CHAPTER IX

THE HIGHER THEISTIC DEVELOPMENT

+943+. The preceding survey of early religious customs and institutions

discloses a recognizable unity in diversity. Everywhere we find the same

classes of sacred objects and the same methods of approaching them.

Whether the supernatural Powers are conceived of as animals or as plants

or as what we call inanimate things, or, in more advanced thought, as

ghosts or spirits or gods, they are held to be factors in human life,

are regarded with awe, are dreaded and avoided, or are welcomed as

helpers, and in any case are propitiated by gifts and other marks of

respect. The potency inherent in things is the object of observation,

its laws are studied, and it is used for purposes of life. The

diversities in the form of ceremonies, in the conception of the

characters of the Powers, and in the general tone and coloring of

worship arise from economic and cultural differences, and are as

numerous as the tribes of men; the unity of cults is a result of the

psychological unity of the human race--the religious needs of men in all

stages of culture are the same; there is nothing in the highest

religious systems that is not found in germ in the lowest.

+944+. The earliest expression of religious feeling, as is pointed out

above,[1729] is in the form of ceremonies. But ceremonies tend to group

themselves round the persons of divine beings. Gods, as the controllers

of human fortunes here and hereafter, naturally become the centers of

religious thought. Their characters and functions reflect the ideals of

their worshipers, and all ritualistic and other usages and all doctrines

concerning the relations between gods and men and, in general, all ideas

concerning the physical and moral constitution of the world attach

themselves perforce to the divine embodiments of these ideals. Thus, in

one sense, the history of the gods is the history of religion. From the

earliest times up to the present the efforts of men have been directed

toward defining the divine Powers that have been supposed to stand

behind all phenomena. The problem of harmonizing diverse divine

activities has always been a serious one, and its solution has been

sought in various ways. Gods have been locally limited, every one to his

own human tribe, district, or nation; or, when they dwell together and

their spheres of influence are larger, they have been given free scope

of action, and the resulting contradictions in human affairs have been

accepted as a part of the mysterious nature of things; or order has been

sought in simplification--headship has been ascribed to some one deity,

and the relation between him and the subordinate divinities has been

somehow explained or has been left unexplained. The process of

simplification has gone steadily on with the result that the great

religious systems of the world fall into groups distinguished from one

another by their conceptions of the divine government of the world,

whether as pluralistic or as unitary. The development of these different

conceptions may be traced here in outline, though the absence of exact

data and the variety and complexity of the formative influences

(economic, philosophical, political, and other) necessarily make it

difficult or impossible to account satisfactorily for all details. The

groups to be considered are polytheism, dualism, and monotheism, to

which may be added brief mention of systems that do not recognize a

personal divine ruler of the world.

POLYTHEISM

+945+. The first stage in the final theistic history of the world up to

the present day, polytheism, appears in all the great civilized nations.

The great polytheistic systems have much in common: for example,

protection of civil order and morality by a god; prominence of the god

of a ruling tribe or family or of a great city; disposition to embody

certain general facts, as war, love, learning, in divine figures;

tendency to make some god universal. On the other hand, they differ

among themselves in certain regards: in the degree of specialization and

differentiation of divine functions, and in the stress that they lay on

the various departments of human life. Their agreements and

disagreements seem to be in some cases independent of racial relations

and climatic conditions; their roots lie so far back in history that we

have no means of tracing their genesis and development.

+946+. The Egyptian and the Semitic peoples were parts of the same

original stock,[1730] and their systems of social and political

organization were substantially identical--the government in its

developed form was monarchical, but tribal and other locally isolated

forms of organization maintained themselves to a certain extent--and

their literary and artistic outputs do not differ materially. We might,

then, expect their religions to be in the main identical. In fact they

agree in having a relative meagerness of theistic differentiation, but

in some important points they are far apart. The Semites were

indifferent to the future life, the Egyptians constructed it elaborately

(in this point taking precedence among the ancients); the Semites were

averse to divinizing human beings, for the Egyptians kings were divine.

In this last point Egypt resembles China, but in other respects is at a

world-wide remove from it. Other peoples thought of their gods as having

relations with beasts; the Egyptians alone, among civilized nations,

worshiped the living animal.[1731] Some Greek writers regarded Egypt as

the religious mother of Greece, but Hellenic cults show little

resemblance to Egyptian.

+947+. The Hebrews had the general Semitic theistic and cultic scheme,

but in their capacity (in their higher development) to content

themselves with one deity, and in their elaboration of ritualistic forms

and institutions, were more closely akin to the Aryan Persians than to

any Semitic community, and borrowed freely from them. The resemblance

between the two cults, however, was confined to these two points; in

other respects they were very different.

+948+. The linguistic identity of the Indo-European peoples does not

carry with it theologic identity. The theistic scheme of India is more

nearly allied, in the disposition to grant equality of significance to

all gods, to the Egyptian and Semitic than to the Persian and the Greek,

yet the tone and color of the Hindu deities do not resemble the tone and

color of the Egyptian and Babylonian divinities.

Even between Greece and Rome the religious differences are great. Greece

stands alone in its artistic creation of divine forms. Rome rather

resembles the Hebrews in its sobriety of theistic creations, and

particularly is like the Chinese in the purpose to make religion

subservient to the interests of the family and the State; Roman

religion, like Chinese, might be described as a body of public and

private ceremonies to which gods were attached.[1732] The Roman gods,

however, are much more definite figures than the Chinese; the latter are

either unimportant folk-gods or powers of nature.

+949+. The contrast between Mexico, with its considerable number of

departmental gods, some of them savage, and Peru, whose

quasi-monotheistic system is relatively mild, is striking. But the

origin of these two peoples (who perhaps are made up of different sets

of tribes) is involved in obscurity, and it is uncertain whether or not

we should expect a greater resemblance between their cults.

+950+. The differentiation in the theistic scheme of the Teutons,

especially the Scandinavians, is noteworthy. Several of their deities,

particularly Wodan (Odin), Thor, and Loki, are well-developed persons,

and these and some others do not differ materially in character from the

earlier corresponding Hindu and Greek gods. A comparison between the

Teutonic figures and the Celtic and Slavic would be pertinent if we knew

more of the character of these last; but the information about them is

slight.[1733]

+951+. The extent of the anthropomorphization of gods in any system may

be measured by the richness and refinement of its mythology. When the

gods live apart from men, being conceived of mainly as transcendent

Powers, or when they are not fully developed men, there is little room

for the play of social emotions and for the creation of biographies of

individual deities. It is the humanized god that has emotional life, and

it is in this mythical life that the religious feeling of the worshiper

is expressed with greatest fullness of detail.

+952+. The development of mythology through all its gradations of

fullness and fineness can be traced in the religious systems of the

world.[1734] Where there is no recognizable worship there is, of course,

no mythology. This is the case in Australia, in Pygmy lands, in Tierra

del Fuego, in parts of New Guinea, and perhaps elsewhere.[1735] Scarcely

above these are parts of Central and Southern Africa, the countries of

the Bantu, the Hottentots, and the Bushmen.[1736] A feeble mythological

invention appears among the Zulus, whose conception of gods is

indistinct;[1737] and the Masai and the Nandi, who are somewhat farther

advanced in the construction of deities, show mythopoeic imagination

in a single case only (the famous myth of the embrace of the earth and

the sky), and this is perhaps borrowed.[1738] Along with these we may

place the Todas whose theogonic conceptions appear to have been cramped

by their buffalo cult, and their mythical material is small and

vague.[1739]

+953+. A somewhat higher stage of mythopoeic development is represented

by peoples of Oceania and North America. The myths are still

prevailingly cosmologic and sociologic, but the beginning of

biographical sketches of supernatural Powers is visible. The Melanesian

Qat and the Polynesian Maui are on the border line between

culture-heroes and gods, but they are real persons, and their

adventures, while they describe origins, are also descriptions of

character. Hawaii and Borneo have departmental gods and a body of

stories about them.[1740] Certain tribes of Redmen have not only divine

genealogical systems but also narratives resembling the Melanesian in

character, the line between myth proper and folk-lore being often hard

to trace.[1741] The stories fall into more or less well-defined groups,

and of the Coyote and, less definitely, of certain other personages

biographies might be written.

+954+. The half-civilized peoples of Madagascar, West Africa (Dahomi,

Ashanti, Yoruba), the Malay Peninsula, and Southern India (Khonds) have

more coherent figures and stories of divine personages.[1742] Here

something like living human beings appear, though there is crudeness in

the portraiture, and the interest is chiefly in the history of origins.

The Malayan and Khond figures are especially noteworthy, but are not

free from the suspicion of influence from higher religions.

+955+. True literary mythology is found only in civilized peoples, and

among these a gradation is recognizable. We have first the stage of

culture represented by the Japanese, the Finns, the Mexicans, and the

Peruvians, with fairly well-developed gods, who have emotions and

histories. In this group Japan takes the lowest place;[1743] it is

chiefly in the figures regarded as deified men that definiteness of

character and human warmth are found. Japanese theogony was depressed by

the interest of the people in family and State organization; the gods,

though civilized, are vague personalities. The Finnish literary mythical

material, given in the Kalevala, has a highly humanized coloring and is

worked up into a coherent story; the social system revealed in the myths

is superior in many regards to that of the Redmen, but the theistic

scheme is crude.[1744] The few Mexican myths that have come down to us

(probably only the remains out of a large mass) show reflection and

portray human experiences.[1745] Both in Mexico and in Peru the Spanish

conquest appears to have destroyed no little material that, if

preserved, would have illustrated the mythical constructions of these

lands. In Peru, further, it may be that the monotheistic tinge of the

State religion had the effect of banishing subordinate deities and the

stories connected with them. For whatever reason little is known of its

mythical material, but the little that is known shows a certain degree

of refinement. South America, excluding Peru, has no mythical

constructions of interest.[1746]

+956+. Of the great religions the Chinese may be passed by in the

present sketch; its form leaves no place for mythology; its virtual

monotheism excludes lesser supernatural figures as actors in the drama

of human life.[1747]

+957+. The Persian cosmogonic myths are merely statements of great facts

without biographical features. In the hands of late writers they shaded

into legendary accounts of the origin of the kingdom, and the whole was

colored by the developed Mazdaism. We thus have theological

constructions rather than true myths.[1748] The few mythical stories

that have survived play an insignificant part in the religious system--a

sort of result that is to be expected whenever a substantially definite

monotheistic conception has been reached.

+958+. Egypt produced a couple of myths of great interest.[1749] The

story of Ra's anger with men, and his act of wholesale destruction,

belongs in the group of myths (in which flood stories and others are

included) the motif of which is antagonism between gods and men. The

conception of such antagonism seems to go back to the early opinion

that all misfortunes were caused by supernatural beings; in civilized

times some great calamity would be singled out as a special result of

divine anger, and imagination would construct a history of the event,

why the god was angry, and how he was appeased. What particular

occurrence this Egyptian story refers to is unknown.

The Osiris myth has better literary form and more cultic

significance.[1750] The slaying of Osiris by Set, Isis's search for the

body of her husband, and the rôle of the young Horus as avenger of his

father make a coherent history. Osiris had the singular fortune of being

the most widely popular god in Egypt, the hero of a romantic episode,

and the ethical judge of men in the Underworld. The motif of the myth is

the cosmic struggle between life and death; the actors are made real

persons, and the story is instinct with human interest. No great cultic

association like the Eleusinian mysteries was created in connection with

it, but the echo of the conception appears in the great rôle later

assigned to Isis.

+959+. All Semitic myths of which we have records are cosmogonic or

sociologic or, in some late forms, theological constructions. It is

Babylonia that has furnished the greater part of the material, perhaps

all of it.[1751] The stories preserved give little or no portraiture of

divine persons--it is always cosmic phenomena that are described, and

gods and heroes are introduced simply as actors. The purpose in the two

cosmogonic poems--to explain the reduction of the world to order and the

existing constitution of earth and sky--is one that is found everywhere

in ancient systems of thought. The Gilgamesh epic, a collection of

popular usages and tales without definite unity, is contaminated with

legend; Gilgamesh is now a god, now a national hero; at the end,

however, there is a bit of speculation concerning the future state of

men. Ishtar's descent to the Underworld is a pure nature myth; Ishtar

and the goddess of the Underworld are real persons, yet merely

attachments to the fact. The seizure of the tablets of fate from Bel by

the storm-god Zu represents some natural phenomenon (perhaps the reign

of winter), possibly, also, a transference of headship from one deity to

another. The story of Adapa is in part an explanation of how men came to

lose immortality. There is, thus, in these myths a fairly full history

of the origin of the large facts of human life, with little interest in

the personalities of the divine actors.

Hebrew mythical material is in general identical with Babylonian; its

Old Testament form has been more or less revised by late monotheistic

editors. The two cosmogonies in Genesis, the flood story, and the dragon

of chaos (a late figure in the Old Testament[1752]) are merely

descriptions of cosmic or local facts. The dispersion at Babel (not now

found in Babylonian records, but paralleled elsewhere) deals with a

sociological fact of great interest for the Hebrews, marking them off,

as it did, from all other peoples.[1753] The heroes of the early

time[1754] belong to folk-lore, probably a mixture of myth and legend.

The explanation of various human experiences in the Eden story[1755]

appears to be of Hebrew origination; it is, however, rather a late

theological theory than a myth. The Syrian and Palestinian Tammuz

(Adonis) myth is identical in general form with the Babylonian myth of

Tammuz and Ishtar.[1756]

+960+. The Indo-European mythical material shows an advance over the

Egyptian and Semitic in distinctness and fullness of life corresponding

to the distincter individuality of the Indo-European divine personages.

These are not mere powers in the world, more or less identified with

natural forces and phenomena, nor a collection of deities substantially

identical in character and functions; they have grown into persons,

differing, indeed, in the degree of individualization, but all

pronounced personalities.

+961+. Hindu myths, though less numerous and less highly elaborated

than the Greek, still reflect fairly well the characters of certain

divinities, especially Indra, Agni, the Açvins, the Maruts, and some

others.[1757] Indra, particularly, is portrayed in detail, so that he is

as distinct a person as Ares or Mars. Krishna and other figures in the

epics live human lives with all human virtues and vices.

+962+. The full literary form of the myth is found only in Greece. As

Zeus, Apollo, Athene, Aphrodite, and others are well-defined

personalities, each with certain intellectual and moral characteristics

and with a unity of development, so the stories about them recount

adventures and acts that form biographical unities; and, as these

stories are of diverse nature, some reflecting barbarous periods, others

marked by refinement, they exhibit, when brought together and arranged

in order of moral or intellectual excellence or according to their

geographical or ethnical origin, not only the history of the gods, but

also the development of Greek religious feeling. Being the embodiment of

human experiences, they lend themselves readily to processes of

allegorizing and spiritualizing.[1758]

+963+. Roman gods, homely figures, occupied with agriculture and affairs

of State, have no adventures and no biographies. The practical Roman

mind was concerned with the domestic functions of divine beings, and the

Roman genius was not of a sort to conceive gods as individuals leading

lives filled with human passions. Myths do not figure in the Roman

religious scheme except as they are borrowed from Greece or from some

other land.

+964+. Teutonic mythology is largely cosmogonic or cosmologic, not

without shrewd portraitures and attractive episodes, but never reaching

the point of artistic roundness and grace.[1759] The adventures of Odin,

Thor, Loki, and other divine persons reflect for the most part the

daring and savagery of the viking age, though there are kindly features

and an occasional touch of humor.[1760] Loki in some stories is a

genuine villain, and the death of Balder is a real tragedy. The great

cosmogonic and eschatological myths are conceived in grandiose style.

The struggle between gods and giants is in its basis the widespread

nature myth of the conflict of seasons. The overthrow of the old divine

government (the Twilight of the Gods) and the rise of a new order appear

to have a Christian coloring, but the belief that the world is to be

destroyed may be old Teutonic.[1761]

The history of theistic movements in civilized peoples shows that the

effectiveness of a polytheistic system as a framework of religious life

is in proportion to the extent of its anthropomorphization of deities,

that is, it is in proportion to their humanization that gods enter into

intimate association with human experiences. On the other hand, it is

true that the tendency toward a unitary conception of the divine

government of the world is in inverse proportion to such humanization;

the more definitely aloof from men the gods have stood (as among the

Hebrews and the Persians), the easier it has been for the people to

attach themselves to a single deity as all-sufficient. The Romans form

no exception to this general rule, for though, while they did not create

great anthropomorphic deities, there was yet no native Roman movement

toward monolatry, the place of such deities in worship was taken by a

multitude of minor divine patrons who presided over all the details of

private and public life and satisfied the demand for divine guidance.

While polytheism has assumed various forms, differing from one another

in elaboration of deities and in general cultural character, it has had,

as a system, a distinctly marked place in human experience.

+965+. _General rôle of polytheism._ Polytheism has played a great rôle

in the religious history of the world. Representing in general a

thoughtful protest against the earlier shapeless mass of spirits, it

expressed more definitely the belief in the intellectual and moral

divine control of all things. It flourished at a time when there was no

general demand in human thought for coöperation in supernatural Powers.

The sense of variety in the world was predominant, corresponding to the

absence of coöperation among the tribes and nations of the world; the

apparently isolated character of natural phenomena and the independence

of the nations, each of the others, seemed to men to demand a number of

separate divine agencies. These were all made to accord with the

external and internal condition of their worshipers and met the demands

of life in that they represented redemption, salvation, and, in general,

all blessings. They were not offensive ethically to the people for the

reason that they embodied the ethical conceptions and usages of their

time. Thus they furnished the framework for religious feeling--they

secured the union of divine and human in life, brought the divine,

indeed, into most intimate contact with the human, and so supplied the

material for the expression of pious feeling. When the gods were

represented by idols, these tended to become merely the symbols and

reminders of their divine originals. The elastic character of this

theistic system permitted the widest variety of cults, with the

possibility of bringing any new social tendency or idea into immediate

connection with a divine patron, so that human life became religious

with a degree of intelligence and intensity that has perhaps not existed

under any other system.

+966+. The great civilizations of the ancient world arose and were

developed under polytheism--many noble human characters and customs and

institutions were created under the dominance of this system in

Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and elsewhere--that is to say, human

instincts and aspirations developed freely under a theistic organization

that satisfied in general the intellectual and moral needs of the time.

The different polytheistic cults of the world differed considerably in

intellectual and moral value. These differences pertain to the diversity

of characteristics among the nations of the world and are to be studied

in connection with the histories of the various peoples. Here it is

sufficient to note the general position which polytheism has occupied in

the whole religious development of the world.[1762]

+967+. At a relatively early time, however, dissatisfaction arose with

the discordances of the polytheistic conception. It raised many problems

and failed to account for many phenomena, and efforts were made to

systematize and simplify the conceptions of the divine government of the

world. These efforts took the shape of dualism, monotheism, pantheism,

Buddhism, Confucianism, and later tended to regard the supernatural in

the world as Ultimate Force or as Moral Ideal. These tendencies may be

examined in the order just given.

DUALISM

+968+. In all the religious systems so far considered the existence of

human suffering is assumed. The sole object of religious practices, in

all cults except the highest, has been to secure extrahuman or

superhuman aid and comfort in the ills of life. There has been the

conviction, for the most part implicit, that man is not in harmony with

his surroundings. We have now to consider those systems of religious

thought in which the existence of this disharmony is more or less

distinctly announced and the effort is made to discover its source.

The conception of two sets of Powers in the world, one helpful and the

other harmful, is suggested by human experience and by the larger

observation of natural phenomena, and it is found all over the world,

among low communities as well as high, perhaps in all tribes of

men.[1763] Possibly there are some low groups, such as the Fuegians and

the African Pygmies in which the conception does not exist; but as the

religious ideas of these low groups are yet imperfectly understood, we

cannot say what their position on this point is. In general, for the

lower tribes the world is peopled by spirits, which are the ghosts of

the departed or the embodiment of natural forces, and the feeling has

been that these are sometimes friendly, sometimes unfriendly.[1764] In

some cases the hurtful spirits stand in contrast with a god who may be a

strict ruler and somewhat indifferent to men, but not hostile; in other

cases there is a simple division of spirits into two classes, the

friendly and the unfriendly,[1765] and in the higher forms of savage

life there may be two such classes of deities.[1766] The double feeling

of man respecting the attitude of ghosts toward living human beings is

referred to above.[1767]

+969+. In certain higher forms of savage and half-civilized life we find

the conception of a definite contrast between the two sets of Powers.

The Hottentots are said to believe in two opposed supernatural beings,

the struggle between them ending to the advantage of the one who is

beneficent toward men.[1768] The Masai have two powerful beings, one

accounted good, the other bad; the difference between them is not

ethical, but represents only the relation of their acts to man's

well-being.[1769] The Malays have a very elaborate system of good and

evil spirits, but the system is colored by foreign influences.[1770] For

the Ainu snakes are an embodiment of merely physical evil, and other

Powers are the dispensers of physical well-being.[1771] The Arab jinn

represent the unwholesome and antagonistic conditions of nature, stand

opposed to the gods, and are without ethical motives.[1772] Even the

Andamanese, one of the lowest of human communities, have a division of

Powers into one who is friendly and two who are unfriendly.[1773] In all

these cases we have to recognize simply the expression of the perception

of two sets of physical agencies in the world. It is easy to exaggerate

the nature of these contrasts and to represent certain low tribes as

possessing general divine embodiments of good and evil.

+970+. Such a conception has been attributed to the American

Redmen,[1774] but on insufficient grounds. The most careful recent

investigations of the religious ideas of the Creeks, the Lenâpé, the

Pawnees, and the Californian Shasta (four typical communities) fail to

discover anything that can be called a real dualistic conception.[1775]

Dorsey mentions a Pawnee myth of the introduction of death into the

world by a member of the heavenly council of gods who felt himself

slighted; but this isolated story does not prove the existence of a

general dualistic scheme--the act in question has parallels in savage

systems that recognize various unfriendly Powers.[1776] The reports we

have of two definite morally antagonistic deities in Redmen tribes

resolve themselves on examination into misconceptions or exaggerations

on the part of the reporters; or, so far as the antagonism really

exists, it is due to Christian influence. The Iroquois dualistic system

as described by Chief Cusic (in 1825)--two brothers, Good Mind and Bad

Mind, the former the creator of all things good, the latter the creator

of all things bad--appears in the version of Brébeuf (in 1636) as a

simple nature myth, the two deities in question being somewhat more

definite forms of the friendly and unfriendly spirits met with in all

lower communities.[1777] In like manner Winslow's two opposed Powers of

the New England Algonkins turn out not to be morally antagonistic to

each other, in fact, according to Brinton, not antagonistic at

all.[1778] These facts warn us to treat with caution the vague

statements of early travelers respecting dualistic views supposed to be

held by tribes in North America and South America.[1779]

+971+. In West Africa the Ashanti embody the sources of physical

misfortune in several deities, who are malignant but do not stand in

opposition to the friendly gods. A preliminary step to the conception of

a god of misfortunes is the assignment of a sort of headship to one of a

mass of unfriendly or hurtful spirits--such a crude organization is

natural in a community in which there is a fairly developed form of

social organization, and the head spirit easily grows into a god. A

simple headship over hurtful spirits appears to be found in the Ainu

system, though this latter is in general not well developed.[1780]

+972+. A definite antagonism of good and bad Powers is found in the

religion of the non-Aryan Khonds of Orissa: the earth-goddess Tari, the

creature but the opponent of the sun-god Bella Pennu, introduced sin and

death into the world and contested (and, according to one native

account, still contests) with her creator the control of life. This

explanation of the origin of death is a higher form of stories that

occur abundantly in savage lore, with the important difference that in

these death comes by accident, but here by malicious purpose. It is not

clear whether or not the characters of Tari and Bella Pennu are

conceived of ethically. The weapons (comets, winds, mountains) employed

by the two deities indicate that the basis of the representation is a

nature myth. Advanced eschatological thought appears in the opinion,

held by some natives, that the good god was victorious in the

contest.[1781]

+973+. In the great ancient religions, with the exception of

Zoroastrianism, no dualistic scheme appears. An Egyptian god may be

angry, as, for example, Ra, who in a fit of resentment causes men to be

slain but soon repents; and Set, the enemy of Osiris, a nature god,

seemed at one time to be on the way to become an embodiment of evil, but

the Egyptian cult rejected this idea and Set gradually

disappeared.[1782] The Babylonian cosmogonic myth, in which Tiamat is

the enemy of the gods of order, has no cultic significance; the great

mass of demonic beings was not organized into a kingdom of evil, and the

Underworld deities, nature gods, while subject to ordinary human

passions, are not hostile to the gods of heaven and earth. The Hebrews

adopted the Babylonian cosmogonic myth,[1783] but it became a mere

literary attachment to the conception of the supreme god Yahweh, and was

otherwise ineffective.

+974+. The same thing is true of certain cosmogonic myths of the Greeks,

such as the war of the Titans against Zeus and similar episodes. Ate and

the Erinyes are embodiments of man's own evil nature or represent the

punishment that overtakes guilt, but they do not represent a formal

opposition to goodness nor are they organized into a definite

body.[1784] The Roman Furies are practically identical in function with

the Erinyes. In the old Teutonic religion the only figure who approaches

essential badness is Loki; but he, though at times malignant and

treacherous (as a human chieftain might be), remains a recognized member

of the assembly of gods. As a nature god he may represent the elements

of darkness and unhappiness in life, just as the various evil spirits in

the world do, but he never approaches the position of an independent

creator of evil.[1785] The Celtic deities Llew and Dylan are said to

stand over against each other and to represent good and bad tendencies

and elements of life; but they are not very distinct and are probably

nothing more than somewhat developed local deities.[1786] In the Chinese

and Japanese cults there is no indication of a conflict; evil spirits

there are in abundance, but no cosmic antagonism.

+975+. In India the cosmogonic myths are to be interpreted in the same

way as those mentioned above. Soma and Indra, as slayers of the demon

Vritya, represent order as against disorder, but Vritya never had cultic

significance; he appears only as a bodily demonstration of the power of

the great gods. The asuras are not essentially different from the

harmful spirits of savages, though it is true that they come into

conflict with the friendly gods. Rahu, who causes eclipses by swallowing

the sun, is only a nature deity of great might. In the Mahabharata there

are powerful demons, and the Çivaite cult includes the worship of dread

beings, but such worship only reflects the fear of the unfriendly

elements of physical nature.[1787] Nor do we find in the persons of

Durga, Kali, and the Yakshas, unpleasantly savage as these are, a

conception of evil as an organized force directed against the good gods;

they are rather the embodiment of evil human dispositions. The

underground demons are punishers of sin, but not themselves morally

evil. There is, it is true, in the Hindu religious scheme the general

antithesis of light and darkness, which are connected with right and

wrong--an antithesis that appears abundantly in other religious

systems;[1788] but the powers of darkness are not organized against the

powers of light, and there is no complete dualism, though we have here,

perhaps, the starting-point for such a conception.

+976+. While thus a vague sense of duality has existed all over the

world, and in certain cases, as it seems, there were vague attempts at

organization, it is only in Zoroastrianism that the decisive step has

been taken. We have to recognize in this system a distinct movement

towards a unitary conception of the world; but the sense of difference

in human experiences was so great in the mind of the creators of the

system that they were led to a unification in two divisions.[1789] The

origin of the movement lies far back at a time when there were no

records of thought and social movements, and it is impossible now to say

definitely what were the original elements of the cult. We may surmise

that there was an Indo-Iranian conception of a general contrast between

light and darkness, and that this was the starting-point or the basis of

the developed Iranian theological system. The old Indic and the old

Iranian religions seem to have been independent developments from a

common original mass of material; but we do not know what determined the

differences in the two developments. The constructions were the work,

doubtless, of successions of reformers, but the details of these

long-continued efforts have not come down to us.[1790] The essential

point is that the evil mass in the world was conceived of as a unity by

the Iranians and assigned a head, Angro Mainyu. This name does not occur

in the Achæmenian inscriptions, but it is mentioned in the Gathas and by

Aristotle,[1791] so that it appears to belong to an early stratum of the

Iranian religion. The present state of the world is regarded as the

result of a constant series of antagonisms between the two creators,

Spenta Mainyu (Ahura Mazda) and Angro Mainyu, these being attended each

by a circle of helpers. A polytheistic interpretation of the helpers is

avoided by making them abstractions (though with a tendency toward

personification), the representatives of various features or elements in

the government of the world or in the experiences of men.[1792]

+977+. A strictly dualistic system recognizes only two Powers in the

world. The Avestan religion, however, admits other deities besides Ahura

Mazda and Angro Mainyu; Mitra, Anahita, and others are objects of

worship. The ancient national faiths, that is, were not content with a

simple division of things between two divine beings. An approach to such

a view was made by Judaism, which, partly under Persian influence,

produced the figure of the Satan, a quasi-independent being hostile to

the Supreme Deity.[1793] Christianity, adopting this conception from

Judaism, elaborated it into the person of the Devil, the veritable head

of a kingdom of evil, called in the New Testament "the god of this

age."[1794] Though doomed to final defeat, as Ahriman in the Avesta is

doomed, the Devil in the orthodox Christian system is practically

omnipresent and is powerful enough to defeat the plans of God in many

cases. In modern enlightened Christian feeling, however, he has become

little more than a name. Though he is credited in theory with suggesting

evil and alluring men to sin, this dogma has small force in the better

minds against the strong conviction of individual freedom and

responsibility. Current Christianity, in its highest forms, is

theoretically, but not really, dualistic. The Satan is taken more

seriously by Islam, which has adopted the conception from Christianity

and Judaism.[1795] For the ordinary Moslem he belongs in the category of

evil spirits and is as real as one of the jinn; he may be cursed and

stoned and driven away,[1796] but he does not affect the Moslem belief

in the oneness of God.

+978+. From the conquest of Persia by Alexander to the fall of the

Parthian dynasty (a period of over five hundred years) little is known

of the history of Mazdaism beyond the fact that it seems to have been

adopted by the Parthians in a debased form; but about the time of the

Persian revival under the Sassanians (226 A.D.) it passed the bounds of

its native land and made its way into the Roman Empire in the shape of

Manichæism, a mixture of dualistic and Christian Gnostic conceptions.

That Manichæism had a certain force is shown by the fact that it

attracted such a man as Augustine, and its survival for several

centuries in spite of persecutions attests its vitality. It may be

doubted whether its attractiveness lay so much in its dualism as in its

gnosticism, though the former element maintained itself in some minor

Christian sects. However this may be, it gradually faded away, leaving

no lasting impression; it was a form of faith not suited to the peoples

who professed Christianity.[1797]

+979+. The modern philosophic proposals to recognize two deities instead

of one are as yet too vague to call for discussion. Dualism, though it

accounts in some fashion for the twofold character of human experiences,

raises as many problems as it solves; in particular it finds itself

confronted apparently by a physical and psychological unity in the world

which it is hard to explain on the hypothesis of conflicting

supernatural Powers.[1798] On the moral side the record of dualistic

schemes is in general good. The ethical standard of Mazdaism is high,

and the ethical practice of Mazdean communities hardly differs from that

of other prominent modern religious bodies. Though the Manichæans were

accused of immoral practices, it does not appear that Mani himself or

any prominent disciple of his announced or favored or permitted such

practices.

MONOTHEISM

+980+. The preceding survey has shown that the theory of dualism has not

proved in general acceptable to men. It was adopted by one people only,

and even by them not in complete form, and its character as a national

cult was destroyed by the Moslem conquest of Persia in the seventh

century. The Zoroastrian system was indeed carried by a body of

emigrants to India and has since been professed by the Parsis there; but

it has been converted by them into a practical monotheistic cult, so

that a consistent dualism now exists nowhere in the world. The thought

of the great civilized nations has turned rather to a unitary view of

the divine government of the world.

+981+. The history of the movement which has elevated monotheism to the

highest place among the civilized cults extends over the whole period of

man's life on the earth. It is pointed out above[1799] that very

generally in low tribes a local supernatural personage is invested with

great power: he is creator, ruler, and guardian of morals; where a

tolerably definite civil and political organization exists he has

virtually the position and performs the functions of the tribal chief,

only with vastly greater powers and privileges; where there is no such

organization he is simply a vaguely conceived, mysterious man who has

control of the elements and of human fortunes, and punishes violations

of tribal custom. Such a personage is, however, at best only the highest

among many supernatural Powers. It is immaterial whether we regard such

a figure as developed from a spirit or as the direct product of

religious imagination. He is always crudely anthropomorphic and,

notwithstanding his primacy, is limited in power by his own nature, by

other supernatural Powers, and by men. Frequently, also, he tends to

become otiose and virtually loses his supremacy;[1800] that is to say,

in the increased complexity of social life a god who was once sufficient

for the needs of a simpler organization has to give way to a number of

Powers which are regarded as the controllers of special departments of

life. Such an otiose form may sometimes indicate a succession of divine

quasi-dynasties, somewhat as in the Greek sequence of Ouranos, Kronos,

Zeus. Handed down from a former generation, he becomes dim and is

neglected. That he is not worshiped is a result of the fact that other

divine beings, standing nearer to existing human interests, have come to

the front.

+982+. The theory has been held in the past, and is still held, that

monotheism was the primitive form of religion and that the worship of

many spirits or many gods is a corruption of primitive thought due to

man's intellectual feebleness or to his moral depravity. It is urged

that such a monotheistic system was the natural one for unsophisticated

man. The view has been widely held also that it was the result of a

primitive divine revelation to men. It is obvious that neither of these

opinions is susceptible of proof on a priori grounds; the question can

be settled only by a survey of the phenomena known to us. When the facts

are clearly stated, it is then allowable to deduce from them such

conclusions as may seem legitimate.

+983+. As a matter of fact, it does not appear that real monotheistic

belief exists or has existed among savage and half-civilized communities

of whose history we have any knowledge. Where a certain supernatural

being is described by observers as "the god" or "the supreme god" of a

tribe, it turns out on inquiry that he is at most, as is remarked above,

a very prominent divine figure, perhaps the most prominent, but never

standing alone and never invested with those physical, intellectual, and

moral capacities that are necessary for a complete monotheistic faith.

+984+. While, however, this conclusion is generally admitted for the

majority of cases,[1801] it has been held, and is still held, that there

are found in savage cults certain "self-existent, eternal, moral" beings

who satisfy all the conditions of a monotheistic faith. Among the

examples cited are the American gods described by Strachey and Winslow

as supreme in power and ethically good.[1802] But, even in the curt and

vague accounts of these early observers (who were not in position to get

accurate notions of Indian beliefs), it appears that there were many

gods, the supposed supreme deity being simply the most prominent in the

regions known to the first settlers. The "Great Spirit" of the Jesuit

missionaries is found, in like manner, to be one of many supernatural

patrons, locally important but not absolute in power.[1803] The Zulu

Unkulunkulu is revered by the natives as a very great being, morally

good according to the standards of the people, but he is of uncertain

origin and is valueless in the existing cult.[1804] The much-discussed

Australian figures, Baiame, Bunjil, and Daramulun, appear not to differ

essentially from those just mentioned. The reports of the natives who

have been questioned on the subject are often vague and sometimes

mutually contradictory, and exact biographical details of these divine

personages are lacking; but careful recent observers are of opinion that

they are nothing more than supernatural headmen, having such power as

tribal chiefs or headmen possess, and credited in different regions with

different moral qualities.[1805]

+985+. In the systems of many other low tribes there are quasi-divine

beings who are credited with great power and are revered without being

thought of as eternal or as standing alone in the government of the

world. A specially interesting example is the Andaman Puluga, a sort of

creator who receives no worship; his abode is a mountain or the sky, and

he seems to have been originally a local supernatural figure who is

traditionally respected but is no longer thought of as an efficient

patron.[1806] The mysterious Ndengei of Fiji is judge of the dead, but

one of many gods and not all-powerful.[1807] In many tribes there is no

one great divine figure; the control of things is divided among hosts of

spirits and gods. This is the case with the Ainu, the Maoris, the

Greenlanders, the Kwakiutl of Northwest America,[1808] and is probably

the rule in most of the lower communities.

The terms 'self-existent' and 'eternal' are not found in savage

vocabularies and seem to have no representatives in savage thought.

Savage cosmology carries the history of the world back to a certain

point and stops when there is no familiar hypothesis of genesis.[1809]

As a rule spirits (as distinguished from ghosts) are not thought of as

having a creator; they are a part of the system of things and are not

supposed to need explanation, and so it seems to be with simple clan

gods. Nor is there any reason, in savage theory, why gods or spirits

should die; death is an accident for human beings, not an essential

feature of their constitution; but such an accident is not usually

supposed to occur in the case of gods. What takes the place of the

conception of 'eternal' in savage thought is an existence that is

supposed to continue for the reason that its cessation does not come

into consideration. As to creation, there is no need, in a low

community, to suppose more than one originator of the world, and

cosmogonic theory may stop at that point, though this is not an

invariable rule. The title "father" for persons of distinction, human or

divine, is found among many undeveloped peoples, and a headman or patron

may be called, by a natural extension of thought, "all-father," a title

that is not essentially different in signification from the simple

"father," and does not carry with it the refined sense of later times.

The question of savage monotheism need present no difficulty if the

conditions are clearly defined.[1810] It is true that there is in some

cases a monarchical conception of the divine control of a clan or a

tribe, and that this simple system is followed by a more or less

elaborate theology. In both civil and religious systems the increasing

complexity of social life has called forth correspondingly complex

organizations, but this movement away from simplicity does not denote

falling off in civil and religious purity and wisdom. A true monotheism

has never arisen except as a criticism of polytheism.

+986+. It is obvious that the popular cults of the great nations of

antiquity were far removed from monotheism. The Egyptians, the

Babylonians and the Assyrians, the Phoenicians, the Hebrews, the

Arabs, the Hindus, the Greeks and the Romans, down to a late period,

worshiped a multitude of gods and were not disturbed by any feeling of

lack of unity in the divine government of the world. The proof that such

was the case among the ancient Hebrews down to the sixth century B.C. is

found in the Old Testament writings: the historical books from the

entrance of the Hebrew tribes into Canaan down to the destruction of

Jerusalem by the Chaldeans and the prophetical writings of the eighth,

seventh, and sixth centuries represent the people generally as addicted

to the worship of a great number of gods. In Persia also, since the

Mazdean system recognized a considerable number of deities, it cannot be

doubted that the people were polytheistic, not to speak of the

probability that there were survivals of a lower form of religion which

preceded Mazdaism. In the modern nations of the east of Asia, China and

Japan, the popular worship is anything but monotheistic: in China the

local spirits play a very great part in the life of the people, and in

Japan the old gods are still objects of worship. It may be added that

among the masses in some nominally Christian countries, particularly

among the peasants of Southern Europe, the old polytheism continues in

the form of the worship of saints and the Madonna.

+987+. While the popular cults in the civilized world have held somewhat

pertinaciously to pluralistic views, there has been a general tendency

in advanced circles everywhere toward a unitary conception of the

government of the world. As this tendency has been general it must be

referred to the general progress of thought, the demand of the human

mind for unity or simplicity. The particular lines of the movement have

varied among different peoples according to the peculiarities of their

culture, and the unitary feeling has varied in its degree of

definiteness. In some cases the political predominance of a city or

region has secured preëminence for its deity, or national attachment to

the national god has elevated him above all other gods; where a people

has cultivated poetry or philosophy, the idealizing thought of the one

or the scientific analysis of the other has led in the same direction.

+988+. First, then, we may note the disposition to give substantial

absoluteness to some one god, the choice of the deity being determined

by the political condition as is suggested above, or by local

attachments, or possibly by other conditions which do not appear in the

meager records of early times. Examples of this form of thought are

found in several of the great nations of antiquity. The hymns to the

Egyptian gods Ra, Amon, Amon-Ra, Osiris, and the Nile describe these

deities as universal in attributes and in power. At the moment the poet

conceives of the god whom he celebrates as practically the only one--if

Ra does everything, there is no need of any other deity. At another

moment, however, the same poet may celebrate Osiris with equal

enthusiasm--these high gods are interchangeable. The suggestion from

such fluid conceptions of the divine persons is that the real thought in

the mind of the poet was the supremacy of some divine power which is

incorporated now in one familiar divine name, now in another. It does

not, however, quite reach the point of well-defined monotheism, for

these gods remain distinct, sometimes with separate functions and

duties.

+989+. But this mode of conceiving of the supernatural Power would

naturally pave the way for monotheism, and it is not surprising that

very early in Egypt a definite monotheistic view was developed. King

Amenophis IV, or to give him the name that he adopted in conformity with

his later cult, Khuen-Aten, made a deliberate attempt to elevate the

sun-god Aten to the position of sole ruler and object of worship. Though

the nature of his belief in this deity is not stated in the documents

with the fullness and precision that we should desire, it seems clear,

from the fact that he ordered the destruction of the shrines of the

other deities in the land, that he regarded the worship of this one god

as sufficient. The movement was not a successful one in so far as the

national religion was concerned--it lasted only during his lifetime and

that of his son, and then a counter-revolution swept Aten away and

reinstated the Theban Amon in all his former dignity and powers--but its

very existence is a testimony to the direction of thought of educated

minds in Egypt about the year 1400 B.C. The Aten revolution appears to

have been distinctively Egyptian--there is no trace of foreign influence

in its construction. It has been suggested that Amenophis got his idea

from Semites of Western Asia or particularly from the Hebrews. But

neither the Hebrews nor any other Semitic people of that period were

monotheistic, nor do we find in Egyptian history at the time such social

intercourse as might produce a violent upturning of the religious usage.

We can only suppose that Amenophis was a religious genius who put into

definite shape a conception that was in the air, and by the force of his

enthusiasm made it for the moment effective. Such geniuses have arisen

from time to time in the world, and though the revolution of this

Egyptian king may seem to us to have sprung up with abnormal abruptness,

it is more reasonable to suppose that the way had been prepared for it

in Egyptian thought. He was a man born out of due time; but it cannot be

said that his attempt was without influence on succeeding generations.

+990+. Passing now to the oldest Semitic civilizations, we find in

Babylonia and Assyria many local deities, one or another of whom comes

to the front under the hegemony of some city or state. Here we are met

by the fact already referred to that the gods are interchangeable--it is

practically a matter of indifference whether one deity or another is

elevated to headship. In the great empires the gods of the capital

cities naturally became preëminent; so Marduk in Babylonia and Ashur in

Assyria. The royal inscriptions speak of these gods as if they were

all-powerful and all-controlling. In both countries the goddess Ishtar

appears as the supreme director of affairs, and other deities are

similarly honored. What might have been the issue if the later

Babylonian kingdom had continued for a long time it is impossible to

say, but the impression made by the words of the devout king

Nebuchadnezzar II (605-562 B.C.) is that he would have been content with

Marduk as the one object of worship. Babylonia produced no such radical

reformer as the Egyptian Amenophis--there is no formulation of

monotheism; but the general tone of the Babylonian religion of the sixth

century is not very different from that of the Hebrew religion of the

same time.

+991+. The religious point of view of the Vedas belongs in the same

category with the early Egyptian. Varuna, Agni, and Indra appear in the

hymns, each in his turn, as supreme. The rôle of Varuna seems to be

practically identical with that of the Iranian Ahura, but unlike the

latter he does not succeed in expelling his brother divinities. This

difference of development between the Hindu and the Iranian people we

cannot hope to explain. India moved not toward monotheism, but toward

pantheism. But the Vedic hymns prove the existence of a certain sense

of oneness in the world, held by the poets, though not by the mass of

the people, and destined to issue in a very remarkable religious system.

+992+. It has been by a very different line that China has reached its

unitary conception of the world. The details of the movement are

obscure, but its general course is clear.[1811] As with many other

peoples it is the objects of nature to which Chinese worship is mainly

paid, but the Chinese mind, impressed by the power of these objects, is

content to rest in them in their visible form; no proper names are

attached to them, and they have a more or less vague personality which

varies in definiteness at different times and with different persons.

The theistic system is a reflection of the social system. The eminently

practical Chinese mind lays the chief stress on the earthly life: in the

common everyday life the family is the unit; but the general course of

affairs is controlled by the great natural Powers of earth and sky,

whence arise the two great divisions of Chinese worship. The State is a

larger family in which the duke or emperor or other chief political

officer occupies the same position that is occupied by the father in the

smaller social circle; the government is patriarchal, with gradations

which correspond to those of the family. Life, it is held, is controlled

by the heavenly bodies, by the mountains and rivers of the earth, and by

deceased members of families. To these the people sacrifice, the

principal part being taken by the civil heads of the larger and smaller

constituent parts of the empire; there is thus no place for priests. As

the emperor (or other head of the State) is supreme on earth, so Heaven

and Earth, Sun and Moon occupy the highest positions in the divine

hierarchy, and ancestors are influential and entitled to worship

according to the rank of the families they represent.[1812] From an

early time, long before Confucius, the headship of the divine Powers, it

would seem, was assigned to Heaven--not the physical sky, but, at least

in the thinking circles of the nation, the Power therein residing. Thus

arose the conception of an imperial divine government in which Heaven,

though it does not stand alone, is recognized as supreme. The larger

theistic conception is embodied in the annual sacrifices conducted by

the emperor,[1813] especially at the winter and summer solstices when

sacrifices are offered to Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon, the Four

Quarters and the mountains and rivers of the empire and to his

ancestors, whose worship includes the interests of the whole State. Thus

with a vast number of objects of worship (spirits of all departments of

life, and a few gods proper) the Chinese religion has attained and

maintained a general unitary conception of the divine government of the

world.[1814]

+993+. Some resemblance to the Chinese system appears in the religion of

Peru, so far as this can be understood from the accounts that have come

down to us.[1815] The supreme position given to the Sun in Peru and to

the Inca as child of the Sun is parallel to the supremacy of Heaven in

China and the headship of the emperor as the son of Heaven. The Peruvian

cult appears not to have reached the distinctness of the Chinese. There

were, in fact, in Peru a considerable number of tolerably well-formed

divinities along with a vast crowd of spirits. Yet it appears that the

sun was regarded, at least by the Inca and his circle, as supreme ruler

of the world. The Sun, as god, has no proper name in Peru, as in China

Heaven, as god, has no proper name. In both countries, it would seem,

the imagination of the people was overpowered by the spectacle of the

majesty of a great natural object. The two religions differ in their

ritual development: while the Inca, like the Chinese emperor, was the

religious head of the nation, the Peruvians created an elaborate system

of worship, with temples and ministrants, which is wanting in

China.[1816] The remarkable character of the Peruvian system makes it

all the more regrettable that the data available do not enable us to

trace its growth from the simplest beginnings.

+994+. Still another line of theistic development is furnished by the

Hebrew system. The Hebrews are remarkable among ancient peoples as

having had, so far as our information goes, only one national god. This

god they brought with them into Canaan from the wilderness over which

they appear to have roamed with their flocks for a period and under

conditions not definitely known to us. Arrived in Canaan, the masses

were attracted by the local Canaanite deities (whose worship represented

a higher civilization than that of the nomadic Hebrews), and later, in

the seventh century B.C., a great part of the people of the little

kingdom of Judah adopted the Assyrian astral cult; but a group of

Israelites had always remained faithful to the national deity Yahweh

(Jehovah) and vigorously opposed all foreign worship. It was naturally

the more thoughtful and ethically better-developed part of the community

that took this uncompromising position, and their spokesmen, the writing

prophets whose discourses are preserved in the Old Testament, became

preachers of morality as well as champions of the sole worship of

Yahweh. It does not appear that they denied the existence of other gods,

but they regarded their own god as superior to all others in power,

standing in a peculiarly close relation to his people and bound to them

by peculiarly intimate ties.

+995+. This attachment to one deity proved to be the dominant sentiment

of the nation. As time went on and the people were sifted by the

Assyrian and Babylonian deportations, the higher moral feeling of the

best men attached itself more and more definitely to the national god.

Thus was established a monolatry which was practically monotheism,

though a theory of absolute monotheism was never formulated by the

pre-Christian Jews. It must be added, as is remarked above, that, from

the third or second century B.C. on, the somewhat undefined range of

activity attributed to Satan produced a sort of dualism, yet without

impairing the practically unitary conception of the divine government of

the world.[1817] The course of their national fortunes and the

remarkable power of self-contained persistence of the Jews brought

about a segregation of the people and, finally, their organization into

a community governed by a law held to be divinely revealed. This

capacity of social religious organization was the distinctive

characteristic of the Jewish people and, supported by their unitary

theistic system and a high moral code, gave the example of popular

monotheism which, through the medium of Christianity, finally imposed

itself upon the Roman world.

+996+. In the ancient world the most thorough investigation of the

theistic problem was made by the Greeks, whose leading thinkers, like

the Hebrews, moved steadily toward a unitary conception of the divine

power, but, unlike the Hebrews, did not succeed in impressing their

views on the people at large. What the theistic conception in the

pre-Homeric times was we are unable to say definitely, but presumably in

every separate community there was a local deity who had practically the

direction of affairs. In process of time, through conditions not known

to us, Zeus came to be recognized throughout the Hellenic world as the

principal deity. In the Homeric poems and in Hesiod we find a political

or governmental organization of the gods which followed the lines of the

social organization of the times. As Agamemnon is the head chief over a

group of local chiefs, so Zeus, though not absolutely supreme, is a

divine king, the head over a considerable number of deities who have

their own preferences and plans, and in ordinary matters go their own

way and are not interfered with so long as they mind their own business;

but at critical points Zeus, like Agamemnon, intervenes, and then no god

disputes his decisions.

+997+. This conception of the divine government appears, therefore, to

rest on the Greek demand for political organization; the world was

thought of as divided into various departments which had to be brought

into a unity by the ascription of a quasi-supreme authority to some one

personage. Necessarily, however, larger intellectual and ethical ideas

were incorporated in this political view. Though the popular

anthropomorphic conceptions of the deities appear throughout the Homeric

poems (the gods being sometimes morally low as well as limited in

knowledge and power), yet on the other hand they are said to know

everything. To Zeus in particular lofty qualities are ascribed; he is

the father of men and their savior and the patron of justice. How it

came about that these two sorts of conceptions of a supreme deity are

mingled in the poems is a question that need not be discussed here; a

similar mingling of contradictory ideas is found in the Old Testament,

in which the unmoral god of the people stands alongside of the highly

developed ethical Yahweh of the great prophets.

+998+. In Homer and Hesiod, however, the conception of headship is

complicated by the introduction of the idea of fate. In the Iliad Zeus

is sometimes ignorant of the future and has to employ the scales of

destiny, and in Hesiod appear the three Fates who control the lives of

men independently of the gods. The conception of a controlling fate may

be regarded as an effort to reach an absolutely unitary view of the

world. Above all the divine powers that regulate affairs, after the

manner of the government by a king with his attendant chieftains and

officers, there is a sense of a dim and undefined power of unknown

origin, mysterious, absolute, universal. The question whether this

conception was a reflection of a sense of the controlling power resident

in the universe itself, or merely an endeavor to rise above the

variations of anthropomorphic deities, is important from the point of

view of the genesis of ideas, but its decision will not affect the fact

just stated.[1818] Obviously in the Homeric world there appears this

general conviction that men and gods are bound together in unity and

that some force or power controls all things.[1819]

+999+. This sense of the governmental unity is further developed by the

later great poets who infused into it higher and more definite moral

elements. The polytheistic view continues; to the thinkers of the time

there was no more difficulty in conceiving of a single headship along

with many deities of particular functions than was felt by Hebrew

prophets who recognized the existence of foreign deities, with Yahweh

as a superior god, or by the modern Christian world with its apparatus

of angels, saints, and demons alongside of the supreme God. For Pindar

Zeus is lord of all things and is far removed from the moral impurities

of the popular conception. Æschylus represents him as supreme and in

general as just, though not wholly free from human weaknesses. A real

unity of the world is set forth by Sophocles: there is a divinely

ordered control by immutable law, and the will of Zeus is unquestioned.

The unitary conception is found also in Euripides notwithstanding his

skeptical attitude toward the current mythology. The sense of symmetry

potent in the poets forced them to this unitary conception of

government, and the natural progress of ethical feeling led them to

ascribe the highest ethical qualities to the deities.

+1000+. Similar motives appear in the speculations of the Greek

philosophers: Greek philosophy in seeking to discover the essential

nature of the world moved definitely toward the conception of its

unity--so, for example, as early as the sixth century, in Xenophanes and

Parmenides. The conception of a supreme spiritual ruler of the world

appears in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras (fifth century). To these and other

Greek thinkers the unity of the world and the dominance of mind or

spirit appeared to be necessary assumptions. The most definite

expression of these conceptions is found in Plato and Aristotle.

According to Plato (in the Timæus) God, the eternal Father, created the

world (for nothing can be created without a cause), brought order out of

disorder and made the universe to be most fair and good, so that it

became a rational living soul, the one only-begotten universe, created

the gods and the sons of the gods, and framed the soul to be the ruler

of the body. Aristotle, in simpler phrase, represents the ground of the

world as self-sufficient Mind, an eternal Power ([Greek: dunamis]), from

which all action or actuality ([Greek: energeia]) proceeds.[1820]

+1001+. There are certain apparent limitations, it is true, to this

conception of unity. Both Plato and Aristotle recognize the existence of

a host of subordinate deities (created but immortal) to whom is

assigned a share, by direction of the supreme God, in the creation of

things; yet essentially these deities are nothing more than agents or

intermediaries of the divine activity, and may be compared to the

natural laws and agents of modern theism and, more exactly, to the

Hebrew angels through whom, according to the Old Testament, God governed

the world. Plato has also a somewhat vague notion of a something in the

nature of the material of the world that limits or constrains the divine

creative power--a "necessity" that forces the deity to do not the

absolutely best but the best possible. Perhaps this is a philosophical

formulation of the old "fate," perhaps Plato is merely trying to account

for certain supposed inconcinnities and inadequacies in the world. He is

not quite consistent with himself, since he represents the creation of

the universe as resulting from the fact that necessity yielded to the

persuasion of mind, which thus became supreme.[1821] In spite of this

vagueness his view is unitary, and the unitary conception is continued

by the Stoics, its best Stoic expression being found in the famous hymn

of Cleanthes to Zeus: "Nothing occurs on earth apart from thee" and "We

are thy offspring."[1822]

+1002+. In the last centuries before the beginning of our era the Jews,

partly under Persian and Greek influence, clarified their theistic view,

attaining a practically pure monotheism, only retaining their apparatus

of angels and demons. This theistic scheme passed over in complete form

to early Christianity, in which, however, greater prominence was given

to the chief demon, the Satan; his larger rôle arose from the fact that

he was brought into sharp antagonism with the Christ, the head of the

kingdom of God. When Christianity was adopted by the Græco-Roman world,

the doctrine of the Trinity was worked out and formulated in accordance

with Greek and Roman philosophic thought, but was held not to impair the

monotheistic view since the three Persons were regarded as being in

substance one. Islam adopted the Jewish form of monotheism, with its

Satan and angels, retaining also the old Arabian apparatus of demonic

beings (the jinn).

+1003+. A certain tendency to a practically unitary view is discernible

in the cults of Isis and Mithra, which were widely diffused in the Roman

Empire.[1823] In both these cults the main interest of the worshipers

was centered in a single deity, though other deities were recognized.

The unifying impulse was devotional, not philosophic.

So far as a unitary conception of the divine government of the world

existed it must be referred to the spirit of the age which had outgrown

the old crude polytheism. Such modern monotheistic movements as the

Brahma-Samaj and the Parsi in India, the Babist in Persia, and the

reformed Shinto in Japan owe much to European influence, though

doubtless some part of them is the outcome of natural progress in

intellectual and moral conceptions.

PANTHEISTIC AND NONTHEISTIC SYSTEMS

+1004+. The systems of theistic thought considered above all make a

sharp separation between God and the world. Plato and Aristotle regarded

mind or spirit as a force that dominated matter. The Persian, Hebrew,

and Christian theologies conceive of the deity as transcendent, standing

outside of and above the world and entering into communication with it

either by direct revelation or through intermediaries. To certain

thinkers of ancient times this dualistic conception presented

difficulties--an absolute unity was held to be incompatible with such

separation between the world and God. The precise nature of the

reflections by which the earliest philosophers reached this conclusion

is not clearly set forth, but it may be surmised that in general there

were two lines of thought that led to this inference: first, a

metaphysical conception of unity as something that was demanded by the

sense of perfectness in the world; and, secondly, observation of facts

that appeared to characterize the world as a unit. Among several

different peoples, and apparently in each independently, the idea arose

that the divine manifests itself in the world of phenomena and is

recognizable only therein. Such a view appears in India in the Vedanta

philosophy, and in Greece a little later it is more or less involved in

Orphic theories and in the systems of several philosophers. The tendency

to deify nature appears even in writers who do not wholly exclude gods

from their schemes of the world--in the sayings of Heraclitus, for

example: "All things are one," "From all comes one, and from one comes

all." A similar view is attributed to Xenophanes by Aristotle,[1824] and

traces of such a conception appear in Euripides.[1825] For the modern

forms of pantheism, in Spinoza and other philosophers, reference must be

made to the histories of philosophy.

+1005+. Pantheism has never commended itself to the masses of men. It is

definitely theistic, but the view that the divine power is visible only

in phenomena and is to be identified practically with the world is one

that men in general find difficult to comprehend. The demand is for a

deity with whom one may enter into personal relations--the simple

conception of a god who dwells apart satisfies the religious instincts

of the majority of men. The ethical questions arising from pantheism

seem to them perplexing: how can man be morally responsible when it is

the deity who thinks and acts in him? and how can he have any sense of

loyalty to a deity whom he cannot distinguish from himself? Nor do men

generally demand so absolute a unity as is represented by pantheism.

Such questions as those relating to the eternity of matter, the

possibility of the existence of an immaterial being, and the mode in

which such a being, if it exists, could act on matter, have not seemed

practical to the majority of men. Man demands a method of worship, and

pantheism does not permit organized worship. For these reasons it has

remained a sentiment of philosophers, though it has not been without

effect in modifying popular conceptions of the deity: the conception of

the immanence of God in the world (held in many Christian orthodox

circles), when carried to its legitimate consequences, it is often hard

to distinguish from pantheism.

+1006+. _Nontheistic systems._ A further attempt to secure a complete

unity of the world appears in those systems of thought which regard the

world as self-sufficient and, therefore, dispense with extramundane

agency. These start either from the point of view of man and human life

or from contemplation of the world. In China the sense of the sole

importance of the moral life and the impossibility of knowing anything

beyond mundane life led Confucius practically to ignore divine agency.

He did not deny the existence of Powers outside of men, but he declined

to speak of them, regarding them as of no practical importance. This

sort of agnosticism appears in Greece as early as the fifth century

B.C., when Protagoras's view that "man is the measure of all things"

makes extrahuman Powers superfluous. Epicurus reached a similar

practical atheism apparently from a scientific view of the construction

of the world. According to him there are gods, but they are

otiose--living a life of happy ease, they are to be thought of as a

pleasant phenomenon in the world, but ineffective as regards human

fortunes, and men may go their ways certain that if they obey the laws

of the world the gods will not interfere with them.

+1007+. The Sankhya philosophy of India dispenses completely with gods,

holding that the primordial stuff is eternal, but it also holds that

souls have a separate existence and are eternal. Thus a species of

dualism emerges. Buddhism goes a step further, ignoring the soul as well

as gods. It is agnostic in that, admitting the world to have a cause, it

holds that it is impossible to know this cause. Its practical aim--to

get rid of suffering by getting rid of desire, and thus to pass into a

blissful state of existence in which apparently there is to be no effort

as there is to be no pain--has enabled it to establish a vigorous

organization, a sort of church, in which the undefined universe takes

the place of a personal god, and character takes the place of soul, this

character (Karma) passing from one being to another without the

assumption of identity in the beings thus united in destiny.[1826]

+1008+. In Greece pure materialism (similar in essence to the Sankhya)

took the shape of the assumption of an original and eternal mass of

atoms whence have come all forms of being (so Democritus in the fifth

century B.C.), and this conception was adopted by Epicurus and expounded

at length by Lucretius.[1827] The necessary qualities and movements

being attributed to the atoms, the conclusion was that nothing else was

required in order to explain the world. With this may be compared the

view of Empedocles (fifth century) that love and hate (in modern phrase,

attraction and repulsion) are the creative forces of the world. The

simplicity of this scheme has commended it to many minds in modern as in

ancient times. Man, it is said, can know nothing outside of phenomena,

and, so far as regards the origin of things, it is as easy to conceive

of an eternal self-existent mass of matter as of an eternal

self-existent deity. The nobler part of man, it is held, is not thereby

surrendered--reason and all high ethical and spiritual ideals have grown

naturally out of the primordial mass. In such systems there is often the

hypothesis of an original force or life resident in matter, and this

force or life, being credited with all that has issued from it, may be

regarded as having the elements of personality, and in that case becomes

practically a deity. Such a deistic materialism approaches pantheism

nearly.

GENERAL SURVEY OF THE THEISTIC DEVELOPMENT

+1009+. The theistic conceptions of men have followed the general line

of social development. All systems and shades of thought are faithfully

reflected in the various ideas that men have formed for themselves of

the gods. Human nature is the highest thing known to men, and their

conception of supernatural forces has been based on ideals derived from

experience. The sphere of divine activity has been determined for men by

their systems of physical science; the moral character of the gods is a

reflection of human ethical conceptions; the internal activity of the

deity in man's mind is defined by man's spiritual experience.

+1010+. From the earliest times the extent to which the gods were

supposed to intervene in human affairs has been fixed by scientific

observation, by the knowledge of natural law--the gods have been called

on to intervene only when it was necessary because ordinary powers

failed. When finally the conception is reached that all nature is

governed by natural law, the theistic view assumes that the deity works

through ordinary natural means, and the supposition of particular

interventions is rejected by the mass of scientific thinkers. It was

natural in early times to suppose that reward and punishment were

administered by the deity in this world in accordance with the

principles of right, that the good prospered and the bad failed; but

this view has vanished before observation, and, by those who demand an

exact accordance between conduct and fortunes, the final compensations

of life have been relegated to the other world.

+1011+. The belief in miracles, however, has never completely vanished

from the world. A miracle is an intervention by the deity whereby a

natural law is set aside. No a priori reasoning can ever prove or

disprove the possibility of miracles--such proof or disproof would

involve complete knowledge of the universe or of the divine power in the

universe, and this is impossible for man. The indisposition to accept a

miracle has arisen from the conviction that the demand for interventions

that set aside the natural order is a reflection on the wisdom of the

Creator's arrangement of the world, and further from long-continued

observation of the dominance of natural law, and, when appeal is made to

alleged miraculous occurrences, from the arbitrary way in which,

according to the reports, these have been introduced. In the records of

peoples we find that miracles increase in number and magnitude in

proportion as we go back to dim times without exact historical

documents. They appear, it is held, in connection usually with

insignificant affairs while the really great affairs in later times are

left without miraculous elements.[1828] The history of the world, so

historical science holds, receives a satisfactory explanation from the

character of the general laws of human nature, and the principle of

parsimony demands that no unnecessary elements of action be introduced

into affairs. The exclusion of miracles from the world does not exclude

divine agency and government; it only defines the latter as being in

accordance with man's observation of natural law.

+1012+. Philosophy constructs the constitution of the deity and the

relation of divine elements to the world. Whether the deity stands

outside of the world or within it, whether the divine power is unitary

or dual or plural, or whether there is any need to assume a power

outside of physical nature--these are the questions that are discussed

by philosophy, whose conclusions sometimes favor a religious view of the

world, sometimes oppose it. Few persons are able to follow elaborate

philosophic lines of thought--the majority of men accept the simple

doctrine of a personal god who is generally supposed to stand outside of

the world. The controlling consideration here is that everything must

have a cause--a line of reasoning in accordance with common sense, but

not always, in its crude form, regarded by philosophers as decisive.

+1013+. The moral character of a deity is always in accordance with the

moral ideas of his worshipers. Religions have sometimes been divided

into the ethical and the nonethical; but so far as the character of the

deity is concerned no such division holds, for there never has been a

supernatural Power that has not reflected the moral ideas of its time

and place. A cannibal god is not only natural in a cannibal society, but

he represents moral ideals, namely, the attempt to acquire strength by

absorbing the physical substance of men. The deity who deceives or is

vindictive arises in a society in which deceit and vindictiveness are

regarded as virtues. The pictures of what we regard as immoralities in

the deity as given in the Iliad and in the Old Testament were not

regarded as immoral by the writers. The progress in the characterization

of the deity has been not by the introduction of an ethical element, but

by the purification and elevation of the already existing ethical

element.[1829]

Introduction to the History of Religions Handbooks on the History of Religions, Volume IV · 第 12 / 18 章