Mr Godwin's five propositions respecting political truth, on which his
whole work hinges, not established--Reasons we have for supposing, from
the distress occasioned by the principle of population, that the vices
and moral weakness of man can never be wholly
eradicated--Perfectibility, in the sense in which Mr Godwin uses the
term, not applicable to man--Nature of the real perfectibility of man
illustrated.
If the reasonings of the preceding chapter are just, the corollaries
respecting political truth, which Mr Godwin draws from the proposition,
that the voluntary actions of men originate in their opinions, will not
appear to be clearly established. These corollaries are, "Sound
reasoning and truth, when adequately communicated, must always be
victorious over error: Sound reasoning and truth are capable of being
so communicated: Truth is omnipotent: The vices and moral weakness of
man are not invincible: Man is perfectible, or in other words,
susceptible of perpetual improvement."
The first three propositions may be considered a complete syllogism. If
by adequately communicated, be meant such a conviction as to produce an
adequate effect upon the conduct, the major may be allowed and the
minor denied. The consequent, or the omnipotence of truth, of course
falls to the ground. If by 'adequately communicated' be meant merely
the conviction of the rational faculty, the major must be denied, the
minor will be only true in cases capable of demonstration, and the
consequent equally falls. The fourth proposition Mr Godwin calls the
preceding proposition, with a slight variation in the statement. If so,
it must accompany the preceding proposition in its fall. But it may be
worth while to inquire, with reference to the principal argument of
this essay, into the particular reasons which we have for supposing
that the vices and moral weakness of man can never be wholly overcome
in this world.
Man, according to Mr Godwin, is a creature formed what he is by the
successive impressions which he has received, from the first moment
that the germ from which he sprung was animated. Could he be placed in
a situation, where he was subject to no evil impressions whatever,
though it might be doubted whether in such a situation virtue could
exist, vice would certainly be banished. The great bent of Mr Godwin's
work on Political Justice, if I understand it rightly, is to shew that
the greater part of the vices and weaknesses of men proceed from the
injustice of their political and social institutions, and that if these
were removed and the understandings of men more enlightened, there
would be little or no temptation in the world to evil. As it has been
clearly proved, however, (at least as I think) that this is entirely a
false conception, and that, independent of any political or social
institutions whatever, the greater part of mankind, from the fixed and
unalterable laws of nature, must ever be subject to the evil
temptations arising from want, besides other passions, it follows from
Mr Godwin's definition of man that such impressions, and combinations
of impressions, cannot be afloat in the world without generating a
variety of bad men. According to Mr Godwin's own conception of the
formation of character, it is surely as improbable that under such
circumstances all men will be virtuous as that sixes will come up a
hundred times following upon the dice. The great variety of
combinations upon the dice in a repeated succession of throws appears
to me not inaptly to represent the great variety of character that must
necessarily exist in the world, supposing every individual to be formed
what he is by that combination of impressions which he has received
since his first existence. And this comparison will, in some measure,
shew the absurdity of supposing, that exceptions will ever become
general rules; that extraordinary and unusual combinations will be
frequent; or that the individual instances of great virtue which had
appeared in all ages of the world will ever prevail universally.
I am aware that Mr Godwin might say that the comparison is in one
respect inaccurate, that in the case of the dice, the preceding causes,
or rather the chances respecting the preceding causes, were always the
same, and that, therefore, I could have no good reason for supposing
that a greater number of sixes would come up in the next hundred times
of throwing than in the preceding same number of throws. But, that man
had in some sort a power of influencing those causes that formed
character, and that every good and virtuous man that was produced, by
the influence which he must necessarily have, rather increased the
probability that another such virtuous character would be generated,
whereas the coming up of sixes upon the dice once, would certainly not
increase the probability of their coming up a second time. I admit this
objection to the accuracy of the comparison, but it is only partially
valid. Repeated experience has assured us, that the influence of the
most virtuous character will rarely prevail against very strong
temptations to evil. It will undoubtedly affect some, but it will fail
with a much greater number. Had Mr Godwin succeeded in his attempt to
prove that these temptations to evil could by the exertions of man be
removed, I would give up the comparison; or at least allow, that a man
might be so far enlightened with regard to the mode of shaking his
elbow, that he would be able to throw sixes every time. But as long as
a great number of those impressions which form character, like the nice
motions of the arm, remain absolutely independent of the will of man,
though it would be the height of folly and presumption to attempt to
calculate the relative proportions of virtue and vice at the future
periods of the world, it may be safely asserted that the vices and
moral weakness of mankind, taken in the mass, are invincible.
The fifth proposition is the general deduction from the four former and
will consequently fall, as the foundations which support it have given
way. In the sense in which Mr Godwin understands the term
'perfectible', the perfectibility of man cannot be asserted, unless the
preceding propositions could have been clearly established. There is,
however, one sense, which the term will bear, in which it is, perhaps,
just. It may be said with truth that man is always susceptible of
improvement, or that there never has been, or will be, a period of his
history, in which he can be said to have reached his possible acme of
perfection. Yet it does not by any means follow from this, that our
efforts to improve man will always succeed, or even that he will ever
make, in the greatest number of ages, any extraordinary strides towards
perfection. The only inference that can be drawn is that the precise
limit of his improvement cannot possibly be known. And I cannot help
again reminding the reader of a distinction which, it appears to me,
ought particularly to be attended to in the present question: I mean,
the essential difference there is between an unlimited improvement and
an improvement the limit of which cannot be ascertained. The former is
an improvement not applicable to man under the present laws of his
nature. The latter, undoubtedly, is applicable.
The real perfectibility of man may be illustrated, as I have mentioned
before, by the perfectibility of a plant. The object of the
enterprising florist is, as I conceive, to unite size, symmetry, and
beauty of colour. It would surely be presumptuous in the most
successful improver to affirm, that he possessed a carnation in which
these qualities existed in the greatest possible state of perfection.
However beautiful his flower may be, other care, other soil, or other
suns, might produce one still more beautiful.
Yet, although he may be aware of the absurdity of supposing that he has
reached perfection, and though he may know by what means he attained
that degree of beauty in the flower which he at present possesses, yet
he cannot be sure that by pursuing similar means, rather increased in
strength, he will obtain a more beautiful blossom. By endeavouring to
improve one quality, he may impair the beauty of another. The richer
mould which he would employ to increase the size of his plant would
probably burst the calyx, and destroy at once its symmetry. In a
similar manner, the forcing manure used to bring about the French
Revolution, and to give a greater freedom and energy to the human mind,
has burst the calyx of humanity, the restraining bond of all society;
and, however large the separate petals have grown, however strongly, or
even beautifully, a few of them have been marked, the whole is at
present a loose, deformed, disjointed mass, without union, symmetry, or
harmony of colouring.
Were it of consequence to improve pinks and carnations, though we could
have no hope of raising them as large as cabbages, we might undoubtedly
expect, by successive efforts, to obtain more beautiful specimens than
we at present possess. No person can deny the importance of improving
the happiness of the human species. Every the least advance in this
respect is highly valuable. But an experiment with the human race is
not like an experiment upon inanimate objects. The bursting of a flower
may be a trifle. Another will soon succeed it. But the bursting of the
bonds of society is such a separation of parts as cannot take place
without giving the most acute pain to thousands: and a long time may
elapse, and much misery may be endured, before the wound grows up again.
As the five propositions which I have been examining may be considered
as the corner stones of Mr Godwin's fanciful structure, and, indeed, as
expressing the aim and bent of his whole work, however excellent much
of his detached reasoning may be, he must be considered as having
failed in the great object of his undertaking. Besides the difficulties
arising from the compound nature of man, which he has by no means
sufficiently smoothed, the principal argument against the
perfectibility of man and society remains whole and unimpaired from any
thing that he has advanced. And as far as I can trust my own judgement,
this argument appears to be conclusive, not only against the
perfectibility of man, in the enlarged sense in which Mr Godwin
understands the term, but against any very marked and striking change
for the better, in the form and structure of general society; by which
I mean any great and decided amelioration of the condition of the lower
classes of mankind, the most numerous, and, consequently, in a general
view of the subject, the most important part of the human race. Were I
to live a thousand years, and the laws of nature to remain the same, I
should little fear, or rather little hope, a contradiction from
experience in asserting that no possible sacrifices or exertions of the
rich, in a country which had been long inhabited, could for any time
place the lower classes of the community in a situation equal, with
regard to circumstances, to the situation of the common people about
thirty years ago in the northern States of America.
The lower classes of people in Europe may at some future period be much
better instructed than they are at present; they may be taught to
employ the little spare time they have in many better ways than at the
ale-house; they may live under better and more equal laws than they
have ever hitherto done, perhaps, in any country; and I even conceive
it possible, though not probable that they may have more leisure; but
it is not in the nature of things that they can be awarded such a
quantity of money or subsistence as will allow them all to marry early,
in the full confidence that they shall be able to provide with ease for
a numerous family.