He proceeds to inquire how it is that not only the perfection of moral

sentiment that would apportion more approbation and disapprobation

according to the real tendencies of actions, is not attained, but men's

moral feelings are not seldom in extreme contrariety with the real

effects of human conduct. First, he finds that men, from partial views,

or momentarily, or from caprice, may bestow their sentiments altogether

at variance with the real consequences of actions. Next there is the

difficulty, or even impossibility, of calculating all the consequences

far and near; whence human conduct is liable to be appreciated on

whimsical grounds or on no discernible grounds at all, and errors in

moral sentiment arise, which it takes increased knowledge to get rid

of. In the third place, it is a fact that our moral sentiments are to a

very great extent derived from tradition, while the approbation and

disapprobation may have originally been wrongly applied. The force of

tradition he illustrates by supposing the case of a patriarchal family,

and he cannot too strongly represent its strength in overcoming or at

least struggling against natural feeling. The authoritative precept of

a superior may also make actions be approved or disapproved, not

because they are directly perceived or even traditionally held to be

beneficial or injurious, but solely because they are commanded or

prohibited. Lastly, he dwells upon the influence of superstition in

perverting moral sentiment, finding, however, that it operates most

strongly in the way of creating false virtues and false vices and

crimes.

These circumstances, explaining the want of conformity in our moral

sentiments to the real tendencies of actions, he next employs to

account for discrepancies in moral sentiment between different

communities. Having given examples of such discrepancies, he supposes

the case of two families, endowed with the rudimentary qualities

mentioned at the beginning, but placed in different circumstances.

Under the influence of dissimilar physical conditions, and owing to the

dissimilar personal idiosyncracies of the families, and especially of

their chiefs, there will be left few points of complete analogy between

them in the first generation, and in course of time they will become

two races exceedingly unlike in moral sentiment, as in other respects.

He warns strongly against making moral generalizations except under

analogous circumstances of knowledge and civilization. Most men have

the rudimentary feelings, but there is no end to the variety of their

intensity and direction. As a highest instance of discrepant moral

sentiment, he cites the fact that, in our own country, a moral stigma

is still attached to intellectual error by many people, and even by men

of cultivation.

He now comes to the important question of the test or criterion that is

to determine which of these diverse sentiments are right and which

wrong, since they cannot all be right from the mere fact of their

existence, or because they are felt by the subjects of them to be

right, or believed to be in consonance with the injunctions of

superiors, or to be held also by other people. The foregoing review of

the _genesis_ of moral sentiments suggests a direct and simple answer.

As they arise from likings and dislikings of actions that cause, or

tend to cause, pleasure and pain, the first thing is to see that the

likings and dislikings are well founded. Where this does not at once

appear, examination of the real effects of actions must be resorted to;

and, in dubious cases, men in general, when unprejudiced, allow this to

be the natural test for applying moral approbation and disapprobation.

If, indeed, the end of moral sentiment is to promote or to prevent the

actions, there can be no better way of attaining that end. And, as a

fact, almost all moralists virtually adopt it on occasion, though often

unconsciously; the greatest happiness--principle is denounced by its

opponents as a _mischievous_ doctrine.

The objection that the criterion of consequences is difficult of

application, and thus devoid of practical utility, he rebuts by

asserting that the difficulty is not greater than in other cases. We

have simply to follow effects as far as we can; and it is by its

ascertainable, not by its unascertainable, consequences, that we

pronounce an action, as we pronounce an article of food or a statute,

to be good or bad. The main effects of most actions are already very

well ascertained, and the consequences to human happiness, when

unascertainable, are of no value. If the test were honestly applied,

ethical discrepancies would tend gradually to disappear.

He starts another objection:--The happiness-test is good as far as it

goes, but we also approve and disapprove of actions as they are just or

generous, or the contrary, and with no reference to happiness or

unhappiness. In answering this argument, he confines himself to the

case of Justice. To be morally approved, a just action must in itself

be peculiarly pleasant or agreeable, irrespective of its other effects,

which are left out: for on no theory can pleasantness or agreeableness

be dissociated from moral approbation. Now, as Happiness is but a

general appellation for all the agreeable affections of our nature, and

unable to exist except in the shape of some agreeable emotion or

combinations of agreeable emotions; the just action that is morally

commendable, as giving naturally and directly a peculiar kind of

pleasure independent of any other consequences, only produces one

species of those pleasant states of mind that are ranged under the

genus happiness. The test of justice therefore coincides with the

happiness-test. But he does not mean that we are actually affected

thus, in doing just actions, nor refuse to accept justice as a

criterion of actions; only in the one case he maintains that, whatever

association may have effected, the just act must originally have been

approved for the sake of its consequences, and, in the other, that

justice is a criterion, because proved over and over again to be a most

beneficial principle.

After remarking that the Moral Sentiments of praise and blame may enter

into accidental connection with, other feelings of a distinct

character, like pity, wonder, &c., he criticises the use of the word

_Utility_ in Morals. He avoids the term as objectionable, because the

_useful_ in common language does not mean what is directly productive

of happiness, but only what is instrumental in its production, and in

most cases customarily or recurrently instrumental. A blanket is of

continual utility to a poor wretch through a severe winter, but the

benevolent act of the donor is not termed useful, because it confers

the benefit and ceases. Utility is too narrow to comprehend all the

actions that deserve approbation. We want an uncompounded substantive

expressing the two attributes of _conferring_ and _conducing to_

happiness; as a descriptive phrase, _producing_ happiness is as

succinct as any. The term useful is, besides, associated with the

notion of what is serviceable in the affairs and objects of common

life, whence the philosophical doctrine that erects utility as its

banner is apt to be deemed, by the unthinking, low, mean, and

derogatory to human nature and aspirations, although its real import is

wholly free from such a reproach. Notwithstanding, therefore, the

convenience of the term, and because the associations connected with it

are not easily eradicated, whilst most of the trite objections to the

true doctrine of morals turn upon its narrow meanings, he thinks it

should be as much as possible disused.

Mr. Bailey ends by remarking of the common question, whether our moral

sentiments have their origin in Reason, or in a separate power called

the Moral Sense, that in his view of man's sensitive and intellectual

nature it is easily settled. He recognizes the feelings that have been

enumerated, and, in connexion with them, intellectual processes of

discerning and inferring; for which, if the Moral Sense and Reason are

meant as anything more than unnecessary general expressions, they are

merely fictitious entities. So, too, Conscience, whether as identified

with the moral sense, or put for sensibility in regard to the moral

qualities of one's own mind, is a mere personification of certain

mental states. The summary of Bailey's doctrine falls within the two

first heads.

I.--The Standard is the production of Happiness. [It should be

remarked, however, that happiness is a wider aim than morality;

although all virtue tends to produce happiness, very much that produces

happiness is not virtue.]

II.--The Moral Faculty, while involving processes of discernment and

inference, is mainly composed of certain sentiments, the chief being

Reciprocity and Sympathy. [These are undoubtedly the largest

ingredients in a mature, self-acting conscience; and the way that they

contribute to the production of moral sentiment deserved to be, as it

has been, well handled. The great omission in Mr. Bailey's account is

the absence of the element of _authority_, which is the main instrument

in imparting to us the sense of obligation.]

HERBERT SPENCER.

Mr. Spencer's ethical doctrines are, as yet, nowhere fully expressed.

They form part of the more general doctrine of Evolution which he is

engaged in working out; and they are at present to be gathered only

from scattered passages. It is true that, in his first work, _Social

Statics_ he presented what he then regarded as a tolerably complete

view of one division of Morals. But without abandoning this view, he

now regards it as inadequate--more especially in respect of its basis.

Mr. Spencer's conception of Morality as a science, is conveyed in the

following passages in a letter written by him to Mr. Mill; repudiating

the title anti-utilitarian, which Mr. Mill had applied to him:--

'The note in question greatly startled me by implicitly classing me

with Anti-utilitarians. I have never regarded myself as an

Anti-utilitarian. My dissent from the doctrine of Utility as commonly

understood, concerns not the object to be reached by men, but the

method of reaching it. While I admit that happiness is the ultimate end

to be contemplated, I do not admit that it should be the proximate end.

The Expediency-Philosophy having concluded that happiness is a thing to

be achieved, assumes that Morality has no other business than

empirically to generalize the results of conduct, and to supply for the

guidance of conduct nothing more than its empirical generalizations.

But the view for which I contend is, that Morality properly so

called--the science of right conduct--has for its object to determine

_how_ and _why_ certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain

other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be

accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of

things; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to

deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what

kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds

to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be

recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective

of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.

'Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning. During its early

stages, planetary Astronomy consisted of nothing more than accumulated

observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and

planets; from which accumulated observations it came by and by to be

empirically predicted, with an approach to truth, that certain of the

heavenly bodies would have certain positions at certain times. But the

modern science of planetary Astronomy consists of deductions from the

law of gravitation--deductions showing why the celestial bodies

_necessarily_ occupy certain places at certain times. Now, the kind of

relation which thus exists between ancient and modern Astronomy, is

analogous to the kind of relation which, I conceive, exists between the

Expediency-Morality, and Moral Science properly so-called. And the

objection which I have to the current Utilitarianism, is, that it

recognizes no more developed form of morality--does not see that it has

reached but the initial stage of Moral Science.

'To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that,

corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed Moral

Science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race,

certain fundamental moral intuitions; and that, though these moral

intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of Utility,

gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite

independent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I

believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to

have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all

antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly-developed

nervous organizations--just as I believe that this intuition, requiring

only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has

practically become a form of thought, apparently quite independent of

experience; so do I believe that the experiences of utility organised

and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have

been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued

transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of

moral intuition--certain emotions responding to right and wrong

conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of

utility. I also hold that just as the space-intuition responds to the

exact demonstrations of Geometry, and has its rough conclusions

interpreted and verified by them; so will moral intuitions respond to

the demonstrations of Moral Science, and will have their rough

conclusions interpreted and verified by them.'

The relations between the Expediency-Morality, and Moral Science,

conceived by Mr. Spencer to be, the one transitional, and the other

ultimate, are further explained in the following passage from his essay

on 'Prison-Ethics':--

'Progressing civilization, which is of necessity a succession of

compromises between old and new, requires a perpetual re-adjustment of

the compromise between the ideal and the practicable in social

arrangements: to which end both elements of the compromise must be kept

in view. If it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of

things far too good for men as they are; it is not less true that mere

expediency does not of itself tend to establish a system of things any

better than that which exists. While absolute morality owes to

expediency the checks which prevent it from rushing into utopian

absurdities; expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all

stimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly interested in

ascertaining what is _relatively right_; it still follows that we must

first consider what is _absolutely right_; since the one conception

presupposes the other. That is to say, though we must ever aim to do

what is best for the present times, yet we must ever bear in mind what

is abstractedly best; so that the changes we make may be _towards_ it,

and not _away_ from it.'

By the word _absolute_ as thus applied, Mr. Spencer does not mean to

imply a right and wrong existing apart from Humanity and its relations.

Agreeing with Utilitarians in the belief that happiness is the end, and

that the conduct called moral is simply the best means of attaining it,

he of course does not assert that there is a morality which is absolute

in the sense of being true out of relation to human existence. By

absolute morality as distinguished from relative, he here means the

mode of conduct which, under the conditions arising from social union,

must be pursued to achieve the greatest welfare of each and all. He

holds, that the laws of Life, physiologically considered, being fixed,

it necessarily follows that when a number of individuals have to live

in social union, which necessarily involves fixity of conditions in the

shape of mutual interferences and limitations, there result certain

fixed principles by which conduct must be restricted, before the

greatest sum of happiness can be achieved. These principles constitute

what Mr. Spencer distinguishes as absolute Morality; and the absolutely

moral man is the man who conforms to these principles, not by external

coercion nor self-coercion, but who acts them out spontaneously.

To be fully understood, this conception must be taken along with the

general theory of Evolution. Mr. Spencer argues that all things

whatever are inevitably tending towards equilibrium; and that

consequently the progress of mankind cannot cease until there is

equilibrium between the human constitution and the conditions of human

existence. Or, as he argues in _First Principles_ (Second Edition, p.

512), 'The adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his

existence cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as

feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter.

And the establishment of this equilibrium, is the arrival at a state of

human nature and social organization, such that the individual has no

desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper

sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which

the individual voluntarily respects. The progressive extension of the

liberty of citizens, and the reciprocal removal of political

restrictions, are the steps by which we advance towards this state. And

the ultimate abolition of all limits to the freedom of each, save those

imposed by the like freedom of all, must, result from the complete

equilibration between man's desires and the conduct necessitated by

surrounding conditions.'

The conduct proper to such a state, which Mr. Spencer thus conceives to

be the subject-matter of Moral Science, truly so-called, he proposes,

in the Prospectus to his _System of Philosophy_, to treat under the

following heads.

PERSONAL MORALS.--The principles of private conduct--physical,

intellectual, moral, and religious--that follow from the conditions to

complete individual life; or, what is the same thing, those modes of

private action which must result from the eventual equilibration of

internal desires and external needs.

JUSTICE.--The mutual limitation of men's actions necessitated by their

co-existence as units of a society--limitations, the perfect observance

of which constitutes that state of equilibrium forming the goal of

political progress.

NEGATIVE BENEFICENCE.--Those secondary limitations, similarly

necessitated, which, though less important and not cognizable by law,

are yet requisite to prevent mutual destruction of happiness in various

indirect ways: in other words--those minor self-restraints dictated by

what may be called passive sympathy.

POSITIVE BENEFICENCE.--Comprehending all modes of conduct, dictated by

active sympathy, which imply pleasure in giving pleasure--modes of

conduct that social adaptation has induced and must render ever more

general; and which, in becoming universal, must fill to the full the

possible measure of human happiness.

* * * * *

This completes the long succession of British moralists during the

three last centuries. It has been possible, and even necessary, to

present them thus in an unbroken line, because the insular movement in

ethical philosophy has been hardly, if at all, affected by anything

done abroad. In the earlier part of the modern period, little of any

kind was done in ethics by the great continental thinkers. Descartes

has only a few allusions to the subject; the 'Ethica' of Spinoza is

chiefly a work of speculative philosophy; Leibnitz has no systematic

treatment of moral questions. The case is very different; in the new

German philosophy since the time of Kant; besides Kant himself, Fichte,

Hegel, Schleiermacher, and many later and contemporary thinkers having

devoted a large amount of attention to practical philosophy. But unless

it be Kant--and he not to any great extent--none of these has

influenced the later attempts at ethical speculation amongst ourselves:

nor, again with the exception of Kant, are we as yet in a position

properly to deal with them. One reason, for proceeding to expound the

ethical system of the founder of the later German philosophy, without

regard to his successors, lies in the fact that he stood, on the

practical side, in as definite a relation to the English moralists of

last century, as, in his speculative philosophy, to Locke and Hume.

IMMANUEL, KANT. [1724-1804.]

The ethical writings of Kant, in the order of their appearance,

are--_Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals_ (1785); _Critique of the

Practical Reason_ (1788); _Metaphysic of Morals_ (1797, in two

parts--(1) _Doctrine of Right_ or Jurisprudence, (2) _Doctrine of

Virtue_ or Ethics proper). The third work contains the details of his

system; the general theory is presented in the two others. Of these we

select for analysis the earlier, containing, as it does, in less

artificial form, an ampler discussion of the fundamental questions of

morals; but towards the end it must be supplemented, in regard to

certain characteristic doctrines, from the second, in some respects

more developed, work.[26]

In the introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant distinguishes

between the empirical and the rational mode of treating Ethics. He

announces his intention to depart from the common plan of mixing up the

two together, and to attempt for once to set forth the _pure_ moral

philosophy that is implied even in the vulgar ideas of duty and moral

law. Because a moral law means an absolute necessity laid on all

rational beings whatever, its foundation is to be sought, not in human

nature or circumstances, but _à priori_ in the conception of pure

reason. The most universal precept founded on mere experience is only a

practical rule, and never a moral law. A purely rational moral

philosophy, or Metaphysic of Morals, will serve the double end of

meeting a speculative requirement, and of furnishing the only true norm

of practice. It investigates the idea and principles of a potentially

pure Will, instead of the acts and conditions of human volition as

known from psychology. Not a complete Metaphysic of Morals, however,

(which would be a Critique of the pure Practical Reason), but merely a

foundation for such will be given. The supreme principle of morality is

to be established, apart from detailed application. First, common

notions will be analyzed in order to get at this highest principle; and

then, when the principle has been sought out, they will be returned

upon by way of synthesis.

In the first of the three main sections of the work, he makes the

passage from Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to Philosophical.

Nothing in the world, he begins, can without qualification be called

good, except _Will_. Qualities of temperament, like courage, &c., gifts

of fortune, like wealth and power, are good only with reference to a

good will. As to a good will, when it is really such, the circumstance

that it can, or cannot, be executed does not matter; its value is

independent of the utility or fruitlessness of it.

This idea of the absolute worth of mere Will, though it is allowed even

by the vulgar understanding, he seeks to establish beyond dispute, by

an argument from the natural _subjection_ of Will to Reason. In a being

well-organized, if Conservation or Happiness were the grand aim, such

subjection would be a great mistake. When Instinct could do the work

far better and more surely, Reason should have been deprived of all

practical function. Discontent, in fact, rather than happiness comes of

pursuit of mere enjoyment by rational calculation; and to make light of

the part contributed by Reason to happiness, is really to make out that

it exists for a nobler purpose. But now, since Reason _is_ a practical

faculty and governs the will, its function can only be to produce a

Will good in itself. Such a Will, if not the only good, is certainly

the highest; and happiness, unattainable by Reason as a primary aim,

and subject in this life altogether to much limitation, is to be sought

only in the contentment that arises from the attainment by Reason of

its true aim, at the sacrifice often of many a natural inclination.

He proceeds to develop this conception of a Will in itself good and

estimable, by dealing with the commonly received ideas of Duty. Leaving

aside profitable actions that are plain violations of duty, and also

actions conformed to duty, but, while not prompted directly by nature,

done from some special inclination--in which case it is easy to

distinguish whether the action is done from duty or from self-interest;

he considers those more difficult cases where the same action is at

once duty, and prompted by direct natural inclination. In all such,

whether it be duty of self-preservation, of benevolence, of securing

one's own happiness (this last a duty, because discontent and the

pressure of care may easily lead to the transgression of other duties),

he lays it down that the action is not allowed to have true moral

value, unless done in the abeyance or absence of the natural

inclination prompting to it. A second position is, that the moral value

of an action done from duty lies not in the intention of it, but in the

maxim that determines it; not in the object, but in the _principle of

Volition_. That is to say, in action done out of regard to duty, the

will must be determined by its _formal à priori_ principle, not being

determined by any _material à posteriori_ motive. A third position

follows then from the other two; Duty is the necessity of an action out

of respect for Law. Towards an object there may be inclination, and

this inclination may be matter for approval or liking; but it is Law

only--the ground and not the effect of Volition, bearing down

inclination rather than serving it--that can inspire _Respect_. When

inclination and motives are both excluded, nothing remains to determine

Will, except Law objectively; and, subjectively, pure respect for a law

of practice--_i.e._, the maxim to follow such a law, even at the

sacrifice of every inclination. The conception of Law-in-itself alone

determining the will, is, then, the surpassing good that is called

moral, which exists already in a man before his action has any result.

Conformity to Law in general, all special motive to follow any single

law being excluded, remains as the one principle of Volition: I am

never to act otherwise, than so as to be able also to wish that my

maxim (_i.e._, my subjective principle of volition) should become a

universal law. This is what he finds implied in the common notions of

Duty.

Having illustrated at length this reading, in regard to the duty of

keeping a promise, he contrasts, at the close of the section, the all

but infallibility of common human reason in practice with its

helplessness in speculation. Notwithstanding, it finds itself unable to

settle the contending claims of Reason and Inclination, and so is

driven to devise a practical philosophy, owing to the rise of a

'Natural Dialectic' or tendency to refine upon the strict laws of duty

in order to make them more pleasant. But, as in the speculative region,

the Dialectic cannot be properly got rid of without a complete Critique

of Reason.

In Section II. the passage is made from the popular moral philosophy

thus arising to the metaphysic of morals. He denies that the notion of

duty that has been taken above from common sage is empirical. It is

proved not to be such from the very assertions of philosophers that men

always act from more or less refined self-love; assertions that are

founded upon the difficulty of proving that acts most apparently

conformed to duty are really such. The fact is, no act _can_ be proved

by experience to be absolutely moral, _i.e._, done solely from regard

to duty, to the exclusion of all inclination; and therefore to concede

that morality and duty are ideas to be had from experience, is the

surest way to get rid of them altogether. Duty, and respect for its

law, are not to be preserved at all, unless Reason is allowed to lay

_absolute_ injunctions on the will, whatever experience says of their

non-execution. How, indeed, is experience to disclose a moral law,

that, in applying to all rational beings as well as men, and to men

only as rational, must originate _à priori_ in pure (practical) Reason?

Instead of yielding the principles of morality, empirical examples of

moral conduct have rather to be judged by these.

All supreme principles of morality, that are genuine, must rest on pure

Reason solely; and the mistake of the popular practical philosophies in

vogue, one and all--whether advancing as their principle a special

determination of human nature, or Perfection, or Happiness, or Moral

Feeling, or Fear of God, or a little of this and a little of that--is

that there has been no previous consideration whether the principles of

morality are to be sought for in our empirical knowledge of human

nature at all. Such consideration would have shown them to be

altogether _à priori_, and would have appeared as a _pure_ practical

philosophy or metaphysic of morals (upon the completion of which any

popularizing might have waited), kept free from admixture of

Anthropology, Theology, Physics, Hyperphysics, &c., and setting forth

the conception of Duty as purely rational, without the confusion of

empirical motives. To a metaphysic of this kind, Kant is now to ascend

from the popular philosophy, with its stock-in-trade of single

instances, following out the practical faculty of Reason from the

general rules determining it, to the point where the conception of Duty

emerges.

While things in nature work according to laws, rational beings alone

can act according to a conceived idea of laws, _i.e._, to principles.

This is to have a Will, or, what is the same, Practical Reason, reason

being required in deducing actions from laws. If the Will follows

Reason exactly and without fail, actions objectively necessary are

necessary also subjectively; if, through subjective conditions

(inclinations, &c.), the Will does not follow Reason inevitably,

objectively necessary actions become subjectively contingent, and

towards the objective laws the attitude of the will is no longer

unfailing choice, but _constraint_. A constraining objective principle

mentally represented, is a _command_; its formula is called

_Imperative_, for which the expression is _Ought_. A will perfectly

good--_i.e._, subjectively determined to follow the objective laws of

good as soon as conceived--knows no Ought. Imperatives are only for an

imperfect, such as is the human, will. _Hypothetical_ Imperatives

represent the practical necessity of an action as a means to an end,

being _problematical_ or _assertory_ principles, according as the end

is possible or real. _Categorical_ Imperatives represent an action as

objectively necessary for itself, and count as _apodeictical_

principles.

To the endless number of possible aims of human action correspond as

many Imperatives, directing merely how they are to be attained, without

any question of their value; these are Imperatives of _Fitness_. To one

real aim, existing necessarily for all rational beings, viz.,

Happiness, corresponds the Imperative of _Prudence_ (in the narrow

sense), being assertory while hypothetical. The categorical Imperative,

enjoining a mode of action for itself, and concerned about the form and

principle of it, not its nature and result, is the Imperative of

_Morality_. These various kinds of Imperatives, as influencing the

will, may be distinguished as _Rules_ (of fitness), _Counsels_ (of

prudence), _Commands_ or _Laws_ (of morality); also as _technical,

pragmatical, moral_.

Now, as to the question of the possibility of these different

Imperatives--how they can be supposed able to influence or act upon the

Will--there is in the first case no difficulty; in wishing an end it is

necessarily implied that we wish the indispensable means, when this is

in our power. In like manner, the Imperatives of Prudence are also

_analytical_ in character (_i.e._, given by implication), if only it

were possible to have a definite idea of the end sought, viz.,

happiness. But, in fact, with the elements of happiness to be got from

experience at the same time that the idea requires an absolute whole,

or maximum, of satisfaction now and at every future moment, no finite

being can know precisely what he wants, or what may be the effect of

any of his wishes. Action, on fixed principles, with a view to

happiness, is, therefore, not possible; and one can only follow

empirical directions, about Diet, Frugality, Politeness, &c., seen on

the whole to promote it. Although, however, there is no certainty of

causing happiness, and the Imperatives with reference thereto are mere

counsels, they retain their character of analytical propositions, and

their action on the will is not less possible than in the former case.

To prove the possibility of the Imperative of morality is more

difficult. As categorical, it presupposes nothing else to rest its

necessity upon; while by way of experience, it can never be made out to

be more than a prudential precept--_i.e._, a pragmatic or hypothetic

principle. Its possibility must therefore be established _à priori_.

But the difficulty will then appear no matter of wonder, when it is

remembered (from the Critique of Pure Reason) how hard it is to

establish synthetic propositions _à priori_.

The question of the possibility, however, meanwhile postponed, the mere

conception of a categorical Imperative is found to yield the one

formula that can express it, from its not being dependent, like a

hypothetical Imperative, on any external condition. Besides the Law (or

objective principle of conduct), the only thing implied in the

Imperative being the necessity laid upon the _Maxim_ (or subjective

principle) to conform to the law--a law limited by no condition; there

is nothing for the maxim to be conformed to but the universality of a

law in general, and it is the conformity alone that properly

constitutes the Imperative necessary. The Imperative is thus single,

and runs: _Act according to that maxim only which you can wish at the

same time to become a_ _universal law_. Or, since universality of law

as determining effects is what we understand by nature: _Act as if the

maxim of your action ought by your will to become the universal law of

nature_.

Taking cases of duties according to the common divisions of duties to

ourselves and to others, perfect and imperfect, he proceeds to show

that they may be all deduced from the single Imperative; the question

of the _reality_ of duty, which is the same as the establishment of the

possibility of the Imperative as a synthetic practical proposition _à

priori_, at present altogether apart. Suppose a man tempted to commit

suicide, with the view of bettering his evil condition; but it is

contradictory that the very principle of self-conservation should lead

to self-destruction, and such a maxim of conduct cannot therefore

become a universal law of nature. Next, the case of a man borrowing

without meaning to repay, has only to be turned into a universal law,

and the thing becomes impossible; nobody would lend. Again, to neglect

a talent that is generally useful for mere ease and self-gratification,

can indeed be supposed a universal practice, but can never be wished to

be. Finally, to refuse help to others universally might not ruin the

race, but can be wished by no one that knows how soon he must himself

need assistance. Now, the rule was, that a maxim of conduct should be

_wished_ to become the universal law. In the last two cases, it cannot

be wished; in the others, the maxim cannot even be conceived in

universal form. Thus, two grades of duty, one admitting of merit, the

other so strict as to be irremissible, are established on the general

principle. The principle is moreover confirmed in the case of

transgression of duty: the transgressor by no means wishes to have his

act turned into a general rule, but only seeks special and temporary

exemption from a law allowed by himself to be universal.

Notwithstanding this force and ease of application, a categorical

Imperative has not yet been proved _à priori_ actually existent; and it

was allowed that it could not be proved empirically, elements of

inclination, interest, &c., being inconsistent with morality. The real

question is this: Is it a necessary law that all rational beings should

act on maxims that they can wish, to become universal laws? If so, this

must be bound up with the very notion of the will of a rational being;

the relation of the will to itself being to be determined _à priori_ by

pure Reason. The Will is considered as a power of self-determination to

act according to certain laws as represented to the mind, existing only

in rational beings. And, if the objective ground of self-determination,

or _End_, is supplied by mere Reason, it must be the same for all

rational beings. _Ends_ may be divided into _Subjective_, resting upon

individual _Impulses_ or subjective grounds of desire; and _Objective_,

depending on _Motives_ or objective grounds of Volition valid for all

rational beings. The principles of action are, in the one case,

_Material_, and, in the other, _Formal, i.e._, abstracted from all

subjective ends. Material ends, as relative, beget only hypothetical

Imperatives. But, supposed some thing, the presence of which in itself

has an absolute value, and which, as End-in-self, can be a ground of

fixed laws; there, and there only, can be the ground of a possible

categorical Imperative, or Law of Practice.

Now, such an End-in-self (not a thing with merely conditional value,--a

means to be used arbitrarily) is Man and every rational being, as

_Person_. There is no other objective end with absolute value that can

supply to the Reason the supreme practical principle requisite for

turning subjective principles of action into objective principles of

volition. Rational Nature as End-in-self is a subjective principle to a

man having this conception of his own being, but becomes objective when

every rational being has the same from the same ground in Reason. Hence

a new form (the second) to the practical Imperative: _Act so as to use

Humanity (Human Nature) as well in your own person, as in the person of

another, ever as end also, and never merely as means_.

To this new formula, the old examples are easily squared. Suicide is

using one's person as a mere means to a tolerable existence; breaking

faith to others is using them as means, not as ends-in-self; neglect of

self-cultivation is the not furthering human nature as end-in-self in

one's own person; withholding help is refusing to further Humanity as

end-in-self through the medium of the aims of others. [In a note he

denies that 'the trivial, Do to others as you would,' &c., is a full

expression of the law of duty: it contains the ground, neither of

duties to self; nor of duties of benevolence to others, for many would

forego receiving good on conditions of not conferring it; nor of the

duty of retribution, for the malefactor could turn it against his

judge, &c.]

The universality of this principle of Human and Rational Nature as

End-in-self, as also its character of objective end limiting merely

subjective ends, prove that its source is in pure Reason. Objectively,

the ground of all practical legislation is Rule and the Form of

Universality that enables rule to be Law (of Nature), according to

principle first (in its double form); subjectively, it is End, the

subject of all ends being every rational being as End-in-self,

according to principle second. Hence follows the third practical

principle of the Will, as supreme condition of its agreement with

universal practical Reason--_the idea of the Will of every rational

being as a Will that legislates universally_. The Will, if subject to

law, has first itself imposed it.

This new idea--of the Will of every rational being as universally

legislative--is what, in the implication of the Categorical Imperative,

specifically marks it off from any Hypothetical: Interest is seen to be

quite incompatible with Duty, if Duty is Volition of this kind. A will

merely subject to laws can be bound to them by interest; not so a will

itself legislating supremely, for that would imply another law to keep

the interest of self-love from trenching upon the validity of the

universal law. Illustration is not needed to prove that a Categorical

Imperative, or law for the will of every rational being, if it exist at

all, cannot exclude Interest and be unconditional, except as enjoining

everything to be done from the maxim of a will that in legislating

universally can have itself for object. This is the point that has been

always missed, that the laws of duty shall be at once self-imposed and

yet universal. Subjection to a law not springing from one's own will

implies interest or constraint, and constitutes a certain necessity of

action, but never makes Duty. Be the interest one's own or another's,

the Imperative is conditional only. Kant's principle is the _Autonomy

of the Will_; every other its _Heteronomy_.

The new point of view opens up the very fruitful conception of an

_Empire_ or _Realm of Ends_. As a Realm is the systematic union of

rational beings by means of common laws, so the ends determined by the

laws may, abstractly viewed, be taken to form a systematic whole.

Rational beings, as subject to a law requiring them to treat themselves

and others as ends and never merely as means, enter into a systematic

union by means of common objective laws, _i.e._ into an (ideal) Empire

or Realm of Ends, from the laws being concerned about the mutual

relations of rational beings as Ends and Means. In this Realm, a

rational being is either Head or Member: Head, if legislating

universally and with complete independence; Member, if also

universally, but at the same time subject to the laws. When now the

maxim of the will does not by nature accord necessarily with the demand

of the objective principle--that the will through its maxim be able to

regard itself at the same time as legislating; universally--a practical

constraint is exerted by the principle, which is _Duty_, lying on every

Member in the Realm of Ends (not on the Head) alike. This necessity of

practice reposes, not on feeling, impulse, or inclination, but on the

relation between rational beings arising from the fact that each, as

End-in-self, legislates universally. The Reason gives a universal

application to every maxim of the Will; not from any motive of

interest, but from the idea of the _Dignity_ of a rational being that

follows no law that it does not itself at the same time give.

Everything in the Realm of Ends has either a _Price_ or a _Dignity_.

Skill, Diligence, &c., bearing on human likings and needs, have a

_Market-price_; Qualities like Wit, Fancy, &c., appealing to Taste or

Emotional Satisfaction, have an _Affection-price_. But Morality, the

only way of being End-in-self, and legislating member in the Realm of

Ends, has an intrinsic _Worth or Dignity_, calculable in nothing else.

Its worth is not in results, but in dispositions of Will; its actions

need neither recommendation from a subjective disposition or taste, nor

prompting from immediate tendency or feeling. Being laid on the Will by

Reason, they make the Will, in the execution, the object of an

immediate _Respect_, testifying to a Dignity beyond all price. The

grounds of these lofty claims in moral goodness and virtue are the

participation by a rational being in the universal legislation, fitness

to be a member in a possible Realm of Ends, subjection only to

self-imposed laws. Nothing having value but as the law confers it, an

unconditional, incomparable worth attaches to the giving of the law,

and _Respect_ is the only word that expresses a rational being's

appreciation of that. Autonomy is thus the foundation of the dignity of

human and of all rational nature.

The three different expressions that have been given to the one general

principle of morality imply each the others, and differ merely in their

mode of presenting one idea of the Reason to the mind. _Universal

application of the Maxim of Conduct, as if it were a law of nature_, is

the formula of the Will as absolutely good; _universal prohibition

against the use of rational beings ever as means only_, has reference

to the fact that a good will in a rational being is an altogether

independent and ultimate End, an End-in-self in all; _universal

legislation of each for all_ recognizes the prerogative or special

dignity of rational beings, that they necessarily take their maxims

from the point of view of all, and must regard themselves, being

Ends-in-self, as members in a Realm of Ends (analogous to the Realm, or

Kingdom of Nature), which, though merely an ideal and possible

conception, none the less really imposes an imperative upon action.

_Morality_, he concludes, is _the relation of actions to the Autonomy

of the Will_, _i.e._, to possible universal legislation through its

maxims. Actions that can co-exist with this autonomy are _allowed_; all

others are not. A will, whose maxims necessarily accord with the laws

of Autonomy, is holy, or absolutely good; the dependence of a will not

thus absolutely good is _Obligation_. The objective necessity of an

action from obligation is _Duty. Subjection to law_ is not the only

element in duty; the fact of the law being self-imposed gives

_Dignity_.

The Autonomy of the will is its being a law to itself, without respect

to the objects of volition; the principle of autonomy is to choose only

in such a way as that the maxims of choice are conceived at the same

time as a universal law. This rule cannot be proved analytically to be

an Imperative, absolutely binding on every will; as a synthetic

proposition it requires, besides a knowledge of the objects, a critique

of the subject, _i.e._, pure practical Reason, before, in its

apodeictic character, it can be proved completely _à priori_. Still the

mere analysis of moral conceptions has sufficed to prove it the sole

principle of morals, because this principle is seen to be a categorical

Imperative, and a categorical Imperative enjoins neither more nor less

than this Autonomy. If, then, Autonomy of Will is the supreme

principle, Heteronomy is the source of all ungenuine principles, of

Morality. Heteronomy is whenever the Will does not give itself laws,

but some object, in relation to the Will, gives them. There is then

never more than a hypothetical Imperative: I am to do something because

I wish something else.

There follows a division and criticism of the various possible

principles of morality that can be set up on the assumption of

Heteronomy, and that have been put forward by human Reason in default

of the required Critique of its pure use. Such, are either _Empirical_

or _Rational_. The Empirical, embodying the principle of _Happiness_,

are founded on (1) _physical_ or (2) _moral feeling_; the Rational,

embodying the principle of _perfection_, on (1) the rational conception

of it as a possible result, or (2) the conception of an independent

perfection (the Will of God), as the determining cause of the will. The

Empirical principles are altogether to be rejected, because they can

give no universal law for all rational beings; of the Rational

principles, the first, though setting up an empty and indefinite

conception, has the merit of at least making an appeal from sense to

pure reason. But the fatal objection to all four is their implying

Heteronomy; no imperative founded on them can utter moral, _i.e._,

categorical commands.

That the absolutely good Will must be autonomous--_i.e._, without any

kind of motive or interest, lay Commands on itself that are at the same

time fit to be laws for all rational beings, appears, then, from a

deeper consideration of even the popular conceptions of morality. But

now the question can no longer be put off: Is Morality, of which this

is the only conception, a reality or a phantom? All the different

expressions given to the Categorical Imperatives are synthetic

practical propositions _a priori_; they postulate a possible synthetic

use of the pure practical reason. Is there, and how is there, such a

possible synthetic use? This is the question (the same as the other)

that Kant proceeds to answer in the Third Section, by giving, in

default of a complete Critique of the faculty, as much as is necessary

for the purpose. But here, since he afterwards undertook the full

Critique, it is better to stop the analysis of the earlier work, and

summarily draw upon both for the remainder of the argument, and the

rather because some important points have to be added that occur only

in the later treatise. The foregoing is a sufficient example of his

method of treatment.

The synthetic use of the pure practical reason, in the Categorical

Imperative, is legitimized; Autonomy of the Will is explained; Duty is

shown to be no phantom--through the conception of Freedom of Will,

properly understood. Theoretically (speculatively), Freedom is

undemonstrable; being eternally met, in one of the (cosmological)

Antinomies of the Pure Reason, by the counter-assertion that everything

in the universe takes place according to unchanging laws of nature.

Even theoretically, however, Freedom is not inconceivable, and morally

we become certain of it; for we are conscious of the 'ought' of duty,

and with the 'ought' there must go a 'can.' It is not, however, as

Phenomenon or Sensible Ens that a man 'can,' is free, has an absolute

initiative; all phenomena or Sensible Entia, being in space and time,

are subject to the Natural Law of Causality. But man is also Noumenon,

Thing-in-self, Intelligible Ens; and as such, being free from

conditions of time and space, stands outside of the sequence of Nature.

Now, the Noumenon or Ens of the Reason (he assumes) stands higher than,

or has a value above, the Phenomenon or Sensible Ens (as much as Reason

stands higher than Sense and Inclination); accordingly, while it is

only man as Noumenon that 'can,' it is to man as Phenomenon that the

'ought' is properly addressed; it is upon man as Phenomenon that the

law of Duty, prescribed, with perfect freedom from motive, by Man as

Noumenon, is laid.

_Freedom of Will_ in Man as Rational End or Thing-in-self is thus the

great Postulate of the pure Practical Reason; we can be sure of the

fact (although it must always remain speculatively undemonstrable),

because else there could be no explanation of the Categorical

Imperative of Duty. But inasmuch as the Practical Reason, besides

enjoining a law of Duty, must provide also a final end of action in the

idea of an unconditioned Supreme Good, it contains also two other

Postulates: Man being a sentient as well as a rational being, Happiness

as well as Perfect Virtue or Moral Perfection must enter into the

Summum Bonum (not, one of them to the exclusion of the other, as the

Stoics and Epicureans, in different senses, declared). Now, since there

is no such necessary conjunction of the two in nature, it must be

sought otherwise. It is found in postulating _Immortality_ and _God_.

_Immortality_ is required to render possible the attainment of moral

perfection. Virtue out of _respect_ for law, with a constant tendency

to fall away, is all that is attainable in life. The _Holiness_, or

complete accommodation of the will to the Moral Law, implied in the

Summum Bonum, can be attained to only in the course of an infinite

progression; which means personal Immortality. [As in the former case,

the _speculative_ impossibility of proving the immateriality, &c., of

the supernatural soul is not here overcome; but Immortality is

_morally_ certain, being demanded by the Practical Reason.]

Moral perfection thus provided for, _God_ must be postulated in order

to find the ground of the required conjunction of Felicity. Happiness

is the condition of the rational being in whose whole existence

everything goes according to wish and will; and this is not the

condition of man, for in him observance of the moral law is not

conjoined with power of disposal over the laws of nature. But, as

Practical Reason demands the conjunction, it is to be found only in a

being who is the author at once of Nature and of the Moral Law; and

this is God. [The same remark once more applies, that here what is

obtained is a _moral_ certainty of the existence of the Deity: the

negative result of the Critique of the Pure _(speculative)_ Reason

abides what it was.]

We may now attempt to summarize this abstruse Ethical theory of Kant.

I---The STANDARD of morally good action (or rather Will), as expressed

in the different forms of the Categorical Imperative, is the

possibility of its being universally extended as a law for all rational

beings. His meaning comes out still better in the obverse statement:

The action is bad that _cannot be_, or at least _cannot be wished to

lie_, turned unto a universal law.

II.--Kant would expressly demur to being questioned as to his

PSYCHOLOGY of Ethics; since he puts his own theory in express

opposition to every other founded upon any empirical view of the mental

constitution. Nevertheless, we may extract some kind of answers to the

usual queries.

The Faculty is the (pure Practical) Reason. The apprehension of what is

morally right is entirely an affair of Reason; the only element of

Feeling is an added Sentiment of Awe or Respect for the law that Reason

imposes, this being a law, not only for me who impose it on myself, but

at the same time for every rational agent. The Pure Reason, which means

with Kant the Faculty of Principles, is _Speculative_ or _Practical_.

As _Speculative_, it _requires_ us to bring our knowledge (of the

understanding) to certain higher unconditioned unities (Soul, Cosmos,

God); but there is error if these are themselves regarded as facts of

knowledge. As _Practical_, it sets up an unconditional law of Duty in

Action (unconditioned by motives); and in this and in the related

conception of the Summum Bonum is contained a moral certainty of the

Immortality (of the soul), Freedom (in the midst of Natural Necessity),

and of God as existent.

As to the point of Free-will, nothing more need be said.

Disinterested Sentiment, as _sentiment_, is very little regarded:

disinterested _action_ is required with such rigour that every act or

disposition is made to lose its character as moral, according as any

element of interested feeling of any kind enters into it. Kant

obliterates the line between Duty and Virtue, by making a duty of every

virtue; at least he conceives clearly that there is no Virtue in doing

what we are strongly prompted to by inclination--that virtue must

involve self-sacrifice.

III.--His position with respect to Happiness is peculiar. Happiness is

not the end of action: the end of action is rather the self-assertion

of the rational faculty over the lower man.

If the constituents of Happiness could be known--and they cannot

be--there would be no _morality_, but only _prudence_ in the pursuit of

them. To promote our own happiness is indeed a duty, but in order to

keep us from neglecting our other duties.

Nevertheless, he conceives it necessary that there should be an

ultimate equation of Virtue and Happiness; and the need of Happiness he

then expressly connects with the sensuous side of our being.

IV.--His MORAL CODE may here be shortly presented from the second part

of his latest work, where it is fully given. Distinguishing _Moral_

Duties or (as he calls them) '_Virtue-duties,'_ left to be enforced

internally by Conscience, from _Legal_ Duties _(Rechtspflichten)_,

externally enforced, he divides them into two classes--(A) Duties to

_Self_; (B) Duties to _Others_.

(A) Duties to _Self_. These have regard to the one _private_ Aim or End

that a man can make a duty of, viz., his own _Perfection_; for his own

_Happiness_, being provided for by a natural propensity or inclination,

is to himself no duty. They are (a) _perfect_ (negative or restrictive)

as directed to mere Self-Conservation; (b) _imperfect_ (positive or

extensive) as directed to the Advancement or Perfecting of one's being.

The _perfect_ are concerned about Self (a), as an _Animal_ creature,

and then are directed against--(1) _Self-destruction_, (2) _Sexual

Excess_, (3) _Intemperance in Eating and Drinking_; (B) as a _Moral_

creature, and then are directed against--(1) _Lying_, (2) _Avarice_,

(3) _Servility_. The _imperfect_ have reference to (a) _physical_, (B)

_moral_ advancement or perfection (subjectively. _Purity_ or

_Holiness_).

(B) Duties to _Others_. These have regard to the only Aim or End of

others that a man can make a duty of, viz., their _Happiness_; for

their _Perfection_ can be promoted only by themselves. Duties to others

_as men_ are metaphysically deducible; and application to _special

conditions_ of men is to be made empirically. They include (a) Duties

of LOVE, involving _Merit_ or _Desert (i.e._, return from the objects

of them) in the performance: (1) _Beneficence_, (2) _Gratitude_, (3)

_Fellow-feeling_; (b) Duties of RESPECT, absolutely _due_ to others as

men; the opposites are the _vices_: (1) _Haughtiness_, (2) _Slander_,

(3) _Scornfulness_. In _Friendship_, Love and Respect are combined in

the highest degree. Lastly, he notes _Social_ duties in human

intercourse _(Affability_, &c.)--these being _outworks_ of morality.

He allows no special Duties to God, or Inferior Creatures, beyond what

is contained in Moral Perfection as Duty to Self.

V.--The conception of Law enters largely into Kant's theory of morals,

but in a sense purely transcendental, and not as subjecting or

assimilating morality to positive political institution. The _Legality_

of external _actions_, as well as the _Morality_ of internal

_dispositions_, is determined by reference to the one universal moral

Imperative. The principle underlying all _legal_ or _jural_ (as opposed

to moral or ethical) provisions, is the necessity of uniting in a

universal law of freedom the spontaneity of each with the spontaneity

of all the others: individual freedom and freedom of all must be made

to subsist together in a universal law.

VI.--With Kant, Religion and Morality are very closely connected, or,

in a sense, even identified; but the alliance is not at the expense of

Morality. So far from making this dependent on Religion, he can find

nothing but the moral conviction whereon to establish the religious

doctrines of Immortality and the Existence of God; while, in a special

work, he declares further that Religion consists merely in the practice

of Morality as a system of divine commands, and claims to judge of all

religious institutions and dogmas by the moral consciousness. Besides,

the Postulates themselves, in which the passage to Religion is made,

are not all equally imperative,--Freedom, as the ground of the fact of

Duty, being more urgently demanded than others; and he even goes so far

as to make the allowance, that whoever has sufficient moral strength to

fulfil the Law of Reason without them, is not required to subscribe to

them.

The modern French school, that has arisen in this century under the

combined influence of the Scotch and the German philosophy, has

bestowed some attention on Ethics. We end by noticing under it Cousin

and Jouffroy.

VICTOR COUSIN. [1792-1867.]

The analysis of Cousin's ethical views is made upon his historical

lectures _Sur les Idees du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_, as delivered in

1817-18. They contain a dogmatic exposition of his own opinions,

beginning at the 20th lecture; the three preceding lectures, in the

section of the whole course devoted to the Good, being taken up with

the preliminary review of other opinions required for his eclectical

purpose.

He determines to consider, by way of psychological analysis, the ideas

and sentiments of every kind called up by the spectacle of human

actions; and first he notes actions that please and displease the

senses, or in some way affect our interest: those that are agreeable

and useful we naturally choose, avoiding the opposites, and in this we

are _prudent_. But there is another set of actions, having no reference

to our own personal interest, which yet we qualify as good or bad. When

an armed robber kills and spoils a defenceless man, we, though

beholding the sight in safety, are at once stirred up to disinterested

horror and indignation. This is no mere passing sentiment, but includes

a two-fold judgment, pronounced then and ever after; that the action is

in itself bad, and that it ought not to be committed. Still farther,

our anger implies that the object of it is conscious of the evil and

the obligation, and is therefore responsible; wherein again is implied

that he is a free agent. And, finally, demanding as we do that he

should be punished, we pass what has been called a judgment of merit

and demerit, which is built upon an idea in our minds of a supreme law,

joining happiness to virtue and misfortune to crime.

The analysis thus far he claims to be strictly scientific; he now

proceeds to vary the case, taking actions of our own. I am supposed

entrusted by a dying friend with a deposit for another, and a struggle

ensues between interest and probity as to whether I should pay it. If

interest conquers, remorse ensues. He paints the state of remorse, and

analyzes it into the same elements as before, the idea of _good_ and

_evil_, of an _obligatory law_, of _liberty_, of _merit_ and _demerit_;

it thus includes the whole phenomenon of morality. The exactly opposite

state that follows upon the victory of probity, is proved to imply the

same facts.

The Moral Sentiment, so striking in its character, has by some been

supposed the foundation of all morality, but in point of fact it is

itself constituted by these various judgments. Now that they are known

to stand as its elements, he goes on to subject each to a stricter

analysis, taking first the judgment of _good_ and _evil_, which is at

the bottom of all the rest. It lies in the original constitution of

human nature, being simple and indecomposable, like the judgment of the

True and the Beautiful. It is absolute, and cannot be withheld in

presence of certain acts; but it only declares, and does not

constitute, good and evil, these being real and independent qualities

of actions. Applied at first to special cases, the judgment of good

gives birth to general principles that become rules for judging other

actions. Like other sciences, morality has its axioms, justly called

moral truths; if it is good to keep an oath, it is also true, the oath

being made with no other purpose than to be kept. Faithful guarding as

much belongs to the idea of a deposit, as the equality between its

three angles and two right angles to the idea of a triangle. By no

caprice or effort of will can a moral verity be made in the smallest

degree other than it is.

But, he goes on, a moral verity is not simply to be believed; it must

also be practised, and this is _obligation_, the second of the elements

of moral sentiment. Obligation, like moral truth, on which it rests, is

absolute, immutable, universal. Kant even went so far as to make it the

principle of our morality; but this was subjectivizing good, as he had

subjectivized truth. Before there is an obligation to act, there must

be an intrinsic goodness in the action; the real first truth of

morality is justics, _i.e._, the essential distinction of good and

evil. It is justice, therefore, and not duty, that strictly deserves

the name of a principle.

The next element is _liberty_. Obligation implies the faculty of

resisting desire, passion, &c., else there would be a contradiction in

human nature. But the truest proof of liberty is to be sought in the

constant testimony of consciousness, that, in wishing this or that, I

am equally able to will the contrary. He distinguishes between the

power of willing and the power of executing; also between will and

desire, or passion. In the conflict between will and the tyranny of

desire lies liberty; and the aim of the conflict is the fulfilment of

duty. For the will is never so free, never so much itself, as when

yielding to the law of duty. Persons are distinguished from Things in

having responsibility, dignity, intrinsic value. Because there is in me

a being worthy of respect, I am bound in duty to respect myself, and I

have the _right_ to be respected by you. My duty (he means, of course,

what I owe to self) is the exact measure of my right. The character of

being a _person_ is inviolable, is the foundation of property, is

inalienable by self or others, and so forth.

He passes to the last element of the phenomenon of morality, the

judgement of _merit_ and _demerit_. The judgement follows, as the agent

is supposed free, and it is not affected by lapse of time. It depends

also essentially on the idea that the agent knows good from evil. Upon

itself follow the notions of reward and punishment. Merit is the

natural right to be rewarded; demerit, paradox as it may appear, is the

_right_ to be punished. A criminal would claim to be punished, if he

could comprehend the absolute necessity of expiation; and are there not

real cases of such criminals? But as there can be merit without actual

reward, so to be rewarded does not constitute merit.

If good, he continues, is good in itself, and ought to be done without

regard to consequences, it is no less true that the consequences of

good cannot fail to be happy. Virtue without happiness and crime

without misfortune are a contradiction, a disorder; which are hardly

met with in the world, even as it is, or, where in a few cases they are

found, are sure to be righted in the end by eternal justice. The

sacrifice supposed in virtue, if generously accepted and courageously

undergone, has to be recompensed in respect of the amount of happiness

sacrificed.

Once more, he takes up the _Sentiment_, which is the general echo of

all the elements of the phenomenon. Its end is to make the mind

sensible of the bond between virtue and happiness; it is the direct and

vivid application of the law of merit. Again, he touches the states of

moral satisfaction and remorse, speaks of our sympathy with the moral

goodness of others and our benevolent feeling that arises towards

them--emotions all, but covering up judgments; and this is the end of

his detailed analysis of the actual facts of the case. But he still

goes on to sum up in exact expressions the foregoing results, and he

claims especially to have overlooked neither the part played by Reason,

nor the function of Sentiment. The rational character of the idea of

good gives morality its firm foundation; the lively sentiment helps to

lighten the often heavy burden of duty, and stirs up to the most heroic

deeds. Self-interest too is not denied its place. In this connexion,

led again to allude to the happiness appointed to virtue here or at

least hereafter, he allows that God may be regarded as the fountain of

morality, but only in the sense that his will is the expression of his

eternal wisdom and justice. Religion crowns morality, but morality is

based upon itself. The rest of the lecture is in praise of Eclecticism,

and advocates consideration of all the facts involved in morality, as

against exclusive theories founded upon only some of the facts.

Lectures 21st and 22nd, compressed into one (Ed. 1846) contain the

application of the foregoing principles, and the answer to the

question, what our duties are. Duty being absolute, truth becomes

obligatory, and absolute truth being known by the reason only, to obey

the law of duty is to obey reason. But what actions are conformable to

reason? The characteristic of reason he takes to be Universality, and

this will appear in the motives of actions, since it is these that

confer on actions their morality. Accordingly, the sign whereby to

discover whether an action is duty, is, if its motive when generalized

appear to the reason to be a maxim of universal legislation for all

free and intelligent beings. This, the norm set up by Kant, as

certainly discovers what is and is not duty, as the syllogism detects

the error and truth of an argument.

To obey reason is, then, the first duty, at the root of all others, and

itself resting directly upon the relation between liberty and reason;

in a sense, to remain reasonable is the sole duty. But it assumes

special forms amid the diversity of human relations. He first considers

the relations wherein we stand to ourselves and the corresponding

duties. That there should be any such duties is at first sight strange,

seeing we belong to ourselves; but this is not the same as having

complete power over ourselves. Possessing liberty, we must not abdicate

it by yielding to passions, and treat ourselves as if there were

nothing in us that merits respect. We are to distinguish between what

is peculiar to each of us, and what we share with humanity. Individual

peculiarities are things indifferent, but the liberty and intelligence

that constitute us persons, rather than individuals, demand to be

respected even by ourselves. There is an obligation of self-respect

imposed upon us as moral persons that was not established, and is not

to be destroyed, by us. As special cases of this respect of the moral

person in us, he cites (1) the duty of _self-control_ against anger or

melancholy, not for their pernicious consequences, but as trenching

upon the moral dignity of liberty and intelligence; (2) the duty of

_prudence_, meaning providence in all things, which regulates courage,

enjoins temperance, is, as the ancients said, the mother of all the

virtues,--in short, the government of liberty by reason; (3)

_veracity_; (4) duty towards the _body_; (5) duty of _perfecting_ (and

not merely keeping intact) the intelligence, liberty, and sensibility

that constitute us moral beings.

But the same liberty and intelligence that constitute me a moral

person, and need thus to be respected even by myself, exist also in

others, conferring rights on them, and imposing new duties of respect

on me relatively to them. To their intelligence I owe _Truth_; their

liberty I am bound to respect, sometimes even to the extent of not

hindering them from making a wrong use of it. I must respect also their

affections (family, &c.) which form part of themselves; their bodies;

their goods, whether acquired by labour or heritage. All these duties

are summed up in the one great duty of _Justice_ or respect for the

rights of others; of which the greatest violation is slavery.

The whole of duty towards others is not however comprehended in

justice. Conscience complains, if we have only not done injustice to

one in suffering. There is a new class of duties--_consolation,

charity, sacrifice_--to which indeed correspond no rights, and which

therefore are not so obligatory as justice, but which cannot be said

not to be obligatory. From their nature, they cannot be reduced to an

exact formula; their beauty lies in liberty. But in charity, he adds,

there is also a danger, from its effacing, to a certain extent, the

moral personality of the object of it. In acting upon others, we risk

interfering with their natural rights; charity is therefore to be

proportioned to the liberty and reason of the person benefited, and is

never to be made the means of usurping power over another.

Justice and Charity are the two elements composing social morality. But

what is social? and on what is Society founded, existing as it does

everywhere, and making man to be what he is? Into the hopeless question

of its origin he refuses to enter; its present state is to be studied

by the light of the knowledge of human nature. Its invariable

foundations are (1) the need we have of each other, and our social

instincts, (2) the lasting and indestructible idea and sentiment of

right and justice. The need and instinct, of which he finds many

proofs, begin society; justice crowns the work. The least consideration

of the relations of man to man, suggest the essential principles of

Society--justice, liberty, equality, government, punishment. Into each

of these he enters. Liberty is made out to be assured and developed in

society, instead of diminished. Equality is established upon the

character of moral personality, which admits of no degree. The need of

some repression upon liberty, where the liberty of others is trenched

upon, conducts to the idea of Government--a disinterested third party

armed with the necessary power to assure and defend the liberty of all.

To government is to be ascribed, first its inseparable function of

protecting the common liberty (without unnecessary repression), and

next, beneficent action, corresponding to the duty of charity. It

requires, for its guidance, a rule superior to itself, i.e., law, the

expression of universal and absolute justice. Here follows the usual

distinction of positive and natural law. The sanction of law is

punishment; the right of punishing, as was seen, depending on the idea

of demerit. Punishment is not mere vengeance, but the expiation by the

criminal of violated justice; it is to be measured therefore chiefly by

the demerit and not by the injury only. Whether, in punishing,

allowance should be made for correction and amelioration, is to put the

same case over again of charity coming in after justice.

Here the philosopher stops on the threshold of the special science of

politics. But already the fixed and invariable principles of society

and government have been given, and, even in the relative sphere of

politics, the rule still holds that all forms and institutions are to

be moulded as far as possible on the eternal principles supplied by

philosophy. The following is a summary of Cousin's views:--

I.--The Standard is the judgment of good or evil in actions. Cousin

holds that good and evil are qualities of actions independent of our

judgment, and having a sort of objective existence.

II.--The Moral Faculty he analyzes into four judgments: (1) good and

evil; (2) obligation; (3) freedom of the will; and (4) merit and

demerit. The moral sentiment is the emotions connected with those

judgments, and chiefly the feeling connected with the idea of merit.

[This analysis is obviously redundant. 'Good' and 'evil' apply to many

things outside ethics, and to be at all appropriate, they must be

qualified as _moral_ (i.e., _obligatory_) good and evil. The connexion

between obligation and demerit has been previously explained.]

III.--In regard to the Summum Bonum, Cousin considers that virtue must

bring happiness here or hereafter, and vice, misery.

IV.--He accepts the criterion of duties set forth by Kant. He argues

for the existence of duties towards ourselves.

V. and VI. require no remark.

THÉODORE SIMON JOUFFROY. [1796-1842.]

In the Second Lecture of his unfinished _Cours de Droit Naturel_,

Jouffroy gives a condensed exposition of the Moral Facts of human

nature from his own point of view.

What distinguishes, he says, one being from another, is its

Organization; and as having a special nature, every creature has a

special end. Its end or destination is its good, or its good consists

in the accomplishment of its end. Further, to have an end implies the

possession of faculties wherewith to attain it; and all this is

applicable also to man. In man, as in other creatures, from the very

first, his nature tends to its end, by means of purely instinctive

movements, which may be called primitive and instinctive tendencies of

human nature; later they are called passions. Along with these

tendencies, and under their influence, the intellectual faculties also

awake and seek to procure for them satisfaction. The faculties work,

however, at first, in an indeterminate fashion, and only by meeting

obstacles are driven to the concentration necessary to attain the ends.

He illustrates this by the case of the intellectual faculty seeking to

satisfy the desire of knowledge, and not succeeding until it

concentrates on a single point its scattered energies. This spontaneous

concentration is the first manifestation of Will, but is proved to be

not natural from the feeling of constraint always experienced, and the

glad rebound, after effort, to tho indeterminate condition. One fact,

too, remains even after every thing possible has been done, viz., that

the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies is never quite complete.

When, however, such satisfaction as may be, has been attained, there

arises pleasure; and pain, when our faculties fail to attain the good

or end they sought. There could be action, successful and unsuccessful,

and so good and evil, without any sensibility, wherefore good and evil

are not to be confounded with pain and pleasure; but constituted as we

are, there is a sensible echo that varies according as the result of

action is attained or not. Pleasure is, then, the consequence, and, as

it were, the sign of the realization of good, and pain of its

privation.

He next distinguishes Secondary passions from the great primary

tendencies and passions. These arise _apropos_ of external objects, as

they are found to further or oppose the satisfaction of the fundamental

tendencies. Such objects are then called _useful_ or _pernicious_.

Finally, he completes his account of the infantile or primitive

condition of man, by remarking that some of our natural tendencies,

like Sympathy, are entirely disinterested in seeking the good of

others. The main feature of the whole primitive state is the exclusive

domination of passion. The will already exists, but there is no

liberty; the present passion triumphs over the future, the stronger

over the weaker.

He now passes to consider the double transformation of this original

state, that takes place when reason appears. Reason is the faculty of

_comprehending_, which is different from knowing, and is peculiar to

man. As soon as it awakes in man, it comprehends, and penetrates to the

meaning of, the whole spectacle of human activity. It first forms the

general idea of _Good_ as the resultant of the satisfaction of all the

primary tendencies, and as the true End of man. Then, comprehending the

actual situation of man, it resolves this idea into the idea of the

_greatest possible_ good. All that conduces to the attainment of this

good, it includes under the general idea of the _Useful_; and finally,

it constructs the general idea of _Happiness_ out of all that is common

to the agreeable sensations that follow upon the satisfaction of the

primary tendencies.

But besides forming these three perfectly distinct ideas, and exploring

the secret of what has been passing within, the reason also comprehends

the necessity of subjecting to control the faculties and forces that

are the condition of the greatest satisfaction of human nature. In the

place of the merely mechanical impulsion of passion, which is coupled

with grave disadvantages, it puts forward, as a new principle of

action, the rational calculation of interest. The faculties are brought

into the service of this idea of the reason, by the same process of

concentration as was needful in satisfying the passions; only now

voluntarily instead of spontaneously. Being an idea instead of a

passion, the new principle supplies a real _motive_, under whose

guidance our natural power over our faculties is developed and

strengthened. All partial ends are merged in the one great End of

Interest, to which the means is self-control. The first great change

thus wrought by reason is, that it takes the direction of the human

forces into its own hand, and although, even when by a natural

transformation the new system of conduct acquires all the force of a

passion, it is not able steadily to procure for the idea of interest

the victory over the single passions, the change nevertheless abides.

To the state of Passion has succeeded the state of Egoism.

Reason must, however, he thinks, make another discovery before there is

a truly moral state--must from general ideas rise to ideas that are

universal and absolute. There is no real equation, he holds, between

Good and the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies, which is the

good of egoism. Not till the special ends of all creatures are regarded

as elements of one great End of creation, of Universal Order, do we

obtain an idea whose equivalence to the idea of the Good requires no

proof. The special ends are good, because, through their realization,

the end of creation, which is the absolute Good, is realized; hence

they acquire the sacred character that it has in the eye of reason.

No sooner is the idea of Universal Order present to the reason, than it

is recognized as an absolute law; and, in consequence, the special end

of our being, by participation in its character of goodness and

sacredness, is henceforth pursued as a duty, and its satisfaction

claimed as a right. Also every creature assumes the same position, and

we no longer merely concede that others have tendencies to be

satisfied, and consent from Sympathy or Egoism to promote their good;

but the idea of Universal Order makes it as much our duty to respect

and contribute to the accomplishment of their good as to accomplish our

own. From the idea of good-in-itself, i.e., Order, flow all duty,

right, obligation, morality, and natural legislation.

He carries the idea of Order still farther back to the Deity, making it

the expression of the divine thought, and opening up the religious side

of morality; but he does not mean that its obligatoriness as regards

the reason is thereby increased. He also identifies it, in the last

resort, with the ideas of the Beautiful and the True.

We have now reached the truly moral condition, a state perfectly

distinct from either of the foregoing. Even when the egoistic and the

moral determination prescribe the same conduct, the one only counsels,

while the other obliges. The one, having in view only the greatest

satisfaction of our nature, is personal even when counselling benefits

to others; the other regarding only the law of Order, something

distinct from self, is impersonal, even when prescribing our own good.

Hence there is in the latter case _dévouement_ of self to something

else, and it is exactly the _dévouement_ to a something that is not

self, but is regarded as good, that gets the name of virtue or moral

good. Moral good is voluntary and intelligent obedience to the law that

is the rule of our conduct. As an additional distinction between the

egoistic and the moral determination, he mentions the judgment of merit

or demerit that ensues upon actions when, and only when, they have a

moral character. No remorse follows an act of mere imprudence involving

no violation of universal order.

He denies that there is any real contradiction among the three

different determinations. Nothing is prescribed in the moral law that

is not also in accordance with some primitive tendency, and with

self-interest rightly understood; if it were not so, it would go hard

with virtue. On the other hand, if everything not done from regard to

duty were opposed to moral law and order, society could not only not

subsist, but would never have been formed. When a struggle does ensue

between passion and self-interest, passion is blind; when between

egoism and the moral determination, egoism is at fault. It is in the

true interest of Passion to be sacrificed to Egoism, and of Egoism to

be sacrificed to Order.

He closes the review of the various moral facts by explaining in what

sense the succession of the three states is to be understood. The state

of Passion is historically first, but the Egoistic and the Moral states

are not so sharply defined. As soon as reason dawns it introduces the

moral motive as well as the egoistic, and to this extent the two states

are contemporaneous. Only, so far is the moral law from being at this

stage fully conceived, that, in the majority of men, it is never

conceived in its full clearness at all. Their confused idea of moral

law is the so-called moral _conscience_, which works more like a sense

or an instinct, and is inferior to the clear rational conception in

everything except that it conveys the full force of obligation. In its

grades of guilt human justice rightly makes allowance for different

degrees of intelligence. The Egoistic determination and the Moral

state, such as it is, once developed, passion is not to be supposed

abolished, but henceforth what really takes place in all is a perpetual

alternation of the various states. Yet though no man is able

exclusively to follow the moral determination, and no man will

constantly be under the influence of any one of the motives, there is

one motive commonly uppermost whereby each can be characterized. Thus

men, according to their habitual conduct, are known as passionate,

egoistic, or virtuous.

We now summarize the opinions of Jouffroy:--

I.--The Standard is the Idea of Absolute Good or Universal Order in the

sense explained by the author. Like Cousin, he identifies the 'good'

with the 'true.' What, then, is the criterion that distinguishes moral

from other truths? If _obligation_ be selected as the _differentia_, it

is in effect to give up the attempt to determine what truths are

obligatory. The idea of 'good' is obviously too vague to be a

_differentia_. How far the idea of 'Universal Order' gets us out of the

difficulty may be doubted, especially after the candid admission of the

author, that it is an idea of which the majority of men have never any

very clear notions.

II.--The moral faculty is Reason; Conscience is hardly more than a

confused feeling of obligatoriness.

Sympathy is one of the primitive tendencies of our nature. Jouffroy's

opinion on the subject is open to the objections urged against Butler's

psychology.

He upholds the freedom of the Will, but embarrasses his argument by

admitting, like Reid, that there is a stage in our existence when we

are ruled by the passions, and are destitute of liberty.

III.--The Summum Bonum is the _end_ of every creature; the passions

ought to be subordinated to self-interest, and self-interest to

morality.

In regard to the other points, it is unnecessary to continue the

summary.

NOTES

[Footnote 1: Duties strictly so called, the department of obligatory

morality, enforced by punishment, may be exemplified in the following

classified summary:--

Under the Legal Sanction, are included; (A) Forbearance from

(specified) injuries; as (a) Intentional injury--crimes, (b) Injury not

intentional--wrongs, repaired by Damages or Compensation. (B) The

rendering of services; (a) Fulfilling contracts or agreements; (b)

Reciprocating anterior services rendered, though, not requested, as in

filial duty; (c) Cases of extreme or superior need, as parental duty,

relief of destitution.

Under the Popular Sanction are created duties on such points as the

following:--(1) The Etiquette of small societies or coteries. (2)

Religious orthodoxy; Sabbath observance. (3) Unchastity; violations of

the etiquette of the sexes, Immodesty, and whatever endangers chastity,

especially in women. (4) Duties of parents to children, and of children

to parents, beyond the requirements of the law. (5) Suicide: when only

attempted, the individual is punished, when carried out, the relatives.

(6) Drunkenness, and neglect of the means of self-support. (7) Gross

Inhumanity. In all these cases the sanction, or punishment, is social;

and is either mere disapprobation or dislike, not issuing in overt

acts, or exclusion from fellowship and the good offices consequent

thereon.]

[Footnote 2: Optional Morality, the Morality of Reward, is exemplified

as follows:--

(A) A liberal performance of duties properly so called. (_a_) The

support of aged parents; this, though to a certain extent a legal duty,

is still more a virtue, being stimulated by the approbation of one's

fellows. The performance of the family duties generally is the subject

of commendation. (_b_) The payment of debts that cannot be legally

recovered, as in the case of bankrupts after receiving their discharge.

These examples typify cases (1) where no definite law is laid down, or

where the law is content with a minimum; and (2) where the law is

restrained by its rules of evidence or procedure. Society, in such

cases, steps in and supplies a motive in the shape of reward.

(B) Pure Virtue, or Beneficence; all actions for the benefit of others

without stipulation, and without reward; relief of distress, promotion

of the good of individuals or of society at large. The highest honours

of society are called into exercise by the highest services.

Bentham's principle of the claims of superior need cannot be fully

carried out, (although he conceives it might, in some cases), by either

the legal or the popular sanction. Thus, the act of the good Samaritan,

the rescue of a ship's crew from drowning, could not be exacted; the

law cannot require heroism. It is of importance to remark, that

although Duty and Nobleness, Punishment and Reward, are in their

extremes unmistakably contrasted, yet there may be a margin of doubt or

ambiguity (like the passing of day into night). Thus, expressed

approbation, generally speaking, belongs to Reward; yet, if it has

become a thing of course, the withholding of it operates as a

Punishment or a Penalty.]

[Footnote 3: The conditions that regulate the authoritative enforcement

of actions, are exhaustively given in works on Jurisprudence, but they

do not all concern Ethical Theory. The expedience of imposing a rule

depends on the importance of the object compared with the cost of the

machinery. A certain line of conduct may be highly beneficial, but may

not be a fit case for coercion. For example, the law can enforce only a

_minimum_ of service: now, if the case be such, that a minimum is

useless, as in helping a ship in distress, or in supporting aged

parents, it is much, better to leave the case to voluntary impulses,

seconded by approbation or reward. Again, an offence punished by law

must be, in its nature, definable; which, makes a difficulty in such

cases as insult, and defamation, and many species of fraud. Farther,

the offence must be easy of detection, so that the vast majority of

offenders may not escape. This limits the action of the law in

unchastity.]

[Footnote 4: See, on the method of Sokrates, Appendix A.]

[Footnote 5: In setting forth, the Ethical End, the language of

Sokrates was not always consistent. He sometimes stated it, as if it

included an independent reference to the happiness of others; at other

times, he speaks as if the end was the agent's own happiness, to which,

the happiness of others was the greatest and most essential means. The

first view, although not always adhered to, prevails in Xenophon; the

second appears most in Plato.]

[Footnote 6: 'What Plato here calls the Knowledge of Good, or

Reason,--the just discrimination and comparative appreciation, of Ends

and Means--appears in the Politikus and the Euthydêmus, under the title

of the Regal or Political Art, as employing or directing the results of

all other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the Protagoras,

under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the Philêbus,

as measure and proportion: in the Phaedrus (in regard to rhetoric) as

the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of persuasion, all

the special processes, stratagems, decorations, &c., imparted by

professional masters. In the Republic, it is personified in the few

venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of the society, and whose

directions all the rest (Guardians and Producers) arc bound implicitly

to follow: the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit

obedience. In the Leges, it is defined as the complete subjection in

the mind, of pleasures and pains to right Reason, without which, no

special aptitudes are worth, having. In the Xenophontic Memorabilia, it

stands as a Sokratic authority under the title of Sophrosynê or

Temperance: and the Profitable is declared identical with, the Good, as

the directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and

proceedings.' (Grote's Plato, I., 362.)]

[Footnote 7: 'Indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias,

than the manner in which. Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured,

exorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all

the actualities of life--all the recreative and elegant arts, including

music and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic--all provision for the

most essential wants, all protection against particular sufferings and

dangers, even all service rendered to another person in the way of

relief or of rescue--all the effective maintenance of public organized

force, such as ships, docks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction,

or relief, and those who confer it, are treated with contempt, and

presented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure.

And it is in this point of view, that various Platonic commentators

extol in an especial manner the Gorgias: as recognizing an Idea of Good

superhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and

pains of any human being, and incommensurable with, them; an Universal

Idea, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon its

particulars, is separated from them by an incalculable space, and is

discernible only by the Platonic telescope.' (Grote, _Gorgias_)]

[Footnote 8: There is some analogy between the above doctrine and the

great law of Self-conservation, as expounded in this volume (p. 75).]

[Footnote 9: Aristotle and the Peripatetics held that there were _tria

genera bonorum_: (1) Those of the mind _(mens sana)_, (2) those of the

body, and (3) external advantages. The Stoics altered this theory by

saying that only the first of the three was _bonum_; the others were

merely _praeposita_ or _sumenda_. The opponents of the Stoics contended

that this was an alteration in words rather than in substance.]

[Footnote 10: This also might truly be said of the Epicureans; though

with them it is not so much _pride_, as a quiet self-satisfaction in

escaping pains and disappointments that they saw others enduring. See

the beginning of Lucretius' second book, and the last epistle of

Epicurus to Idomeneus.]

[Footnote 11: This was a later development of Stoicism: the earlier

theorists laid it down that there were no graduating marks below the

level of wisdom; all shortcomings were on a par. _Good_ was a point,

_Evil_ was a point; there were gradations in the _praeposita_ or

_sumenda_ (none of which were _good_), and in the _rejecta_ or

_rejicienda_ (none of which were _evil_), but there was no _more or

less good_. The idea of advance by steps towards virtue or wisdom, was

probably familiar to Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus; the

Stoic theories, on the other hand, tended to throw it out of sight,

though they insisted strenuously on the necessity of mental training

and meditation.]

[Footnote 12: This theory (taken in its most general sense, and apart

from differences in the estimation of particular pleasures and pains),

had been proclaimed long before the time of Epicurus. It is one of the

various theories of Plato: for in his dialogue called Protagoras

(though in other dialogues he reasons differently) we find it

explicitly set forth and elaborately vindicated by his principal

spokesman, Sokrates, against the Sophist Protagoras. It was also held

by Aristippus (companion of Sokrates along with Plato) and by his

followers after him, called the Cyrenaics. Lastly, it was maintained by

Eudoxus, one of the most estimable philosophers contemporary with

Aristotle. Epicurus was thus in no way the originator of the theory:

but he had his own way of conceiving it--his own body of doctrine

physical, cosmological, and theological, with which it was

implicated--and his own comparative valuation of pleasures and pains.]

[Footnote 13: The soul, according to Epicurus, was a subtle but

energetic compound (of air, vapour, heat, and another nameless

ingredient), with its best parts concentrated in the chest, yet

pervading and sustaining the whole body; still, however, depending for

its support on the body, and incapable of separate or disembodied

continuance.]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Coelo. II.a.12, p. 292, 22, 6, _5_. In the

Ethics, Aristotle assigns theorizing contemplation to the gods, as the

only process worthy of their exalted dignity and supreme felicity.]

[Footnote 15: Xenophon Memor. I. 1--10; IV. 3--12.]

[Footnote 16: These exhortations to active friendship were not

unfruitful. We know, even by the admission of witnesses adverse to the

Epicurean doctrines, that the harmony among the members of the sect,

with common veneration for the founder, was more marked and more

enduring than that exhibited by any of the other philosophical sects.

Epicurus himself was a man of amiable personal qualities: his

testament, still remaining, shows an affectionate regard, both for his

surviving friends, and for the permanent attachment of each, to the

others, as well as of all to the school. Diogenes Laertius tells

us--nearly 200 years after Christ, and 450 years after the death of

Epicurus--that the Epicurean sect still continued its numbers and

dignity, having outlasted its contemporaries and rivals. The harmony

among the Epicureans may be explained, not merely from the temper of

the master, but partly from the doctrines and plan of life that he

recommended. Ambition and love of power were discouraged: rivalry among

the members for success, either political or rhetorical, was at any

rate a rare exception: all were taught to confine themselves to that

privacy of life and love of philosophical communion, which alike

required and nourished the mutual sympathies of the brotherhood.]

[Footnote 17: Consistently with this view of happiness, Epicurus

advised, in regard to politics, quiet submission, to established

authority, without active meddling beyond what necessity required.]

[Footnote 18: Locke examines the Innate Principles put forth, by Lord

Herbert in his book _De Veritate_, 1st, There is a supreme governor of

the world; 2nd, Worship is due to him; 3rd, Virtue, joined with Piety,

is the best Worship; 4th, Men must repent of their sins; 5th, There

will be a future life of rewards and punishments. Locke admits these to

be such truths as a rational creature, after due explanation given

them, can hardly avoid attending to; but he will not allow them to be

innate. For, First, There are other propositions with, as good a claim

as these to be of the number imprinted by nature on the mind.

Secondly, The marks assigned are not found in all the propositions.

Many men, and even whole nations, disbelieve some of them.

Then, as to the third principle,--virtue, joined with piety, is the

best worship of God; he cannot see how it can be innate, seeing that it

contains a name, virtue, of the greatest possible uncertainty of

meaning. For, if virtue be taken, as commonly it is, to denote the

actions accounted laudable in particular countries, then the

proposition will be untrue. Or, if it is taken to mean accordance with

God's will, it will then be true, but unmeaning; that God will be

pleased with what he commands is an identical assertion, of no use to

any one.

So the fourth proposition,--men must repent of their sins,--is open to

the same remark. It is not possible that God should engrave on men's

minds principles couched on such uncertain words as Virtue and Sin.

Nay more, as a general word is nothing in itself, but only report as to

particular facts, the knowledge of rules is a knowledge of a sufficient

number of actions to determine the rule. [Innate principles are not

compatible with Nominalism.]

According to Lord Herbert, the standard of virtue is the _common

notions_ in which, all men agree. They are such, as the following,--to

avoid evil, to be temperate, in doubtful cases to choose the safer

course, not to do to others what you would not wish done to yourself,

to be grateful to benefactors, &c. _Conscience_ is what teaches us to

carry out those principles in practice. It excites joy over good

actions, and produces abhorrence and repentance for bad. Upon it, our

repentance of mind and eternal welfare depend. (For an account of Lord

Herbert's common notions, see Appendix B., Lord Herbert of Cherbury.)]

[Footnote 19: In this respect, Butler differs from both Shaftesbury and

Hutcheson. With Shaftesbury, the main function of the moral sense is to

smile approval on benevolent affections, by which an additional

pleasure is thrown into the scale against the selfish affections. The

superiority of the 'natural affections' thus depends on a double

pleasure, their intrinsically pleasureable character, and the

superadded pleasure of reflection. The tendency of Shaftesbury is here

to make benevolence and virtue identical, and at the same time to

impair the disinterested character of benevolence.]

[Footnote 20: With this view, we may compare the psychology of

Shaftesbury, set forth in his 'Characteristics of Men, Manners, and

Times.' The soul has two kinds of affections--(1) _Self-affection_,

leading to the 'good of the private,' such as love of life, revenge,

pleasure or aptitude towards nourishment and the means of generation,

emulation or love of praise, indolence; and (2) _Natural affections_,

leading to the good of the public. The natural or spontaneous

predominance of benevolence is _goodness_; the subjection of the

selfish by effort and training is _virtue_. Virtue consists generally

in the proper exercise of the several affections.]

[Footnote 21: Butler's definition of conscience, and his whole

treatment of it, have created a great puzzle of classification, as to

whether he is to be placed along with the upholders of a 'moral sense.'

Shaftesbury is more explicit:

'No sooner does the eye open upon figures, the ear to sounds, than

straight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and

acknowledged. No sooner are _actions_ viewed, no sooner the human

affections discerned (and they are, most of them, as soon discerned as

felt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes the _fair_ and

_shapely_, the _amiable_ and _admirable_, apart from the _deformed_,

the _foul_, the _odious_, or the _despicable_' 'In a creature capable

of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which

offer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the affections, but

the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, and

gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by

reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this _reflected

sense_, there arises another kind of affection towards these affections

themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the

subject of a new liking or dislike.' What this 'moral sense' approves

is benevolence, and when its approval has been acted upon, by

subjecting the selfish affections, 'virtue' is attained.]

[Footnote 22: It is instructive to compare Mandeville's _a priori_

guesses with, the results of Mr. Maine's historical investigation into

the condition of early societies. The evidence shows that society

originated in the family system. Mandeville conjectured that solitary

families would never attain to government; but Mr. Maine considers that

there was a complete despotic government in single families. 'They have

neither assemblies for consultation nor _themistes_, but every one

exercises jurisdiction over his wives and children, and they pay no

regard to one another.' The next stage is the rise of _gentes_ and

tribes, which took place probably when a family held together instead

of separating on the death of the patriarch. The features of this state

were chieftainship and _themistes_, that is, government not by laws,

but by _ex post facto_ decisions upon cases as they arose. This

gradually developed into customary law, which was in its turn

superseded, on the invention of writing, by written codes. Maine's

Ancient Law, Chap. V.]

[Footnote 23: It is perhaps worth while to quote a sentence or two,

giving the author's opinion on the theory of the Moral Sense. 'Against

every account of the principle of approbation, which makes it depend

upon a peculiar sentiment, distinct from every other, I would object,

that it is strange that this sentiment, which Providence undoubtedly

intended to be the governing principle of human nature, should,

hitherto have been so little taken notice of, as not to have got a name

in any language. The word Moral Sense is of very late formation, and

cannot yet be considered as making part of the English tongue. The word

approbation has but within these few years been appropriated to denote

peculiarly anything of this kind. In propriety of language we approve

of whatever is entirely to our satisfaction--of the form of a building,

of the contrivance of a machine, of the flavour of a dish of meat. The

word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which

we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of

some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having

acted agreeably or contrary to its directions. When love, hatred, joy,

sorrow, gratitude, resentment, with so many other passions which are

all supposed to be the subjects of this principle, have made themselves

considerable enough to get titles to know them by, is it not surprising

that the sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little

heeded; that, a few philosophers excepted, nobody has yet thought it

worth while to bestow a name upon it?']

[Footnote 24: ADAM FERGUSON (1724-1816), is not of sufficient

importance in purely Ethical theory to demand a full abstract. The

following remark on his views is made by Professor Veitch:--'Ferguson,

while holding-with Reid that the notion of Rightness is not resolvable

into utility, or to be derived from sympathy or a moral sense, goes a

step beyond both. Reid and Stewart in the inquiry which he raises

regarding the definite nature and ground of Rightness itself.' The

following is his definition of Moral Good:--'Moral good is the specific

excellence and felicity of human nature, and moral depravity its

specific defect and wretchedness.' The 'excellence' of human nature

consists in four things, drawn out after the analogy of the cardinal

virtues: (1) _Skill_ (Wisdom); (2) _Benevolence_, the principal

excellence of a creature destined to perform a part in social life

(Justice); (3) _Application of mind_ (Temperance); (4) _Force_, or

energy to overcome obstacles (Fortitude). Regarding the _motives_ to

virtue, either virtue is its own reward, or divine rewards and

punishments constitute a sanction; but, in any case, the motive is our

own happiness. All the virtues enumerated are themselves useful or

pleasant, but, over and above, they give rise to an additional

pleasure, when they are made the subject of reflection.]

[Footnote 25: 'The theory which, places the standard of morality in the

_Divine nature_ must not be confounded with that which, places it in

the arbitrary will of God. God did not create morality by his will; it

is inherent in his nature, and co-eternal with himself; nor can he be

conceived as capable of reversing it.' The distinction here drawn does

not avoid the fatal objection to the simpler theory, namely, that it

takes away the moral character of God. The acts of a sovereign cannot,

with, any propriety, as Austin has shown, be termed either legal or

illegal; in like manner, if God is a moral lawgiver, if 'he is

accountable to no one,' then 'his duty and his pleasure are

undistinguishable from each other,' and he cannot without

self-contradiction be called a moral being. Even upon Mr. Mansel's own

theory, it is hardly correct to say that 'God did not create morality

by his will.' Morality involves two elements--one, rules of conduct,

the other, an obligation to observe them. Now, the authority or

obligatoriness of moral laws has been made to depend upon the will of

God, so that, prior to that will, morality could not exist. Hence the

only part of morality that can be co-eternal with God, is simply the

rules of morality, without their obligatoriness, the salt without its

savour. The closing assertion that God cannot reverse morality, may

mean either that it would be inconsistent with his immutability to

reverse the laws he had himself established, or that he is compelled by

his nature to impose certain rules, and no others. The first

supposition is a truism; the second is not proved. For, since Mr.

Mansel has discarded as a fiction any 'absolute law of duty,' it is

hard to conjecture whence he could derive any compulsory choice of

rules. Why God commands some things in preference to others--whether

from a regard to the happiness of all his creatures, or of some only;

whether with, a view to his own glory, or from conformity with some

abstract notion--has been much disputed, and it is quite _conceivable_

that he may not adopt any of those objects.]

[Footnote 26: For help in understanding Kant's peculiar phraseology and

general point of view, the reader is referred to the short exposition

of his Speculative Philosophy in Appendix B.]