AN UNFULFILLED ARMY ORDER
It is impossible to contemplate the position at Anzac on Wednesday,
28th April, when the fighting for a foothold on the peninsula had
finished and the Turks had been crushed back, without feeling that
the battlefields of France and Flanders had not taught the lessons
that were only too startlingly obvious--that success was only won by
adequate reserves being ready to hurl against the enemy _in extremis_.
Granted that two or three days--Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday--were
necessary for the reorganization of the Australian lines, bent but
not broken, and full of fighting vigour, and eager to fulfil the task
that was set them of breaking across the peninsula at this, almost
its narrowest neck, there seems to be no explanation why there was
such a miscalculation by experienced Generals of Turkish strength,
and lack of reserves, which left the Turks the same three days to
lick their wounds and bandage them, and return, greatly reinforced,
to the fray. It becomes more inexplicable still when it is found that
certain Army Corps orders were issued for a general advance, and that
a chance word alone was the means of that advance being altered to a
mere straightening of a portion of the strongly entrenched line. I do
not think it was because we feared the Turks: that would be to pay
him more credit than his actions warranted. It was, to put it quite
plainly, faulty Staff work. Events are too near to attempt to place the
blame; for assuredly there was some one blameable for the great wasted
opportunity to crush the Turkish army of Liman von Sanders.
Behind the apparent chaos of Anzac Cove and the fighting force on the
hills during the first three days there was, nevertheless, the great
purpose that mattered. Every one was doing his utmost to reduce the
lines of communication, the stores on the beach, and the army itself
to their proper and normal state. Those days from Tuesday onward may
be regarded as showing some of the finest Staff organizing work that
has been done in the campaign. By Friday the position was completely
reorganized. Units had been rested and linked up; trenches had been
straightened, strengthened, and defended against attack. Water,
ammunition, food, were trickling in regular streams up the gullies;
guns were in position, and fresh troops had been landed to relieve the
strain and hurry matters forward. Unfortunately, it seems, they were
not in sufficient numbers apparently to justify a general offensive
immediately. The 1st Light Horse Brigade, under Brigadier-General
Chauvel, and the Royal Marine Light Infantry, those young troops that
had seen their first service in the defence of Antwerp, were put into
the trenches to relieve the men who had won their first fight and fame
in a three days' battle. For seventy-two hours these heroes had been
without sleep; they were dropping in their tracks from fatigue. They
had had water and biscuits and bully beef, but until Wednesday nothing
warm to eat or drink. All day and night small parties of perhaps as
many as 50, perhaps only 10 men, were to be seen going from one section
of the line to another; men who had been collected a mile away from
their original unit, who had got separated in the wild rushes over
the hills, who had gone into the firing-line at the nearest point at
which they found themselves to it. It was essential that commanders
should have their own men before any move forward could be attempted on
a large scale. In digging alone, the men suffered terrible hardships
after their advances, strategical retreats, and the endless fatigues
for water, food, and munitions.
In order, therefore, that the battalions could be reformed and
rearrangements made in the commands of the companies, units were
withdrawn at various points from the firing-line, as they could be
spared, and placed in reserve gullies, where the men obtained good
sleep and rest, a hot meal, and, generally, a swim down on the beach.
Now, in this 1st Division reorganization work no officer took a
greater or finer part than Colonel C. B. B. White, the Chief of
General Staff to General Bridges, ably supported by Major Glasfurd.
He seemed indefatigable, never perturbed, always ready to remedy a
defect. Major Blamey, who was Intelligence Officer, carried out daring
reconnaissance work towards Maidos, leaving our lines under cover of
darkness and penetrating to a distant ridge and determining much of
the enemy's position on the right. Meanwhile, complete field telephone
communication had been established under most awful conditions,
directed by Major Mackworth, D.S.O., whose gravest difficulty was the
constant breaking of the lines, through men stumbling over them in
the saps and shrapnel fire, that led to the beach and the Army Corps
headquarters, not usually a matter for much worry, as being distant
many miles from the firing-line, in an ordinary battlefield.
On 28th and 29th April a comparative calm stole over Anzac. Gradually
the Turks had ceased their intense bombardments of the gullies. Their
waste of ammunition had been enormous, 600 shells falling often in the
course of a few hours in one small gully; yet the damage on the beach
was almost negligible. Their shelling of the cove was now regulated to
odd times, and never lasted for more than half an hour or an hour. The
Australians had orders not to waste their rifle fire in blazing away
into the darkness to no purpose, and scarcely fired a shot except at
periods throughout the night when fierce bursts foreshadowed an enemy
counter-attack. Anzac of the first days and Anzac of this second period
was a contrast as of a raging ocean to a placid sea.
By 30th April all initial difficulties had been overcome. It was on
that day occurred the incident, already briefly mentioned, that had
such far-reaching effects on the destinies of the Australians, and,
I venture to say, on the whole of the Gallipoli operations. I refer
to the formulation of an order for a general advance that was never
executed. Many officers will recall that the leaders of the armies
were, on the evening of the 30th April, summoned to conferences, the
1st Division under Major General Bridges, and the 2nd Division under
Major-General Godley. Now, Major-General Godley had already been
informed of the serious and vital nature of the centre of the line,
the apex of the position, which was blunted, for the Turks still held
trenches at the head of Monash Gully which commanded portions of it. He
had not visited General Monash's positions and had hinted that there
would be a forward movement when all units would be "out of it," and
meanwhile "Cling on" was the order the 4th Brigade received.
It is with this latter conference we are mostly concerned. General
Godley was very seriously talking with Generals Russell and Johnston
(New Zealand officers) when Brigadier-General Monash, commanding the
4th Infantry Brigade, arrived from the firing-line. Outside the dugouts
there were many Staff officers. The "pow-wow" was held to disclose the
plans for a general attack, ordered from Army Corps headquarters, to
take place on the following evening. It was to commence at 7 o'clock.
The plan disclosed that the 1st Australian Division (now roughly
holding the main ridge that ran in a south-easterly direction) was
to advance due east--that was, across Mule Gully on to Pine Ridge
and towards the villages of Kojadere and Bogali, lying beyond; while
the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Division was to advance due north
beyond Chunak Bair up the back of the great Sari Bair ridge, of which
we already held the spur, known as "Russell's Top." This position lay
just south of the point where the ridge occupied by the Australasian
Division at Pope's Hill and Quinn's Post joined the Sari Bair crest.
General Monash, on hearing General Birdwood's orders, immediately
pointed out that if such an advance were made the gap that already
existed in the line at the head of Monash Gully, between the left flank
of the 4th Brigade and the right of the New Zealand troops, would be
widened. Now a very unfortunate circumstance prevented this discussion
being continued to its conclusion, for a telephone message had come
from that section of the line held by General Monash's troops that
the R.M.L.I. (who had been holding the trenches) had been driven out
by the Turks, who were pouring in at the head of the gully. There was
no alternative under the circumstances but for the General to return
to his headquarters, situated in Shrapnel Valley, more than a mile
away, to supervise the regaining of the lost trenches. But before he
hurried away General Monash was told by General Godley that the gap
would be remembered when making out the divisional order that night. At
any rate, it was the business of General Monash to see that touch was
maintained with the New Zealanders in the coming fight. The divisional
orders duly arrived next morning, in which the 4th Brigade was ordered
to keep touch with the New Zealanders on the left. It was very apparent
to General Monash that if the advance was persisted in, the centre,
which he was responsible for, would be the weakest section of the whole
line, and would, as the advance continued, grow weaker and weaker as
the armies advanced to their separate objective, the gap widening all
the time. It would fall to the already much reduced 4th Brigade alone
to extend its flanks and to keep in touch. Two new battalions would be
needed to make good the gap.
Consequently, on Monday morning General Monash met Brigadier-General
Walker, who was commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade (Colonel M'Laurin
having been killed in the circumstances related), and very forcibly
pointed out, not on the map, but on the actual ground itself from an
overlooking point, what exactly would be the result of the execution
of the new plan. General Walker agreed. "It cannot be done," he said.
Soon afterwards General Bridges arrived, and, after a conference,
strode over to the telephone without comment--in his usual silent way.
It could be seen he was convinced, and in the next few minutes the
statements he made while waiting at the telephone left no doubt about
the matter. He called up General Birdwood, who was reported to be on
the battleship _Queen_, then lying off the position. General Bridges
turned and said: "I take it on myself; the Australian Division will not
attack. You [addressing General Monash] may tell General Godley so from
me."
General Godley, on being informed of this message by telephone a
little later by General Monash himself, announced his determination
of carrying out the attack. "Very well," he said, "the New Zealand
Division will carry out orders and attack." General Monash then asked
that a Staff officer should be sent up to reconnoitre the position.
This was done, and he, after visiting Quinn's Post and the position in
the vicinity, reported that the manoeuvre was highly impracticable,
with the troops detailed, with the result that General Godley too
cancelled his section of the orders.
Yet the Army Corps order remained uncancelled, as it remained
unfulfilled. One can only conclude that it was drawn up without a
proper reconnaissance of the country having been made. That there
should have been a general advance is recognized on all hands, and
there is no doubt in the minds of many Generals with whom I have spoken
that it would have been possible that day, had proper provision been
made in the original orders for the filling of the very vital gap in
the centre of our line. The whole lamentable incident must be put down
as indicative of bad Staff work--for thus it was that the whole future
of Anzac was changed by a chance meeting of three senior officers on
the main ridge and General Bridges' firm decision.
Two days later an attempt, that may only be termed half-successful,
was made to effectively seal the head of Monash Gully against Turkish
advance. The attack was begun with great gallantry, some of the Naval
Brigade penetrating through many Turkish lines, but the increasing
battle-front as the plateau of the ridge broadened out, and the
strength of the Turks (left unchallenged from the right of the line
opposite the Australian position) enabled them to concentrate their
attention on the centre. The troops were compelled bit by bit to
withdraw to the edge of the plateau, where they clung on and remained
clinging on for the rest of the period that Anzac was held.
On 2nd May, exactly a week after the landing, the Australians and New
Zealanders were charged with the task of capturing the head of Shrapnel
Gully and the plateau beyond that led up to the Baby 700, a rounded
feature, the first step in the ridge, of which Chunak Bair was the
second, and highest, point. The Australian line stretched across the
gully, with Pope's Hill held in the centre. On the right were Quinn's
and Courtney's Posts, with the Bloody Angle, one head of the gully
between, held by the enemy. On the left from Pope's Hill the line went
down into the main head of the gully, up the eastern slope of the hill
on to the summit, where the New Zealanders were holding on Russell Top.
Practically the whole of the 2nd New Zealand and Australian Brigade
were to take part in the operations, supported by Royal Marine Light
Infantry troops.
Lieut.-Colonel Pope was to advance up the head of Monash Gully and then
storm the heights on the right of the gully, while the Otago Battalion,
under Lieut.-Colonel McDonald, was to advance up the gully and take
the left slopes, which was the sector afterwards called the Turkish
Chessboard trenches. The 13th Battalion was to support the 16th, and
was, on reaching the high ground, to link up the two battalions by
turning to the left. This manoeuvre meant that a line was to be drawn
in front of Pope's Hill and that the 15th Battalion, which held that
post, was to make a sortie. The attack was timed for seven o'clock.
An intense bombardment opened the battle. Warships and the guns
available on shore commenced to prepare the position by blowing up the
Turks. The battalions were moving up the gullies and were waiting for
the ceasing of the firing to attack. At 7.15 the bombardment ceased as
suddenly as it began, and the men, cheering and singing snatches of
"Tipperary" and their new Australian song, "Australia will be there,"
commenced to charge. Against them came a torrent of lead from rifles
and machine guns, for the Turks had occupied the week in fortifying the
plateau, of which we only yet held just small pieces of the outer edge.
A reconnaissance had been made during the day and the leaders knew just
where their objectives lay. By 8 a.m. a ridge--a sort of false crest
immediately in front of Pope's Hill and to the left of Quinn's Post and
covering the south-easterly front of the general position--had been
captured at the point of the bayonet. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting
had occurred in places before the troops got a footing and routed the
Turks from the line of trenches. The enemy counter-attacked almost as
soon as we had gained their position, but they failed to dislodge the
Australians.
Meanwhile, on the left flank the Otago Battalion, who had had to make
a detour round the mountain ridge from their position, had arrived
late for the battle, having found the communication-ways blocked
with wounded. They did not reach their point of concentration till a
quarter to eight, and it was only an hour later that they charged the
position, which had been partially held for them by an extension of the
13th Battalion's line. This Australian battalion, led by Lieut.-Colonel
Burnage, had stormed the ridge on which the Turkish entrenchments
had been dug, just immediately in front of Pope's Hill, and the
Turks, though they counter-attacked, were unable here also to regain
possession of those trenches.
The Nelson Battalion of the Naval Brigade now sent up a company under
Major Primrose, and, with a company of the 14th Battalion, the position
of the 16th was rendered a little more secure. In the darkness touch
had not been kept on the left, their flank was in the air, and the
13th Battalion had not linked up as it should. The Turkish fire was
smashing down the resistance of the men on the left, and the position
was fast becoming untenable as the dawn broke. At 4 a.m. the Portsmouth
Battalion was ordered up to support the 16th and to strengthen its
left flank. Through some misunderstanding of orders valuable time was
lost by the leader of the Marine Battalion, who was unwilling to enter
the firing-line when orders had only been given him to form a support.
The Commanding Officer would take no responsibility for going into
the firing-line. While the position was still in doubt, the situation
became utterly untenable owing to shells that commenced to burst in the
16th Battalion trenches, which subsequently it was found came from the
destroyers, who mistook the target--so close were the trenches--and
before this ghastly error could be rectified, the battalion was forced
to retire on this left flank.
To make matters worse a stampede ensued in the rank and file of the
Portsmouth Battalion, who were congregated in the gully below. It
was only by the presence of mind and great personal effort of Major
Tilney, second in command of the 16th Battalion, and Major Festian,
Brigade-Major of the R.M.L.I., that the stampede was checked. Efforts
were made to direct gun fire on what at first were believed to be the
Turkish artillery. Horrible confusion prevailed. Daylight was breaking.
Some of the Portsmouth Battalion occupied a ridge on the left of the
gully, on to which the Turks were firing a deadly enfilade and almost
rear fire from their centre position. Until ten o'clock in the morning
the 13th and 16th clung to the trenches (some of their trenches were
blown away into the gully by gun fire), but, exposed to a withering
fire, had at length to withdraw. At one o'clock the gully and captured
trenches were abandoned.
The Otago Battalion meanwhile, on the extreme left, joining with the
13th Battalion, had faced a terrible fire, but reached almost to the
point of its objective in line with the remainder of the line there,
well in advance of Pope's Hill. There they stuck desperately, waiting
for reinforcements, which were to come under cover of darkness from the
Canterbury Battalion. This succour was found impracticable, as it had
been found on the right that an advance was not possible. Shells began
to destroy the trenches dug overnight, with the result that the left
flank of the New Zealanders was driven back. There remained but the
13th Battalion and a party from the Otago Battalion clinging on to the
sharp ridge in front of Pope's Hill. They were digging hard throughout
the day, while the Turks, too, were digging so close to them that it
was almost impossible to say which trenches belonged to which. But the
Turks, also, were working round behind the position, and at dusk there
was nothing for it but that the gallant 13th should retire from their
position, now being enfiladed from both flanks. The Otago Battalion,
which was more or less isolated, clung on desperately to the position
it had won until two days later, when it had to cut its way out.
The one object accomplished by the attack was the checking of any enemy
offensive against the posts which were undoubtedly the weakest portion
of the whole line. But the main objective, to straighten out the line,
or rather to bring the line to a culminating point at the head of the
gully, and gain a footing on the plateau where the main ridge linked up
with the ridge running away to the south-east, was not accomplished. It
was the greatest of the many attacks about this time planned for this
purpose. All along this section of the ridge fierce fighting went on
during the next weeks, sorties being made from various posts to prevent
the Turk pushing our line from the edge of the ridge which they had so
desperately won, until in the great May attack the Australians gained
the upper hand and the mastery of the Turkish fire. Always a dangerous
and nervy part of the line, it was only declared "safe" after the
Turkish offensive on 19th May.