Governor-General to go to the Fort and see the sick, “he found them

so extremely crowded that he could hardly pass between them.”

The influence of such conditions in conducing to the virulence and

spread of the disease has been already exemplified in what has been

stated under the head “Localizing Causes;” but it must be added, that

the crew had here also access to ardent spirits, in which both the sick

and the uninfected indulged to still greater excess even than at Sierra

Leone.

“It is with great regret,” says Sir William Burnett, “I have now to

state on the best information, that while in this situation means were

found to supply the sick as well as others with enormous quantities of

ardent spirits, which were drunk with avidity and produced the most

deleterious effects; indeed, I have reason to believe that some were

absolutely killed by it as if by poison. Had there not been a fever

already in existence, the intense heat (86° of Fahrenheit), the nature

of the soil, and this dreadful intoxication together, would have been

fully sufficient to have produced it, and one of the worst kind too, in

which irritability of the stomach and dark-coloured vomiting would have

been conspicuous symptoms.”

The actual result, as stated by Dr McWilliam, was that the accession to

the sick-list and the mortality became much greater at this time than

they had been at any previous period, and that from an endemic remittent

of the African coast, the disease became exalted into a concentrated

remittent or Yellow Fever.

Indubitable evidence further shows that, in addition to all these causes

of disease, the crew when on board were constantly inhaling a poison

generated in the ship itself. On a superficial examination the ship may

have appeared clean, and Sir William Pym positively asserts that she was

so; but there is conclusive evidence that this appearance was

fallacious.

From the records of the Medical Department of the Navy have been

extracted the following decisive statement with reference to this point,

by Captain Simpson, late of the “Rolla:”—

“In June, 1845, being then in command of the ‘Rolla,’ I went on board

the ‘Eclair’ off Shebar River. Commander Estcourt reported to me that he

had sent a boat up the Sherborough River, and that the crew, during

night, were exposed to heavy rain and much lightning, and were sick:

some deaths had occurred on board. In the early part of July I went to

Sierra Leone for supplies; the ‘Eclair’ was there; the vessel was

anchored close to the shore; and I advised her Commander to move her

further out, which he did. There seemed much excitement amongst the

crew; some liberty had been given them, and drunkenness and sickness

were the consequence. Wood was received on board for fuel in lieu of

coals. This wood was green, as I understood at Sierra Leone, and very

unhealthy to burn.”

This fact is substantiated by the log of the “Eclair,” which shows that

from July 16th to the 19th inclusive, the crew were employed at Sierra

Leone in wooding.

The influence of a quantity of greenwood recently taken on board a ship

navigating the tropical seas, in producing destructive fever, is shown

in the most striking manner by the history of the “Regalia,” and by that

of the “Vestal.”[33]

Footnote 33:

For these cases see the Second Report on Quarantine, pp. 64, 299.

Further evidence will be found in the Medical Department of the Navy to

show “that the hold of the ‘Eclair’ was in a pestiferous state;” and Dr

King states, that long after the people left the ship in England, and

when the engines were removed, mud, some inches deep, was found under

the flooring.

“I should scarcely have noticed the above circumstance,” he says, “but

for some remarkable occurrences which took place in the same vessel at a

subsequent period, which confirmed me in the opinion I had previously

formed that the origin and continuance of the fever on board depended

solely on local causes.

“The ‘Rosamond,’ formerly the ‘Eclair,’ was commissioned at Woolwich on

the 5th of November, 1846, for the Cape of Good Hope station, but none

of the former crew rejoined the ship. During the time of fitting out,

four cases of typhus fever occurred, and were sent to the hospital,

where two of them died, but it is necessary to mention that typhus was

prevalent at Woolwich at the time. The steamer left England for the Cape

on the 23rd of February, 1847. Three days after sailing, one of the men

was affected with slight febrile symptoms, and he continued more or less

indisposed for a number of days, but occasionally felt so well that he

returned to his work. After the ship entered the tropics, however, the

disease began to assume a new and alarming character; and when off the

Island of St Nicholas, and almost in sight of Boa Vista, the man died,

having had for two days previous black vomit and other characteristic

symptoms of Yellow Fever. Within a few days afterwards the ‘Rosamond’

arrived at Ascension, where I was then stationed; and Commander Foot

having communicated to Captain Hutton, the superintendent of the island,

every particular respecting the illness and death of the seaman, I was

ordered, with Dr Sloane, the surgeon of the hospital, to make a report

on the case, and at the same time to suggest measures for the benefit of

the ship without endangering the health of the people on the island.

Having obtained from Dr Slight, surgeon of the ‘Rosamond,’ every

information relative to his late patient, we stated our opinion that the

disease the man died from was sporadic Yellow Fever. * * * On the

following morning I went on board with the view of learning something to

enable me to form an opinion as to the sanitary condition of the ship,

and for the purpose also of inspecting the sick, as the surgeon informed

me he had then a suspicious case, with symptoms of a low kind of fever.

I had barely time to take a cursory view of the after parts of the ship,

when my attention was called to the patients, who were all mustered in

the steerage, and I found the man the doctor had alluded to in such a

precarious state that I recommended him to be sent on shore immediately.

The only other severe case was that of a supernumary lad, who was taken

ill the same morning, but the indications of a low malignant fever were

so apparent even at that early stage, as to induce me to express my

opinion to the surgeon that he would not probably survive 24 hours. As

it was most desirable to prevent a panic among the ship’s company, I

went on shore to consult with Captain Hutton, and make arrangements for

their reception. * * * The patients themselves attributed their illness

to foul air in the forepart of the ship; one of them said he suffered so

much from an abominable stench in the boatswain’s storeroom, that he

represented the circumstance and obtained permission to cut a hole in

the floor, which exposed to view a considerable quantity of soft mud,

and five or six buckets full of it mixed with decayed shavings, and

emitting an offensive odour, were removed at the time.

“It appears then, that besides an unusual number sleeping in the

fore-cockpit, some of them at least had been exposed to a morbific

miasma, exhaled from a festering mass of filth in the bottom of that

part of the ship. The quantity of mud, no doubt, was small in comparison

with what had accumulated when the vessel arrived at Spithead from the

coast of Africa, yet the malaria eliminated from that small and

circumscribed focus was equally virulent in its operation, and produced

the same disease in a few who were placed within the sphere of its

influence.”

Such is a brief narrative of the circumstances connected with this ship

and her crew.

But it has been alleged that while the landing of the crew of the

“Eclair,” at Boa Vista, afforded no benefit to the ship’s company, it

inflicted a grievous evil on the inhabitants of the island; that several

individuals in contact, or close proximity with the sick, became

affected with the same kind of fever; that from these individuals the

malady spread to others with whom they came in contact, and from these

again to others, as from so many centres of contagion, until the disease

became general over the island, thus affording a positive instance of

the importation of epidemic disease. The alleged facts on which these

representations rest are the following:—

It is stated, that during the occupancy of the Fort by the crew, there

was a small Portuguese guard stationed there; that this guard was

several times relieved; that at the time when the “Eclair” left the

island, the guard consisted of one negro and two European soldiers;

that within three days after the sailing of the “Eclair” both

Europeans were attacked with fever similar to that from which the crew

of the “Eclair” had suffered; that the negro soldier, who, with his

comrade—the man sent from Boa Vista to nurse the two Europeans—on

returning from the small island to Porto Sal Rey, had been—“as a

matter of precaution”—“restricted for [‘about 8’ or] 17 days to the

occupation of a small hut at the northern end” of the town, was

afterwards attacked,—though not confined to bed until the day

following his return to barracks; and that a woman (Anna Gallinha),

who lived next door to this hut, was the first person who was attacked

with fever in the town. It is further stated that a man (Pathi), who

had been a labourer on board the “Eclair,” was also attacked with

fever, according to one account, on the day after the “Eclair” sailed;

but according to another account, on the third day after that event.

Such are the alleged facts, and the only ones bearing directly on the

communication of a specific contagion by the crew of the “Eclair,”

collected by Dr M‘William by personal inquiries on the spot; and these,

in his opinion, present a chain of evidence sufficient to establish a

positive instance of the importation of epidemic disease.

With reference, however, to these inquiries, it has been already stated

that they were not instituted until several months after the departure

of the “Eclair” from Boa Vista;—the only regular practitioner on the

island (Dr Kenny) who could have given authentic and trustworthy

information respecting the nature and progress of the disease, had

died;—the witnesses examined by Dr M‘William, poor and ignorant, gave

their evidence, hearsay and otherwise, in the loosest possible

manner;—their statements as to dates and occurrences, alleged to have

happened several months before the inquiry took place, were received

implicitly, without examination into the correctness of their answers

and the credibility of their testimony;—all the witnesses of this class

appear to have spoken under the influence of the strongest feeling of

self-interest, with a view to establish a claim to pecuniary

compensation should they be able to make out a case against the

“Eclair,” in which expectation they were not disappointed, since the sum

of £1000 was eventually granted by Great Britain for the benefit of the

inhabitants;—and to this motive may probably be ascribed the highly

coloured and exaggerated statements put forth by these people on the

re-appearance of fever in the following year.

Taking the facts, however, precisely as they are represented in the

Report of Dr M‘William, they do not, as the proof of the allegation in

question requires, present a clear and palpable chain of evidence,

connecting as cause and effect the fever of the ship with the epidemic

on shore; but, on the contrary, there is not a single link undoubtedly

connecting the one with the other.

The Common Nature of Epidemics, and their relation to climate and civilization · 第 7 / 10 段