the frightfully impregnable position which we do; fenced about with
all sorts of legal safeguards which put us above our parishioners
on the one hand, and out of the reach of our bishops on the other;
having, as we have, an almost unlimited power of turning our benefices
into sinecures while we reside upon them, or of leaving them to the
veriest hireling to serve while we are disporting ourselves in foreign
travel almost as long as we should choose to stay away;--I know no
more splendid testimony to the high and honourable character of the
English clergy than that which would be wrung from their worst enemies
who should fairly consider what the law of the land would allow of
their being if they were so disposed--and what, in fact, they are. It
is because as a class they are so animated by a high ideal; because
as a class their conscience is their law; it is, therefore, that, in
spite of legal safeguards which in their tendency are corrupting and
demoralizing, as a class they are incomparably _better than they need
be_. The clergy of the Church of England constitute the one protected
interest in the universe that does not languish. Nevertheless, _C’est
magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre_. These things ought not so to
be.
* * * * *
How then are the evils inseparable from the present state of things to
be remedied? They are evils which do not appear on the surface where
the clergy themselves are conscientious, high-minded, and zealous,
throwing themselves into their duties with self-denying earnestness,
and hardly aware of how much they might abuse their powers if they were
so disposed. They are very real and scandalous evils in the case of the
careless, the worthless, and the immoral; that is, exactly in the case
of those whom we can least afford to leave as they are.
I can see no other plan for utilizing to the utmost the resources
already at our disposal than by sweeping away altogether this archaic
anomaly of the parson’s freehold. We are all a great deal too tenacious
of vested rights, a great deal too reluctant to deal harshly with
those who have accepted any office under certain conditions expressed
or implied, to allow of our disturbing the present occupants of the
benefices, or to bring them under any new _régime_. As long as the
existing beneficed clergy choose to retain their hold upon their
benefices, obviously they must be left undisturbed; as they are
freeholders, so they must continue to be, and practically irremovable;
but, as they drop off either by death or voluntary resignation, let the
freehold be vested in other hands. Let us follow the main lines upon
which the Endowed School Commissioners pursued their revolution in the
case of the educational reserve fund, learning experience by their
blunders, their failures or their _fads_.
And when we do so, where shall we find ourselves?
1. The freehold of every church, churchyard, glebe-house and lands,
together with the tithes and any other invested funds now constituting
the endowment of a benefice, would be vested in a body of trustees or
governors exactly as the estates and buildings of the endowed schools
are at this moment. These governors would have the administration of
this estate entrusted to them, and be personally and collectively
responsible for its management--responsible, that is, to a _duly
constituted authority_ with a power of enforcing its precepts.
2. All liability to keep house and chancel in repair, together with all
powers of mortgaging the lands of a benefice, would be transferred from
the incumbent to the governing body of trustees.
3. The patronage of every benefice would, as a matter of course,
pass out of the hands of the present patrons, and would be vested in
the trustees of the benefice; exactly as the patronage of Shrewsbury
and Sedbergh schools passed out of the hands of St. John’s College,
Cambridge, or as the patronage of Thame school passed out of the hands
of New College, Oxford, or as the patronage of Brentwood, Kirkleatham,
and Bosworth schools has passed out of the hands of _private patrons_
into those of the newly-constituted governing bodies.
4. The governors in presenting to a benefice would in each case be
expected to consider the financial position in which it happened to
be at the time of the vacancy, and would be empowered to determine
what amount of net income could be assigned to the incumbent according
to the circumstances of the estate in their hands; in all cases
guaranteeing a minimum stipend and, in cases where a house was
provided, a house free of all rates, taxes, and repairs.
5. The governing body would be required to render an account of all
moneys received and expended to the _constituted authority_, to which
they would be answerable.
6. Any clergyman presented to a benefice by the governing body would be
liable to be dismissed for inefficiency or misconduct; such dismissal
to be subject to an appeal as against caprice, malevolence, or tyranny.
* * * * *
Before proceeding further, it will be as well at this point to consider
an objection that may be offered, and then to see how such a reform as
that proposed would work.
First, with regard to handing over the property of a benefice,
together with the patronage, to a body of trustees. Such a course
will certainly be denounced as revolutionary, and of course that word
has a very alarming sound. But I venture to remind objectors that
we have already embarked upon this revolutionary course, and on a
very large scale too. We have already taken vast estates out of the
hands of ecclesiastical corporations, and vested them in the hands of
the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. We have already made our bishops
stipendiaries, receiving their _salaries_ from the holders of their
estates; and happy are those deans and canons who are in such a case,
and not in the pitiable condition of landlords with their farms upon
their hands, or let to tenants who, just now, can make their own terms
with the panic-stricken lifeholders of the freehold. But this is not
all. There are at least a thousand benefices in England at this moment,
the patronage of which _is already in the hands of trustees_; and in
many of these cases--in many more cases than people suspect--the very
freehold of the church itself is vested in those trustees, who have
almost entire control over the funds, and almost entire control over
the fabric of the church. At this moment, as I write, there is lying on
my table an application from _the Trustees_ of St. Excellent’s Church,
at Jericho, asking me to subscribe for the erection of a tower, and
pleading that the _Trustees_ have done all that was possible, and have
been loyally _seconded_ by their devoted vicar.
Ask those who know anything of what has been going on in the second
city in England during the last forty years what condition the masses
at Liverpool would be in at this moment but for the church-building on
the Trustee system which has been in operation there so long. Ask them
whether that system has worked well or ill, and whether there is any
reason to regret that the patronage of the Trustee churches is not in
other hands.
* * * * *
And now with regard to the working of the scheme proposed.
The rectory of Claylump finds itself vacant by the promotion of its
rector to the bishopric of Loo Choo. The governors forthwith proceed to
take a survey of the property they hold in trust, and to look about for
a new parson. The character and qualification of the various candidates
for the vacant benefice are carefully inquired into, and, the choice
being made, the new incumbent is presented to the bishop of the see and
instituted with all fitting and necessary solemnity.
But before he enters upon his charge the new rector has been informed
that, in view of the governors being responsible for certain outgoings,
they can for the present guarantee the parson only a minimum income of
_x_ pounds per annum, to be increased according as the funds at their
disposal shall allow of the augmentation.
Observe that we already find ourselves face to face with the problem
which has been found so difficult of solution--viz., how to deal with
Ecclesiastical Dilapidations. A beneficed clergyman at present may, if
he pleases, let his house tumble about his ears--may let his barn be
tenanted by the rats, turn his stable into a pigsty, and, keeping his
glebe in his own hands, render it valueless for his successor for the
next five years. At his death he may be absolutely insolvent. The next
incumbent is, however, called upon to put all into tenantable repair at
his own cost, and by the very fact of accepting the living is liable
for these substantial repairs.
Or a beneficed clergyman may do exactly the reverse. Being tenant for
life of a living of less than three hundred a year, he may convert
the parsonage-house into a noble mansion--erect hot-houses and
conservatories _ad libitum_, build stables for a dozen horses, and lay
out acres of the glebe in ornamental gardens; and he too may die in
difficulties. At the avoidance of the living the bishop may give orders
for pulling down half the house and more than half the appurtenances;
but the question of who is to pay for the expenses of the alteration
will present a serious difficulty, and may be settled in the strangest
way at last. As long as the living is in a good neighbourhood, with
certain advantages which it is unnecessary to particularise, it
will not be hard to find another man of fortune who for the sake of
the house will consent to accept the cure. But, if it chance that a
neighbourhood has “changed,” and the parish has become otherwise than a
desirable place of residence, that parish may find it very hard indeed
to get any who will face the terrible prospect of having to keep up a
palace on £300 a year. In either case--that of finding himself with
a tumble-down rectory, or that of finding himself with an entirely
unsuitable one--the incoming parson will assuredly have to make his
account to submit to a serious abatement from the nominal revenue of
his preferment, and will assuredly be in no better position than he
would be if, not he, but the trustees, were the owners of the parson’s
freehold.
But once more. Let us suppose that the new rector under the new
_régime_ finds it desirable to add to his parsonage-house for any
reason or for none. What follows? Is he to be allowed to do as he
pleases? Certainly not. If he can get the consent of his governors,
well and good; without that consent he would have no more right
to build up than to pull down. He would be living in an _official
residence_ provided for him. Clearly, he could not be permitted to deal
with it as if it were his own.
Again, let us suppose that the parsonage should sorely need repair,
and that the parson, being poor or otherwise unwilling to be meddled
with, should declare it was good enough for him. Would it be reasonable
to let an obstructive eccentric continue living in a house which was
seriously lessening in value from the want of structural repairs? It is
obvious that the governors who were liable for these repairs being duly
executed, and whose interest was to maintain the buildings in good and
tenantable condition, would interpose. The official residence having to
be kept up by the income of the benefice in their view would clearly
not be regarded as something to be handed over in its entirety to the
present holder of the living, as if his personal interest were the only
thing to consider.
As it would not be allowable for a Plutus to over-build, so it
would not be permitted to a niggard to let the parsonage fall into
disrepair. In either case the governing body would have a voice, and
over the buildings of the benefice they would exercise a general
supervision and control.
What, however, will startle most people, and especially clergymen, is
the proposal to give to _any_ body at all or any person or any officer
the power to dismiss a parson from his cure. Yet, as an abstract
question, why should the parson be the only functionary to enjoy
the immunity he does? Is it because it does not matter much to his
parishioners whether he is fit or unfit, moral or immoral, active or
indolent, whether he is exhibiting an example of holiness or is a mere
helot whose daily walk is an abominable scandal? As things are, the
more conscientious a clergyman is, the more easily you may hunt him out
of his preferment; such men cannot bear to stay where--as they put it
in all earnestness and devout sincerity--they are “doing no good.” Such
men are ready enough to go out into the wilderness if you tell them
they are not wanted or are hindering Christ’s work by staying where
they are. But tell the bad man that he is not wanted in his parish, and
his ministrations are hateful to the people among whom he lives, and he
will laugh in your face with the grim joke that, if the people don’t
like to come to church, they may stay away, and if they don’t want
him at the font or the altar or the grave, so much the better; he will
have less work to do for his money. The thick-skinned with a seared
conscience defies you; safe in the possession of the parson’s freehold,
he holds his own.
How is it that we are always so ready to conjure up the worst
imaginable evils when any new proposal is offered to us, and always
draw some picture of abuses and horrors when we begin to think of any
great change, as if there were no abuses and horrors which called
for the change? “A body of governors with a power of dismissal,” it
is said; “why, no man’s position would be safe!” To begin with, I do
not see why the first thing to be aimed at should be that _any one’s_
position should be _safe_. The first thing that is needed, imperatively
needed, is that the duties of any office, from that of the Prime
Minister downwards, should be effectively discharged. It may be very
desirable that the driver of an express train should be safe of getting
his wages as long as he lives. It is infinitely more desirable that the
train itself should not run off the metals from the aforesaid driver
going to sleep.
But _whose_ position in the case before us would be _unsafe_? As a
rule, only his whose position ought to be unsafe. The Endowed Schools
Commissioners have been at work for more than twenty years. Every one
of their schemes gives to the governing body a power of dismissal,
and that too with usually no appeal. During these twenty years, I
have never heard of more than two cases in which this power has been
exercised; so slow are we Englishmen to be hard on an old servant, or
to use to the utmost the powers which we have in our hand.
* * * * *
Our next point to consider is, what should be the constitution of the
governing body?
Let it be premised that, in embarking upon a reform so radical as this
that is contemplated, I for one at the outset shrink from committing
ourselves to any details until we have first laid down the grand
principles on which we are going to proceed. Moreover, it must never
be forgotten that the circumstances of every parish or district in
England vary to an extent which they who have never thought much upon
the subject could hardly bring themselves to believe. In a matter of so
much intricacy and complexity we must not be afraid to feel our way,
and at any rate let us have at the outset as few hard-and-fast lines as
may be.
With this caution and proviso, I yet venture to suggest that the main
lines to be laid down should be as follows:--
1. The governing body should not be too large, nor should it ever be
chosen from the inhabitants of the parish exclusively.
2. It should be a representative body.
3. Its meetings should not be held too frequently.
4. Its proceedings should be duly chronicled, and a record kept which
might be produced and referred to when necessary.
* * * * *
1. Not too large, because experience proves that any administrative
body is in danger of becoming a speechifying body, and liable to be
influenced by pressure from without, almost exactly in proportion to
the increase of its numbers. Nor should this body be chosen exclusively
from the inhabitants of the parish. In the case of small parishes, it
would be quite impossible to find persons qualified to exercise the
powers to be conferred, or fitted by education and intelligence to
occupy the independent and important position of governor.
2. It will be necessary that the governing body should in all cases
be a representative body. In such a body what interests should be
represented?
(i) First the owners of the land on which tithes are paid. Observe, I
do not say the tithe-_payers_; for, of all the objectionable practices
which have sprung up among us affecting the tenure of the land, and
the burdens it has to bear, none appears to me more mischievous or
indefensible, none has done more to make the tillers of the soil
discontented, or led them more passionately to set themselves against
their best friends, than the practice sanctioned by the Legislature of
calling upon the tenant to pay the tithe in addition to the rent of his
land. As long as this goes on, so long will both tenant and landlord be
tempted to make common cause with one another in hopes of getting rid
of the tithe. You might just as well call upon the tenant to pay the
landlord’s mortgage interest, or the jointures and annuities with which
the estate is charged, or the premiums upon his policies of insurance,
as call upon him to pay the tithe. A landlord holds his lands subject
to certain charges, which are antecedent to any profits that may remain
to him after they are discharged.
The land-tax, the county-rates, the tithe, are all on the same level;
so are the jointures, annuities, and interest of money borrowed. Of
course the landlord would gladly throw them all upon the tenant if
he could, and does throw upon him all he can. In permitting him to
follow this course, you tempt the tenant to cry out, “Away with this
payment, and away with that!” and you tempt the landlord to cry, “Amen!
So be it, as long as my rent is assured me!” Worried by the annual
recurrence of _extra_ payments, for which he has to provide at all
sorts of inconvenient times, the tenant is ready enough to demand
relief from these burdens, never reflecting that he is playing the
landlord’s game, directly or indirectly robbing somebody else to enrich
the owner of the soil. “Down with the rates!” means “Throw them upon
the Consolidated Fund and let the taxpayer relieve the landlord.” “Down
with the jointures!” would mean “Rob the dowagers and let the landlord
be the richer for the pillage.” “Down with the mortgage interest!”
would mean “Up with the debtor at the expense of the creditor;” and
“Down with the tithe!” would mean the extinction of the parson, but
with the gain of not a shilling ultimately to the tenant, though with
a very considerable gain to the owner of the land. It must be, and it
is, demoralizing to allow the payment of the tithe to be regarded as
an _extra_ with which the tenant is chargeable. The obligation to pay
the tithe is a condition antecedent to the _owner_ of the soil enjoying
the very possession of his land. The tithe is a _rent-charge_ upon
the land, exactly as an annuity or jointure is--or, if you choose to
call it a tax because the term tax is an odious word, and therefore
serviceable when you want to make those you hate odious--it is a
landlord’s _tax_, and no tenant should be allowed to pay it without
having the right under all circumstances of deducting it from his rent.
Moreover, without yielding to the temptation of straying into an
historical argument, yet remembering that in the past there was a very
close connection between the landlord whose estate supplied the tithe
from which the parson was supported and the patron of the living to
which the parson was instituted, I think there are good reasons why
the owners of the soil liable to pay tithe should be represented in
the proposed governing body of a benefice. Where the parish was a
close parish--_i.e_., owned by a single landlord--he would naturally
and very properly be the only person eligible, or at any rate capable
of nominating the tithe-owner’s representative. Where there were many
landlords, they could elect their representatives--one or more, as the
case might be--in the ordinary way.
(ii) As the owners of land subject to the payment of tithes should
be represented, so should the ratepayers of the parish have their
representative upon the board of governors. And here I confess I
cannot see that you could introduce any religious test whereby any one
should be disqualified by reason of his creed. I do not believe that
in ordinary cases any real inconveniences would arise. That under no
circumstances conceivable evils should emerge is too much to hope
for; but whether or not, we must, I repeat, face the facts, and what
reasonable man, who watches the signs of the times, will be sanguine
enough to expect that, in our days, we have any chance of extorting
from the Legislature anything in the shape of a conscience clause?
But, when I speak of ratepayers, I mean _bonâ fide_ payers of rates.
I exclude from this category the compound householder: I by no means
exclude unmarried women who pay their own rates and taxes, who are
often among the most sagacious, high-minded, and exemplary inhabitants
of a country parish, or of a town one too, for that matter. If any
should have a voice in the choice of a representative governor, clearly
they should.
(iii) But, if the owners of the soil and the ratepayers should be
represented, it would be more than unreasonable--it would be a
monstrous injustice--that the regular worshippers in the church
should be left without their representative governors. I am quite
aware that some people are ready with all sorts of difficulties and
all sorts of objections when we come to deal with the qualification
of church membership, and quite aware, too, that at this point one
is sorely tempted to do that which I protested against above--viz.,
go into details; but I resist the temptation, simply expressing my
conviction that there _can_ be and there is no real and insuperable
difficulty in defining what is meant by “regular worshippers,” and that
such difficulty would vanish at once if we were really in earnest in
grappling with it. I am not hinting at a compromise. Here as elsewhere
what we want is--common sense!
(iv) Again, I conceive that on any board of governors there should be
a representative appointed by the bishop of the diocese, and that he
should be a resident in the archdeaconry in which the benefice was
situated. In every board of directors, be it of a railway or bank or
insurance company, it is held to be essential to effectiveness that
one or more of such directors should have some pretension to technical
or professional knowledge of the business carried on. Is it too much
to ask that at least one _expert_ should be found upon every body of
church governors? Such a representative would, if discreet and able,
be always listened to with respectful attention; if inclined to be
domineering or impracticable, he would assuredly be outvoted when it
came to a contest. He would be a voice, but he would be no more.
(v) It is conceivable, nay it is probable, that in addition to these
representative governors it might in some cases be advisable that
other members should be added to the governing body. Thus it might
be contended by the present patrons of benefices, whether lay or
clerical, that they should be represented, and I can see no particular
objection to such a claim being allowed. It is also conceivable and
probable that, after due consideration and discussion, it might be
thought advisable to group two or more benefices together and vest
their funds in the same body of governors. Indeed, in many country
districts, where the endowments are very small and the population very
sparse, it might prove extremely difficult and sometimes extremely
undesirable to have a board of governors for each of these tiny
units, let alone the absurd waste of power which in such cases would
be inevitable. But, such as I have sketched it out, such in the main
would be the constitution of the governing body of every benefice in
the country, and to that governing body the freehold of that benefice
and its appurtenances, together with the patronage thereof, should be
handed over.